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Since the early twentieth century, Nordic societies have attracted the 
 attention of international observers. From this attention grew the concept 
of a ‘Nordic model’, still today a dominant idea among academics as well 
as policymakers, experts, social movements and the like. For most people, 
‘the Nordic Model’ represents a progressive pathway successfully combin-
ing factors such as economic growth, democracy, social and gender equal-
ity, social welfare, a highly skilled labor force, and high quality of living. 
However, for others, more critically minded, the Nordic model represents 
paternalistic, self-righteous, homogenous – quasi-socialist – welfare states 
which tax their citizens far too much and represent xenophobic treatment 
of asylum seekers and non-Western ethnic groups. In other words, we do 
not only find positive views of ‘Nordic solutions’; there are also very strong 
negative images as well.
This does not only reflect the diverging ideological frames or political 
positions of the observers; it also reflects the movement toward multiple un-
derstandings of the Nordic model. Although mainly associated with devel-
opments in the sphere of socioeconomics, labor, and welfare (Christiansen 
et al., 2006; Dølvik et al., 2015), the Nordic model has expanded into labeling 
a diversity of experiences and perspectives in spheres like gender equality, 
education, daycare, prisons, design, food, and culture. The idea of Nordic 
models has thus traveled into new fields of expertise, culture, institutional 
spheres, or lifestyles, but there is a lack of knowledge on how this has hap-
pened and how the models in the different fields are related.
Drawing on theories of translation, cross-national policy transfer, diffu-
sion theory, and transnational history, this volume emphasizes how ideas 
related to the Nordics as models and policies associated with them have 
circulated internationally. By circulation we mean ‘a double movement of 
going back and forth and coming back, which can be repeated indefinitely’ 
(Markovits et al., 2006: 2–3, see also Marklund and Petersen, 2013). This 
way, our circulation approach differs from the more one-directional transla-
tion perspective which focuses on the travel of ideas from source to receiver 
but shares the assumption that ideas and models get transformed during 
their journey.
1 The making and circulation of 
Nordic models
An introduction
Haldor Byrkjeflot, Mads Mordhorst and 
Klaus Petersen
DOI: 10.4324/9781003156925-1
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Historians have pointed out that knowledge related to Nordic exception-
alism, in its many manifestations, is a cultural construction (Sørensen and 
Stråth, 1997). This perspective does not reject the importance of institu-
tional similarities or other kinds of common Nordic traits (or the opposite), 
but it emphasizes that our understandings and conceptualizations of such 
similarities and differences have been culturally constructed – and these 
constructions have real-life repercussions. The way we label ‘the Nordic 
Model’ matters. In this volume, we go beyond the Nordic realm and demon-
strate how international circulation has informed the analysis of the Nordic 
trajectory as well as how the Nordic societies were socially constructed as 
models. Meanings, content, and values associated with Nordic models both 
historically and in the present may be related to their history of circulation 
(see also Petersen, 2011; Kettunen et al., 2016).
Rather than seeing a Nordic model as a something defined once and for 
all, we argue that it may be seen as what in conceptual history is called a 
‘collective singular’ (Koselleck, 2011: 13), a concept that is mentioned in sin-
gular, but in praxis is used in different ways in space and over time. How this 
exactly happens is an empirical question addressed in this volume. These 
ways of using ‘the Nordic Model’ allow for exploration of the many his-
torical layers that underpins it, which again opens for understanding the 
possible coexistence of different meanings activated at the same time. On 
the one hand, there are meanings on a synthetic level, claims about common 
traits in the five countries across more than one issue area (Chapter 3). On 
the other hand, there are also a set of meanings associated with specific issue 
areas or spheres, such as the Nordic model of healthcare policy (Chapter 11), 
prostitution regulation (Chapter 9), or New Nordic cuisine (Chapter 12). The 
aim of this book is to pay attention to the historical multitude of circulating 
ideas referred to as ‘Nordic’ at the general level, associated with the specific 
Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden) and linked 
to various fields.
The historical layers and dualities of the Swedish and Nordic mod-
els are discussed in more detail in the chapters by Kettunen and Petersen 
 (Chapter 2) and Mjøset (Chapter 3). Kettunen and Petersen refer to the way 
there is both a nostalgia and a future-oriented aspect associated with the 
use of the model. First, there is the idea of a people’s home that may provide 
a shelter from international competition, whereas the more future-oriented 
aspect of the model suggests that we all have to adapt to global markets in 
order to stay competitive (see also Chapter 4). Mjøset refers to three versions 
of the Swedish model: the radical, the cautious, and the liberal/conservative 
model. The first two models circulated in the mid-1970s in Sweden, while 
the liberal/conservative model has become more important over time. Cur-
rently the neoliberal Nordic model may again be challenged as the COVID 
pandemic has favored ideas of a strong public sector and state intervention, 
which may result in a return to previous perceptions of the Nordic models 
or to something new. The most important insight here, however, is that such 
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ambivalent images of the Nordic model contribute to its circulation as it 
may be – or at least sound – attractive to a diverse set of audiences and car-
riers of ideas at the same time.
Approaches to the Nordic model
As demonstrated by comparative research (Esping-Andersen, 1990) and 
aggregated analyzes of indexes (Kirkebø et al., 2021), the Nordic countries 
often cluster, differing from other nation states and ‘families of nations’ 
(Castles, 1993) on multiple dimensions. Arguably, the most established 
feature is the Nordic welfare model with comprehensive and generous wel-
fare states (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Christiansen et al., 2006). However, 
scholars have also highlighted other aspects related to particular institu-
tionalized spheres of these societies such as gender equality (Hernes, 1987; 
Lundqvist, 2017), labor market relations (Hvid and Falkum, 2018), old age 
pensions (Petersen and Åmark, 2006), the role of experts and knowledge 
(Lundqvist and Petersen, 2010; Christensen et al., 2017; Österling et  al., 
2020), politics (Nedergaard and Wivel, 2017), industrial management 
(Byrkjeflot et al., 2001), and education (Blossing et al., 2014). This list can 
be expanded to include other perspectives such as Lutheranism (Mark-
kola, 2015; Nelson, 2017), the role of Social Democracy (Brandal et al., 
2013), Nordic democracy and political culture (Knutsen, 2017), Nordic 
 cooperation (Strang, 2016; Mordhorst and Jensen, 2019), Nordic capitalism 
(Byrkjeflot et al., 2001; Fellman et al., 2008; Mjøset, 2011), and Nordic civil 
society (Stenius, 2010).
More recently, literature on the Nordic model has expanded beyond the 
academic (and political) market (discussed in Chapters 5–11) and ventured 
into the general popular life-style literature. In some ways, popular books 
on the Nordic model are not anything new, and the Nordic countries have 
for almost a century used the Nordic model brand as a selling point for 
products (see Chapters 12 and 13) and tourism (see Chapter 4). However, 
the post-2000s Nordic hype has engaged new topics such as popular culture, 
food, and comfort. Concepts like happiness, Nordic cuisine, and ‘hygge’ 
(Wiking, 2016) are associated with a Nordic way of living. Likewise, cultural 
innovations of New Nordic cuisine, Nordic design, Nordic Noir, and Nordic 
music have similarly become brands that are sold as products.
In this way, studies on the Nordic model – or rather the Nordic models (in 
plural) – have demonstrated its multiple societal and cultural dimensions. 
We want to add to and challenge the existent literature in four ways:
First, we add a historical and sociological dimension highlighting the dy-
namic character of the Nordic model. The term Nordic ‘model’ was popu-
larized in the 1980s (see Chapter 4) although as many of the chapters in this 
book show Nordic societies and policies were already ‘modelized’ through-
out the twentieth century. Over time, the content, the images, and the valori-
zation of the Nordic model have changed significantly. We need to approach 
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the Nordic model as something historically dynamic where meanings and 
connotations change over time.
Second, we add a transnational dimension. The Nordic model was not the 
result of splendid Nordic isolation, but of national Nordic processes con-
stantly interacting with the outside world. Following the Finnish historian 
Pauli Kettunen (2011), comparison is not only an analytical strategy used 
by researchers but also a part and parcel of policymaking. National policy 
processes are based on cross-country learning and diffusion (cf. Rose, 1991), 
and political debates are loaded with comparisons. As pointed out by von 
Beyme (1994), the use of models is often serving domestic political purposes 
rather than aiming for a true representation of the model’s origin in a sci-
entific empirical sense. In this way, the image of Nordic societies in US or 
Chinese debates should not be expected to offer a ‘correct’ representation 
of Nordic social reality (see Chapters 5–8). However, when such images of 
a model – positive or negative, true or false – become part of the circulation 
of the ‘model,’ they might even have significant feedback and impact in its 
geographical origin. (This is demonstrated in several chapters, but see espe-
cially Chapters 5, 7, 9, 10, and 13 for this.)
Third, we add a political dimension by asking to what extent the dis-
course around the Nordic model has been part of domestic power struggles 
within the Nordic region. Chapters 5 and 6 show how the Swedish prime 
minister, Olof Palme, first rejected the suggested reference to Sweden as a 
model by journalists and politicians, but that he later appropriated the idea 
of a Swedish/Nordic model as a response to the challenge from the right of 
the political spectrum during the election campaign in 1976. Furthermore, 
as pointed out in Chapter 3, the Nordic social democrats adopted the Nor-
dic model concept in the early 1980s as part of discussions in SAMAK, the 
discussion forum for Nordic social democratic parties and unions (see also 
Lundberg, 2006). Finally, the idea of a ‘Nordic model’ was again politicized 
as the Swedish moderate-liberal coalition government took an interest in 
the model concept as a way to assume issue ownership in the 2010s (see 
Chapters 4 and 5).
Fourth, we add a cultural and commercial dimension by asking how the 
Nordic model has transcended the borders of the political and academic 
spheres and ventured into the spheres of culture, lifestyle, and advertising. 
This way, the Nordic label also becomes an element in branding, as a means 
to promote and sell products. When the ‘Nordic model’ is applied to new 
spheres, new actors and networks are involved. Since the 1930s, the Swedish 
model has been especially promoted and defended internationally by dip-
lomatic actors, public intellectuals, and other interested parties, but it was 
not until after 2000 that aspects of both the Swedish and the Nordic models 
and the creative industries were promoted as brands (Chapter 4; Kharkina, 
2013). The international marketing of furniture and Scandinavian design 
was an early example of such a development (Chapter 13; Werner, 2008; 
Hansen, 2018), whereas in the more recent case of New Nordic Cuisine, we 
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see the mobilization of a new movement that includes entrepreneurial chefs, 
bureaucrats, and politicians in the respective Nordic countries (Chapter 12; 
Byrkjeflot et al., 2013).
Theoretical perspectives
How can we understand such processes where ideas flow and are trans-
formed as they move into new settings and models are constructed and 
deconstructed over time? Here different disciplines have offered different 
concepts, approaches, and theories. Historical studies have witnessed an 
emerging ‘transnational turn’ over the last decade, with scholars challeng-
ing the prerogative of the national state as the ‘container’ of historical devel-
opment (Conrad, 2011). This line of criticism has come under various labels 
such as ‘transnational history,’ ‘entangled history,’ or ‘Histoire Croisée’ 
(Werner and Zimmermann, 2006). Such studies have changed the analytical 
gaze from national contexts and institutions toward the process of move-
ment from one context to another. Focus in this strand of research has been 
on things such as transnational interactions, persons and ideas traveling 
across national borders, translation and national domestication of imported 
phenomena, as well as the role of international organizations and epistemic 
communities.
Within the social sciences, one may refer to at least two kinds of inspira-
tions for circulation studies: translation studies (Czarniawska and Joerges, 
1996; Røvik, 2016; Rottenburg et al., 2011) and policy transfer studies (Rose, 
1991; Dobbin et al., 2007; Baker and Walker, 2019). In both these fields of 
study, there has been a movement from more linear transfer models to a 
circulation approach (Stone et al., 2020). Departing from translation theory, 
Westney and Piekarri (2019) argue that it is not sufficient to focus on a few 
actors to explain the massive circulation of Japanese management concepts 
and practices to the West in the 1980s. Instead, they find their explanation 
in the ‘development of an expanding translation ecosystem in which trans-
lators, translations, translation processes, and audiences interact and over 
time develop a “reverse flow” of models and practices.’ Similarly, Djelic 
(2014) argues that transnational communities may, indeed, take a central 
role, some of them, like the neoliberal Atlas-network, are even ‘born to dif-
fuse.’ In the case of ‘the Nordic model,’ it may not be possible to identify 
a single core network of translators; however, the chapters in this volume 
show there are international organizations and expert communities that 
continuously take part in the spread of models in various fields of knowl-
edge and politics.
Both in translation and policy transfer studies, the normal way of pro-
ceeding is to focus on the diffusion (of something) from a source context to a 
sphere of reception. However, as observed in several chapters in this volume, 
it cannot be taken as a given as to what is ‘origin’ and what is ‘audience’ or 
‘receivers.’ It is an empirical question and our circulation perspective allows 
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us also to study the changing roles of actors. For example, Chapters 7, 12, 
and 13 (on development aid, Nordic Cuisine, and Nordic Design) show how 
diverse audiences outside of the Nordic region also take active part in model 
construction within the Nordic realm.
An important assumption in translation theory is that it matters how 
easily models travel and are adapted to new contexts and whether they are 
‘branded’ with reference to their country/region of origin or not (Jaffe and 
Nebenzahl, 2006). The perceptions about what is a credible source may 
change over time and according to context. Røvik (2002: 122) suggests ‘that 
an organizational recipe’s capacity to flow depends on whether it is clearly 
associated with organizations or individuals that are widely recognized as 
authoritative actors and models.’ Both Teigen (Chapter 10) and Langford/
Skilbrei (Chapter 9) argue that the success of the Nordic models they have 
studied relate to the reputation the Nordics have for being leaders in the field 
of gender equality. In the current period the Nordics seem to be attractive 
sources for ideas, more so now than in the early 1990s, for instance, when the 
Swedish economy was in crisis.
A brief outline of the book
Our book includes case studies of how various notions of a Nordic model 
have circulated in international organizational, intellectual, and political 
circles and public spheres. The focus is on the Western world covering coun-
tries such as the United States, Spain, France, and the United Kingdom – 
and of course the Nordic countries themselves. Combining historical, com-
parative, and transnational perspectives allows for a critical empirical ex-
amination of models, ideas, and images related to Nordic experiences or 
constructions of ‘the Nordic’ in transnational institutional spheres and so-
cieties outside the Nordic realm. The chapters analyze quite different types 
of Nordic models and policy circulations covering fields such as welfare, 
democracy, gender equality and gender quota, prostitution legislation, 
food, and furniture design. Part 1 deals with large-scale models such as ‘the 
Swedish model,’ social democratic model, welfare models, and models of 
scientific synthesis. This is still the predominant way of talking about the 
Nordic region when associated with the term model in the singular. Part 2 
addresses more specific models like the development aid model, prostitution 
regulation model, board quotas, New Nordic cuisine, democratic design, 
and ‘Nordic New Public Management.’ In the chapters there are examples 
of how models have emerged and circulated in international professional 
networks and organizations such as among lawyers and public servants 
(e.g., Chapter 8 on the ombudsman), chefs (Chapter 12 on Nordic cuisine), 
or international organizations (Chapter 7 on development aid). Some chap-
ters focus on specific processes of translation and transnational interaction, 
whereas others provide a discussion of possible effects and repercussions 
in the Nordic countries as well as elsewhere in the Western world (and in 
Chapter 7 also in Africa).
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The rich empirical findings in the individual chapters highlight the dy-
namic historical nature of ‘the Nordic model.’ They show that there has 
clearly been change over time in the kind of images and ideas associated 
with the Nordic region. This includes a diversification in what is counted 
as a ‘Nordic model,’ appropriating aspects such as regulation of prostitu-
tion, crime literature, and food. The chapters also demonstrate that these 
Nordic models do not have one clear origin but were sometimes developed 
as deliberate efforts to promote Nordic interests and at other times devel-
oped by outside observers or by academics trying to define the Model. A 
cacophony of actors was involved in the formulations and circulations of 
‘the Nordic model’ – policymakers, experts, organizations, parties, states, 
and many more. It took place in multiple arenas and in different spheres – 
from media debates to more closed circles and on international, national, or 
subnational levels – sometimes interacting, and at other times not. In other 
words, ‘the Nordic model’ has many faces and has traveled sometimes in 
mysterious ways. This brings us back to the underlying question, what is the 
Nordic model? Our answer is fairly simple: It is an empirical question that 
we need to answer through historical-empirical investigations. That is what 
the chapters in this book will do.
The editors would like to thank ReNEW and UiO:Nordic for funding re-
search related to this book and for funding open access. The editors would 
also like to thank participants at workshops in Oslo 2017 and Paris 2019.
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School for All´ Encounters Neo-Liberal Policy (Dordrecht: Springer).
Blumer, H. (1954), ‘What Is Wrong with Social Theory?’, American Sociological 
 Review, 19(1), 3–10.
Brandal, N., Ø. Bratberg and D. Thorsen (2013), The Nordic Model of Social Democ-
racy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
Browning, C. S. (2007), ‘Branding Nordicity: Models, Identity and the Decline of 
Exceptionalism’, Cooperation and Conflict, 42(1), 27–51.
Byrkjeflot, H. (2001), ‘The Nordic Model of Democracy and Management’, in H. 
Byrkjeflot, S. Myklebust, C. Myrvang and F. Sejersted (eds.), The Democratic 
Challenge to Capitalism: Management and Democracy in the Nordic Countries 
(Bergen: Fagbokforlaget), 19–50.
Byrkjeflot, H., J. S. Pedersen and S. Svejenova (2013), ‘From Label to Practice: The 
Process of Creating New Nordic Cuisine’, Journal of Culinary Science & Technol-
ogy, 11(1), 36–55.
Castles, F. G. (ed.) (1993), Families of Nations: Patterns of Public Policy in Western 
Democracies (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company).
8 Haldor Byrkjeflot et al.
Childs, M. (1936), Sweden; The Middle Way (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press).
Christiansen, N. F., K. Petersen, N. Edling and P. Have (eds.) (2006), The Nordic 
Model of Welfare: A Historical Re-appraisal (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum).
Conrad, C. (2011), ‘Social Policy History after the Transnational Turn’, in P. Ket-
tunen and K. Petersen (eds.), Beyond Welfare State Models: Transnational His-
torical Perspectives on Social Policy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing), 
218–240.
Czarniawska, B. and B. Joerges (1996), ‘Travels of Ideas’, in B. Czarniawska, B. 
Joerges and G. Sevon (eds.), Translating Organizational Change (Berlin: Walter 
de Gruyter), 13–48.
Djelic, M. L. (2008), ‘Sociological Studies of Diffusion: Is History Relevant?’, Socio- 
Economic Review, 6(3), 538–557.
Djelic, M. L. (2014), ‘Born to Diffuse: Towards a New Generation of Diffusion 
Studies?’, Score Lecture in Organization 25.9.2014, available at https://www.you-
tube.com/watch?v=4OH_xNE0mmA [accessed March 9, 2021]
Dobbin, F., B. Simmons and G. Garrett (2007), ‘The Global Diffusion of Public Pol-
icies: Social Construction, Coercion, Competition, or Learning?’, Annual Review 
of Sociology, 33, 449–472.
Dølvik, J. E., G. J. Andersen and J. Vartiainen (2015), ‘The Nordic Social Models: 
Consolidation and Flexible Adaptation’, in J. E. Dølvik and A. Martin (eds.), 
 European Social Models from Crisis to Crisis: Employment and Inequality in the 
Era of Monetary Integration (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 246–287.
Esping-Andersen, G. (1990), Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press).
Fellman, S., et al. (2008), Creating Nordic Capitalism (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan).
Hansen, P. H. (2018), Danish Modern Furniture 1930–2016: The Rise, Decline and 
Re-emergence of a Cultural Market Category (Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag).
Hernes, H. M. (1987), Welfare State and Women Power: Essays in State Feminism 
(Oslo: Norwegian University Press).
Howe, F. C. (1921), Denmark: A Cooperative Commonwealth (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace and Company).
Hvid, H. and E. Falkum (eds.) (2018), Work and Wellbeing in the Nordic Countries: 
Critical Perspectives on the World’s Best Working Lives (New York: Routledge).
Jaffe, E. and N. Nebenzahl (2006), National Image & Competitive Advantage: The 
Theory and Practice of Place Branding, 2nd edition (Copenhagen: Copenhagen 
Business School).
Kettunen, P. (2011), ‘The Transnational Construction of National Challenges: The 
Ambiguous Nordic Model of Welfare and Competitiveness’, in P. Kettunen and 
K. Peterson (eds.), Beyond Welfare State Models: Transnational Historical Per-
spectives on Social Policy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing), 16–40.
Kettunen, P. (2012), ‘Reinterpreting the Historicity of the Nordic Model’, Nordic 
Journal of Working Life Studies, 2(4), 21–43.
Kettunen, P., U. Lundberg, M. Österberg and K. Petersen (2016), ‘The Nordic Model 
and the Rise and Fall of ’Nordic Cooperation’, in J. Strang (ed.), Nordic Coopera-
tion: A European Region in Transition (Abingdon: Routledge), 69–92.
Kharkina, A. (2013), From Kinship to Global Brand: The Discourse on Culture in 
Nordic Cooperation after World War II (Doctoral dissertation, Stockholm: Acta 
Universitatis Stockholmiensis).
Making and circulation of Nordic models 9
Kirkebø, T. L., M. Langford and H. Byrkjeflot (2021), ‘Creating Gender Exception-
alism: The Role of Global Indexes’, in E. Larsen et al. (eds.), Gender Equality and 
Nation Branding in the Nordic Region (London: Routledge), 191–206.
Knutsen, O. (eds.) (2017), The Nordic Models in Political Science: Challenged, But 
Still Viable? (Bergen: Fakbokforlaget).
Koselleck, R. (2011), ‘Introduction and Prefaces to the Geschichtliche Grundbe-
griffe. Translated by Michaela Richter’, Contributions to the History of Concepts, 
6(1), 1–37.
Kuhnle, E. S. (2011), ‘International Modelling in the Making of the Nordic Social 
Security Systems’, in P. Kettunen and K. Petersen (eds.), Beyond Welfare State 
Models: Transnational Perspectives on Social Policy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing), 65–81.
Lundberg, U. (2006), ‘A Leap in the Dark: From a Large Actor to a Large Area 
Approach’, in N. F. Christiansen, K. Petersen, N. Edling and P. Have (eds.), The 
Nordic Model of Welfare: A Historical Re-appraisal (Copenhagen: Museum Tus-
culanum), 269–298.
Lundqvist, Å. (2017), Transforming Gender and Family Relations: How Active La-
bour Market Policies Shaped the Dual Earner Model (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing).
Lundqvist, Å. and K. Petersen (eds.) (2010), In Experts We Trust: Knowledge, Politics 
and Bureaucracy in Nordic Welfare States (Odense: University Press of Southern 
Denmark).
Markkola, P. (2015), ‘The Long History of Lutheranism in Scandinavia: From State 
Religion to the People’s Church’, Perichoresis, 13(2), 3–15.
Marklund, C. and K. Petersen (2013), ‘Return to Sender: American Images of the 
Nordic Welfare State and Nordic Welfare Branding’, European Journal of Scandi-
navian Studies, 43(2), 245–257.
Markovits, C., J. Pouchepadass and S. Subrahmanyam (eds.) (2006), Society and 
Circulation: Mobile People and Itinerant Cultures in South Asia, 1750–1950 (Lon-
don: Anthem).
Midttun, A. and N. Witoszek (eds.) (2018), Sustainable Modernity: The Nordic Model 
and Beyond (New York: Routledge).
Mjøset, L. (2011), The Nordic Varieties of Capitalism (Bingley: Emerald Group Pub-
lishing Limited).
Mordhorst, M. and K. Jensen (2019), ‘Co-Operatives between Stable Ideals and a 
Fast Changing Context’, in T. D. S. Lopes, C. Lubinski and H. J. S. Tworek (eds.), 
The Routledge Companion to the Makers of Global Business (Abingdon: Rout-
ledge), 217–233.
Nedergaard, P. and A. Wivel (eds.) (2017), The Routledge Handbook of Scandinavian 
Politics (Abingdon: Routledge).
Nelson, R. H. (2017), Lutheranism and the Nordic Spirit of Social Democracy: A Dif-
ferent Protestant Ethic (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press).
Nygård, S. and J. Strang (2016), ‘Facing Asymmetry: Nordic Intellectuals and 
Center–Periphery Dynamics in European Cultural Space’, Journal of the History 
of Ideas, 77(1), 75–97.
Petersen, K. (2011), ‘National, Nordic and Trans-Nordic: Transnational Perspec-
tives on the History of the Nordic Welfare State’, in P. Kettunen and K. Peter-
son (eds.), Beyond Welfare State Models: Transnational Historical Perspectives on 
 Social Policy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing), 41–64.
10 Haldor Byrkjeflot et al.
Petersen, K. and K. Åmark (2006), ‘Old Age and Supplementary Pensions in the 
Nordic Countries, 1880–2000’, in N. F. Christiansen, K. Petersen, N. Edling and 
P. Have (eds.), The Nordic Welfare State: A Historical Re-appraisal (Copenhagen: 
Museum Tusculanum Press), 145–188.
Rogers, E. (1962), Diffusion of Innovations (New York: Free Press of Glencoe).
Rose, R. (1991), ‘What Is Lesson-Drawing?’, Journal of Public Policy, 11(1), 3–30.
Rottenburg, R., A. Behrends and S. Park (eds.) (2014), Travelling Models in African 
Conflict Management: Translating Technologies of Social Ordering (Leiden and 
Boston, MA: Brill).
Røvik, K. A. (2002), ‘The Secrets of the Winners: Management Ideas that Flow’, 
in K. Sahlin-Andersson and L. Engwall (eds.), The Expansion of Management 
Knowledge: Carriers, Flows and Sources (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press), 113–144.
Røvik, K. A. (2016), ‘Knowledge Transfer as Translation: Review and Elements 
of an Instrumental Theory’, International Journal of Management Reviews, 18, 
290–310.
Servan-Schreiber, J. J. (1967), The American Challenge (Paris: Denoël).
Sørensen, Ø. and B. Stråth (1997), The Cultural Construction of Norden (Oslo: Scan-
dinavian University Press).
Stenius, H. (2010), Nordic Associational Life in a European and an Inter-Nordic Per-
spective (Glashütte: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG), 29–86.
Stone, D., O. Porto de Oliveira and L. A. Pal (2020), ‘Transnational Policy Transfer: 
The Circulation of Ideas, Power and Development Models’, Policy and Society, 
39, 1–18.
Strang, J. (ed.) (2016), Nordic Cooperation: A European Region in Transition ( London: 
Routledge).
von Beyme, K.(1994), ‘The Significance of the Nordic Model’, in S. Karlsson (ed.), 
The Source of Liberty, The Nordic Contribution to Europe (Copenhagen: The Nor-
dic Council), 188–210.
Werner, J. (2008), Medelvägens estetik. Sverigebilder i USA I-ll (Hedemora and 
Möklinta: Gidlunds förlag).
Werner, M. and B. Zimmermann (2006), ‘Beyond Comparison: Histoire Croisée 
and the Challenge of Reflexivity’, History and Theory, 45(1), 30–50.
Westney, D. E. and R. Piekkari (2019), ‘Reversing the Translation Flow: Moving 
Organizational Practices from Japan to the U.S.’, Journal of Management Studies, 
57(1), 57–86.
Wiking, M. (2016), The Little Book of Hygge: The Danish Way to Live Well (London: 
Penguin UK).
Part 1
The Nordic model as  




The purpose of this chapter is to historicize ‘the Nordic model.’ Historicizing 
does not simply mean demonstrating that notions of a Nordic societal model 
existed prior to the more recent launch of this expression, but more impor-
tantly, to study the actual processes of representing Nordic specificities as 
a kind of model. The notion of a Nordic model was constructed during the 
gradual transformation of the five Nordic nation states into welfare states. 
More recently, the Nordic model has been subject to a (re-)branding as a com-
bination of competitiveness and social investments, associated with contests 
about the political ownership of the model. We outline the dynamics and peri-
ods of these developments and discuss the ambiguities included in the images 
of a Nordic model.
Welfare states did not develop within closed national containers. They 
evolved through the interaction of domestic factors, cross-border transfers 
of ideas, and transnational interdependencies (Haas, 1992; Conrad, 2011; 
Kettunen and Petersen, 2011; Obinger et al., 2012). A key feature of this 
process was comparison as a political practice that played a major role in 
political agenda setting as well as in the production and transmission of 
social knowledge (Kettunen, 2006; Ogle, 2015: 4–9). This topic is especially 
important in connection with research on the Nordic welfare states (Pe-
tersen, 2006). The transnational attribute ‘Nordic’ implies a frame of refer-
ence, institutionalized in Nordic cooperation, for comparisons among the 
Nordic countries as well as between them and the rest of the world. Such 
meanings of the Nordic become especially evident in a historical analysis 
of both national and international social policy debates. On the one hand, 
it is reasonable to argue that ‘the Nordic element has never lastingly gone 
beyond national frameworks’ (Sørensen and Stråth, 1997: 19); on the other 
hand, ideas of the ‘Nordic’ have functioned as an important transnational 
reference point for national institutions and identities. This duality of the 
Nordic in relation to the national appears in concepts such as ‘Nordic De-
mocracy,’ ‘Nordic Society,’ and ‘Nordic Welfare State.’ These concepts 
have functioned as referential frames for national societal developments, 
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making it possible for the Nordic societies to be different and similar at the 
same time.
At least from the 1920s, the Nordic countries have periodically joined 
forces to establish Nordic political influence, projecting an image of the 
progressive Norden bringing new ideas to the international scene (Petersen, 
2006). In this process, ideas of the Nordic were promoted, circulated, trans-
formed, and returned to sender. Both the intentions and the intensity of these 
circulations changed significantly over time as the Nordic specificities were 
successfully ‘modelized’ in comparison with social policy arrangements else-
where. As a political practice, comparison involves both positive and nega-
tive diffusion as well as the construction of narratives, stereotypes, rankings, 
hierarchies, and eventually models. Different comparisons display different 
dynamics. In intra-regional comparisons, the Nordic countries occupied dif-
ferent stages of development. Thus, being a Nordic welfare laggard became 
a part of Finnish and Icelandic national identities. In Finland, experiences 
of a conflictual history, including the Civil War of 1918, contributed to an 
identity of a Nordic exception. As a framework of intra-Nordic comparisons, 
at the same time, a notion of the Nordic group of countries representing a 
front-runner model of welfare was developed in wider international compar-
isons, both by Nordic and foreign politicians and experts.
We argue that this can be described as a ‘modelization’ process driven 
by national and regional interests articulated in an international context. 
We argue here that the attribution of ‘Nordic’ to what gradually became a 
societal model had two major consequences. First, it boosted the attention 
given to the small Nordic states on the international scene. Second, trans-
forming national policies and ideas into distinctly Nordic characteristics 
was a means of legitimizing national welfare states that pacified political 
resistance against social reformism, resistance that came from both the left 
and the right.
We focus on four historical phases: The formative phase of modern social 
policy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the interwar pe-
riod, the Cold War period, and the ongoing post-Cold War era. In the con-
cluding discussion, we suggest a framework for understanding the historical 
resilience of the images of a Nordic model. The ambivalence of the images 
of a Nordic model, appearing in several dualisms in the uses of the concept, 
allowed not only for the settling of conflicting interests but also for the con-
tinuation over a century of both continuities and discontinuities.
Images of Nordic problems in the formative period of modern 
social policy (1880–1914)
Notions of Nordic (or Scandinavian) society can be traced back to at least 
the nineteenth century, associated with ideas of Scandinavism, Nordism, 
Nordic culture, and later in the early twentieth century a unique Nordic de-
mocracy and governance (Sørensen and Stråth, 1997; Musial, 2002; Janfelt, 
2005; Hemstad, 2008; Kurunmäki and Strang, 2011). Within welfare state 
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historiography, the origins of the Nordic model are usually located in the 
late nineteenth century when social reforms and modern social policy ar-
rived onto the political scene throughout the Western hemisphere. As Dan-
iel T. Rodgers (1998) has demonstrated, social policy was a trans-Atlantic 
discussion, with ideas moving both within and between nation states. Even 
though Denmark, Sweden, and Norway later became known as forerunner 
countries with respect to modern social legislation, ‘Nordic’ developments 
were heavily influenced by ideas coming from other areas.
This early wave of social reforms was in most countries closely related 
to nation-building, war, and societal modernization. During the nineteenth 
century, international comparisons, oriented toward the horizon of expec-
tation associated with modernization, became an important factor in the 
construction of national politics, national economies, national societies, 
and their collective actors. The comparison was a political practice that in-
formed and framed national decisions (Kuhnle, 1996; Åmark, 2005; Kettu-
nen, 2006; Petersen et al., 2010, 2011). In the Nordic countries, we can point 
to the early well-established (regional) Nordic cooperation between key 
professions connected to social reforms, such as lawyers, economists, ed-
ucators, and other groups of public servants (Wendt, 1959; SAMAK, 1986; 
Edling, 2006; Petersen, 2006). Such specialist networks were supported by 
initiatives toward closer political cooperation, such as the Nordic monetary 
union of 1872 and the Nordic Inter-Parliamentary Association from 1907.
This Nordic epistemic community (cf. Haas, 1992) developed through 
common definitions of social problems and openness toward the flourishing 
market for social policy innovations around 1900. Rodgers (1998: 8–32) illus-
trates this point by examining national demonstrations of social policies at 
the 1900 Paris World Exhibition. In the pavilion for ‘social economy,’ each 
country was profiled with something that their social policy experts sup-
posed to express their particular inventions for solving the so-called social 
question: consumers’ cooperative movement in Britain, state-administered 
social insurance in Germany, mutual assistance and insurance in France, 
and welfare capitalism organized by private companies in the United States. 
Yet as Rodgers remarks, all these social policy ideas had already been mixed 
in different eclectic and contradictory national combinations.
Images of a distinctly Nordic approach to social policy were not wide-
spread around 1900 and were mainly deployed for domestic legitimation. 
Only from the 1920s and 1930s did the Nordic countries move from a pe-
ripheral position in international social policy debates toward the center of 
attention.
The interwar period: from the social policy periphery  
to the center of attention
In the 1920s and, especially, 1930s, international attention directed to the 
Nordic region increased, as illustrated by a growing ‘social tourism liter-
ature.’ American and British authors such as Marquis Childs (1936) and 
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Frederic Howe (1936) reported about Nordic societies having successfully 
transformed themselves, now offering high levels of coordination and social 
security without sacrificing traditions, social cohesion, or (from the 1930s) 
democracy (Musial, 2002). Both Howe and Childs, discussing, respectively, 
Denmark and Sweden, referred to national developments rather than any 
kind of Nordic model, with books entitled Denmark – the Progressive Way 
and Sweden: The Middle Way. However, the usage of the ‘way’ – metaphor in 
the book titles signals a temporality and the potential of Nordic countries as 
models of development for other countries. As summarized by the historian 
Peter Baldwin ‘Where Scandinavia had earlier attracted notice mainly from 
those interested in, say, pig farming or temperance movements, it suddenly 
found itself the center of international attention’ (Baldwin, 1990: 59).
The Nordic countries themselves became aware of this international at-
tention. At the Second Nordic Travel Meeting in 1937, representatives of the 
Nordic tourist organizations discussed ‘Touristic Nordism,’ arguing that ‘In 
our propaganda, our social development must also be considered. We have 
in Norden much to offer and it is not wise always to talk about ourselves as 
being the small ones’ (Petersen, 2009). A cursory review of Nordic tourist 
brochures from the 1930s and 1940s reveals that democracy, social stability, 
and social welfare were used to attract tourists. In a Danish tourist brochure 
from 1938, it was even emphasized that Denmark could, indeed, serve as a 
model for the world:
For those interested in social problems, Denmark is a land of greatest 
interest. Danish social legislation and the Danish cooperative system … 
are known everywhere. They serve indeed as models to the world.
The trigger for generalizing the Nordic experiences into some kind of 
‘model’ (what we refer to as a process of ‘modelization’ whereby general-
ized characteristics gradually become a model in its own right) was the 
interplay between concrete developments in the Nordic countries and the 
international circulation of ‘Nordic’ images. In the following, we look more 
closely at two important and interrelated cases: The regional cooperation 
between the Nordic Ministries of Social Affairs and the Nordic cooperation 
within  the International Labour Organization (ILO). Both cases demon-
strate how the idea of a Nordic welfare model was an outcome of the inter-
play between the national and transnational components.
Nordic social policy cooperation: regionally and internationally
In June 1918, at a Scandinavian meeting for national parliamentarians in 
Copenhagen, Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish politicians agreed on the 
need for closer social–political cooperation.1 This meeting was followed up 
nine months later by the first Nordic social–political meeting held in Co-
penhagen in April 1919.2 The delegations included national experts, civil 
Images of the Nordic welfare model 17
servants, representatives of interest organizations, and welfare agencies, as 
well as politicians including the Ministers for Social Affairs.
This first Nordic meeting established common goals and agendas for suc-
cessive talks. First and foremost, there was an agreement to coordinate na-
tional Nordic policies toward the newly founded ILO and its first conference 
in Washington later the same year (see below). Second, the countries agreed 
to strengthen existing traditions of mutual orientation on national social 
policy developments. Third, and more wide reaching, they expressed a com-
mon wish for ‘uniform guidelines and forms for social development and 
mutuality concerning social rights and duties, in so far as this is found in 
accordance with specific conditions within the different Nordic countries.’3
In the 1920s, the degrees of modernization, economic and political capac-
ities, and the existing social policy legislations clearly varied between the 
Nordic countries. Consequently, more uniform social legislation was not 
an uncontroversial goal (Petersen, 2006: 67–98). By the late 1920s, however, 
Nordic social policy meetings were being held on a regular basis for politi-
cians, civil servants, and experts, and these meetings became the platform 
for a Nordic social policy epistemic community (cf. Haas, 1992). This re-
sulted in intensified streams of knowledge transfer between the countries 
as well as strengthening ideas about a transnational Nordic social citizen-
ship. The first steps in this direction were several mutual social policy agree-
ments between the Nordic countries, and the most important of these, the 
Nordic Poverty Treaty (Den Nordiske Fattigdomskonvention), was signed by 
Finland, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway in October 1929. The treaty en-
sured all Nordic citizens who settled in another Nordic country social rights 
and established a system for reimbursement of expenditures between the 
countries.
A key issue for this epistemic community was the coordination of Nordic 
policies toward international organizations such as the League of Nations 
and the ILO. This desire for a united Nordic front on the international scene 
was important for the development of a Nordic (or Scandinavian) model 
as an international ‘brand’ in the following decades. Since its founding in 
1919 as an autonomous organ within the League of Nations, the ILO has 
been a forum for developing and demonstrating a Nordic pattern of in-
ternational cooperation and a Nordic model of national society, not least 
due to its tripartite structure of representation, with delegates representing 
governments, workers, and employers. In its very structure, the ILO came 
to reflect a notion of a modern society in which organized capital and or-
ganized labor, together with the government, generated social regulations, 
ameliorating the tensions between the international economy and national 
society. The ILO also introduced a model for international cooperation in 
which intergovernmental and inter-societal dimensions would intertwine 
(Kettunen, 2013).
Nordic cooperation very early achieved a recognized status in the admin-
istration of the ILO. The Nordic countries assumed common mandates in 
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the governing body and in various ILO committees. All three participat-
ing groups – governments, workers, and employers – also established their 
own practices of Nordic cooperation within the framework of the ILO, such 
as preparatory meetings in Geneva at the beginning of labor conferences. 
Soon after the foundation of the ILO, the Nordic employer organizations 
established their own office for ILO activities in Brussels, where the inter-
national employers’ federation was situated. H. C. Ørsted from Denmark 
acted as the chief of the Nordic employer’s office from the early 1920s until 
the early 1950s (Sjöberg, 1958: 78–80).
For Nordic cooperation in the workers’ group of the ILO, the precon-
ditions were much more limited in the 1920s. The Finnish and Norwegian 
trade unions were more leftist than the Danish and Swedish ones and had 
deep suspicions toward the ILO, considering it to be an organization of class 
compromise. Until the early 1930s, the Norwegian central organization of 
trade unions refused to nominate a worker representative to international 
labor conferences (Heldal, 1996). It took until 1936 before the Norwegian 
central organization of trade unions finally joined the reformist trade union 
international, the International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU), which 
coordinated the workers’ group within the ILO. Joining the IFTU also 
opened the door to the Joint Committee of the Nordic Social Democratic 
Labour Movement (SAMAK). When the Norwegians joined the IFTU and 
SAMAK in 1936, the Danish, Finnish, Norwegian, and Swedish trade un-
ion confederations also came to an agreement about their intensified coop-
eration in the ILO. The practice of advance negotiations on issues coming 
onto the ILO agenda was established (Valkonen, 1987: 185).
While Denmark, Sweden, and Norway were at the top in the international 
statistics of unionization in the 1930s, Finland had remained one of the least 
unionized countries in Europe. However, this difference ended up contribut-
ing to a deeper Nordic identification among the Finnish trade unionists. In 
their efforts to make the unions stronger and influential, the Finnish trade 
union leaders exploited both the ILO’s tripartite principle of representation 
and the criteria they claimed governed ‘Nordic democracy.’ The concept of 
Nordic democracy, as defined in the cooperation among the Nordic Social 
Democrats in the 1930s and further demonstrated at forums such as the 
Days of Nordic Democracy in the late 1930s, included a combination of 
parliamentary political democracy and institutions of collective negotiation 
and agreement on labor markets. It thus became easy for the Finnish trade 
union leaders to combine the Social Democratic interpretation of Nordic 
democracy and the ideals of the ILO (Kettunen, 2009, 73).
In reports of the ILO General Director during the 1930s, the Scandina-
vian responses to the Great Depression, notably the novelties of employ-
ment policies, were praised as an excellent model.4 They were also discussed 
in the International Federation of Trade Unions. According to a report by 
the IFTU secretariat to the IFTU general council meeting in Copenhagen in 
1935, the Scandinavian countries had ‘decisively shown what good fortune 
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can be brought to the whole nation by the activities of a democratic Labor 
Government.’ This had an encouraging effect ‘on other democratic coun-
tries, where progress has also been made with Trade Union propaganda for 
economic planning on a democratic basis.’5
The engagement of Scandinavian labor parties and trade unions to na-
tional political decision-making also limited their possibilities to act as 
agenda setters within the IFTU and the ILO workers’ group. This was the 
case, for example, in their cautious view on options to reduce working hours 
in the early 1930s (Kettunen, 2013). On the other hand, the ILO’s tripartite 
structure implied that no member country or group of countries (such as the 
Nordics) spoke with one voice in the ILO. For example, the Nordic employ-
ers opposed the presentation of Scandinavian employment policies for use 
as an international model. When the British General Director of the ILO, 
Harold Butler, in his annual report to the international labor conference 
in Geneva in 1936, once again raised the Swedish employment policy as a 
model for other countries, both the Swedish and Finnish employer repre-
sentatives felt themselves compelled to reject such a recommendation.6
During World War II, the officials of the ILO began to plan for the post-
war period as early as the spring of 1940, even though the war had made the 
ILO’s work – now relocated from Geneva to Montreal – considerably more 
difficult. The concrete result of this post-war planning was the Philadel-
phia Declaration in the spring of 1944, a document that, in conjunction with 
the charter of 1919, now constitutes the definitive statement of the ILO’s 
principles, a part of its Constitution. The core of the Philadelphia Declara-
tion consisted of guidelines for social and economic policy at the national 
level: full employment, the interdependence of social equality and economic 
growth, the principle of collective agreements, and the participation of both 
employers and workers in the formulation and implementation of social and 
economic policy.
As sources of inspiration for national post-war planning in the Nordic 
countries, the ILO and the Philadelphia Declaration were less significant 
than the British Beveridge Plan and various intra-Nordic initiatives (Wium 
Olesen, 2002). In any case, the post-war development of Scandinavia, espe-
cially in Sweden, was perceived not only by some Nordic citizens but also 
by many outside the Nordic region, as uniquely consistent steps along a 
universal pathway to progress, envisioned in the Philadelphia Declaration. 
The Nordic social policy cooperation seemed to promote this vision and 
confidence in a virtuous circle of social equality, economic growth, and en-
hanced democracy.
The Nordic ‘middle way’: universalizing Nordic experiences 
during the Cold War
The period from 1945 to 1980 is generally considered the Golden Age of the 
welfare state. This was also the case in the Nordic region. Social rights were 
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expanded in terms of coverage and benefit level, and new programs were in-
troduced. Social expenditures and taxes skyrocketed, both in absolute and 
relative terms. Even though the Nordic welfare states had long institutional 
legacies and underwent an incremental change, it is in the decades from the 
1950s through the 1970s that they take on the classical characteristics high-
lighted by comparative welfare state research; features such as universalism, 
social citizenship, high levels of redistribution, tax financing, gender equal-
ity, and strong states. Building on the image of a Nordic model established 
during the interwar period, the Nordic welfare states during the Cold War 
became a model both within the Nordic region and internationally.
The Cold War context had a decisive impact on ideological debates on so-
cial policy and social policy models (Petersen, 2013). The Cold War consol-
idated the split within the left between Communist and Social Democratic 
movements, and this division on the Left served as an impetus for coali-
tions between Centre-Right and Centre-Left against the larger evil of Com-
munism and the Soviet threat. An observer at the time, Klaus Knorr, argued 
that the welfare state could be considered the ‘most constructive defense of 
the free world against Communism’ (Knorr, 1951: 448). Furthermore, the 
Cold War meant that international social policy debates became structured 
along the lines of the general East-West divide, and systemic competition 
was a Leitmotif both on the international scene and at the domestic level.
The ability of the Western European democracies to develop various ide-
ological forms of social capitalism created room for the expansion of social 
security. In Germany, the Soziale Marktwirtschaft tried to balance the two 
sides (Zinn, 1992; Ptak, 2004), and the Nordic countries went even further, 
launching the idea of Nordic welfare state as a ‘middle way’ between cap-
italism and socialism (Nelson, 1953). In many ways, this image of a model 
was based on ideas promulgated in the interwar period such as ‘Nordic De-
mocracy’ and Childs’ ‘middle way.’ In the Cold War era, however, the social 
policy became even more salient. The successful incarnations into a Nordic 
welfare model were the subject of heated debates, both domestically within 
the Nordic societies and internationally. Within the black-white logic of the 
Cold War, the Nordic welfare model became a realistic utopia for center-left 
progressives, whereas those on the center-right characterized it as a dystopia 
of state paternalism or as a thinly disguised socialism (see also Chapter 4 in 
this book by Carl Marklund).
The attribution of ‘Nordic’ to the national experiences of the Nordic wel-
fare states was important for several reasons. First, it projected the Nordic 
societies as democratic, peaceful, etc. Second, it created a platform for Nor-
dic cooperation in terms of both policy formation and a more generalized 
Nordic ‘branding.’ Third, it gave a stronger voice and position to the Nordic 
countries (and related actors) in international debates. Finally, even though 
the Nordic countries held very different formal positions during the Cold 
War – three countries being members of NATO, two being neutral – the 
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Nordic framework allowed for a joint profile, including even neutral Fin-
land despite its special relationship with the neighboring Soviet Union.
We cannot elaborate on all these aspects here. We will instead focus on 
the international circulation of the image of a Nordic welfare state model. 
This was not simply the result of Nordic actors who, with their intentions 
and strategies, sent out messages that were then received, interpreted, and 
domesticated outside the Nordic region. The process was rather a contin-
uous recirculation and revamping of images that were projected and then 
reimported in different forms. Furthermore, the construction of the idea of 
a Nordic welfare state model happened through numerous channels and was 
facilitated by a multiplicity of mechanisms. One of these channels was cul-
tural institutes – national semipublic institutions intended to promote the 
language, culture, and literature of the individual Nordic country. Although 
nationally grounded, these cultural institutes, dispersed in many countries 
around the world, promoted the Nordic–Scandinavian brand both on their 
own and in close interstate cooperation (Christiansen, 2009; Glover, 2011). 
Another formative platform was the initiatives of the Nordic countries for 
development assistance. After 1945, the Nordic countries became leading 
spenders on foreign aid. Recent studies in the history of foreign aid show 
how ideas about the Nordic welfare state played an important role in this 
respect (Bach et al., 2008: 75ff). In a volume from the early 1950s discussing 
Nordic aid to the developing world, the Danish social policy expert Hen-
ning Friis talked about the Nordic countries as ‘frontline soldiers of peace, 
freedom, and social policy,’ arguing that the national welfare state should 
be projected into the international level (Bach et al., 2008: 75). Finally, the 
idea of a Nordic model of welfare – building on traditions established in 
the earlier periods – was constructed through cooperation and comparison, 
based on a Nordic epistemic community with a shared value system, result-
ing in a projected Nordic identity or hegemonic frame of reference (Lægreid 
and Pedersen, 1994). This projection of a unique Nordic value system had 
a significant impact within the Nordic countries as well as influencing the 
Nordic approach to the outside.
Freedom and welfare
Influenced by international attention (positive and negative), Nordic poli-
ticians and experts placed themselves at the top of the international social 
policy hierarchy. From this summit, it was only a small step to universal-
izing the ‘unique’ Nordic experiences into a general model that should be 
applied to other aspiring welfare states. It is noteworthy how this univer-
salization process also allowed for the development of a concept that could 
bridge differences in social policy development within the Nordic region. 
An illustration of this somewhat arrogant, missionary way of thinking oc-
curred in 1947, when the Icelandic Minister of Social Affairs, Stefánson, 
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argued that even though Iceland lagged behind the general Nordic social–
political development, the Nordic Ministries should jointly produce
… a comprehensive account for the social political development in the 
Nordic countries, which could be comparative, and other countries 
might benefit from. I, for my part, believe that the Nordic countries are 
the highest ranking when it comes to social political legislation.
(Petersen, 2006)
Six years later, Stefánson’s suggestion was realized as a book with the am-
bitious title Freedom and Welfare was published as a joint enterprise of the 
Nordic Ministries of Social Affairs. In the preface to the volume, the Minis-
ters of Social Affairs modestly stated:
All five countries are parliamentary democracies and they are free de-
mocracies dedicated to the basic humanitarian rights they have worked 
and are working today to promote the welfare of their peoples. They do 
not claim to have found any final solution to the many and intricate so-
cial and economic problems with which our industrialized age is beset. 
It is hoped, however, that this account of the experience gained by the 
Northern countries in dealing with a number of these problems will be 
accepted as a modest contribution to the cause of promoting mutual 
knowledge and understanding among the peoples of the world.
(Nelson, 1954: II)
The book is not only illustrative of Nordic self-confidence, exemplify-
ing how identity construction and international branding came together. 
A close reading also reveals that the target audience was in the United States 
(Marklund and Petersen, 2013). It would be tempting to see evidence of this 
audience targeting in the use of terms such as ‘the Northern countries of 
Europe’ instead of ‘the Nordic countries’ since the adjective ‘Nordic’ was 
contaminated in the specific US context because of its frequent use in the 
early twentieth century by defenders of racial hierarchies.7 However, a risk 
of anachronism would be obvious because in Nordic self-descriptions in 
general, ‘Northern countries’ were replaced with ‘the Nordic countries’ only 
later in the 1950s. A more persuasive sign of the targeting of a US audience 
was the avoidance of the term ‘welfare state.’ An American review praised 
the book for demonstrating ‘the broad implications that are attached to 
the term “welfare” in northern countries.’ She was apparently satisfied 
that the term in its Nordic usage did not evoke ‘the connotations associated 
with the welfare state.’8
Indeed, the term ‘welfare state’ was used only once over more than 400 
pages of text. While this indicates that the concept had not yet achieved such 
a central role in Nordic self-descriptions as it would later on (Edling, 2018), 
the absence of reference to a ‘welfare state’ also demonstrated a branding 
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strategy: in the US context, ‘welfare state’ had a very bad press in the early 
Cold War. In 1949, President Truman had thus warned his political allies 
against using the term ‘welfare state’ as it was becoming a ‘scare word’ (Pe-
tersen, 2013). This was the result of an intense campaign from opponents of 
rising taxes and ‘big government,’ attacking the term itself as being a step-
ping stone toward Communism. ‘Reactionaries hunted around for a new 
phrase,’ stated George Meany, secretary-treasurer of the American Federa-
tion of Labour in a speech to the US Congress in April 1950 (Procter, 1950: 
115). Whereas the branding was designed for a specific context, the book 
clearly – although with a rhetoric of modesty – proclaimed the Nordic expe-
riences to be a model for the rest of the world. Obviously, Freedom and Wel-
fare did not dramatically change the nature of the US welfare state, however, 
and despite the general American skepticism vis-à-vis the Nordic welfare 
model, Nordic policies and policymakers occasionally served as inspiration 
for US policy makers (Rom Jensen, 2017).
A more receptive context for generalizing Nordic experiences was the 
ILO, which in the Cold War era turned more attention to decolonization. In 
1956, the International Labour Review, a journal of the ILO, published a de-
tailed overview on the social–political cooperation between ‘the Northern 
Countries of Europe.’ The article was written by Kaare Salvesen, an official 
in the Norwegian Ministry of Social Affairs and Chairman of the United 
Nations Social Commission. Salvesen had recently, as an invited UN ad-
viser at a social policy conference of Arab countries, informed them about 
Nordic cooperation. Concluding his overview, Salvesen noted that:
These five countries follow one social policy in its broadest sense: they 
introduce successively, and try to co-ordinate, national programmes 
consistent with a common view of the responsibility of the community 
towards those in distress, upon the necessity to give everyone fair and 
equal opportunities, upon the relation between the State and the in-
dividual, and upon the interrelationship between economic and social 
progress. The result is that the pattern of social legislation is, although 
differing in details, more homogeneous over the Northern area than it 
is in many federal States.
(Salvesen, 1956: 357)
The Nordic countries were thus represented as both a model of regional 
international cooperation and a model of national society, and both models 
were found relevant also in the context of decolonization.
In the 1950s and 1960s, the conditions in the colonies, then in the throes 
of liberation, were brought to the forefront in the discussion of international 
social norms and in the activities of the ILO. Changes also appeared in the 
interpretations of the Cold War intersystemic conflict (cf. Halliday 1994) 
and the role of different societal models. The French chair of the employers’ 
group, Pierre Waline, argued in 1961 for employers’ active participation in 
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the ILO in order to defend progressive capitalism to confused Asian and 
African trade unionists and employers, who would have to choose between 
East and West. According to Waline, the system of industrial relations that 
had been perfected in the Netherlands and in the Scandinavian countries 
provided the key to the future. According to Waline, the technical assis-
tance programs of the ILO could then spread this gospel, and together with 
strong support for the principle of freedom of association, this approach 
would defeat the appeal of Communism (Haas, 1964: 206). Obviously, not 
all employers shared this view. Nevertheless, acting as representatives for 
the tripartism model became an important aspect of Nordic identity in the 
context of the ILO after World War II. In the Nordic participation in the 
ILO, the idea of international cooperation as a comparative learning pro-
cess was consciously combined with the traditional Nordic confidence in 
popular education. The ILO launched programs of ‘workers’ education,’ 
aimed to train the workers of former colonies to become ‘active and respon-
sible partners in the nation-building process,’ and within these programs, 
the Nordic modes of tripartite participation were promoted by the govern-
ments and trade unions of these countries.9
One cannot talk about any generally shared appraisal of the Nordic 
welfare model in the 1950s and 1960s. Controversial views appeared both 
outside and inside the Nordic region. Social democrats and social liberals 
embraced the idea of a progressive Nordic model, while left-wing critics saw 
it as an empty promise, a tactical integration of workers into capitalism; as 
for the center-right, they were sceptic or even outright hostile towards an 
idea of comprehensive state-organized social security. However, the circula-
tion of the Nordic approach to welfare and the more intense debate during 
the Cold War had long-lasting effects: First, the growing attention and con-
testation regarding a specifically Nordic approach to social problems con-
tributed to the modelization of the Nordic welfare state; second, building 
on the historical layer from the interwar period, the Cold War cemented the 
image of democratic progressiveness as a viable alternative to Soviet-style 
Communism and US-style capitalism. Third, mobilized by a Nordic epis-
temic community, the image of a Nordic model, in its own right, gained 
traction within the Nordic countries.
Since the late 1950s, forecasts of a convergence between capitalist and 
socialist paths of modernization emerged within the expanding social and 
political sciences (see, for example, Tinbergen, 1961; Aron, 1963; Galbraith, 
1967). Among the candidates for the resulting universal societal model was 
the ‘functional socialism,’ elaborated by the Swedish social scientist Gunnar 
Adler-Karlsson (1967). Support for the essentially Western idea of conver-
gence could be found in various notions of a ‘Third Way,’ including the im-
ages of a Nordic ‘Middle Way.’ However, convergence theories lost much of 
their premises after the 1970s. In the 1970s, it was easy to develop interpre-
tations based on a crisis of capitalism. However, it became more and more 
difficult to refer to the economic and social developments in the Eastern 
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bloc as attractive models or powerful potentials. Since the 1980s, the meta-
phor of the Third Way no longer came to mean an alternative between capi-
talism and socialism but was instead applied to economic and social politics 
bridging between Keynesianism and neo-Liberalism, i.e., between different 
modes of regulating capitalism.10
The popularity of the Nordic model in the post-Cold War era
Cross- and trans-national ‘comparative imagination’ (Frederickson, 2000; 
Sluga, 2004), inspiring comparisons as political practice, was an integral 
part of what we retrospectively can interpret as the long history of a Nordic 
model of welfare. However, it was only in the 1980s that the expression ‘Nor-
dic model’ came into wider use. The comparative discussion on ‘models’ – 
now limited referring to different patterns of regulating capitalism – gained 
impetus from the end of the Cold War inter-systemic conflict and from the 
encounters between globalized capitalism and nation-state institutions.
Since the 1980s, crucial aspects of the notion of national society that were 
associated with the expanding welfare state and parity-based negotiations 
and agreements in the labor market have been severely challenged in the 
Nordic countries, as elsewhere. The transformations associated with glo-
balization increased the economic and social asymmetries concerning the 
role of spatial ties. The increased mobility and increased asymmetries be-
tween different actors in terms of their mobility reinforced and, still more, 
changed the role of economic competitiveness in the definition of national 
political agendas. In a new way, competitiveness came to refer to potentials 
of a national society to offer an attractive operational environment to glob-
ally mobile economic actors: companies, investors, and people belonging 
to the ‘creative class.’ Since the millennium, the concept of ‘branding’ has 
frequently been invoked to denote these efforts to make countries attractive 
to market actors, indicating a kind of commodification of national societies.
In the Nordic countries, changes have taken place under conditions of 
relative institutional continuity. ‘The Nordic welfare state’ – often inter-
changeably used with ‘the Nordic welfare society’ – is a very popular term 
in the Nordic countries (Edling, 2019). No political party can expect to gain 
electoral success by declaring itself to be in opposition to the welfare state. 
The arguments for a radical deregulation that emerged in the 1980s have 
been pushed to the margins. Today, everyone seems to be in favor of the 
welfare state.
With varying emphases in different Nordic countries, rescuing the wel-
fare state became one of the most widely shared arguments in the politics 
associated with concerns about the aging of the population and the so-
called sustainability gap from the 1990s, and the financial crisis that began 
in 2008. Those concerned about economic competitiveness or advocating 
austerity politics have motivated these concerns with the necessity of creat-
ing or maintaining resources that can sustain the welfare state. Maintaining 
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a viable welfare state is used as an argument for restrictive immigration 
policies as well as for the promotion of labor immigration. Those defending 
the welfare state against the pressures of globalized capitalism argue that 
the welfare state, through its security networks and risk-sharing systems, 
generates competitive advantages. Rescuing the welfare state seems to be 
a goal that legitimates many different means, and a means that legitimates 
many different goals (although one may question how well the Nordic wel-
fare state succeeds in coping with its various rescue operations).
Are we witnessing the end or a new beginning?
In January 2011, Sweden’s New Conservatives released a document for the 
World Economic Forum in Davos. The document, called The Nordic Way, 
sought to rebrand the Nordic Model as a model of liberal economic growth 
with a social conscience in a time of financial crisis (World Economic 
Forum, 2011; Swedish Institute, 2012). This document was considered an 
attempt to claim ownership to a reinterpreted version of the Nordic model, 
and the reaction by Swedish Social Democrats came promptly: they applied 
to protect the concept of ‘Nordic model’ as a registered trademark. This 
again fueled protest from Nordic Council of Ministers in an affidavit to 
the Swedish Patent and Registration Office: ‘The Nordic Model belongs to 
the cultural-political heritage of all the Nordic countries and their citizens.’ 
However, after several rounds of discussion, the Patent and Registration 
Office decided in favor of the Swedish Social Democrats, who were thus 
granted, for the next 10 years, a privilege of using ‘The Nordic Model’ (Ket-
tunen et al., 2015: 87–88).
One can safely conclude that the Nordic welfare states have changed as a 
result of their responses to the challenges of globalization and Europeani-
zation. However, the idea of a model appears to be very flexible. In the dec-
ades of expanding welfare states, the Nordic model of welfare was developed 
and promoted as a consistent pattern of social reform and change. Since 
the 1990s, the Nordic model has regained international attention due to its 
capacity to reform and restructure itself in the era of flexible capitalism. 
This kind of capability and flexibility has become a key component of the 
Nordic model concept itself. It has increased the possibility to make widely 
varying interpretations of the Nordic model, all equally legitimate, as well 
as expanding opportunities to commit oneself to the model and to the battle 
over its ownership.
Concluding reflections: the ambiguity of the Nordic model
In this chapter, we have traced the history of the idea of Nordic welfare for 
well over a century, through to our day. Naturally, it is not possible to offer 
a complete mapping of this process of ‘modelization’ within a book chap-
ter. However, our survey demonstrates that the notion of a Nordic welfare 
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model has been both durable and capable of continuing reconfiguration. 
The long-term perspective underscores the historical layering of different 
elements in the ideas of Nordic welfare, resulting from a complex process of 
circulation between national, regional, and international experiences and 
identities. In the following, we will offer a framework for interpreting this 
historical layering and its ambiguities.
In public and scholarly discourses after the 1980s, ‘the Nordic model 
of welfare’ appears as a historical interpretation connecting the past, the 
present, and the future. It grasps and mixes the different historical layers 
discussed in this chapter. It also includes dualisms that imply either diver-
gent views or inherent paradoxes in one and the same view concerning the 
contents of the model. In the following, we distinguish between five partly 
overlapping dualisms.
First, a dualism of nostalgia and actuality is involved in the terms Nor-
den and ‘Nordic’ in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. The 
nostalgia may be for the ‘people’s home’ that was at one time sheltered from 
the outer world, for the role of the exceptionally consistent representatives 
of universal moral norms, for a society that was the object and subject of ra-
tional knowledge, or for a unique type of peace-loving popular internation-
alism. However, alongside or combined with nostalgia, there are the efforts 
toward the actualizing of ‘Nordic.’ They appear in the discussion about the 
future-oriented competitiveness of ‘the Nordic model.’ Attempts to unite 
nostalgia and actuality also appear, most obviously in varying combina-
tions of enduring characteristics and creative innovativeness constructed in 
Nordic branding.
In assessments of national adaptations to globalized capitalism or Eu-
ropean integration, we find a second dualism in the usages of ‘the Nordic 
model.’ Here the term ‘model’ may refer to either an old structure now 
threatened through globalization and European integration or to an ef-
fective way of responding to the new challenges. The Nordic model that is 
perceived as a target of threats is usually identified with the welfare state. 
A newer concept, the ‘competition state,’ is usually used by critical schol-
ars, describing a move away from the Nordic model of welfare. There are 
occasional signs of adopting ‘competition state’ as an affirmative concept 
for how to respond to the new challenges of globalization by reforming the 
Nordic welfare model and giving first priority to one of its old ingredients, 
the goal of greater competitiveness.11
However, the Nordic model as a response is most often associated with 
positive economic consequences of the (somehow reformed) welfare state 
(Andersen et al., 2007). This implies an economization of social policy in 
two different senses: as an argument for the recognition of the economic im-
portance of social policy and as an argument for reforming social policy in a 
way that could meet the requirement of its being a productive factor, provid-
ing ‘social investments’ and increasing ‘social capital.’ As far as the Nordic 
model of welfare is developing into a ‘social investment welfare state’ (Morel 
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et al., 2012), we can talk about an institutional conversion in which the old 
welfare-state institutions are modified to serve new competition-state func-
tions.12 Seen as a capacity for self-reform, this kind of change appears to be 
a crucial part of the ‘new super-model’ brand of the Nordic model.
In the world of different models, the concept of model remains ambiguous, 
also in a way that implies a third dualism of the Nordic model. On the one 
hand, ‘model’ refers to deep-rooted, persistent cultural beliefs, norms, and 
values that have given rise to and uphold different kinds of welfare policies 
and institutions. On the other hand, the concept of model refers to best prac-
tices and comparative transferable knowledge to be utilized in cross-border 
policy learning. At the level of policy formulations, this dualism has been 
actualized in discussion on the preconditions and limits of exporting or im-
porting elements of another model, for example, to what degree and how the 
Nordic model could inform welfare policies in China (Kettunen et al., 2014). 
In efforts to ensure national competitiveness, attempts to combine universal 
‘best practices’ with a particular competitive advantage, ‘niche’ or ‘edge,’ 
have been a way of linking the two understandings of ‘model.’13
Focusing on the exceptionalism of the Nordic model, a fourth dualism 
can be identified. Our historical analysis indicates that the Nordic pattern 
of reforming society was often interpreted as a uniquely consistent way of 
advancing on the universal path of social progress. The aforementioned 
books by Childs in 1936 and by the Nordic social ministries in 1953, as well 
as the role of the Nordic countries in the ILO, exemplify this merging of the 
Nordic and the universal, and it is expressed both from Nordic and outsider 
perspectives. However, another, newer way to describe the Nordic unique-
ness also appears. From a perspective of a completed construction of the 
Nordic model, commentators have characterized it as a unique combina-
tion of principles and practices that seem incompatible (e.g., high taxes and 
competitive economies) but nevertheless works as the bumblebee that flies 
against all odds.
Oxymoron-type expressions are used by scholars to represent essential 
features of the Nordic model. One of them is ‘statist individualism.’ It was 
coined by the Swedish historian Lars Trägårdh with Swedish references, but 
it has gained political influence as a characterization of the Nordic model 
in general. Originally, in the 1990s, the argument was targeted against the 
right-wing critique of the allegedly patronizing welfare state. However, 
the  way ‘statist individualism’ has been recently used in the branding of 
the Nordic model seems to focus on a combination of confidence and social 
capital with individualism as the essence of the model. This idea can be used 
in center-right politics, not only for contesting Social Democratic claims 
to ownership of the welfare state but also for arguing that the extension of 
individual choice through market-based solutions is the most appropriate 
policy for implementing the principles of the Nordic model (see especially 
World Economic Forum, 2011).
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The fifth dualism concerns a longer-term ambiguity in the roles and mean-
ings of ‘Nordic.’ In the Nordic discourses we have examined in this chapter, 
‘Nordic’ has referred to a transnational regional framework of international 
cooperation, including intra-Nordic relations and Nordic contributions to 
wider international collaboration. At the same time, it has also referred to 
a mode of change and reform in a national society, appearing in national 
‘Nordic welfare states.’ Both these aspects are included in the nostalgia as-
sociated with ‘Nordic.’ They appear in a narrative of unique, peace-loving 
popular internationalism and in a narrative of shaping the nation states into 
uniquely universalistic welfare states. However, not only Nordic nostalgia 
but also historical welfare-state research, including this chapter, has con-
tributed to bridging these two narratives. The Nordic ideational and insti-
tutional framework of cooperation, comparison, and competition played a 
significant role in the making of five different national welfare states. The 
idea of a Nordic model of welfare was developed and demonstrated in the 
acts of Nordic cooperation that took place in wider international contexts, 
and the model took on different meanings in each national context.
At the same time as the popularity of ‘the Nordic model’ has greatly in-
creased, Nordic cooperation in welfare policies, one of the old core areas 
of Nordic collaboration, has considerably diminished (Kettunen et al., 
2015). The Nordic model of welfare has become more nationalistic. This 
does not mean that differences between the ‘five exceptions of one model’ 
should increase. This kind of nationalism may entail more similarities as 
it is associated with attempts to meet the imperatives of globalization that 
are conceived as national challenges. When ‘the Nordic model’ is discussed 
as a target of threats associated with globalization, the notion of a model 
has often been constructed by means of a nostalgic welfare nationalism, 
sometimes associated with protectionist or xenophobic nationalism. When 
‘the Nordic model’ is discussed as a response to the challenges of globaliza-
tion, the notion of a model is associated with national competitiveness. In 
these ideational constructions of the Nordic model, mythical ingredients of 
Nordicness seem to play a significant role, while the history of Nordic social 
policy cooperation does not.
Notes
 1 See VPM, September 16 1918, ILO-Commission (National Archives Sweden), 
FI:1; Minutes ‘Nordic social political cooperation’, November 7, 1919, Depart-
ment of Social Affairs (National Archives Denmark), International Depart-
ment, 1929, record 23.
 2 Protocol and supplements for the Nordic Social Policy Meeting in Copenhagen 
April 1919, ILO-Commission (National Archives Sweden), FI:1.
 3 Quoted from the Minutes ‘Nordic Social Political Cooperation’, 11 November 
1919, Department of Social Affairs (National Archives Denmark), International 
Department, 1929, record 23.
30 Pauli Kettunen and Klaus Petersen
 4 Especially at the International Labour Conference. Seventeenth Session. Ge-
neva 1935. Report of the Director. Geneva 1935, 18–19; International Labour 
Conference. Sixteenth Session. Geneva 1936. Report of the Director. Geneva 
1936, 24–27.
 5 Report of Secretariat on the Activities of the International Federation of Trade 
Unions during the period from 1st April, 1934, to 31st March, 1935. IFTU Nr 94. 
International Institute of Social History (IISG), Amsterdam.
 6 International Labour Conference. Twentieth Session. Geneva, 1936. Report of 
the Director. Geneva 1936, 24–27; International Labour Conference. Twentieth 
Session. Geneva, 1936. Record of Proceedings. Geneva 1936, 127–128, 134–135.
 7 The term ‘Nordic’ was frequently used to denote racial hierarchies in the in-
terwar period. This was strongly criticised in reviews of the literature in lead-
ing academic journals referring to this as ‘Nordomaniac’, the ‘Nordic Guard’, 
‘Nordic superiority’, ‘the Nordic alarm again’, ‘the Nordic Propaganda’, and as 
‘occasional outbursts from the Ultra-Nordics’.
 8 Review by Helen Fisher Hohman in Social Service Review, 1956, vol. 30 (2), 
229–232.
 9 For example, ‘An International Experiment in Workers’ Education.’ Interna-
tional Labour Review, 1958, vol. 57, 186–194.
 10 Concerning the revised ’Third Way’ among the Swedish Social Democrats, see 
Åmark (1992) and Andersson (2007).
 11 In Denmark, the Social Democratic minister of finance, Bjarne Corydon, in 
2013 acknowledged ‘competition state’ as a good concept for up-to-date national 
politics (‘Corydon: Konkurrencestat er ny velfærdsstat’, Politiken, (23 August 
2013). Scholarly support for this view is provided by Pedersen (2011).
 12 On conversion as a form of institutional change, see Thelen (2003); for studies 
importing ‘competition state’ into scholarly discussion, see Cerny (1990), Streeck 
(1998), and Palan and Abbot (1999).
 13 This mode of thought and action was influentially advocated by Porter (1990).
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Introduction
The relation between social science and politics does not lend itself to easy 
generalizations. For a long time, there was no close relation between polit-
ical invocations of Nordic common features and the systematic knowledge 
provided by historians and social scientists on that question. While aca-
demic scholars through the twentieth century contributed compilations of 
facts about the Nordic countries, we find that only in the late 1960s did a 
few social scientists start the research projects that paved the way for the 
systematic study of common Nordic traits in line with current standards of 
research. We label these researchers ‘pioneers’ in the specific sense that they 
laid down the foundations for research on such common traits. But their 
followers only began to explicitly investigate such traits in the early 1980s – 
just at the time when the notion of a Nordic model was launched in political 
circles. That notion, however, was not at all related to the research of the 
pioneers and their followers.
This chapter provides both a review of research and an exercise in the soci-
ology of knowledge. The review is not just a description of relevant research 
along a timeline as if knowledge on common Nordic traits accumulated in 
a linear sense. Two conceptual frameworks are used to classify and evalu-
ate the various strands of research under review. A sociology of knowledge 
framework establishes a typology of public spheres. A more specified soci-
ology of social scientific knowledge specifies relevant features of the public 
sphere of science, distinguishing three different ways of doing social science 
(history included). Key elements of these conceptual frameworks will be 
introduced in separate sections at the point where they are necessary for the 
argument (cf. the sections below on public spheres, types of party organiza-
tions, strong and loose comparisons).
Combining the two frameworks, the analysis focuses on the role of bound-
ary terms that circulate between various public spheres. The Nordic model 
is identified as a boundary term that emerges in the political public sphere in 
the early 1980s, generalizing an earlier, cautious understanding of a Swedish 
model. The main problem investigated is what happens to social science 
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studies of Nordic common traits (Nordic model) once this term circulates 
from the political into the scientific public sphere.
The review covers efforts by social scientists to establish synthetic ac-
counts of common traits between trajectories of socio-economic devel-
opment at the macro level. Such accounts have to tackle the explanatory 
challenge of combining national and transnational factors, paying attention 
to both comparative specificities and transfers between the units analyzed. 
Unlike narrower, sectoral definitions, such synthetic understandings are 
claims about common traits in the five Nordic countries (Denmark, Fin-
land, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden) across more than one issue area. We are 
particularly concerned with research that has laid the foundations for and 
made claims about a model with reference to the complementarities between 
institutional domains such as the welfare state, parliamentary democracy, 
the state apparatus (central and local), labor markets, education, skills, and 
innovation.
Boundary terms
One concept should be presented up front. A boundary term originates in 
one public sphere (science, politics, culture), but circulates as it becomes 
central to discussions in more than one sphere. Stakeholders agree on such 
terms, in spite of their differing agendas. This is what Miettinen (2013: 89) 
refers to as transdiscursive terms. He finds that in discussions across the sci-
ence/politics divide, such terms focus attention, integrate formally separate 
issues, facilitate discussions between different social groups, create broad 
ideological consensus, and empower proponents of specific views. In short, 
they provide interpretations of the present, what Mannheim called ‘diag-
nosis of our time’ (Miettinen, 2013: 21). It is important to note that as such 
they are terms or labels, they are not concepts formed through systematic 
scientific investigation. As we shall see, scientific disciplines can relate their 
concept formation to boundary terms in different ways.
Miettinen mainly focuses on what such terms do in terms of coordinating 
administration, politics, and interest groups. He studied the term ‘national 
innovation system’ which evolved in interaction between research (evolu-
tionary economics) and policy making (The Finnish Science and Technol-
ogy Policy Council). In this chapter, we mainly study circulations in the 
opposite direction. Our main question is thus: when a boundary term cir-
culates from politics into science, what are the effects on research in the 
science sphere? We study many different political and administrative agents, 
and a number of social science disciplines.
We find that since the 1990s, the ‘Nordic model’ became a boundary 
term facilitating communication across public spheres, especially politics 
and research, providing a common reference in many different discourses. 
From that time, the Nordic model was investigated by an increasing num-
ber of academic disciplines and invoked by a widening circle of political 
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parties. In that situation, research on the Nordic model was drawn away 
from the careful contextual specification that prevailed among the pioneers 
and their followers. This discussion invokes our specified sociology of so-
cial science, a distinction between three practical philosophies or styles of 
social science (Mjøset, 2009). While the research of the pioneers expressed 
a contextualizing style, developing concepts to analyze institutional com-
plexes as singular historical outcomes, the disciplines that responded to the 
Nordic model as a boundary term, were committed to either the standard 
or the social-philosophical practical philosophies. Both of these generalize 
in decontextualizing ways, relying on either definitive concepts (standard) 
or epochal concepts (social philosophy). The value of these distinctions will 
emerge from the analysis below.
Toward the end of the chapter, particular attention is paid to specific re-
search projects in economics and history, projects that express the stand-
ard and social-philosophical style, respectively. The discussion intends to 
demonstrate both strengths and weaknesses in the way scholars in these 
disciplines contribute to the accumulation of knowledge in the form of syn-
thetic claims about Nordic common traits. Comparison with the earlier 
work of the pioneers/followers leads to a number of critical remarks, in the 
hope that this will stimulate self-reflection among scholars analyzing Nor-
dic models in different disciplines.
Late 1940s – the Rehn/Meidner model
In the late 1940s, the Swedish Social Democratic party (SAP) government 
struggled to avoid inflation in a situation of full employment and potential 
overheating of the economy. The Ministry of Finance, led by one of the 
party’s main intellectuals, Ernst Wigforss, suggested an incomes policy that 
would imply wage moderation, particularly for workers in the least produc-
tive firms.
The Swedish trade union confederation (LO) sensed that this might 
undermine its membership support in these sectors. Two LO economists, 
Gösta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner, educated under the Stockholm school of 
economics, suggested an alternative model which avoided incomes policies 
(Erixon, 2017). LO would pursue a ‘wage policy of solidarity’ in the central-
ized wage negotiations. Workers in all firms would claim an average wage 
level, putting pressure on low-productivity firms, but securing a generous 
profit level in high-productivity firms. As long as the most productive capi-
talists reinvested their above-average profits (avoiding too much waste and 
conspicuous consumption), this would boost the transformation of Swedish 
manufacturing industry. Inflation would be avoided by generally tight fis-
cal and monetary policies, while full employment would be safeguarded by 
active labor market policies through the State Labor Market Board (AMS), 
which organized reskilling and geographical mobility.
To show how this model had only a limited circulation, we apply a typol-
ogy of public spheres.
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Public spheres
A science public sphere (science sphere, for short) can be distinguished from 
two interconnected political public spheres, as well as a cultural literary 
sphere. The science sphere involves curricula, peer-reviewed scientific pub-
lications, conferences, and internationalized disciplines with different disci-
plinary profiles. The political sphere is divided between a mobilizing sphere, 
involving social movements pursuing contentious politics (Tilly, 2007), and 
an administrative sphere of routine politics involving governing political 
parties and the bureaucracy.
Political parties often emerged as social movements whose arguments 
spread into the mobilizing political public sphere. The Nordic labor parties 
are cases in point, serving as the political extension of unions aggregated 
in trade union confederations (LOs) which pursue workers’ economic in-
terests. As the parties attained governmental responsibility following the 
turbulence of the 1920s and 1930s, their politics became routinized. Pol-
icy making in the administrative public sphere, involving bureaucracy, 
government, and parliament, gained in importance. Parties thus faced an 
administration/mobilization dilemma: an increasing gap between routine 
(managing the state) and contentious (reproducing support from a sufficient 
amount of voters) politics (Esping-Andersen, 1985).
In the case of the Rehn/Meidner model, communication across public 
spheres was limited: ‘model’ was understood in line with the economics dis-
cipline mainstream, internal to the science sphere. The model was reported 
in at least one scientific publication (Meidner, 1952). There was no spread 
to other academic disciplines. In the early post-war decades, the model was 
only considered in the relatively closed public spheres of Swedish economic 
policy making, strictly inside the administrative layers of the political public 
sphere: bureaucrats in the finance ministry (administrators socialized into 
the same economics terminology), SAP politicians, and LO staff. Only later 
was it labeled a ‘Swedish model’ (Leion, 1974). In spite of the existence of 
a few common institutional features (e.g., centralized wage setting) and the 
existence of Nordic congresses of labor federations, a broader discussion of 
the Swedish Rehn-Meidner model as a Nordic model did not emerge.
Mid-1970s – a Swedish model launched in  
political public spheres
Another notion of the Swedish model was launched by the Swedish social 
democrats in the mid-1970. There was some French/international attention 
to a Swedish model in the late 1960s (see Chapter 5 by Hellenes), but the 
actual struggles on how to understand it started in the Swedish political 
public sphere in 1974.
Only in the 1958–1974 period did the Rehn/Meidner model guide Swedish 
economic policies (Erixon, 2017). LO unions in exporting sectors soon crit-
icized the policy for consequences such as structural rationalization, high 
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labor mobility, and authoritarian work organization (Stråth, 1998). Illegal 
strikes in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Korpi, 1981a) indicated that parts 
of the LO grassroots opposed SAP’s routine politics. An LO-employed 
economist, Leion (1974), synthesized the criticism.
Responding to this mobilization, both LO and SAP waged new policies. 
Meidner headed the LO committee that developed a proposal for wage 
earner investment funds (WEIF). It addressed a main asymmetry in the 
Rehn/Meidner model, the problem of excess profits in the most productive 
firms. The funds would control increasing shares of these profits, dampening 
wealth inequalities, and increasing union power over investment de cisions. 
The proposal challenged the historical (Saltsjøbaden) compromise at the 
core of Swedish reformism since 1938: Employers had accepted social dem-
ocratic welfare state reforms (secured by the large number of SAP MPs), as 
long as they were allowed to retain control over investments and shop-floor 
management. In June 1976, the LO congress decided to pursue the WEIF- 
reform, suggesting the negotiation of a new historical compromise.
As governing party, SAP had already embarked on a more cautious line, 
embracing milder economic democracy reforms (laws on employment se-
curity (LAS) and codetermination (MBL) in 1974 and 1976). In contrast, 
the LO 1976 decision opted for the strongest possible version of economic 
democracy: in the longer term, unions would displace employers’ decision- 
making autonomy. The emphasis was on the contentious politics of the un-
ion grassroots, with less concern for routine politics.
Hellenes (Chapter 5) notes that wider circulation of the term ‘Swedish 
model’ started as both the social democratic and the non-socialist press dis-
cussed these matters in 1974. In 1975, and especially after the 1976 WEIF 
decision, the Conservative party attacked SAP’s concern for economic 
democracy, arguing that any violation of the original historical compro-
mise was an attack on democracy. Two interpretations of democracy here 
clashed: employers and conservative politicians insisted on political democ-
racy only, while the labor movement wanted to extend democratic partici-
pation further into the economic domain.
The labor movement was internally split on how far to extend economic 
democracy: LO surprised SAP in 1976, and despite some verbal support, 
the party elite regretted the WEIF proposal and sought to modify it (Stråth, 
1998). When SAP made the Swedish model its major PR-slogan in the 1976 
electoral campaign, that term differed markedly from the one implied in 
LO’s proposal, which was concerned with the contentious question of invest-
ment control, and suggesting negotiation of a new historical compromise. 
The SAP claim to a Swedish model summed up the historical achievements 
of social democratic routine politics under the stable historical compro-
mise until the late 1960s, celebrating its best results (welfare, safety, full 
employment).
The discussions that circulated the term ‘Swedish model’ in Swedish 
political public spheres 1974–1976 implied three divergent claims to such 
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a model. In Table 3.1, the two different understandings within the LO/
SAP-discussions are labeled the radical versus the cautious one. These two 
versions of the Swedish model circulated in different ways. The radical no-
tion was mainly reproduced in international academic discussions inside 
the science sphere, spilling over only into marginal left-wing politics. The 
cautious concept, in contrast, was generalized into a Nordic model and cir-
culated broadly between politics and research. Finally, the liberal/conserv-
ative notion (Table 3.1) played a role as Swedish employers responded to the 
WEIF challenge but became less relevant as non-socialist intellectuals and 
think tanks found they could hijack the cautious notion and disconnect it 
from the achievements of social democracy.
Types of party organization
A second conceptual resource in our analysis concerns political parties. 
They are main political organizations that operate in-between mobilization, 
contentious politics, and routine politics. They contribute many candidates 
for terms such as ‘the Swedish model’ that circulate in politics and beyond. 
We employ Katz and Mair’s (2018) periodization of the mass party (the late 
1940s to early 1970s), the catch-all party (the 1970s to the 1990s), and the 
cartel party (since the 1990s). The periodization is tailor-made for social 
democratic parties, but the last two phases apply to any party with a large 
share of the vote. The cartel party organizational form emerged since the 
1990s in conjunction with the new consensus on austere economic policies 
and delegation of power to the EU in many European states. The larger 
Table 3.1  Three claims to a Swedish model
Organization Historical Economic Capitalism/
compromise democracy democracy
Radical LO Fundamental Challenge Capitalism can 
renegotiation employers’ no longer be 




Cautious SAP Revision Negotiate and/ Capitalism and 
or legislate democracy can 
codetermination, be reconciled 
board (reformist 
representation position)
Liberal/ Non- Retain as Not a legitimate Democratic 
conservative socialist agreed in part of the principles were 
parties, 1938 democratic never meant for 
employers agenda the sphere of 
(SAF) production
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parties effectively (more than consciously) create a cartel in which the policy 
choices converge despite rhetorical disagreements.
SAP’s use of ‘Swedish model’ in the 1976 electoral campaign indicates the 
final stage of the party’s transformation from a mass party to a catch-all 
party competing for middle-class votes, thus downplaying LO’s efforts to 
counteract increasing inequalities of wealth and to push for radical eco-
nomic democracy in the large manufacturing firms.
Swedish debates in the 1980s
In later debates on the Swedish model, the three different understandings 
(Table 3.1) often circulated together in political and cultural public spheres: 
the left-labor version clashing with the right-leaning/employer version, and 
the cautious position wavering between claims that the early post-war model 
was seriously threatened (when labor was in opposition) and promises that 
it was being revised in the light of new challenges (when labor was in office). 
Conservatives held that even the cautious version would eventually under-
mine democracy, quoting the radical version as proof.
When the social democratic party returned to government in 1982, the 
WEIF proposal had been thoroughly modified. By the time it was imple-
mented in 1983, SAP’s economic and social policy making was increasingly 
influenced by a moderate group of social democratic bureaucrats and pol-
iticians, with Kjell O. Feldt and Erik Åsbrink as key persons. Despite this 
victory for the cautious version of the Swedish model in politics, even this 
watered-down proposal generated massive mobilization by the non- socialist 
side (parties and employers’ organizations), defending the conservative- 
liberal version. If – as Meidner (1993: 226) implied – Sweden by 1976 had been 
‘closer to the ideal of a classless society than any other country,’ the hostil-
ities whirled up by the WEIF-reform was one reason why its path changed. 
In a couple of decades – according to the radical interpretation – Sweden 
became the Nordic country that had departed the furthest from such radical 
ideals. In that period, the generalized concept of a Nordic model emerged.
That concept generalized the cautious notion of the Swedish model. The 
Swedish debates had already circulated it in politics, so it was easy to find 
similar elements (mixed economy, centralized bargaining, generous security 
net) in the other Nordic countries. But even that generalization was no simple 
process. At the time, social scientists had searched for Nordic common traits 
within the relatively autonomous science sphere. This scholarly development 
took place in sociology and political science. In order to cover this part of the 
story, we present another main conceptual element: the use of strong com-
parisons as a methodological tool that specifies sensitizing concepts.
Strong and loose comparisons
According to Blumer (1954: 140), the natural sciences employ definitive 
concepts, which define the traits common to a class of objects, allowing 
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inference directly from the concept to the understanding of a singular case 
and its relevant empirical properties. In contrast, the human/social sciences 
use sensitizing concepts, which are not able to define such common traits 
(attributes, benchmarks). Applied to singular cases, they only give ‘a gen-
eral sense of reference and guidance in approaching empirical instances’ 
(Blumer, 1954: 148). Sensitizing concepts require a specification for each new 
case.
This point was further developed in the case-based methodology of 
grounded theory. This ‘constant comparative method’ (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967: 102) is a way to develop middle range theories that explain by devel-
oping and adjusting sets of sensitizing concepts to specific cases. General-
ization only covers the cases that are actually investigated. Theory is thus 
not predictive. We define strong comparisons as case comparisons that study 
similarities and differences across properties of the cases relevant to the 
explanatory purpose. Empirical comparisons of all relevant properties are 
provided for all cases and for one or more specified periods. Strong com-
parison implies filling all the cells of such a case/property matrix. Loose 
comparisons fail to satisfy this criterion: all cells are not filled, empirical 
information across cases is not fully comparable, and similar properties are 
not covered in all case accounts. One form in which such loose comparisons 
appear is the edited volume with country chapters and only very short intro-
ductory and concluding chapters.
The overall methodological framework for the use of strong comparisons 
is what we have called a contextualist approach (Mjøset, 2009). Such an at-
titude was shared by three researchers that can be seen as pioneers because 
they laid down the foundations for proper research into Nordic common 
traits.
Pioneers of comparative social science in the 1960s and 1970s
In the post-war period, social science was upgraded across Western Europe, 
mainly inspired by US adaptation and upgrading of European traditions 
(Mjøset, 1991).
Three pioneers of sociology/political science posed distinct research ques-
tions that led them to study selections of nation states, the Nordics included. 
Through systematic, strong comparisons of these countries, they also be-
came pioneers of the study of state and society in Norden. They are Stein 
Rokkan (Norwegian, 1921–1979), Walter Korpi (Swedish, 1934–), and Dieter 
Senghaas (German, 1941–). Their work enabled later researchers to pose the 
question of common Nordic traits.
The pioneers conducted comparisons both within the Nordic area and be-
tween Nordic and non-Nordic countries. Two of them compared within the 
Western world, while Senghaas also compared with third world countries. 
They combined qualitative/historical and quantitative/statistical methods. 
Their historical range differed: Korpi mainly analyzed the period from the 
1930s to the present, Rokkan and Senghaas mainly the age of industrialism 
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since the nineteenth century, but Rokkan even made excursions further 
backward.
None of these pioneers made any claims to a Nordic model, but each of 
them displays a ‘relation to values,’ as Weber (1973 [1904]) called it. Rokkan 
(1970) saw the Nordic countries as early instances of multiparty mass de-
mocracy. Korpi saw Sweden as the country that recently had extended de-
mocracy the most, turning political democracy into social democracy and 
then demanding radical economic democracy (see above on the WEIF pro-
posal). Senghaas considered the Nordic countries as some of the earliest 
cases of small countries achieving catch-up industrialization that fulfilled 
a major development goal – economic growth with equity. Among the pio-
neers, only Senghaas applied a regional label: ‘The Scandinavian develop-
ment path’ (Entwicklungsweg), mainly analyzing Finland (working paper ca. 
1980, later Chapter 2 in Senghaas, 1982).
This development of conceptual frameworks in the science sphere took 
place in relative autonomy from other public spheres. Unlike economics, 
these upstart disciplines (sociology, political science) had few direct connec-
tions to the administrative public sphere. They did not make models related 
to national accounts and planning. They studied historical mobilization, 
returning to the more institutionalist/legal, historical kind of political econ-
omy that mathematized economics had left behind. True, like most scholars 
in the 1960s, the pioneers aimed at general theories. Rokkan tried out formal 
conceptual frameworks from Parsons and Hirschman, Korpi developed a 
power resource framework that modeled historical compromises between 
collective actors (referring to rational choice theory), and Senghaas combined 
dependency theories from development economics with linkage theories of 
economic growth. But each of their conceptual frameworks was related to 
the relevant contexts by means of strong comparisons. In this way sensitizing 
concepts were contextualized into components of conjunctural explanations 
of the outcomes under study. Their methodological self- understanding may 
have been conventional (closer to the standard approach, Mjøset, 2009), but 
their comparisons yielded comprehensive case accounts and contextualized 
generalizations, typical of the contextualist approach.
Korpi published some of his most important scientific works (synthe-
sized in Korpi, 1983) during the historical context of the WEIF debates 
1976–1983. He studied the administration/mobilization dilemma (as defined 
above) through large survey materials on the situation of Swedish metal-
workers (Korpi, 1978). He further generated an empirically based taxon-
omy that ranked Western countries depending on the degree to which labor 
movements had been able to accumulate wage earners’ power resources (in 
parliamentary democratic institutions) to counter the power resources of 
employers (investment and labor process control) (Korpi, 1983).
Some may argue that Korpi was biased. He related to the WEIF debates 
in the public sphere like any other active citizen. As a SAP member, he 
wrote in the party journal (Korpi, 1981b), criticizing LO’s scheme for being 
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too syndicalist. Modifying LO’s suggestion that only unions would be rep-
resented on the funds’ boards, Korpi (1982) proposed broader board rep-
resentation by local governments and civil society groups. In the end, as we 
saw (p. 37 above), both proposals lost out.
Korpi’s views in the WEIF debates were based on his research, but his in-
terventions in the mobilizing political sphere did not affect the concepts he – 
as a researcher – chose to employ when formulating his research questions 
and developing explanations of contemporary processes. Below, we argue 
that such grounding was lost when a new wave of researchers just took the 
reality of a Swedish or Nordic model for granted.
In principle, developing the pioneers’ strong comparisons, one should be 
able to determine whether – and in what respects – the Nordic countries 
display enough similarities to merit conclusions on common traits. These 
conclusions might then be aggregated into properties of a synthetic under-
standing of Nordic common traits, valid for a certain historical period. 
Several synthetic models would be possible, depending on the research ques-
tions asked and the properties involved. Thus, on the basis of these results 
and additional research, some of the pioneers’ followers explicitly began to 
discuss Nordic common traits.
The Late 1970s to the early 1990s – social science followers 
searching for common Nordic traits
In the mid-to-late 1970s, the followers extended the work of their teachers 
in many ways, addressing both old and new research questions. They did so 
just as the Swedish model claim surfaced in Swedish political public spheres 
(see p. 37 above). Possibly, this led some of them to investigate claims to 
common Scandinavian or Nordic traits. Still, the question of a Nordic 
model did not come up in these scholarly debates. The questions they asked 
related to current debates in both political and cultural public spheres, but 
answers were developed within the science sphere, relatively independent of 
circulating terms from other public spheres.
The Australian political scientist Francis G. Castles (1978) – drawing on 
concepts and findings from Rokkan – was the first follower to thoroughly 
analyze common Scandinavian traits, labeled a social democratic ‘image’ 
of society. Other Rokkan-students (Lafferty, 1971; Østerud, 1978; Kuhnle, 
1975, 1978, 1981) had analyzed Nordic countries, but only comparing, not 
studying common traits. Later, Kuhnle also studied common traits (Al-
estalo and Kuhnle, 1986).
In several influential contributions, sociologist Gøsta Esping-Andersen 
(1980, 1985) – using Korpi’s data set (Esping-Andersen, 1990) – suggested 
a typology of welfare regimes, linking state, labor market, and family. He 
distinguished the social democratic regime from the conservative (continen-
tal Europe) and liberal (Anglo-Saxon) regimes. Later, political scientists 
Evelyn Huber and John D. Stephens (2001; summing up research since the 
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1980s) – based on their own dataset – explicitly used the term ‘Nordic social 
democratic welfare state,’ analyzing the three Scandinavian countries and 
Finland. There were several other followers, and the following four points 
apply to all of them.
First, the work of the followers yielded no converging conclusions on 
common traits. Like the pioneers, the followers did not think of one Nor-
dic model when they designed their projects. Claims to common traits were 
made on the basis of careful comparisons, both within Norden and with 
non-Nordic cases.
A striking example is the joint work of the most influential pioneer/
follower team. In the mid-1980s, Esping-Andersen and Korpi explicitly 
discussed common features of Nordic welfare states. In their original cal-
culation of power resource and decommodification indexes, they found 
that Finland ranked lower than Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. Esping- 
Andersen defined decommodification by the combination of universalism 
(pension provision) and generous benefit levels, securing maximum per-
sonal independence from the market. Nordic traits could not be reduced 
to high decommodification scores since also Belgium and the Netherlands 
scored high here. A distinct Nordic approach emerged only when the egal-
itarian orientation was included. The same conclusion was brought out in 
a clustered case comparison between Scandinavia, Austria, and Germany 
(Esping- Andersen and Korpi, 1984). They explicitly challenged a view held 
by several Rokkan followers (including Kuhnle) that the post-war welfare 
states were explained by political consensus rather than by the relative power 
position of the labor movements (Esping-Andersen and Korpi, 1986: 71).
Referring to complementarities between the welfare state and other insti-
tutional complexes, their approach was definitely synthetic as defined above. 
They emphasized that egalitarianism (less skewed income distribution) was 
also taken care of via taxation, collective bargaining, and manpower re-
training measures (active labor market policies).
Second, the fifth sovereign member country of the Nordic council 
(founded 1952), Iceland, was seldom included in these comparisons. Among 
the pioneers, only Rokkan (1981) included the country on equal terms with 
the others. Among the followers, Iceland was fully included in a compar-
ison of the five Nordic post-war economic policy models (Mjøset, 1987), 
and in studies of its welfare state in a comparative Scandinavian perspec-
tive (Ólafsson, 1993). The fact that Iceland shares a Nordic early history is 
a challenge for any research-based discussion of a Nordic model (Mjøset, 
2011a) since its historical development from around the Napoleonic wars 
displays more elements of economic dependency, later and more one-sided 
industrialization, and a weaker coalition for bureaucratic autonomy than 
any of the other Nordic states.
Third, many of the followers were inspired by the radical version of the 
Swedish model. They had been socialized into academic social science dur-
ing the student revolt. That revolt was no broad social mobilization; rather it 
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was a mobilization internal to the institutions of higher learning. Attempts 
to broaden mobilization into general politics hardly ever led to more than 
small-scale political organizations expressing revolutionary romanticism. 
The best research on the Nordic countries was never driven by such senti-
ments. Still, many young scholars at the time were inspired by the continu-
ities between the Rehn/Meidner model and the WEIF proposal. Especially 
non-Nordic scholars here saw a ‘third way’ to democratic socialism. Martin 
(1975, and several other publications) was an early case, followed by Ste-
phens (1979; cf also Huber/Stephens, 2001). However, none of these scholars 
idealized the WEIF proposal since they all followed the Swedish situation 
very closely.
Fourth, the followers later directed attention to the issues brought up 
by the feminist movement. Esping-Andersen (1999) and others, driven by 
discussions with feminist researchers, argued that high female labor force 
participation rates were an integral part of the social-democratic welfare 
regime. Esping-Andersen coined the concept ‘defamilialization,’ social pol-
icies that render women autonomous to engage in the labor market or to 
set up autonomous households. Defamilialization turned out to be one of 
the strongest instances of a single common trait. The main demographic 
outcome was a relatively high fertility rate, making the emerging ‘aging cri-
sis’ less of a problem in Norden than on the continent. However, that out-
come could be observed in at least one continental welfare state too, namely 
France. Specified comparisons, particularly referring to the French prona-
talist tradition in family policies, were needed here. There is now a large 
literature covering the ‘women-friendly’ welfare states in the Nordic area, 
celebrating the region’s recent tradition of state feminism (Hernes, 1987), 
another case of a mobilization/administration link.
Concerning family policies as an important branch of social policies (in 
contrast to the principle of subsidiarity typical of Catholic countries), pol-
icy ideas have circulated across public spheres connecting state feminist 
activists (whether in academia or in movements) and administrators in so-
cial affairs ministries. This was the first time social researchers focused on 
potential common traits that were not directly linked to the history of the 
social-democratic labor movement (Lister, 2009). Bergqvist et al. (1999) pro-
vide comparisons of gender and politics in all five Nordic cases, concluding 
with a balanced count of similarities and differences. They do not claim to 
study a Nordic model in this field.
1980s social democratic politics – emergence of the Nordic 
model in political public spheres
In the early 1980s, the cautious notion of the Swedish model was general-
ized for Norden. This was accomplished within SAMAK, the discussion 
forum for all the Nordic social democratic parties/organizations (Lundberg, 
2006; Parr, 2007). Following committee work in 1981, the former Norwegian 
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finance minister, Per Kleppe, in 1982 presented a paper (to the SAMAK 
congress) entitled The Nordic Model. An outline for discussion. In the dry bu-
reaucrat language of the administrative public sphere, he surveyed the main 
challenges to Nordic social democratic routine politics in the early 1980s.
The main external challenge was the lower average rates of world eco-
nomic growth as well as the coming of newly industrializing, low-wage com-
petitors. In addition, there were internal challenges, largely unanticipated 
consequences of labor’s (and other governing parties’) policies during the 
preceding ‘Golden age’: the fact that the various national ‘Keynesian’ va-
rieties of economic policy making were less effective (stagflation); unruly 
grassroots at the factory level; and protests focusing on nature conservation.
Kleppe regarded the old model as a synthetic one, combining solidaristic 
wage-policy in collective bargaining, a welfare state safety net, ‘Keynesian’ 
economic policies, and redistributive arrangements. The new model he sug-
gested was an upgraded version of the cautious Swedish model. The main 
Swedish representative on the SAMAK committee was Feldt, a clear pro-
ponent of the cautious – against the radical – version (Table 3.1). However, 
one point was shared with the radical version: the old model was regarded as 
outdated. But Kleppe’s new model would pursue the cautious line, not push 
toward the radical WEIF alternative.
Kleppe’s ‘outline for discussion’ only used the phrase ‘Nordic model’ in 
the title. In the main text, ‘Scandinavian model’ was the preferred label. He 
generalized the Norwegian and Swedish experiences, and to some extent 
the Danish one as well. It mattered little for his attempts to define a new 
model that Finland and Iceland most likely did not share all elements of 
the old model. For instance, their wage negotiations had been wound up 
with devaluation cycles (Mjøset, 1987). Kleppe was probably aware that the 
Finnish and Icelandic members of SAMAK were eager to follow and learn 
from the three leading Nordic social democracies. He could also reasonably 
assume that Iceland and Finland faced the same external challenges as the 
three others. Whether the internal challenges were similar for all SAMAK 
members was never discussed.
The analysis conveyed a deep sense of the administration/mobilization 
dilemma. Kleppe noted that some might consider it strange to discuss ‘tech-
nical questions’ such as the composition of state budgets and credit flows. 
But he stated as a fact that the economics experts are in control. If politi-
cians did not interfere ‘with the work of the “technicians,” these “techni-
cians” will strongly limit the politicians’ chances of achieving their goals’ 
(Kleppe, 1982: 15). Thus, a new model – like the old one – should be able 
to forge renewed links between an administrative elite and the movement’s 
grassroots. The administration/mobilization dilemma should be solved by 
forging a closer connection between contentious and routine politics.
But at the same time, the quest for a new model was – as in the case of 
the cautious Swedish model – related to the labor parties’ efforts to succeed 
as catch-all parties. Kleppe urged a Norden-wide discussion of what the 
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movement could do to mobilize voters to support the same political forces 
that had guaranteed welfare, equality, and security throughout the 1950s 
and 1960s.
Kleppe’s notion of the old model, like the earlier cautious Swedish model 
claim had little basis in research. As shown above, by 1980 researchers had 
come up with terms such as ‘social democratic image of society’ and ‘Scan-
dinavian development path.’ But Kleppe’s account shows no inspiration 
from such explorations of common traits. His political reference to a Nordic 
model was not a case of a concept circulating from the science sphere into 
politics.
Since the early 1980s, the Nordic model was increasingly on the agenda 
in the social democrat movement, especially in SAMAK. Two points, how-
ever, should be noted: First, SAMAK applied Chatham house-like rules, 
blocking circulation to the broader political public sphere (Parr, 2007: 33). 
Second, SAMAK was less concerned with common Nordic traits than with 
what the five countries could achieve together. In the 1980s, they discussed 
whether the Nordic countries could solve the new challenges by concerted 
action. But such Nordic concertation failed in the early 1990s crises, and 
SAMAK became more preoccupied with the chances that social- democratic 
principles might be reinforced via the EU level.
It took some time before the notion of a Nordic model became really in-
fluential in social and historical research. The 1980s saw the publication 
of a lot of follower works (Esping-Andersen, 1980, 1985, 1990, and various 
others), projects that had been conceived and started too early to be fully 
affected by the growing political attention to a Nordic model. Only since the 
late 1980s and through the 1990s has the term been more widely quoted in 
both political and science spheres. This circulation from the political to the 
science sphere turned the Nordic model into a boundary term.
The spread of the Nordic model as a boundary term  
since the 1990s
At the time, higher learning and research changed in important respects. 
The number of skilled social researchers grew, university departments and 
independent research institutes expanded. Economics had played a role in 
state planning since the late 1930s; now the younger social sciences followed 
suit. The university became a mass university, while the evaluation of re-
search proposals became more systematic and funding more focused on 
value for society.
As for politics, government power increasingly shifted between social 
democratic and non-socialist coalitions. The cautious notion of the Nordic 
model seemed to function even with non-socialist governments. Social dem-
ocratic parties were transformed into cartel parties sharing responsibility 
with the main non-socialist parties for tight economic policies and struc-
tural reforms. There was a political learning process: non-socialist parties 
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and think tanks gave up criticism and instead embraced the cautious model, 
holding that it could sustain employers’ interest in growth and stability.
These broader changes form the background to a more subtle change in 
the science sphere. Through the 1990s, an increasing number of social re-
searchers internalized the Nordic model to such an extent that it was written 
into their research proposals. They allowed a boundary term (‘the Nordic 
model’ or varieties thereof: ‘Nordic welfare state,’ ‘Nordic capitalism’) to be 
part of the outcomes they wanted to explain. They accepted the reality of an 
entity that the earlier followers had only explored on the basis of the work 
of the pioneers. Now, in contrast, the aggregation to Nordic common traits 
was accomplished before the research started. These researchers took the 
model for granted already when defining their research problems. For lack 
of a better term, we label them new wave researchers.
These researchers no longer asked whether all the Nordic cases could be 
subsumed under one concept. They reasoned like Kleppe and a corps of 
other social democratic politicians, generalizing the Swedish experience 
(somehow akin to Norway and Denmark) even for Finland and Iceland. 
If comparisons were made at all, they were loose comparisons, as defined 
above. Whatever qualifications followed in the course of the analysis; some 
ambivalent notion of the Nordic model survived in the conclusion.
Boundary terms spread because they facilitate communication across 
public spheres and establish common reference points in discourses. Their 
meanings differ across the various actors and groups that refer to them. 
The adoption of a boundary term as a scientific concept is not necessarily 
a problem, at least not if researchers treat it as a sensitizing concept, to be 
specified via strong comparisons. However, since the term is used across dif-
ferent discourses, it lends itself easily to lose comparisons. This again invites 
styles of generalization that are insensitive to actual cases. The new wave 
analyses often referred to the three Scandinavian countries, sometimes with 
Finland added, or all five Nordics. But for macro-units such as a country – 
however small – this implies that researchers ignore the specific contexts 
within which actors in the various countries operate. This is so regardless of 
how open the economy is and how many international regimes the state has 
committed itself to. Loose comparisons do not seriously address criteria for 
including cases, the period for which model claims are made, the issue areas 
included, and the properties involved.
New wave research appeared first in sociology and political science, 
both in qualitative and in quantitative projects. Although twitter-size as-
sessments are unfair, two examples may be quoted. The project reported in 
Kauto et al (1999, 2001) used variables-based methods, analyzing regression 
net effects within specific social policy domains. The very brief concluding 
chapters fragment into unsystematic counts of subsections of social policies 
where the case countries differ as compared to subsections where they are 
similar. A later project for SAMAK provided five extensive country stud-
ies of qualitative analysis and descriptive statistics, but the final synthetic 
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report (Dølvik et al., 2015) portrays Nordic developments primarily in ag-
gregate terms, thus failing to provide the strong comparisons that could 
have been constructed from the country studies. In both cases, it may well 
be that strong comparisons ended up as residuals because of strict time lim-
its as funds for research began to run out. But the problem should be noted 
anyway.
Pioneers, followers, and new wave researchers should not be conceived as 
generations. In other words, even after new wave research appeared, there 
have been studies that approach the strong comparisons of the pioneers/
followers. Examples are the Bergqvist et al (1999) study already mentioned, 
as well as the account of the ‘Nordic labor relations model’ by Bruun et al. 
(1992), and studies by American scholars Baldwin (1990), and Luebbert 
(1991), both of which also provide important comparisons with non-Nordic 
cases.
In the following, we discuss the consequences of the more frequent and 
wider circulation of the Nordic model boundary term between the politi-
cal and science public sphere (summarized in Table 3.2). Inside the science 
sphere, the term inspired a larger range of disciplines, triggering research 
in line with their various disciplinary profiles. This implied that both the 
standard and the social-philosophical attitudes were more frequently rep-
resented. These profiles had less of tradition for comparison, so it was easy 
for researchers to take the ‘model’ for granted in the new wave sense. In the 
following, we investigate economics and one branch of history, representing 
the standard and social-philosophical approaches, respectively.
Nordic model for economists
The economics discipline seeks rigor through a combination of mathemat-
ical formalisms (usually constrained optimization) and a general theory 
of actor motivations (producers maximize profits, consumers maximize 
utility). This combination yields idealized models that are used as thought 
experiments.
Comparing economic models to models in physics, Cartwright (2007: 
Ch. 15) found that since economic models lack bridge principles that trans-
late them into empirical experiments, the mathematical formalism chosen 
plays a more important role than in physics. Unlike with physics laws, inter-
nal validity comes at the cost of external validity. In what economists’ dub 
‘toy economy’ models, assumptions about economic realities are stated in 
ways that fit the formalism. In economics, the prestige of modeling is so high 
that many scholars succeed in publishing work that ignores external validity.
When it comes to quantitative, empirical methods, the difference between 
economics, sociology, and political science is less pronounced. All these 
disciplines employ statistical analysis of large, non-experimental datasets. 
Historically, economics was the pioneer. However, unlike the other social 
sciences, modern mathematized economics has no tradition for case studies. 
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Comparative methods play no significant role. Strong comparisons contrast 
with most elements of the economics disciplinary profile.
The Nordic model first caught the interest of some academic economists. 
A dialogue with political science and sociology was facilitated by an interest 
in rational choice modeling in parts of these disciplines. Within political 
science, Michael Wallerstein already in the 1980s (with Adam Przeworski) 
combined historically informed work on labor and politics with consid-
erable skills in economic modeling and quantitative data analysis. From 
the early 1990s, Wallerstein cooperated with Norwegian economist Kalle 
Moene.
Substantively, they studied topics that sociology and political science had 
brought up, especially drawn from the radical interpretation in continuity 
with the Rehn/Meidner model. But their method of analysis was different. 
Consistent with the disciplinary profile of economics, they used constrained 
optimization formalisms with econometric empirical checks. Like other 
new wave scholars, they took the Nordic model for granted. Like earlier re-
search in the 1980s, they saw the model as being ‘in retreat.’ Later, they were 
less certain. They avoided the dilemma between the radical and the cautious 
interpretation (Table 3.1) by arguing that whatever the fate of social democ-
racy in Europe, ‘Nordic lessons’ were highly relevant for social reformers 
elsewhere and particularly in the third world (Moene, 2008: 368).
After Wallerstein’s death in 2006, Moene continued along the same lines in 
the ESOP project (2007–2017) at the University of Oslo. The topic of Nordic 
lessons for third world countries had been investigated by pioneer Senghaas 
since the mid-1970s (Mjøset, 2007). It is a proof of the divergence between 
social science disciplines that the ESOP project never considered the les-
sons that had already been drawn in that project, led by Senghaas. One 
may guess that one reason was that Senghaas never employed constrained 
optimization models or statistical inference. In contrast, he pursued a series 
of case studies by means of strong comparisons.
The ESOP project spread selected findings into political and cultural- 
political spheres, at least in Norway. Still, the main repercussions of the 
project were internal to the international economics profession. Methodo-
logically, the ESOP researchers demonstrated to other economists that the 
advantages of the Nordic countries could be modeled by toy economy tech-
niques. They mostly modeled the small open Nordic economies taken in 
isolation. It is, however, equally possible to draw up a toy economy model of 
the world economy, choosing assumptions and mathematical form, conclud-
ing that Nordic capitalism is ‘cuddly capitalism’ (Acemoglou et al., 2012).
Such parallel toy economies are not competing theories. Each model 
is a thought experiment. There is no way to discriminate empirically be-
tween the various toy economies modeled, each of which depicts one way 
of thinking about various aspects of an economy. The ‘cuddly capitalism’ 
toy economy thought experiment runs counter to the ESOP idea of ben-
eficial ‘learning from Norden’ in poor countries, but thorough empirical 
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investigations – moving beyond toy economy models – would be needed to 
answer that question. Stiglitz (2015) provided a reply with more case mate-
rial on the United States, but he still basically pursued thought experimen-
tal modeling.
Somewhat later, applied macroeconomists also became concerned with 
the Nordic model. Many such experts had been involved in fiscal and mon-
etary management of the Nordic economies under new conditions since the 
1980s. The most relevant schools were varieties of Keynesianism, but all 
strands agreed that the region’s varieties of centralized labor market bar-
gaining are quite efficient institutions despite their breach of free-market 
principles (Andersen et al., 2007; overview in Erixon, 2011; Mjøset, 2011a).
We now turn to a specific humanities tradition, at the opposite end of the 
disciplinary spectrum from economics.
Nordic model for cultural turn humanities
Contemporary humanities contain several disciplinary profiles. We focus 
on the discipline of history, but even that discipline in itself is more diverse 
than economics. Modern historical science has traditionally been commit-
ted to archives-based research on aspects of national histories. From the 
1960s student movement on, historians were also influenced by sociology/
political science. Since the 1990s, the so-called linguistic or cultural turn 
implied additional influence from the aesthetic humanities.
History’s disciplinary profile today combines these three impulses. First, 
process tracing based on archives and other sources allows reconstruction 
of chains of events tied together by singular causal conjunctures. Second, 
the social science impulse leads to histories of economic development, var-
ious social groups (workers, women), and international developments. This 
implies a historical study of contexts within which such historical processes 
are embedded. Third, the recent cultural turn requires interpretation of the 
historical evolution and impact of knowledge regimes.
The aesthetic humanities disciplines interpret human works of art. The 
cultural turn generalized such methods to the study of texts and artifacts. 
This analysis can be conducted in entirely formal terms, moving close to 
linguistics and cognitive science. But mostly, interpretation also involves 
judgments on the context of the work in terms such as ‘Zeitgeist’ (spirit of 
the age), identity, or some existential archetype. Such terms may become 
boundary terms if they start to circulate between science and cultural liter-
ary spheres. At times, they are linked up with social philosophical theories 
of modernity within sociology, contributing their versions of the kind of 
synthetic accounts that we here study. We shall discuss two cases of such 
cultural studies-inspired history.
Swedish historians Bo Stråth and Lars Trägårdh both regard Nordic ‘mo-
dernity’ as a special case of Western modernity. They generalize the Swed-
ish case, despite cursory remarks about differences to other Nordic cases 
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in certain respects. None of them conduct any strong internal Nordic com-
parisons. Both conduct some loose external comparisons with other areas 
of the West (Stråth with Germany, Trägårdh with both Germany and the 
United States).
Trägårdh’s (1997) main external comparisons are with liberal United 
States and Christian democratic Germany. Their political cultures, he 
claims, stem from the generalization of the political privileges of the bour-
geoisie (the United States) and the nobles (Germany) to the lower classes. 
Sweden, by contrast, leveled upper-class privileges down to the level of the 
peasants. His core category ‘statist individualism’ indicates that the ‘rather 
universal drive’ of ‘striving for individual freedom and prosperity (life, lib-
erty, the pursuit of happiness)’ has been thoroughly institutionalized by the 
Nordic states. He also summarizes his overall comparison in a triangular 
form (Berggren and Trägårdh, 2011); Sweden fuses state and individual, ig-
noring the family; the United States fuses family and the individual, with 
skepticism against the state; Germany finally fuses the state and the family, 
ignoring the individual.
Stråth claims that Western modernity implies a tension between freedom 
and equality, which is solved in Nordic modernity through ‘individualism 
with solidarity’ (Stråth, 2012: 28). For instance, he suggests that when Nor-
dic intellectuals/clergy mobilized tradition by constructing the ‘figure of the 
peasant,’ they reduced ‘the conflict between freedom and equality’ (Stråth, 
2012: 29).
These formulas are quite similar, but Trägårdh emphasizes the individ-
ualist side more than Stråth. Trägårdh downplays as much as possible any 
autonomous impact of social mobilization and formation of associations 
within civil society, thus ignoring a long line of research (e.g., Jansson, 1988; 
Nielsen, 2009; Stenius, 2010). Maximizing the contrast to US developments, 
he regards Nordic civil society solely as a function of the state. To the extent 
the labor movement is mentioned, its success in the 1930s–1970s period is 
analyzed as an effect of conditions established earlier, such as the reforma-
tion and peasant influence on the state. (In this respect, the interpretation in 
Sanandaji (2015) is similar, but the analysis of the state differs.)
In contrast, Stråth (2012: 25) links Nordic modernity to ‘images of a 
Social Democratic model,’ implying ‘progressive and egalitarian develop-
ment,’ including more economic and political elements. Still, even Stråth 
puts heavy emphasis on the historical conditions antedating the red/green 
alliances of the late 1930s.
Both Stråth and Trägårdh rely basically on cultural studies, histories of 
ideas, and political philosophy. Stråth, however, has a large publication list 
of historical studies that he can rely on. Full causal conjunctures are hardly 
discussed. Both scholars hint that the cultural matters they trace have ex-
planatory relevance. But it is never demonstrated empirically that the added 
‘modernity’ factors – pertaining to the knowledge regime – are necessary to 
correct earlier explanatory deficiencies.
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History and strong comparisons
It should be emphasized that there are many recent historical contributions 
of relevance to the study of Nordic common traits that do not share such a 
strong cultural studies commitment. Rather, they mostly combine social sci-
ence impulses with historical process tracing. Some of these studies (such as 
Hilson’s (2008) historical overview and political scientist Knudsen’s (2010) 
study of Protestantism and the origins of the welfare state) are on the verge 
of strong comparisons but often struggle to accommodate history’s com-
mitment to reconstruction of singular cases. Although it is unfair to com-
ment on major historical contributions in just a few sentences, the following 
remarks must suffice.
It is striking that the Fellman et al. (2008) study of Nordic capitalism in-
cludes country chapters on Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden that 
apply the same economic history periodization, while the brief introduc-
tory and concluding chapters make no serious attempt to define properties 
and make comparisons within each period. The Christiansen et al. (2006) 
volume covers all five cases, providing many valuable comparisons within 
separate areas of the welfare state, but again, introductory and summary 
chapters fail to provide synthesis. (It should be emphasized that a similar 
criticism would apply to most of Mjøset, 2011b.) In this case, they do not 
provide a satisfactory analysis of complementarities between the various 
institutional complexes. Furthermore, an interesting attempt is made to 
reduce the importance of comparisons by suggesting that parts of the ex-
planation rely on international networks and regimes of Nordic, European, 
and Western range. However, this balancing between regional and national 
explanatory factors is not carried out in sufficient detail. The role of domes-
tic factors tends to be minimized with reference to a generalized critique of 
‘methodological nationalism,’ one that possibly hits many earlier historical 
works on Nordic cases, but not the social science work as represented by the 
tradition from the pioneers.
Finally, with his study of the development of Nordic democracy, Nielsen 
(2009) does a masterly job of weaving together material from the four large 
Nordics (and partly even Iceland) in a net of impressionistic comparisons 
and selected case accounts. The conclusion provides an explicit and bal-
anced discussion of ‘one Nordic model – or several Nordic ones’ (Nielsen, 
2009: 568). Thus, is the most valuable historical work so far when it comes to 
accumulating case material according to topics and periods although pro-
vision of an explicit case/property matrix would be a breach of the more 
literary/philosophical style chosen by Nielsen for his magnum opus.
Generalization of the model since the 1990s
In the wake of troubles in the 1970s/1980s, converging groups of economic 
experts played crucial roles in reforms of tax/pension systems and other 
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structural reforms, bringing economic management on a new footing, with 
fiscal rules, central bank autonomy, European integration, and a focus on 
external surplus.
The macroeconomic interpretation mentioned above has been used to 
shore up both the two non-radical interpretations distinguished in Table 3.1. 
An upgraded liberal-conservative version argues that there were no alter-
natives to the cuts and austerity measures pursued during the periods of 
high unemployment since the 1990s. Austerity measures adapted the Nor-
dic economies to the new external realities of EU single market integra-
tion, financial deregulation, and transition to a European single currency 
in the Eurozone. All five countries did well in the China boom, particularly 
2001–2008.
The new mainstream expert consensus was blessed by the EU and the 
OECD (Sapir, 2006). In the early 2000s, it was generalized as a Nordic ca-
pacity for adjustment to whatever external shocks that might emerge. The re-
vised model implied increased inequalities in income and wealth and higher 
average unemployment rates but was still celebrated as a liberal-democratic 
Nordic model of trust, consensus, and discipline. Unlike Anglo-American 
liberalism, the model was founded on trust in the state, and unlike continen-
tal models, it ‘defamilializes’ society by generalizing the dual-income family 
(cf. Trägårdh’s triangle). First confined to expert circuits, this interpretation 
gained more general attention after the 2008 financial crisis. It was also re-
interpreted in line with liberal political philosophy and spread via liberal 
think tanks (Sanandaji, 2015; Gissurarson, 2018).
Since the profiles of economics and humanities interpretations are so 
different, cooperation is unusual. But we shall cover one striking attempt 
at synthesis. Klas Eklund has a prominent background on Sweden’s ‘bu-
reaucrat right’ (Kanslihögern). He was earlier linked to SAP, state secre-
tary under Feldt, author of economics textbooks, and is now a chief bank 
economist. In a pamphlet (Eklund, 2010) presented to the Davos World 
Economic Forum January 26–30, 2011, he outlined the new mainstream 
expert consensus. His analysis was shored up historically by Berggren and 
Trägårdh (2010).
Their main claim was that the self-realization/autonomy inherent in Nor-
dic statist individualism (now dubbed ‘strong,’ ‘extreme,’ ‘radical’) equals 
the main principles of the market (Berggren and Trägårdh, 2010: 13). Not 
solidaristic institutions, but rather such individualism explains why Nor-
dic people are ‘more willing to accept the market economy both as con-
sumers and producers.’ Nordic development in the twentieth century is here 
reduced to one goal: ‘to liberate the individual citizen from all forms of sub-
ordination and dependency within the family and in civil society.’ Thus, all 
main institutions, such as the welfare state, the health care, and educational 
systems, are expressions of ‘a long history of investing in individuals and 
providing access to resources that allow them to maximize their value in the 
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market place’ (Berggren and Trägårdh, 2010: 14, 17). The main difference 
from classical liberal political philosophy is that a strong state balances civil 
society.
While praising ‘the fundamental coherence and vitality of Nordic cap-
italism,’ their discussion of what other countries can learn is timid. They 
warn that reference to ‘values’ and ‘culture’ only will not be helpful, 
suggesting instead ‘down-to-earth analysis of concrete institutions and 
 policies’ (Berggren and Trägårdh, 2010: 24). They are sure that the Nordic 
‘social contract’ sustains a resilient type of capitalism but consider it an 
empirical question whether that contract is ‘strong enough to withstand the 
polarizing impact of immigration and increased diversity’ (Berggren and 
Trägårdh 2010: 23). It is not the end of history after all; the model may still 
be under pressure.
As always, Iceland is interesting here. The cultural preconditions empha-
sized by cultural turn historians (reformation, the peasant figure) apply to 
Iceland too. But Eklund’s analysis – as most analyses of Nordic common 
traits – did not include Iceland. Once Iceland is taken seriously as a case, it 
is plain that it did not display a strong adaptive capacity in the 2008 global 
financial meltdown. Its financial system crashed miserably. Thus, shared 
Nordic historical preconditions do not always translate into superior ad-
justment capacity, contrary to Gissurarson’s (2018) claims.
Economists and cultural turn-oriented historians represent two dif-
ferent styles of decontextualizing generalization (standard and social- 
philosophical in Mjøset 2009). Their disciplinary profiles are both adverse 
to strong comparisons. These disciplines were inclined to formal or cultural 
generalizations, incompatible with a case-based, contextual strategy of 
generalization. Economists’ generalizations come as toy economy models 
with questionable external validity. Their concepts are definitive (in Blum-
er’s sense) only inside of the mathematical model. Cultural turn historians 
came up with formulas (freedom and solidarity/statist individualism) in-
tended to tap a deep-seated political culture. They do not reflect on their 
epochal terms as boundary terms, thus failing to treat them as sensitizing 
concepts. Instead, they combine loose comparisons (mostly only external) 
with more or less idiosyncratic interpretations of the present pieced together 
from historical terms, political-philosophical concepts, and sociologies of 
modernity.
These economists and historians seem to end up in similar dilemmas. 
If Stråth wanted to link his analysis of the present to a radical political 
position, he would have to realize that a very similar analysis can be used 
to shore up a liberal position (cf. Berggren and Trägårdh, 2010, discussed 
above). As for the economists – as we saw – their modeling cannot decide 
whether one should regard the Nordic model as a template for third world 
countries or as a case of cuddly capitalism. The research is simply not suffi-
ciently contextualized. Abstract and general frameworks fit all.
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Conclusions
Circulating as a boundary term, the Nordic model attracted wider interest. 
Table 3.2 summarizes the interaction between science sphere developments 
(diversification in disciplinary attention within social science and the hu-
manities) and political sphere developments (ideological divisions, admin-
istrative concerns).
The generalization of the cautious Swedish model to a Nordic model 
marks the turn into the second period. The transition between the second 
and third periods spanned all of the 1990s. Since then, we find historical, 
geographical, and disciplinary extensions in the science sphere, and a larger 
share of decontextualized generalizations. In political terms, the Nordic 
model was no longer considered exclusively as a social democratic one.
Although terms circulate from political public spheres to the science 
sphere, conceptions of the Nordic model within the science sphere are also 
affected by factors internal to that sphere. In social science and the hu-
manities, various conceptions are increasingly insulated within different 
disciplines. Few scholars have the urge to discuss across disciplines. Those 
engaged in political and cultural disputes in public spheres outside of sci-
ence can pick and choose from whatever discipline in the science sphere that 
legitimates the arguments they favor.
Our survey yields a rough guide to three main positions in contempo-
rary debates. They parallel the three interpretations of the Swedish model in 
 Table 3.1, and each position relates to the Table 3.2 periodization.
The radical interpretation turns Swedish social democracy at the peak of 
its power – Rehn/Meidner model to the 1976 WEIF proposal – into a norm 
(examples: Dow and Higgins 2013; Therborn, 2018; Andersson, 2015). In this 
view, the Swedish model is now a neoliberal one, the early post-war version 
at most survives as a political ideal on the socialist left.
The second, social democratic/centrist interpretation still traces the ori-
gins of the model to the 1930s, emphasizing the labor parties’ influence in all 
Nordics. This reflects the second period. Although that model faced major 
challenges, and at times failed to mobilize new voter support for the catch 
all labor parties, it has still proven resilient under recent external challenges 
(cf. the SAMAK/FAFO-project, Dølvik et al., 2015).
The third interpretation is the revised liberal one exemplified not only by 
Trägårdh’s synthesis but also by mainstream economic experts’ statements. 
It emphasizes resilience since the 1980s but brackets the historical impor-
tance of the labor movements. Some varieties may even argue that the pe-
riod of social democrat dominance was the cause of the 1970s/1980s troubles 
(Gissurarson, 2018). To the extent it is extended historically, the main claim 
is that the most important specificities of the Nordic countries emerged be-
fore labor had any political influence (Fasting et al., 2011; Sanandaji, 2015). 
In this interpretation, any element of threats to the model is played down. 
There is no need to search for a new model.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































But the celebration of resilience may not last long. Even before the Covid-19 
pandemic in March 2020, a number of other new challenges appeared: a new 
economic cold war, decreasing capacity of great power cooperation, and 
multiple setbacks for EU integration. While the liberal-conservative Davos 
enthusiasm of the early 2010s still could count on China as the growth en-
gine of the world economy, the new friends of the Nordic model will surely 
have to think twice. Even for the politicized claims to a Nordic model, 
proper periodization and contextualization of both external and internal 
challenges are unavoidable.
Note
 1 I am thankful to Andreas Mørkved Hellenes, Reijo Miettinen, Stein Kuhnle, 
Robert Marc Friedman, John Bowman, Haldor Byrkjeflot, and Klaus Petersen 
for comments on earlier drafts. I dedicate this paper to Per Kleppe (1923–2021), 
who, on his retirement from politics, turned up at the University of Oslo as a 
keen student of comparative social science.
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Introduction
While the Nordic countries are generally considered comparatively calm, 
they occasionally attract more intensive attention. For example, the image 
of Sweden became highly contested internationally as former US President 
Donald Trump in mid-February 2017 referred to a television program aired 
by Fox News that described Sweden in general, and the city of Malmö in 
particular, as disproportionally troubled by the allegedly negative effects 
of immigration and multiculturalism (Rapacioli, 2018; Truedson, 2018).2 
Trump’s statement quickly spread across the world, leading also to heated 
exchanges in Sweden itself on the actual status of Swedish society domes-
tically as well as the image of Sweden abroad, Sverigebilden, reflecting 
growing internal political polarization while highlighting the importance 
of transnational circulation of ideas and images: While most observers re-
futed the negative imagery as mostly based on ‘fake news’ and ‘alterna-
tive facts,’ others claimed Fox News’ uncovered the realities of Swedish 
multiculturalism.3
There are naturally demonstrable social problems in Sweden today, just 
as in most societies and recent studies commissioned by the Swedish Insti-
tute confirm that the country’s international reputation remains largely pos-
itive (Swedish Institute, 2019). Yet, there is also a growing trend identifying 
Sweden as an example of misguided, if not failed, integration, in combina-
tion with liberal or progressive values. This view is gaining currency in es-
tablished news outlets as well as on social media and alt-right circles (Traub, 
2016; Swedish Institute, 2017), recently complicated by the Swedish response 
to the COVID-19 pandemic (Baldwin, 2021; Swedish Institute, 2021, Au-
cante, forthcoming). This negative attention is not just motivated by more 
or less newsworthy events in Sweden itself. It is also driven by Sweden’s 
long-time reputation as a policy ‘model’ for liberals and progressives across 
the world – not least in the United States as Democratic politicians such 
as Bernie Sanders, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, and Kamala Harris have 
expressed support for Nordic welfare policies. The recent wave of critical 
attention has naturally contributed to further cement this close association 
4 The utopian trap
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between ‘Sweden’ and ‘progressive’ values generally, and the welfare state 
model in particular (Godeanu-Kenworthy, 2020).
Today, these progressive values as well as the welfare state model are gen-
erally positively connoted with all the Nordic countries, overtaking previous 
focus on Sweden (Nedergaard and Wivel, 2018; a recent example is Dorling 
and Koljonen, 2020). However, there have been rather few cases of compara-
ble negative international media attention toward the other Nordic countries: 
The world reporting on the 2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis (Chartier, 
2011); the Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoons controversy in 2005; and 
the protests against Norwegian sealing, whaling, and oil extraction from 
the 1980s and onward may be cited as such examples (see also Chapter 13 
by Mads Mordhorst). But they appear both more limited in scope and less 
sweeping than the recurrent and often vague ‘Sweden-bashing’ which the 
‘last night in Sweden’-imbroglio plays into. Nevertheless, these contentious 
images do share some important features (Marklund, 2017).
First, they would probably not generate as much global interest if they did 
not explicitly contrast with the preexisting and generally positive images of 
the Nordic countries as prosperous, peaceful, and open welfare states rank-
ing high in various socio-economic indexes. Second, there is the idea that 
the welfare state model – either ‘Nordic’ or named after individual Nordic 
countries – not only embodies certain specific progressive values but has 
done so in a generally profitable way, not the least with regard to satisfaction 
with life and human development (Andersen, 2007; Greve, 2010; see also 
Marklund, 2013b).
Regardless of whether these rankings reflect reality very accurately or 
not, evidence as well as imageries of socio-economic problems in Nordic so-
cieties tend to appear more newsworthy and interesting than similar reports 
from other societies, as they contrast with the internationally widely held 
assumption that social ills would be marginal, if not entirely absent in such 
advanced welfare states (Pred, 2000). In a sense, Trump’s 2017 statements 
derived from a generally positive image of Sweden of the past, precondi-
tioning the negative image of Sweden of the present. This mechanism can be 
described as a kind of ‘utopian trap,’ where the possibly exaggerated expec-
tations of the absence of social problems can be rhetorically contrasted with 
the continuous persistence of old and generation of new social problems, 
even if relatively minor in international comparison (Marklund, 2013a).4
As such, the Nordic countries have played not only a number of contested 
but also remarkably stable roles on ‘the global marketplace of ideas’ (Åsard 
and Bennett, 1997), in a pattern of global circulation and media representa-
tion, where purposive ‘nation branding’ strategies have played a significant 
but often overstated role. These images reflect both domestic individual 
Nordic political needs, intra-Nordic rivalries, and collaborations and politi-
cal and rhetorical purposes abroad. Here, the concept of ‘model’ has played 
a key discursive role, with a long history preceding its deployment with 
the Nordics (Alasuutari et al., 2018). In tracking the circulation of various 
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‘Nordic models’ – asking what political and social needs this ‘modelizing’ 
of Nordic societies have answered to – this explorative study seeks to pro-
vide a mapping of communication of conceptual usages of Nordic models, 
both national and interregional, in a selection of different types of materi-
als, ranging from English language printed books via US press to English 
language academic journals.5 Second, the study seeks to analyze how and 
why Sweden has taken on a lead in this ‘modelization’ as illustrated by its 
evolution in US public debate. Third, the study outlines how this legacy of 
joint Nordic and Swedish models is used as a rhetorical resource in Nordic 
regional or transnational branding and individual Nordic national public 
diplomacy (Aronczyk, 2013; Valaskivi, 2016), highlighting its function infus-
ing the globally circulating images of Nordic progressivism on the one hand 
and Nordic models on the other hand.
Mapping models
When taking an interest in the role played by these small peripheral Nordic 
countries on the global market of ideas, it is necessary to first track the scope 
of this attention to different national Nordic models – i.e., ‘Danish model,’ 
‘Finnish model,’ ‘Norwegian model,’ ‘Swedish model’ – as well as other pos-
sibly competing international policy models. One way of mapping the field 
is provided by the Google Books Ngram Viewer, which charts frequencies 
of any set of comma-delimited search strings in Google’s text corpora, in 
this case in English language, due to its centrality in global communication 
(see Figure 4.1).
While this basic overview appears to confirm the disproportionate in-
terest in the Swedish model, first taking off from circa 1970 and further 
increasing from circa 1980 and onward, we can also track a rapidly rising 
interest in the ‘Scandinavian model’ from circa 1975 to the early 1980s. Then 
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Figure 4.1 G raph of frequency of various ‘models’ between 1900 and 2000 from the 
corpus English with a smoothing of three.
Source: Google Books Ngram Viewer





















Figure 4.2 G raph of frequency of Nordic countries between 1900 and 2000 from the 
corpus English with a smoothing of three.
Source: Google Books Ngram Viewer
From the mid-1990s, the references to the Swedish model go down, relatively 
speaking, while the references to the Nordic model as well as the Danish, 
Finnish, Norwegian models increase. A comparison with a general interest 
in the Nordic countries, sans the model, also confirms the disproportionate 
interest in the Swedish model above Sweden itself, while clearly indicating 
the steep increase in attention to Finland and Norway, not only due to their 
geopolitical and military significance during the Second World War but 
somewhat preceding the war (see Figure 4.2).
A more detailed survey of three influential and internationally highly 
circulated American nationwide newspapers – The New York Times 
(1851–2007), The Washington Post (1877–1994), The Wall Street Journal 
(1889–1993) illustrate these oscillations, at least in US debate (see the first 
column in Table 4.1). Many of these references are unrelated to the socio- 
political model and rather concerned with fashion models and classified ads 
for car dealers, kitchen appliances, furniture, etc.
How are we to understand this statistic? First, it does not include televi-
sion, radio, internet, and film as arenas for circulation, means of communi-
cation, and sources of information. Neither does it isolate the socio-political 
model from other conceptual constructions coupling ‘Nordic’ with ‘models’ 
such as for example the frequent associations between the ‘model’ and var-
ious products as well as individuals, as mentioned above. It does not record 
relevant qualified phrases such as, for example, the ‘welfare model,’ the ‘so-
cial model,’ or the ‘political model.’ Furthermore, it does not cover other 
ways of expressing a coherent image of society which may resemble the Nor-
dic model – such as the ‘Norwegian system,’ for example – or various ways of 
expressing exemplarity – such as ‘method,’ ‘way,’ ‘prototype,’ ‘alternative,’ 
‘ideal,’ ‘experiment,’ or ‘example.’ Neither is it possible to determine without 
looking into greater detail whether a reference to the Nordic national or 
regional model is primarily normative or descriptive.
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Despite these obvious limitations, the popular conception of the relative 
Swedish dominance vis-à-vis the other Nordic countries in US parlance 
can be verified with some degree of certainty. At the same time, the Nordic 
countries have not been widely overrepresented as models if compared to 
‘other’ relevant socio-economic models, at least not in the nationwide news 
outlets selected for study here (see the first column in Table 4.1).
However, the Nordic models are comparatively more prevalent in English 
language academic publications, as listed in the JSTOR database (see the 
second column in Table 4.1). The first search presented in the second column 
below is inclusive, including all indexed titles to ensure basic compatibility 
with the searches of the newspapers. The results give only some 60 hits for 
the Nordic model (first mentioned in 1975), but 200 for the Scandinavian 
model (first relevant mention in 1946, followed by the next occurrence in 
1968), and 362 for the Swedish model (first relevant mention in 1943, pertain-
ing to the Swedish collective bargaining system on the labor market). Most 
of these instances refer to socio-political or welfare state models, confirming 
the notion that the international social science discussions on Nordic mod-
els as well as their various national embodiments have been considerable, 
reflecting their function in comparative political and social sciences. Yet, 
these figures must be compared with the far higher numbers for the Ameri-
can, Soviet, British, German, Chinese, and Japanese models, reflecting the 
centrality of these countries in the context of the global Cold War and evolv-
ing post-industrial society.
These usages of the model concept in conjunction with the Nordic coun-
tries refer to a wide range of different scholarly perspectives and social 
science theorizing – from ‘varieties of capitalism,’ ‘corporate culture,’ and 
‘worlds of welfare’ via ‘forms of political system’ to ‘multiple modernities.’ 
The conceptualizations sometimes pertain to the economic, political, and 
social organization of the society under discussion. But in most cases, these 
phrasings concern some specific aspect of that society. The Swedish model, 
for example, is typically activated in analyses of the country’s political sys-
tem, referring to its administration, constitution, democratic system, forms 
of government, political parties, parliament, or to the socio-economic or-
ganization of the labor market, health system, social policy, and gender 
policy. This kind of modelization becomes demonstrably more common 
than the former usage from the 1970s and onward. A similar shift – away 
from concerns with democracy as to specific social affairs – is also visible in 
references to the Nordic and Scandinavian models in the same time frame. 
Throughout, however, there is a recurrent reference to Nordic policies as 
the result of purposive design and application of social science evidence 
in these academic applications of the model metaphor to describe Nordic 
societies.
To better track the shifts within this socio-political charge in the mod-
elization of Nordic societies, the second search of JSTOR has been lim-
ited to key social science disciplines where model references pertaining 
to socio- economic models and specific social institutions are likely to 
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occur: The result of the search of economics (149 titles), history (294 titles), 
political science (146 titles), and sociology (121 titles) is presented in the third 
column in Table 4.1. The search shows that the Nordic model, the Scandi-
navian model, and the Swedish model are comparatively more common in 
these fields than either the Danish model, the Finnish model, or the Norwe-
gian model, while the other models typically occur about half or less, with 
the notable exception of the British model which reaches the same level as 
the Nordic, Scandinavian, and individual Nordic models (see the third col-
umn in Table 4.1).
The Swedish model has thus been in more common usage than either the 
Nordic or the Scandinavian model in both English language academia and 
media. Also, the Nordic countries have been slightly overrepresented as 
socio-economic models if compared with other relevant models, raising the 
question of what political and social needs this modelizing of Nordic socie-
ties have answered to and followed from.
New deal and middle way
How are we then to understand these shifts in modelization of the Nor-
dic countries? Arguably, the Nordic countries did not feature very prom-
inently internationally until the 1930s, neither individually nor as a group, 
except for the attention they generated in the context of certain interna-
tional  crises – such as in 1905, 1917, 1918, 1920/1921 – as well as diplomatic 
agreements, exhibitions, jubilees, and state visits. During the height of the 
Great Depression, however, public intellectuals, journalists, and politicians 
in the West, not the least in the United States, began to question capitalism 
and liberalism, generating a new genre of looking for policy-oriented solu-
tions in other societies. Many American intellectuals and politicians looked 
Table 4.1  Occurrences of various models in The New York Times, The 
Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, and JSTOR database
NYT, WP, WSJ JSTOR (All Titles) JSTOR (Selected 
Fields)
Danish model 50 49 33
Finnish model 9 37 26
Nordic model 8 59 44
Norwegian model 14 31 26
Scandinavian model 28 200 166
Swedish model 137 362 274
American model 1,568 1,707 969
British model 613 912 649
Chinese model - 836 296
German model 533 886 492
Japanese model 347 633 363
Soviet model 604 1,634 882
Sources: ProQuest; JSTOR.
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to totalitarian states, such as Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union (Pells, 
1973; Schivelbusch, 2006; Patel, 2016). Yet others took an interest in the Nor-
dic countries, as they appeared to combine a controlled form of capitalism 
with parliamentary democracy. As Kazimierz Musiał (2002) has shown, 
this interest also focused on the Nordic countries for joining modernity and 
tradition, progress with moderation. While interest in the Nordic countries 
took off already in the early 1930s, Sweden moved to the fore in US debate 
from the mid-1930s with the 1936 publication of American journalist Mar-
quis Childs’ book Sweden: The Middle Way (1936; see also Kastrup, 1985: 
43–45; Ohlsson, 1992; Ottosson, 2002; Marklund, 2009a).
The concept of the ‘middle way’ as employed by Childs to analyze the 
Nordic countries had already been activated as a byword for US Presi-
dent Franklin D. Roosevelt so-called Second New Deal in 1935. In the 
early years of the New Deal, the pragmatic attitude of the Roosevelt ad-
ministration toward mitigating economic and social crisis received wide-
spread public support. However, as the ‘Brain Trust’ of Roosevelt advisers 
proposed universal health care, unemployment benefits, increased labor 
market regulation, state-trade union collaboration, and higher taxation on 
interstate trade, business circles, and conservatives attacked the adminis-
tration’s efforts as ‘un-American’ totalitarianism. In this context, the New 
Dealers sought new ways of presenting the Administration’s proposals as 
being small-scale, local and pragmatic, far removed from any totalitar-
ian planning. For example, John Dickinson, a prominent lawyer close to 
the administration published in 1935 a book entitled Hold Fast the Middle 
Way, arguing that the New Deal embodied American values of modera-
tion and pragmatism (Dickinson, 1935; see also Schlesinger, 1960: 647ff). 
Childs’ book served to pin Dickinson’s rather vague concept to the tangi-
ble results of the small Nordic countries in controlling capitalism without 
imperiling democracy (Kastrup, 1985: 61; Hilson, 2006; Marklund, 2010; 
Stadius, 2013).
Looking back at the Nordic euphoria of the 1930s, American-German po-
litical scientist and sociologist Dankwart A. Rustow argued that ‘Sweden’s 
economic and social policies appeared to have realized the fondest dreams 
of large masses in Western civilization’ (Rustow, 1955: 3). While even the 
most enthusiastic US proponents of Nordic policy exemplarity usually em-
phasized that the Nordic countries were too small, too homogeneous, and 
too unique to provide direct models to the United States, the generally pos-
itive image proliferated. In fact, this enthusiastic reporting somewhat wor-
ried the press officials at the American-Swedish News Exchange (ASNE) 
in New York (Markham, 1932). They feared that overly positive accounts 
could generate unrealistic expectations which in its turn could easily turn 
into liabilities as they attracted hyperbole, jealousy, and ridicule, an early 
example of the risks presented by the utopian trap (Kastrup, 1985: 62).
Others embraced the positive views. Swedish social reformer Alva Myrdal 
(1941) suggested, for example, that Swedish population and family policy 
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could be generalized to combat the spread of totalitarianism. Her husband, 
Swedish social scientist Gunnar Myrdal (1941), relied upon this interest-
ing interplay between exemplarity and experimentality associated with the 
Nordic countries when he called Sweden his ‘population laboratory’ (Sellin, 
1938). While marginal, the ideas on Nordic exemplarity became influen-
tial enough for skeptics to emerge: Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter 
(1976 [1942]: 325) – then in the United States – suggested in 1941 that it would 
be ‘…absurd for other nations to try to copy Swedish examples: the only 
effective way of doing so would be to import the Swedes and to put them in 
charge’ (see also Joesten, 1943).
Cold War and Swedish model
Naturally, the Second World War affected the US images of all the Nordic 
countries in fundamental ways, as evidenced by the graph in Figure 4.2. 
Danish and Norwegian information activities in the United States largely 
succeeded in relaying positive images of resistance and non-collaboration, 
while Finland’s case was decidedly more complicated. Sweden’s reputation 
declined following US criticism of Swedish neutrality. It became a delicate 
task for Swedish post-war public diplomacy to combine the positive ‘middle 
way’ imagery of interwar Swedish domestic policies with wartime and post-
war Swedish foreign policy (Undén, 1947).
Nils Andrén and Yngve Möller (1990: 69–70; see also Nilsson, 1950) have 
described this as an attempt at ‘ideologically motivating Sweden’s choice of 
role between the two blocks, launching the Swedish model as an alternative 
of a particular value as an image to copy.’ While Undén did not explicitly 
speak of the Swedish model, Swedish officials at the time sought to align 
internal and external policies with one another through the unifying lens 
of the generally positive foreign views of the former (Hedin, 1946; Lindb-
lom, 1948). In fact, Swedish US-based public diplomacy played a key role 
in modelizing Sweden, as the ASNE collaborated in publishing University 
of Alabama professor Hudson Strode’s (1949; see also Kastrup, 1985: 154) 
book Sweden – Model for a World, which explicitly spoke of Swedish society 
as exemplary, even though the author somewhat distanced himself from this 
conclusion in the preface.
Generally, the Nordic countries enjoyed moderate, if mostly positive, 
press in the United States at the time. Yet, increasingly negative reporting 
on the domestic policies of Sweden also began to emerge arguing that Swe-
den had moved away from middle way of the 1930s into full-fledged socialist 
planning. These accounts of Swedish domestic policies were now firmly lo-
cated in the Cold War security universe. While US military observers in the 
late 1940s conceived of Sweden as well equipped to guarantee the security 
of NATO’s Northern flank, Swedish attention to economic planning and 
social welfare was now assumed to make Sweden less prosperous and thus 
militarily weaker.
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In view of the need to present the Nordic countries to an educated Anglo-
phone audience globally, the Nordics themselves identified the interwar rep-
utation for progressive social policies as a unique selling point, as evidenced 
in the publication of Freedom and Welfare (Nelson, 1953). While rejecting 
the accusations of socialism, Freedom and Welfare reconfirmed the interwar 
association with pragmatism, prosperity, and peacefulness, claiming that 
‘the Northern peoples are realists, and in their “social engineering” they 
have never followed any one general formula’ (Nelson, 1953: 38–39). In US 
1950s social science literature, the Nordic societies gradually evolved into 
ideal types of both the welfare state and compromise politics, which both 
the American and the Soviets were expected to converge with (Rustow, 1955; 
Myrdal, 1960).
While there is little evidence for any Soviet interest in Nordic models at the 
time, actual Nordic policies did interest policymakers at least in the United 
States, where ASNE continued to promote information on how peaceful 
labor relations had evolved in Sweden. The 1959 Swedish pension reform, 
the subsequent establishment of investment funds in 1960 to boost the pro-
ductive sectors of the economy (pursuant to the Rehn-Meidner Model, as 
developed in 1951), and the almost complete labor peace seemed to support 
the idea of the welfare state as the superior method by which to guarantee 
stable economic growth. These policy models interested Democratic pres-
idential candidate John F. Kennedy in preparation for the 1960 elections. 
Naturally, this made contemporary US perceptions of Sweden as a pros-
perous society a problem for Kennedy’s opponents. President Dwight Ei-
senhower made passing comments about ‘a very friendly country’ – initially 
believed by many to have referred to Denmark – which follows ‘a socialist 
philosophy and whose rate of suicide has gone up almost unbelievably.’ In a 
clever rhetorical reversal, the President claimed the interwar ‘middle way’ 
for Republican presidential candidate Richard Nixon, while pinning social-
ism to the Nordics and, by extension, the Democrats (Wiskari, 1960; Tumin, 
1961; Andersson, 2009; Rom-Jensen, 2017).
A wealthy and socialist Nordic country, such as Sweden, thus proved 
rhetorically more dangerous to the welfare state critics in the 1960s, than 
Nordic freedom and welfare had been in the 1950s, confirming yet again 
the salience of the utopian trap. After winning the 1960 presidential elec-
tions, the Kennedy Administration did, in fact, take a closer look at Swed-
ish taxation and labor policies, described as the policies ‘a free-enterprise 
welfare state,’ rather than socialism – this formulation, in fact, originating 
with the ASNE (Kastrup, 1985: 299–300). The study trips of US administra-
tors as well as British trade unionists to Sweden in 1962 resulted in a great 
deal of attention toward Swedish policies as well as the establishment of the 
Advisory Committee on Labor-Management which received several Swed-
ish labor and business delegations. While it is difficult to assess the actual 
policy impact of these relations, contacts established in this context proved 
fruitful, especially with Walter Reuther, which later led to policy exchanges 
between Tage Erlander and Olof Palme with Hubert Humphrey, Lyndon 
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B. Johnson’s Vice President (Rom-Jensen, 2017). Policy attention was also 
reflected in academic analysis. For example, Andrew Shonfield’s Modern 
Capitalism (1965) influentially included Sweden as a case in his analysis of 
different types of capitalism, which exercised a strong impact on compara-
tive politics and comparative political economy for years to come, eventu-
ally influencing the more recent Varieties of Capitalism literature.
Welfare state criticism
While the other Nordic countries perhaps did not attract as much positive 
attention as Sweden in the United States during the early 1960s, they did not 
suffer from the gradual reversal of this reputation by the early 1970s either. 
Despite all the efforts of the ASNE to the contrary, Sweden was increasingly 
perceived in the United States as socialist, mostly as a result of Swedish 
Prime Minister Olof Palme’s critique of the American military involvement 
in Vietnam, the social democrats’ ideological emphasis upon ‘economic 
democracy,’ and American social science radicals, actively looking for ‘so-
cialist’ alternatives to US policy models (Fleischer, 1967; Rosenthal, 1967; 
Jenkins, 1968; see also Tomasson, 1971). Emerging US counter-culture elites 
took an interest in ‘progressive’ or ‘radical’ alternatives to US capitalism 
and consumerism in Western Europe, including Sweden, thus reinforcing 
the socialist stereotype, possibly beyond its actual reach, as noted by Susan 
Sontag in 1969 (Marklund, 2009b). Originally rather vague and often be-
mused themes on Swedish boredom and Swedish sin in the 1960s, sometimes 
explicitly following from the 1960 ‘Eisenhower-hypothesis’ on the allegedly 
negative social consequences of the welfare state (Arnberg and Marklund, 
2016), gradually fused into more alarmist reports on ‘Sweden’s surrealistic 
socialism’ by the mid-1970s (cf. Time, 1976). These accounts primarily re-
ferred to heavy taxation and bureaucratic regulation as systemic faults of 
the welfare state, and by this time, Sweden had transformed in US debate as 
epitomizing the archetypical welfare state.
At the same time, serious international academic interest in the Nordic 
countries boomed by the mid-1970s due to the centrality of the welfare state 
in shaping these societies, a factor which also played a significant role as 
the Swedish model gradually entered domestic political usage in Sweden it-
self, from the mid-1970s and onward (see Chapter 5 by Andreas Mørkved 
 Hellenes). The concept of the Scandinavian model became a standard ref-
erence for the fiscal, taxation, and labor market policies of the Nordic coun-
tries, which were often somewhat misguidedly conceived of as following 
Swedish precedents. However, as Sweden and the other Nordic countries – 
as most of western Europe – experienced economic downturn, re-assertive 
business interests, and recurrent labor market conflict from the late 1970s 
and culminating in the early 1980s – the relative absence of which had been 
one of the Scandinavian/Swedish model’s unique selling points in the past – 
the reputation of Sweden’s successful combination of prosperity and security 
began to wane internationally, not the least in the eyes of Swedish observers 
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(Downie Jr., 1981; see also Korpi, 1980), but this view appears also somewhat 
exaggerated as Sweden hardly experienced a more severe crisis than compa-
rable western societies, in what appears a replay of the utopian trap.
These oscillations confirm the close association between perceived and 
expected performance in the global circulation of Nordic models. Again, as 
Sweden and Finland suffered from an economic downturn in 1991, Amer-
ican economic and political commentators often referred to the former 
country as having succumbed to ‘a particularly virulent form of Euroscle-
rosis,’ to paraphrase an expression of Walter Korpi’s, while Finland’s crisis 
was more directly associated with the fall of the Soviet Union (Samuelson, 
1993). Having been used as a model in the past also contributed to Sweden’s 
usefulness as a warning example in the present: In the early 1990s, numerous 
articles in The Washington Post and The Wall Street Journal argued that 
the Swedish model produced similar shortcomings as communism, often 
relaying statements by Swedish economists, such as Assar Lindbeck and 
Anders Åslund (e.g., Frankel, 1990; Hoagland, 1990; Horowitz, 1990). Swed-
ish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson (1990) responded with an open letter in 
The Washington Post, protesting the view of the Swedish model as ‘socialist,’ 
pointing out that the country had always had an ‘open market economy.’
While Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s (1990) academically highly influential 
The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism clarified both the association be-
tween the Nordic welfare states and capitalism as well as social democracy, 
the framing of the Swedish model as socialism had become firmly estab-
lished in global public discourse by this time. The Wall Street Journal (1991) 
regarded the bourgeois electoral victory that year, otherwise marked by fi-
nancial turmoil in Finland and Sweden, as evidence of ‘Swedish voters are 
finally tiring of something the world’s left has long praised, the “Swedish 
model” of socialism.’ Instead, the newspaper noted, ‘talk of the “Danish 
model” of economic recovery has replaced the “Swedish model” of a cradle- 
to-grave welfare state,’ arguing that ‘the Danish experience also could set 
a precedent for states such as Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia looking for 
ways to develop their small economies’ (Forman, 1991). While Sweden’s 
reputation was fading by the early 1990s, the notion of Nordic exemplar-
ity had become so firmly established that the decline of one Nordic model 
society – Sweden – quite naturally transformed into the expected rise of 
another – Denmark.
Branding Nordic progress
Exemplarity – the Nordic model and its derivatives – has thus been both an 
asset and a liability in the global circulation of the image of Nordic coun-
tries as indicated by the recurrence of utopian traps detailed in this study. 
Today, by contrast, Nordic nation branding professionals apparently assign 
a considerable degree of significance of the model as a brand in itself. As the 
Nordic Council of Ministers decided to launch in 2014, a new strategy for 
the ‘international profiling of Scandinavia’ globally under the joint initiative 
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‘Team Norden,’ ‘the Nordic perspective,’ and ‘the Nordic model’ is explicit 
to be presented to the world in international fora such as G20, IMF, and the 
World Bank. The reason for this initiative is to be found in global interest in 
the Nordic countries, as ‘we appear to have answers to some of the questions 
the world is posing itself right now – how to build an open society capable 
of progress and of coping with crises,’ concluding that ‘[w]e should respond 
positively to this curiosity and use it as a source of inspiration for further 
social improvements’ (Nordic Council of Ministers, 2014).
Again, as in the early 1950s, it is thus the alleged foreign interest that 
promotes the joining of forces to present the Nordic countries to the world. 
In the 60 years that have passed, the joint Nordic values of freedom and 
welfare have been replaced by concepts such as progress and openness. A 
complicating factor, however, is that the Nordic countries are today being 
used (positively) for rather different ends by different actors internationally 
(The Economist, 2013; Moody, 2016).
While the Nordic countries quite predictably attract criticism from pop-
ulists and conservatives due to the esteem they enjoy among progressives 
and liberals, there is another complicating factor in branding the Nordic 
countries jointly today: there is a wide-ranging debate within the Nordic 
countries as to the more precise character of the recent domestic transfor-
mations of the Nordic model. Some view the typically liberal reforms of the 
1990s and 2000s as the main reason for continued Nordic economic suc-
cess. Others conclude that the Nordic model has, in fact, been substantially 
weakened by deregulation, New Public Management, privatization and now 
needs to be ‘rebuilt’ or ‘renewed’ (Greve and Kvist, 2011; Kananen, 2014; 
Ivarsson Westerberg et al., 2014; for contrary views, see Lindbom, 2011; 
Rothstein and Ahlbäck Öberg, 2014).
While positive accounts still abound, there is also a marginal but growing 
international and not necessarily right-wing discussion as to whether the 
Nordic countries – despite their high ranking in numerous indexes – do live 
up to their global reputation of being good, open, and safe societies for all, 
following recurrent reports on rising inequality, growing right-wing pop-
ulism, increasing crime rates, and persistent structural discrimination, to 
not mention the ecological footprint of the Nordic countries (Brown, 2008; 
Booth, 2014; Moore, 2014). This genre reflects also a vague sense of self-
doubt proliferating within the Nordic countries too, to some extent echoing 
commonplace concerns with post-truth politics, populism, and protection-
ism in the face of the challenges of globalization, concerns which conceiva-
bly contrast with the Nordic countries overall socio-economic performance 
(Koivunen and Ojala, 2021). In addition, there appears to be a sense of dis-
parity among the Nordic countries on several issues, especially their differ-
ent public responses during the 2015 European refugee crisis, where Sweden 
is often cited as an outlier in terms of ‘generosity,’ even if actual policies 
have tended to converge toward more restrictive levels since (Eakin, 2014).
How may then the Team Norden branding effort deal with such internally 
Nordic as well as inter-Nordic fragmentation? Allowing for the possibility 
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of divergent Nordic policies, the strategy of choice this far has been to con-
centrate the framing of the branding narrative upon largely shared Nor-
dic values – quite irrespectively of how the individual Nordic societies seek 
to politically approximate these values.6 Similarities with regard to values 
obscures divergences with regard to policies. In the strategy document for 
the international branding of the Nordic region for 2015–2018, entitled The 
Nordic Perspective, the focus is upon promoting five specific Nordic values: 
Openness, trust, creativity, sustainability, and compassion/tolerance/equal-
ity (see the left figure in Figure 4.3) (Nordic Council of Ministers, 2015).
The Nordic values as outlined in the Team Norden effort are to some 
extent coterminous and even interchangeable with the Swedish ‘core values’ 
[kärnvärden] which have since 2008 been placed at the center of Swedish 
public diplomacy and branding efforts under the aegis of the Nämnden for 
Sverigeinformationen utomlands. Departing from the observation that ear-
lier Swedish public diplomacy has lacked a clear thematic stand, passively 
reacting to whatever positive or negative opinions which may circulate in 
global views on Sweden, liberal editor, politician, and former Director Gen-
eral of the Swedish Institute, Olle Wästberg (2011), commissioned the search 
for a more proactive platform for Sweden information abroad. The resulting 
platform, launched in 2008, identified four core values as characteristic for 
Sweden: Openness, authenticity, care, and innovation (see the right figure 
in Figure 4.3). These values in their turn provide the basis for the ‘position’ 
of ‘progressivity – a will to improve’ [progressivitet – en vilja att förbättra] 
which is assigned a key role in this post-modern search for a common de-
nominator of Swedishness (Swedish Institute, 2008: 7–8).
Figure 4.3 T he Nordic perspective and Swedish progressivity.
Sources: Nordic Council of Ministers, The Nordic Perspective (2015); Swedish Institute, Sver-
igebilden 2.0 (2008)
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While the Swedish platform from 2008 was explicitly stating that these 
values were unique to Sweden, they resemble closely the later Nordic per-
spective. Here, the branding effort appears to reflect Nordic social val-
ues, at least as reflected by the World Values Survey (WVS). The WVS 
confirms the existence of a Nordic sub-region of ‘Protestant Europe,’ 
with Sweden as the most profiled case – characterized by exceptionally 
low traditional- survival values and exceptionally high secular-r ational-
self-expression values  (Figure 4.4) – a predilection which is also under-
scored by the recent mapping of the shifting, more liberal values of recent 
migrants to Sweden (Institute for Future Studies 2019). In this mental 
mapping of sorts, these shared values apparently underpin the possibly 
divergent policies which constitute the welfare state and Nordic model. 
The joint political as well as branding appeal is obvious, as may be ev-
idence from the consistently high rankings of ‘soft power’ accredited to 
the Nordic countries in international lifestyle magazine Monocle’s (2017) 
annual Soft Power Survey.7
Conclusion
The strong connection between the welfare state, progressive values, and the 
Nordic countries has increasingly been used also in the international out-
reach efforts of the Nordic countries. This association is frequently invoked 
in commercial contacts between Nordic producers and service providers 
and increasingly environmentally and socially oriented consumers globally, 
not the least in Asia (Arup, 2010). Reversibly, semiofficial attempts at pub-
lic diplomacy during the Swedish center-right governments of 2006–2014, 
respectively, tended until recently to refer to the Nordic model rather than 
the Swedish model, positively embracing novel concepts such as the ‘Nordic 
Way’ launched at the World International Forum in Davos 2011.
The welfare state appears to have become less Swedish and more Nordic 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s. In the same way that the welfare state had 
assumed a ‘socialist’ hue due to its Swedish associations in the 1960s, its 
Nordic connection has been used to somewhat dilute its social democratic 
veneer in Sweden. While at least the Swedish labor movement has viewed 
the previous center-right government’s interest in the ‘Nordic’ welfare state 
as an attempt to obscure the social democratic origins of the welfare state 
and to claim a share in its rise, both the Moderate Party and the Social Dem-
ocratic Party brand the Nordic model as a viable response to the challenges 
of globalization (cf. Sandberg, 2013; Dølvik et al., 2014).
It is, therefore, interesting to note how the leading party of the preceding 
center-right government, the conservative Moderate Party, used the con-
cept of Sverige – Föregångslandet (Sweden – The pioneering country) in its 
ultimately unsuccessful 2014 election campaign. Similarly, the incoming 
red-green coalition’s Prime Minister Stefan Löfven drove home the same 
point in the government policy statement after having won the elections, 
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specifying that the Swedish model should be presented before the world, 
while the Moderate Party in April 2019 offered its political platform under 
the caption of the ‘new’ Swedish model, signifying the continued domestic 
importance of this originally externally oriented concept.
The image of the Nordic model, the individual Nordic countries, as 
well as the welfare state as such are becoming jointly politically recharged 
again, at the same time as there are tendencies toward competition and 
fragmentation remaining in between the Nordic countries with regard to 
exemplarity. Attracting attention abroad serves as evidence of success for 
politicians at home. There appears always to be at least one Nordic coun-
try excelling on one parameter of socio-economic performance or another 
– thus facilitating the Nordic countries’ serving as each other’s ‘branding 
lifebuoys’ – at least as long as the group altogether performs comparatively 
well (Marklund, 2013a). This may, in fact, serve as an independent factor 
in explaining the region’s continued policy attractiveness and modeliza-
tion potential: Even if individual Nordic countries may conceivably suffer 
from problems and exhibit less successful policy choices, the multiple ex-
periments conducted by Nordic countries as a group serve as an opportu-
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Figure 4.4 World Values Survey 2015.
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of ideas of the Nordic countries as imaginary testing grounds, social lab-
oratories, and experiment stations for future politics. For this reason, and 
irrespectively of which figure of thought appears attractive in confronting 
common political and social challenges – the middle way in the 1930s and 
1950s, the welfare state model in the 1940s to the 1990s, or progressive 
values in the 2000s – the utopian trap appears to be continuously at work, 
especially with regard to Sweden, attracting negative attention where there 
is positive expectation.
Notes
 1 This work was supported by the Independent Research Fund Denmark (Project 
8018-00023B).
 2 ‘Stockholm Syndrome’, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rqa-
IgeQXQgI [accessed April 13, 2021]
 3 For example, the Swedish condition –svenske tilstand – became a feature of Nor-
wegian public debate in the 2017 parliamentary elections.
 4 This is also a primary reason for why Swedish cultural diplomats often sought 
to moderate the high hopes associated with the middle way imagery in the 1930s 
and why Swedish public diplomats and politicians expressed sometime caution 
with regard to the Swedish model imagery in the 1970s and 1980s. With regard 
to the latter, see Chapter 5 by Andreas Mørkved Hellenes.
 5 This part is a reduced sample of a pilot study in digital humanities, tracking the 
concept of the Nordic model as well as other relevant policy models, entitled 
“Mapping Models: The Shifting Fates of the Nordic Model on the Global Mar-
ket of Ideas,” originally presented at Society for the Advancement of Scandina-
vian Studies 103rd Annual Meeting May 2–4, 2013, San Francisco Hilton Hotel 
and the UiO:Norden conference on Global Challenges, Nordic Experiences, 
University of Oslo, 20–21 March 2017.During the finalization of this chapter, it 
has come to my attention that a similar research design is employed by Koivu-
nen et al. (2021) in their chapter ‘Always in Crisis, Always a Solution? The Nordic 
Model as a Political and Scholarly Concept’, in A. Koivunen and J. Ojala (eds.), 
The Nordic Economic, Social and Political Model: Challenges in the 21st Century 
(London: Routledge), 1–19.
 6 Personal communication with Bodil Tingsby, 23 September 2015.
 7 In the 2017/2018 ranking Finland reached position 18, Norway 15, Denmark 11, 
and Sweden 8.
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Introduction
In his 2017 presidential campaign, Emmanuel Macron made repeated refer-
ences to the ‘Scandinavian model,’ allegedly a source of inspiration for his 
program to reform France.2 In so doing, Macron followed in the footsteps 
of another French political maverick: the journalist and businessman- cum-
politician Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber. More precisely, it was in the wake 
of Servan-Schreiber’s book Le défi américain that the modèle suédois was 
introduced and circulated to later become a flexible, catchall term for the 
progressive image of Swedish society, not least within Sweden itself. It has 
since long been common for scholars to posit that the term was coined by 
Servan-Schreiber (Stråth, 1993a; Aucante, 2002; Musiał, 2002; Glover, 2009; 
Marklund, 2009) and note in passing that it spread from the Swedish to 
the Nordic level in the 1980s (Stråth, 1993b; Christiansen and Markkola, 
2006). Beyond this, however, little attention appears to have been given to 
questions concerning the circulation and appropriation(s) of the particular 
concept of a Swedish, Scandinavian, or Nordic model: all of them having 
nevertheless been the object of a wide range of studies in history and the 
social sciences, most particularly welfare state studies, both in Sweden, Nor-
den and the rest of the world. This prompts the question as to how and where 
this circulation from the French via the Swedish to the Nordic level actually 
occurred.
The point here is not to deny that both tropes of Nordic and Swedish 
exemplarity and attempts at modelling Nordic societies have a long his-
tory in travel literature, in the political vocabulary of western Europeans 
and Americans, and social and political science literature (Musiał, 2002).3 
Rather, the purpose of this chapter is to trace the more systematic and in-
tertextual transnational historical articulations and circulations of the con-
cept of the Swedish and Nordic model(s).4 Swedish historians such as Björck 
(2008) and Edling (2013, 2019) have studied the semantic struggles surround-
ing certain key concepts in Swedish contemporary history, some of them 
homegrown, others a result of gradual processes of cultural transfer. Tak-
ing the cue from such studies, this chapter adopts a pragmatic nominalist 
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approach to conceptual history, searching for the specific terms and their 
changing usages (Edling, 2019: 4). It is, therefore, necessary to consider the 
way that these concepts have been filled with layers of meaning by various 
actors at different times and through the stages of their emergence; in other 
words, how the concept has been modified through its circulation over bor-
ders (Werner and Zimmermann, 2006).
This focus allows the chapter to do two things. First, it permits to offer 
a more comprehensive view of the makings of the concept of the Nordic 
model. By looking beyond social and political science scholarship and sys-
tematically explore other sources, such as digitized press and magazines 
alongside relevant institutional and personal archives, the contested char-
acter of the model concept in public culture and political debate becomes 
much more evident.5 Second, by exploring the transnational circulation of 
the concept, the chapter broadens the set of actors and sites and offers a 
wider politico-cultural perspective on the Nordic model in the global circu-
lation of ideas. In this way, the chapter contributes to the growing research 
on not only the foreign images of Sweden and the Nordic countries but also, 
increasingly, the entangled usages of the reference to the Nordic model in 
politics and policy-making both inside and outside of the Nordic region 
(Hoctor, 2017; Rom-Jensen, 2017; Hellenes, 2019).6 While the space at hand 
does not allow for an investigation of all relevant sites, texts, and actors in 
this circulation process, it will permit an examination of the border- crossing 
trajectory of the Swedish and Nordic model through its arguably most im-
portant stages. This story begins in Paris.
The French rise of the Swedish model
In December 1968, looking back on an eventful year across the globe, the in-
fluential Parisian news magazine L’Express stated that the ‘Swedish model,’ 
due to its combination of capitalist productivity with social justice, together 
with a perpetual willingness to change and rejuvenation, now represented 
the most humane model on the world’s horizon.7 The leader was signed 
‘JJSS,’ the signature of the magazine’s founder and owner: the journalist 
and polytechnicien Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber. To be sure, Servan- 
Schreiber’s interest for models of reform predated the events of May ’68; 
the modernization of French society was a central theme on the pages of 
L’Express, a magazine that since its creation in 1953 had represented the 
import of American business values and management theories (Boltanski, 
1981). Such ideas of Servan-Schreiber’s came into full fruition in the 1967 
book Le défi américain, a plea for change and reorganization of Europe, 
and especially France, to better face the challenge represented by American 
investments in its industry (Servan-Schreiber, 1967). Its style was alarmist 
and its aim was to change the future. Quickly a bestseller, the book was first 
in France to popularize the notion of the turn to the post-industrial society 
and became a symbol of the zeitgeist (Bothorel, 2005: 349). To put it with 
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historian Richard Kuisel (1993: 201), it popularized the position of French 
‘Americanizers’: public officials, managers, and social scientists enthusias-
tic about some of modern America’s realizations although not advocates 
of uncritical imitation. But it was also conceived, marketed, and written as 
a global book, partly as a synthesis of, partly as a dialogue with what one 
could term the futurists’ international – a transnational group of social sci-
entists and policy makers concerned with finding scientific predictions for 
the future of the world (Andersson, 2018). It thus linked French discussions 
about modernization, represented by contributions from Michel Crozier, 
Louis Armand, and Claude Gruson with the analyses of influential Ameri-
can thinkers such as John Kenneth Galbraith, Herman Kahn, Daniel Bell, 
and the recently established Hudson Institute’s study The Year 2000. It was 
in part through these analyses that Sweden came to be singled out; accord-
ing to the Hudson Institute’s predictions, four countries would by the turn 
of the millennium have attained the status of post-industrial societies: the 
United States, Canada, Japan, and Sweden, alone among European nations 
(Servan-Schreiber, 1967).
As such, Servan-Schreiber’s book was nothing like the ‘Swedology’ of ear-
lier decades, where political observations were mixed with tourist musings 
in synthesizing attempts at grasping the realities of the country (Östlund, 
2014). Together with Japan, Sweden was portrayed in Le défi as a contrast 
to the United States and introduced in special appendixes at the end of the 
book. In short, Sweden represented a successful attempt at building a mod-
ern, prosperous, and technically advanced capitalist society. Not by copy-
ing American ideals, but by finding an original way that included respecting 
laws of competition, state subventions to parts of the advanced industry, the 
agreements between the parties on the labor market, and a public ethos of 
social and economic progress. ‘The originality of the Swedish model,’ wrote 
Servan-Schreiber, ‘is the intelligent merging, in one single country, of these 
factors that exist in a less coherent way in other industrial societies (Servan- 
Schreiber, 1968a, 1968b: 312).’ To summarize, Sweden offered  Europe a 
much-needed alternative to America.
A few months after the publication of Le défi, it had sold 400.000 copies, 
becoming one of the most-sold essays in French history (Kuisel, 1993: 154). 
Its author toured Europe with a series of public discussions about the topic, 
and in New York Magazine, the businessman John Diebold wrote that ‘[F]
ew books in the French language can ever have been the center of as much 
attention in this country – six months or a year prior to their publication in 
English (Diebold, 1968: 54).’8 Servan-Schreiber’s book was translated into 
seven other European languages, among them Swedish.
Although Servan-Schreiber’s opinions of Sweden did not go unnoticed 
in the Swedish press, it was the release of the translation Den amerikanska 
utmaningen in March 1968 that transformed it from Parisian intellectual 
curiosum to a relevant reference in Swedish contemporary debate. In his 
short introduction, the translator Johan Åkerman, a renowned economist, 
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highlighted that Sweden was singled out as a lodestar for Europe, ‘due to 
our industrial specialization and our social structure’ (Åkerman, 1968: 9). 
But whereas the original’s modèle suédois in, for example, the English trans-
lation was rendered as the Swedish model, this was not the case in the Swed-
ish edition, where Åkerman instead chose the term det svenska systemet [the 
Swedish system] (Åkerman, 1968).9
In general, the Swedish reviewers of Le défi balanced between two posi-
tions: on the one hand, including Sweden in Servan-Schreiber’s ‘Europe,’ 
portraying the book’s American challenge as a threat to all western Euro-
pean countries, and on the other hand, underlining Sweden’s distinctiveness 
from Europe, taking the book as evidence that Sweden had, in fact, already 
tackled the American challenge. This latter interpretation became dominant 
not least after Servan-Schreiber came to Sweden a couple of months after 
the publication of the Swedish edition. The visit was no ordinary journalist 
trip. Prime Minister Tage Erlander invited Servan-Schreiber as a personal 
guest to his official residence at Harpsund, and the latter responded enthu-
siastically at the prospect of discussing with the Swedish Prime Minister.10
The visit was covered like that of a head of state. ‘Finally,’ Expressen 
wrote, ‘a newspaper man was received like a prince (Lindgren, 1968).’ As 
the Frenchman set out from Paris correspondents launched what came to 
be his main message to the Swedes: Sweden should assume its leading role 
and join the EEC (Ehrenmark, 1968; Griggs, 1968; Nilsson, 1968). ‘I have 
come here to unsettle the Swedes. I’m not sure that they understand how 
important they are for the future of Europe,’ Servan-Schreiber declared, 
speculating fantastically that a Swedish adhesion to the EEC would force 
the Community’s NATO members to quit the military alliance and move 
toward Sweden-style active neutrality (Ahlenius, 1968).11 In a televised talk 
show, Servan-Schreiber faced the journalists Åke Ortmark and Gustaf Ol-
ivecrona and explained at length in English why and what he meant by at-
tributing Sweden model status.
Sweden… speaks to the imagination because of its very special blending 
of many things that in our country are generally opposed, for instance 
social justice has been opposed to economic development; here, it is rec-
onciled. State responsibility has been opposed to free enterprise; here it 
is reconciled. And all of that in a country that is highly developed, and 
has a foreign policy of independence… the reason I asked… the Swed-
ish government last night to come actively into the debate in Europe, is 
because the Swedish model is the most interesting one for the future of 
Europe.12
After initial skepticism against Servan-Schreiber following his media ap-
pearances, Tage Erlander became more amicable toward the Frenchman 
after his visit to Harpsund (Erlander, 2015). Despite still considering his 
views on Sweden ‘unrealistic,’ Erlander nevertheless praised his ‘richness of 
Tracing the Nordic model 87
thoughts and ideas’ and soon after started including references to Servan- 
Schreiber in his speeches (Erlander, 2015). The visit made Servan- Schreiber 
an official ‘Sweden-friend,’ and his book stayed on bestseller lists well into 
the following autumn. Svenska Dagbladet resumed the feeling after a ‘unique 
journalist visit in Sweden,’ noting that ‘Servan-Schreiber has given Sweden 
more fame … than perhaps anyone else (Plogvall, 1968).’
The Swedish rejection of the Swedish model
Although the concept of the Swedish model first appeared in the context 
of French stagnation and the menace of Americanization, it was the after-
math of the national crisis of May ’68 that would introduce it more broadly 
in French and Swedish public culture. This was closely related to the situ-
ation following de Gaulle’s demission from the presidency in April, after 
his failure to secure popular support in a constitutional referendum that 
de facto became a plebiscite on the General’s political future. In the en-
suing presidential campaign, no less than four of the candidates made ex-
plicit references to Sweden as an example to follow. To Swedish diplomats 
and correspondents in Paris, the publicity reached such heights that one 
started talking about a French Swedomania (Lindström, 1969; SvD, 1969). 
Aftonbladet’s Herman Lindqvist, for example, noted that French politicians 
now spoke about ‘something they call “the Swedish model,” and they do not 
mean Swedish girls (Lindqvist, 1969).’ He recounted how the new president, 
Georges Pompidou, had told in an interview how he saw the ideal society as 
‘Sweden, with a bit more sun,’ a quip that became a commonplace in reports 
from Swedomaniac France.
French experts also entered the debate to explain what this ‘model’ that 
politicians frequently cited actually consisted of, including the essential 
question of whether or not it was importable to specific French conditions. 
The economist Jean Parent, for example, published in 1970 the much-praised 
book Le modele suédois.13 To Dagens Nyheter, Parent argued that ‘[T]here 
has been created some sort of French mythology about Sweden. Pompidou, 
Servan-Schreiber, Mendès-France have taken the cream off the cake and 
used it in their political speeches… Sweden has been presented as a kind of 
economic paradise (Thalin, 1970).’ As Aucante (2015: 27) has observed, Par-
ent’s ‘Swedish model’ was an expression of particular conditions, an origi-
nal ‘social equilibrium’ that could hardly be exported abroad.
Despite such scholarly warnings, the political name-dropping of Sweden 
continued well into 1970. In a French context where societal reforms were 
on the agenda, not the least to appease radicalization after the events of 
May ’68, the reference to the Swedish model appeared as a convenient way 
for center-right politicians to position themselves as modern, progressive, 
and reform-inclined. Such was the case, for example, of Prime Minister 
Jacques Chaban-Delmas’ project for a Nouvelle société. Within the new So-
cialist Party (PS), conversely, the Sweden-fad seemed less impressive, as a 
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consequence of the centrist and left-Gaullist embraces of the Swedish model 
(Fulla, 2016: 218–219). This was not unproblematic for the Swedish Social 
Democrats. When Servan-Schreiber, as the newly elected president of the 
centrist Radical Party, wanted an official endorsement from Sweden, Olof 
Palme wrote him a personal congratulation, but the party refused to send 
representatives to the Radical Congress.14
When Palme came on his first visit to Paris as Prime Minister in spring 
1970, Sweden’s role as a potential model for France was thus a hot topic. 
Here Palme’s communication – in fluent French – was very clear. He tried as 
firmly as he could to establish that Sweden did not see itself as a model, re-
jecting the appellation altogether both when he spoke to his hosts and to the 
media.15 In a TV interview, Palme stressed the point that there were still im-
portant political tasks ahead for him and other Swedish politicians. When 
the interviewer stated that one often, in France, cited the ‘Swedish model,’ 
Palme quickly added, with a smile, ‘with a bit more sun,’ and continued:
Yes, we are naturally very happy if one is interested in the Swedish so-
ciety; yet, our society is not a model, because it is not achieved. What is 
interesting is possibly the manner in which we seek to solve our prob-
lems, but it is not a society without problems.16
The international press conference that closed the visit only strengthened 
the positive image that had been spread. To the question of whether or 
not the Swedish model had been present in discussions with President Pom-
pidou, Palme resumed his earlier position on the matter: ‘Sweden isn’t a 
model at all, Sweden is a country… If all we had to do was administering 
a model- machinery, I would quit politics. To me, what’s interesting is to 
change the society.’17
Both in articles and interviews, Palme continued to reject the Swedish 
model, proposing instead that what one perhaps could talk about, was a 
particular Swedish method of reforms to improve society in the right di-
rection (Palme, 1971; Nilsson, 1972; Palme, 1972). Similarly, his close col-
laborator Carl Lidbom emphasized in a reportage from Sweden produced 
by French TV titled ‘Le “modèle suédois”’ that he never ‘talked about the 
“Swedish model”; one often hears this expression used abroad, and I can 
assure you that it is not a Swedish expression.’18
Despite Palme and other Swedish spokespersons’ insistence that the 
Swedish model was not part of their vocabulary, the term caught on, 
spreading also outside of France, for example, in Denmark (Stråth, 1993b: 
57). From 1969 and onward, ‘the Swedish model’ was moreover established 
as a category in its own right within the Swedish MFA’s annual reports 
monitoring foreign images of Sweden, regrouping now not only French 
press writing about Sweden as a model but also those of other countries; 
tellingly, the French modèle suédois was replaced by the Swedish svenska 
modellen.19
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Criticism from the left
Palme’s rejection of the Swedish model concept harked back to earlier ep-
isodes when officials had sought to correct foreign depictions of Swedish 
happiness (Glover and Hellenes, 2020). This became more acute in the early 
1970s, with increasing criticism against the party from the left. It was in this 
context that the Swedish model made its definitive entry into the domestic 
political debate. In Sweden, the LO-economist Anders Leion was among 
the first to introduce the concept. Leion had written the first report of the 
government-appointed Committee on Low Income, which from 1965 looked 
into the conditions of Swedish low wage earners on the labor market, whose 
results provided fuel for a critique of Social Democratic policies (Anders-
son, 2006: 46–56).20 As a result of these polemics, it was shut down by the 
government in 1971. In 1974, Leion published a debate book titled Den sven-
ska modellen, against the backdrop of the Social Democrats’ bad election re-
sults in 1973 (Stråth, 1998: 111). Leion included a series of proposals in order 
to address the new societal problems of the 1970s, pointing to the failure ‘of 
what abroad often is called the Swedish model’ in handling transformations 
in the economy and on the labor market (Leion, 1974). The cornerstones 
of the Swedish model, as Leion defined it, were the policies of structural 
rationalization, labor mobility, and solidarity wage policy for economic 
growth that had been developed through the postwar decades in Sweden, in 
other words what increasingly was referred to as the ‘Rehn-Meidner model,’ 
after the two LO economists who had laid down its theoretical foundations 
in the 1950s.
Den svenska modellen caused much debate, both before and after its publi-
cation. Rapidly named an enfant terrible of LO, Leion was quoted favorably 
by bourgeois newspapers and cited by Moderates in the Riksdag. The public 
criticism against the party from within its own ranks added considerably to 
the news value of the publication (Ekstrand, 1974; Expressen, 1974a). ‘From 
having been meant as a guarantee for the working classes, the Swedish 
model has now become a threat against them,’ wrote Expressen (Palmborg, 
1974; Ramsby, 1974; Expressen, 1974b, 1974c).
To some extent, the debate also provoked a mobilization around the con-
cept of the Swedish model from Social Democratic debaters, such as Olle 
Svenning, a former state secretary under Erlander. From his place as col-
umnist in Aftonbladet, Svenning defended the Swedish model as ‘our societal 
system (Svenning, 1974a, 1974b, 1974c).’ In the mid-1970s, thus, the Swedish 
model definitely made its way into Swedish political usage, as a flexible con-
cept used in a number of different instances: a ‘singular societal system’ 
built by a century of popular movements; a ‘suitably mixed economy’ for the 
world to emulate; or an ‘evolutionary model’ of socialism as opposed to a 
revolutionary one, just to provide some examples (DN, 1975; Moberg, 1975; 
Nyblom, 1975). In September 1975, Aftonbladet’s Dieter Strand proposed 
an overarching definition, describing vividly the inauguration of the Social 
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Democratic Party Congress, where a silent protest against Franco was con-
cluded by a few solemn words by Palme, followed by ‘Arbetets söner,’ that 
‘most Swedish of labor songs,’ before the party leader went on to talk in 
length about an environmental project for lake Trummen outside of the 
mid-sized town of Växjö. ‘This,’ wrote Strand, ‘is the Swedish model. It is 
the classical Social Democratic mix, known from every people’s house and 
every party congress (Strand, 1975).’ In the words of the Social Democratic 
journalist the Swedish model came to stand for a combination of a global 
outlook and local concerns that had been characteristic of the Swedish party 
at least since Per Albin Hansson’s days, in other words Social Democratic 
Sweden’s past and present.
The Swedish appropriation of the Swedish model
While Strand’s idyllic report from the Party Congress of 1975 underlined 
continuities with past congresses and within Social Democratic practices, its 
aftermath would also provoke a direct conflict over the concept of the Swed-
ish model. At the congress, the party launched an ambitious new program 
including a renewal of labor relations and increased democracy in the work-
place. In the Riksdag, Moderate leader Gösta Bohman warned that radical-
ized Social Democrats threatened to turn their back on the Swedish model:
Our mixed economy has worked well…. Foreign observers talk as a rule 
not without envy – about “the Swedish model”, a system that has suc-
ceeded in uniting social responsibility, freedom and peace on the labor 
market with high efficiency in business.21
In the Riksdag debate, Palme reacted violently against Bohman’s words, not 
least his hints that Swedish democracy would be threatened by continued 
Social Democratic rule:
When peasants and workers in Sweden agreed on the crisis policy that 
lifted our country out of the misery of mass unemployment, the leader 
of the Right explained that one thus strengthened the antidemocratic 
forces. Now Mr Bohman tries to claim for himself the foreign praise of 
the Swedish model that he and his party have fought against with tooth 
and nail.22
Where Palme earlier had refused to accept the notion of the Swedish model, 
he now claimed ownership of it. His appropriation of the concept was a sim-
ple operation, by redefining the Swedish model as precisely that which he 
had previously used as a contrast to the idea of model: the ‘Swedish method’ 
of step-by-step reforms.
This is the Swedish model – that we, albeit carefully, experiment, change 
society in accord with the changing demands of the people and the 
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development of the productive forces, but always with the fundamental 
aim to defend Swedish democracy.23
In different ways, both parties tried to mobilize history, and more specif-
ically the narrative of democratic Sweden’s rise from a poor agricultural 
nation to a wealthy industrial welfare state, in their bids to win the Swedish 
model for their side. For Palme, it was evident that the Social Democrats 
were the architects of this development, often against bourgeois political 
forces.24 For Bohman, the core of the Swedish model was the ‘mixed econ-
omy,’ echoing in this respect Servan-Schreiber’s key concern of a separation 
between the economic and political spheres. In his argument, the Swedish 
model had originated outside of party politics, more precisely in the sphere 
of the economy. As the elections of autumn 1976 approached, the Moder-
ate leader reiterated claims that the Social Democrats now threatened the 
Swedish mixed economy and the Swedish model that had gained so much 
praise abroad.25
Bohman’s rhetoric should be seen in perspective with the contemporary 
shifts in the Swedish political debate, where the battles over the opinion 
took new shapes as the idea of wage-earner funds gained traction and be-
came more defined. Mobilizations on the side of the Swedish Employers’ 
Association (SAF) turned it into a veritable policy- and opinion-building 
organization by the mid-1970s, directed first and foremost against the Social 
Democratic Party and LO (Stråth, 1998: 220–221). Protest against the wage-
earner funds became the big symbol that united these efforts. During the 
upcoming electoral campaigns, the Swedish model – a concept that was not 
present in the party program of 1975 – was frequently referred to, not least 
in the context of the wage-earner funds.26 Ingvar Carlsson thus portrayed 
the Social Democrats’ support of the LO proposal as ‘living up to the so-
called Swedish model,’ in line with Palme’s argument that its core was to 
adapt to the demands of Swedish society (Carlson, 1976).
By the elections of 1976, thus, the Swedish model had become the ob-
ject of a veritable politicosemantic struggle. Confronted with the oppo-
sition’s messages of a Swedish model praised abroad but threatened by 
Social Democratic rule, the ruling party reacted by putting the concept 
center-stage in their electoral campaign. In the big public duel between the 
main candidates Palme consequently portrayed the bourgeois coalition as 
a menace to the Swedish model, while Bohman said it was exactly the other 
way around (Crona, 1976). The concept now appeared not only in political 
rhetoric but also in the Social Democrats’ visual and textual campaign ma-
terial. On big ads titled ‘The Swedish model,’ Palme and Finance Minister 
Gunnar Sträng stood shoulder by shoulder, explaining what was meant by 
the concept:
Together, the Swedish people has made Sweden a welfare country. Many 
countries today see Sweden as an example to follow. One talks about the 
Swedish model. The Social Democrats have been entrusted to lead this 
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development towards greater social justice, security and liberty for the 
people. The nature of our politics is today the same as under the lead-
ership of Per Albin Hansson and Tage Erlander. Broad popular reform 
politics in close collaboration with the wage earners. This is the Swedish 
model.27
Through this operation, the Social Democratic Party claimed ownership 
of the Swedish model; it was to be understood as the Swedish society as a 
whole, in the form of the welfare state that had developed under 40 years 
of Social Democratic rule. It was, therefore, unsurprising that the Social 
Democratic electoral defeat echoed around the world. The fall of the model 
became a central perspective in the international press and was widely inter-
preted as signifying the end of the Swedish Social Democratic experience. 
On the day after the elections, Olle Svenning offered a bitter analysis in 
Aftonbladet:
The Swedish model has fallen. It was crushed after 44 years. It came to 
an end when the economic situation of people is better than ever before, 
there is more work than in any previous period, and greater social se-
curity than at any previous stage. The Swedish model burst when it had 
become more efficient than ever before.
(Svenning, 1976)
In 1976, for the Swedish Social Democratic press, too, the electoral defeat 
was equaled to the end of the Swedish model. In this respect, it is certainly 
true that the Swedish model was created in the rear window (Stråth, 1998: 
19). Yet at the same time, this far from signaled the disappearance of the 
concept.
Toward the Nordic model
The Swedish Social Democrats’ appropriation of the Swedish model con-
cept occurred at a time when their societal project experienced strong chal-
lenges both from within Sweden and from the outside. In the late 1970s 
Swedish political and social science literature, this backward-looking con-
struction of a fixed Swedish model abounded.28 Furthermore, it became a 
key rhetorical weapon used against the bourgeois governments, accused 
of ruining the model in their failure to handle the labor conflicts following 
the 1979 energy crisis and big strikes of 1980 (Marklund, 2013: 277). His-
torian Urban Lundberg has argued that such defensive positions on behalf 
of the achieved welfare state constructions became a central feature of not 
only the Swedish, but the Nordic Social Democrats during the 1970s and 
that the concept of a ‘Nordic model’ took shape in the context of the Joint 
Committee of the Nordic Social Democratic Labour Movement (SAMAK) 
(Lundberg, 2006: 275–277).
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Indeed, soon after the model concept entered the active vocabulary of 
Swedish Social Democrats, it also emerged in the Nordic sphere.29 The new 
international challenges such as oil price shocks and the ensuing crises trig-
gered ‘comprehensive and intense platform activities within the various co-
operative bodies of Nordic Social Democracy’ (Lundberg, 2006: 276–277). 
The rise of neoliberalism, both abroad and at home, signaled a threat to the 
postwar welfare state for its political architects. In this context, prominent 
members of the Scandinavian Social Democratic parties started to refer to 
a ‘Nordic’ or ‘Scandinavian’ model. In February 1981, the Danish Minister 
for Social Affairs, Ritt Bjerregaard, gave a talk in Oslo with the title ‘Is the 
Scandinavian model dead?’ Stirring debate both in Norway and Denmark, 
Bjerregaard declared that the model was not dead, but that it was ‘moving,’ 
and called for a reform of the Social Democratic parties (Bjerregaard, 1981). 
Soon after, at the Congress of the Norwegian Labour Party, chief ideologue 
Einar Førde warned that a failure for the so-called Scandinavian model 
would have international repercussions (Adresseavisen, 1981; Røyseland, 
1981). At the Nordic Council’s plenary meeting that summer, Olof Palme 
declared that ‘[T]he struggle for a peaceful transformation of society and 
international solidarity that is often called the Nordic model is threatened 
by icing winds from the right that have started to find their way over our 
borders (Ljungberg, 1981).’ At the same time as these vocal representatives 
of Nordic Social Democracy started to include the Scandinavian or Nordic 
model in their rhetorical vocabulary, a more analytical approach to the con-
cept was also underway. On the initiative of Norwegian Minister of Plan-
ning Per Kleppe a SAMAK working group had been created during spring 
1981 to formulate a distinct ‘Scandinavian model’ different from those of 
other Western countries. According to Kleppe, the term was modeled on 
the already established concept of the Swedish model (Parr, 2007: 31).30 The 
group included a number of figures from the Nordic Social Democratic 
parties, among them the later Swedish Finance Minister Kjell-Olof Feldt. 
Against the backdrop of its discussions, Kleppe penned the draft ‘A new 
Nordic model.’31 It was presented at the Nordic Labour Movement’s Con-
gress in Sandefjord in 1982, and described by Dagbladet as the Congress’ 
‘most innovative document’ (Holm, 1982). The report started with invoking 
the former glory of the Scandinavian model and its long standing as a suc-
cessful example for other countries before Kleppe stated that the precondi-
tions for the model had profoundly changed during the 1970s.32 Economic 
growth in the export-dependent Nordic economies had suffered dire conse-
quences after the oil crisis, and recent efforts to tackle these problems had 
revealed that the traditional toolbox, including Keynesian economics, no 
longer worked satisfactorily.33 During the same period, oppositional forces 
had grown in strength, both in the form of the green wave and the success 
of the Conservatives. Introspection was, therefore, called for Kleppe con-
tended, not unwilling to learn from Social Democracy’s critics.34 The core 
idea in the report was that economic growth was the key to reaching the 
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overarching goals of Social Democracy: work for everyone, social justice, 
more equality between the sexes, and better local communities. In order to 
achieve this, it was necessary to put aside sector interests and look at the to-
tal picture; the necessary willingness to change was another central message 
in Kleppe’s report. The report stated that the Social Democrats by and large 
now were in favor of a market economy, and Kleppe proposed that the state 
should introduce new frameworks for more efficient markets and new gov-
ernance systems for more efficient institutions, along with a prioritization 
of action in domains that would engender economic growth and restructur-
ations.35 As the Norwegian Labor Party’s leader Gro Harlem Brundtland 
stated in her discussion of the report in the opening address to the Congress, 
the dilemma of the Nordic labor movement was now not whether or not it 
should govern the economy, but which parts it should govern.36 This was the 
‘new Nordic model.’
The transnational trajectory of the Swedish and Nordic model
This chapter has explored the trajectory of the concept of the Nordic 
model, from the first mentions of a Swedish model in Jean-Jacques Servan- 
Schreiber’s 1967 bestseller Le défi américain to the Kleppe report’s articu-
lation of a new Nordic model in 1981. In conclusion, the chapter will point 
out some of its main contributions. First of all, it has shed light on the con-
tested character of a concept that was intensely political in both France 
and Sweden, and later on the Nordic level, oscillating between notions of a 
mixed economy and of representing a way toward democratic socialism. In 
its overarching ambition to restructure the economy to create new growth, 
the Kleppe report drew on the work of both the Norwegian party’s Long-
Term Program and the Swedish party’s crisis program Future for Sweden, 
both of which had been met with internal criticism for being too willing 
to abandon traditional Social Democratic policies in favor of a line closer 
to that of the bourgeois parties (Andersson, 2006: 112–116). This had also 
been the reaction to Bjerregaard’s talk from her Danish comrades (Her-
mund, 1981). If, as Lundberg suggests, the conscience of a Nordic model 
grew through the 1970s in parallel with new challenges and a defense of 
the social achievements of organized labor, it seems that the concept was 
first articulated and came into wider circulation through the Kleppe report. 
However, when Kleppe launched ‘The Nordic model’ in 1982, it was con-
sciously placed as standing on the threshold. Analogous to how Swedish 
Social Democrats had appropriated the Swedish model, it looked back at 
what already seemed a golden era for Social Democracy when many for-
eigners turned to the Nordic countries for inspiration and ideals. But, sim-
ilar again to the Swedish situation, it also looked forward although the aim 
of introducing democratic socialism was replaced with that of a return to 
economic growth: Kleppe’s ‘ Nordic model’ was intended as a tool for new 
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thinking and the promotion of adequate solutions for a different age, to help 
overcome the perceived crisis of Nordic Social Democracy. From this first 
articulation of the concept, it bore within itself a palpable tension, referring, 
on the one hand, to a legacy of past success and, on the other hand, to a 
future of possibilities. At the same time, this flexibility has made the model 
concept, both in its Nordic, Swedish, and, indeed, today, Finnish, Danish, 
and Norwegian versions, a key political concept at home and a frequent ref-
erence abroad used by a variety of political and ideological actors. Against 
this backdrop, it is no surprise that the Swedish Social Democrats in 2018 
again went into the election campaign with the old-new slogan ‘[T]he Swed-
ish model must be developed, not dismantled.’
Second, in exploring the transnational circulation of the concept, the 
chapter has shown how the circulation process took place in different steps, 
adding layers of meaning from France via Sweden to the Nordic level. This 
investigation prompts us to recognize the asymmetries within the Nordic re-
gion, which are perhaps only accentuated when studying the Nordic on the 
global level (Marklund, 2013). Andersson and Hilson (2009: 223) observe the 
double position of Sweden in relation to its Nordic neighbors during much 
of the twentieth century, being both ‘the silent reference point for what is 
considered Nordic or Scandinavia’ in the eyes of many foreigners, and cen-
tral for how the other Nordic countries identified themselves as Nordic. We 
cannot fully explore the conceptual history of the Nordic model without 
considering its entangled Swedish prehistory. Servan-Schreiber’s Swedish 
model was not a Nordic model; there were particular reasons related to 
Swedish economic, industrial, and foreign political specificities that made 
the country stand out in the eyes of the Frenchman debating the future of 
the advanced industrial democracies. When the Swedish Social Democrats 
in the mid-1970s won ownership of the concept, on the other hand, it was 
quickly generalized as an avatar for Social Democracy, in a time of increas-
ing challenges. This in turn made its expansion into the Nordic social dem-
ocratic sphere – at a moment when at least the Scandinavian experiences 
were more similar than they had been in the late 1960s – a relatively easy 
operation.
Finally, this attempt at tracing the roots of the concept of the Nordic model 
suggests that we must consider a multiplicity of actors, heeding the call of 
Kettunen and Petersen (2011) that, doing historical research on welfare state 
models, we must recognize that we’re operating in a ‘field where images of 
change, and thus of the past, the present and the future, are constructed not 
only by researchers but also by many different actors such as politicians, 
business leaders, consultants and journalists.’ The chapter has highlighted 
both the role of diplomats, correspondents, and politicians as intermedi-
aries capable of influencing processes of intercultural transfer. They were 
the translators necessary for the model concept’s circulation between public 
cultures and political arenas from France to Sweden and Norden.
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 1 Research for this chapter has been funded by the Independent Research Fund 
Denmark (Project 8018-00023B). I am grateful to Eirinn Larsen for valuable 
comments to a previous version of the chapter.
 2 ‘Macron veut importer le modèle scandinave’, Le Monde (March 3, 2017). See 
also A. Lefebvre (2018), Macron, le Suédois (Paris: Presses universitaires de 
France).
 3 For a case in point in the latter category see the chapter on Sweden in A. Shon-
field (1965), Modern Capitalism. The Changing Balance of Public and Private 
Power, (London: Oxford University Press).
 4 The association of Sweden with the model concept had already occurred; in 
one American publication it had been characterized as a ‘model for the world’, 
and in 1961 the British intellectual Perry Anderson used in passing the term the 
‘Swedish model’ in an article. See H. Strode (1949), Sweden: Model for a World, 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co); and P. Anderson, ‘Sweden: Mr. Crosland’s 
Dreamland’, New Left Review (January–February 1961), 4–12.
 5 On the transdiscursive character of the Nordic model concept see Lars Mjøset’s 
contribution to this volume.
 6 See also several contributions in this volume.
 7 J. J. Servan-Schreiber, ‘Le choc de 68’, L’Express (December 30, 1968), 16. Un-
less otherwise indicated all translations from French and the Scandinavian lan-
guages to English are my own.
 8 J. Diebold, ‘Unity in Face of Challenge’, New York Magazine (August 5, 1968), 54.
 9 See ‘Not om de svenska resultaten’, 206–210; ‘den svenska modellen’ was how-
ever used once in a footnote, see footnote 82, 229.
 10 Letter from J. J. Servan-Schreiber to T. Erlander (April 19, 1968), Arbetarrörels-
ens arkiv och bibliotek (ARAB), Tage Erlander’s Papers (TEA), 4.7:2.
 11 K. Ahlenius, ‘”Sverige kan tvinga EEC-länderna ur NATO”’, Dagens Nyheter 
(May 2, 1968).
 12 ‘En fransk utmaning’, (May 6, 1968), SR, TV1, Kungliga Biblioteket (KB), 
Audiovisuella medier.
 13 J. Parent (1970), Le modèle suédois, (Paris: Calmann-Lévy).
 14 Letter from O. Palme to J.-J. Servan-Schreiber, undated; Note from A. Ferm to 
O. Palme, undated, ARAB, Olof Palme’s Papers (OPA), 3.2:54.
 15 ‘Middag Quai d’Orsay. Tal till Chaban-Delmas’ (April 14, 1970), ARAB, OPA, 
4.2:59.
 16 JT 20h (April 13, 1970), ORTF, Bibliothéque Nationale de France (BNF), In-
stitut national de l’audiovisuel (INA). Available online: http://www.ina.fr/
video/CAF97047315/interview-premier-ministre-suedois-video.html (Accessed 
6-11-2015.)
 17 ‘Conférence de presse accordée par le Premier Ministre Olof Palme à la presse 
internationale à Paris, le 15 avril 1970’, (April 15, 1970), Ministère royal des af-
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 18 ‘Le “modèle suédois”’ (March 8, 1971), Objectifs, BNF, INA.
 19 Sverige i utländsk press 1969 (1970), (Stockholm: Utrikesdepartementet), 1.
 20 A. Leion (1970), Inkomstfördelningen i Sverige. En sammanfattning av Låginkom-
stutredningens första delbetänkanden, (Stockholm: Prisma).
 21 Riksdagens protokoll [Proceedings of the Riksdag] 1975/1976: 11 (October 29, 
1975), 12. 
 
 22 Ibid., 41.
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gram. 1897 till 1990, (Stockholm: Arbettarörelsens arkiv och bibliotek), 74–104.
  
 27 ‘Den svenska modellen’, ad for the Social Democratic Party, Aftonbladet 
( September 1, 1976).
28 See for example the contributions to the Swedish Institute for Future Studies 
seminar on the Swedish model, published in Återblick på den svenska  modellen – 
om den fanns (1979), (Stockholm: Sekretariatet för framtidsstudier), and I. 
Elander (1979) “Den svenska modellen”: recept även för 80-tallet?, (Stockholm: 
Sekretariatet för framtidsstudier), as well as A. Leion (1979), Solidarisk lönep-
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Rabén & Sjögren) and A. Hedborg & R. Meidner (1984), Folkhemsmodellen, 
(Stockholm: Rabén & Sjögren).
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from a clearly defined social science perspective, Lars Mjøset similarly observed 
that the Swedish model, ‘contrary to the other Nordic models’ by this point was 
a well-established concept; moreover, it was a slogan. See L. Mjøset (ed.) (1986), 
Norden dagen derpå. De nordiske økonomisk-politiske modellene og deres proble-
mer på 70- og 80-tallet, (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget), 121–122.
 30 To my knowledge, Parr is the first to shed light on this first conscious articula-
tion of a ‘Nordic model’.
 
 31 P. Kleppe, ‘En ny nordisk modell’, (November 1981), ARAB, Arbetarrörelsens 
nordiska samarbetskomité (SAMAK), Series F2, Vol. 4. While actually finished 
in December, Kleppe dated the final draft one month earlier because he had 
taken up the job of secretary-general of EFTA from December 1. See Letter from 
P. Kleppe to S. Dahlin, (December 17, 1981), ARAB, SAMAK, Series F2, Vol. 4.
 32 P. Kleppe, ‘Den nordiske modellen – et debattinnlegg’, 1. ARAB, SAMAK, 
F2:4.
 33 Ibid., 2. 
34 Ibid., 6.  
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Introduction
This chapter analyses how the Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party (Partido 
Socialista Obrero Español – PSOE) understood and used the concept ‘the 
Swedish model’ rhetorically during the Spanish transition to democracy 
in the mid-1970s. Furthermore, it aims to shed light on the bilateral rela-
tions between PSOE and the Swedish Social Democrat Party (Sveriges So-
cialdemokratiska Arbetareparti – SAP) during these years, providing an 
account of the exchange of ideas and experiences between SAP and PSOE. 
Thus, this chapter deals with the circulation and meaning of the Swed-
ish model from a hitherto unexplored perspective – that of Spanish party 
politics.
Our focus on the relations between these two parties is justified by the 
state of the art. In the context of what has been called the crises in Southern 
Europe (Varsori, 2009), the European social democrats provided great sup-
port to PSOE during the Spanish transition to democracy. The German So-
cial Democrat Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands – SPD) and 
the French Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste Français – PSF) in particular 
influenced PSOE (Ortuño, 2005; Muñoz, 2012; Granadino, 2016; Kassem, 
2016; Salm, 2016). These parties represented two competing trends within 
the Socialist International (SI) in terms of foreign and economic policy, and 
they disagreed on the issue of the relations between socialists and commu-
nists in Western Europe. Notwithstanding all the above, it is still a common 
assumption in Spanish literature that one of the main sources of interna-
tional inspiration for PSOE during these years was the Swedish/Nordic 
model (Mateos, 2016).
Focusing on the relations between PSOE and SAP will shed light on this 
puzzle. Choosing SAP, and no other Nordic social democrat party, as the 
representative of and catalyst for the Swedish model responds to three fac-
tors. First, the literature suggests that the Swedes were more deeply involved 
in the democratization processes in Southern Europe than any other Nordic 
social democrats. Second, at the time the Swedish social democrats were the 
main representatives of a Nordic model of social democracy – ‘the Swedish 
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model’. Third, the high international profile of the Swedish Prime Minister 
Olof Palme, and his public criticism of Franco’s dictatorship in Spain, sug-
gests that SAP’s relations with PSOE might have been especially significant.
Our main argument is that PSOE was interested in the political and ide-
ological line of the Swedish social democrats, especially between 1976 and 
1979. The leaders of the Spanish party emphasized the ideological affinity 
between PSOE and SAP and used the concept of the Swedish model to facil-
itate the ideological transition of the party from Marxism to social democ-
racy in a context in which the latter term had been discredited among the 
Spanish left. Furthermore, this paper supports the argument that SAP tried 
to actively help the radicalized PSOE of the early 1970s towards a social 
democratic path. The Swedes provided the Spanish with economic, tech-
nical, educational, and moral support. In this process, SAP was influenced 
by the Iberian context and by the internal debates of the Spanish socialists. 
SAP re-conceptualized and re-branded their party and their model as part 
of an effective policy transfer to enhance Swedish soft power in Spain. As a 
result, SAP and the Swedish model were facilitators of the ideological mod-
eration of PSOE.
Finally, we argue that the Swedish model, as understood by PSOE, 
changed during these years of rapid political transformations. Initially the 
Spanish socialists overlooked it; then, it went from being a model of social 
democracy that could lead to the radical transformation of the economy 
and society, to being a model of feasible international neutralism. These 
changes were connected to the image of SAP’s leader Olof Palme, to the 
active support of SAP for PSOE, and to the rapidly changing political needs 
of PSOE in the context of Spanish transition.
This chapter is based on primary sources, mainly from the historical ar-
chives of PSOE and SAP, and on published sources. Its interpretative frame-
work is based on the theories of cultural transfers and policy transfers. The 
former is understood as a process in which the national contexts of donors 
and receivers do not exist independently of one another before and during 
the transfers, and as a process in which there is active selection and appro-
priation on the receiving end (Bourdieu, 2002; Nygård and Strang, 2016). 
Furthermore, cultural transfers and reception processes are conceived here 
as a sequence of a broader and longer circulation process (Keim, 2014). In 
this sense, this paper offers a case study that constitutes a particular in-
stance of the circulation of ‘the Swedish model’ during the Cold War. Pol-
icy transfer refers to the travel of country-specific policy models and best 
practices. Classical policy transfer theory has evolved around the parity of 
 government-to-government transfers (Rom-Jensen, 2017: 33). In this case, we 
focus on two parties with very different positions in their respective coun-
tries at the time. However, this case represents a typical moment of projected 
rupture and urge for change stemming from dissatisfaction with a current 
policy, which is one criterion for policy transfer (Rose, 2005: 1). The dy-
namics of policy transfer become that of a lesson drawn from abroad being 
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used in domestic politics as proposals for new policy. Possible pre-existing 
policy traditions and path dependencies are thus combated not just with the 
policies themselves but also by selling a more comprehensive foreign image, 
in this case, the Swedish version of the Nordic Welfare State. This image 
leaned on established images of a progressive Scandinavia or Nordic region 
(Stadius, 2010). This broader image tradition, we argue, is also part of the 
argument and persuasive power offered by Sweden as a model. As Byron 
Rom-Jensen has showed in the case of policy transfers related to the United 
States, a general trend of Americanization supported US policy advance-
ments internationally (Rom-Jensen, 2017: 36). The Nordic-Swedish case is 
far more modest but still carries a similar quality of attraction as a model.
Spain in the 1970s and the concept of ‘the Swedish model’
At the beginning of the 1970s, everyone in Spain assumed that Franco’s 
dictatorship could not continue unchanged after the death of the dictator 
(Preston, 2004). Franco had envisaged the continuation of his regime in the 
shape of a Monarchy. Although he had not foreseen the democratization of 
Spain, most of the political families1 that composed the regime acknowl-
edged that the country should evolve politically. However, when it came to 
possible democracy, there was an issue that concerned the regime. Surveys 
on Spaniards’ political preferences showed that the majority of those who 
had political interests were in favour of socialism and/or social democracy2 
(Gillespie, 1989).
Political parties had been banned in Spain since 1939. However, at the be-
ginning of the 1970s, the main party in the clandestine opposition in terms 
of members and activities was the communist party (Partido Comunista de 
España – PCE), which in the 1970s adopted the Euro-communist ideological 
line. Moreover, there were several socialist parties acting clandestinely. All 
these parties shared two ideological characteristics: anti-capitalism and the 
aim of ‘democratic rupture’, meaning the rejection of any kind of reformist 
alternative proposed by the regime after Franco’s death.
PSOE was one of these parties. It was the oldest political party in Spain, 
and it carried weight in the historical memory of the people for the role it 
played during the Second Republic (1931–1939). However, after more than 
30 years in exile, it was practically inoperative. In 1972, some members 
sought to rejuvenate the party. The organizational and ideological renova-
tion split the party in two: PSOE renovado and PSOE histórico. In January 
1974, the SI recognized the PSOE renovado (hereafter PSOE) as the only 
representative of Spanish socialism (Ortuño, 2005). From then on, PSOE 
tried to promote a new identity aimed at regaining its hegemony within the 
left-wing Spanish opposition (Guidoni and González, 1976: 40). It was built 
in opposition to both Soviet communism and West European social democ-
racy. The latter was discredited among the Spanish left for having allowed 
Franco’s regime to survive, for being too friendly with the United States 
(US) and for having become the managers of capitalism. PSOE’s renewed 
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ideological line was sanctioned by the 13th Congress of the party in exile 
(Suresnes, October 1974), at which a new executive committee led by Felipe 
González was elected.
In this frame, the concept of ‘the Swedish model’ started to be used in 
Spain. Analysis of the main Spanish newspapers – La Vanguardia Española 
and ABC – suggests that the Swedish model was introduced to Spain in an 
echo of the discussions in Great Britain and France at that time.3 Certainly, 
the concept became better known to the Spanish public from February 
1971 onwards, after ABC published a translation of an interview with Olof 
Palme, entitled El Modelo Sueco. Palme described the main characteristics 
of Sweden’s social system and policy of neutrality to conclude that ‘Sweden 
does not offer a model, but a method’ (Los Domingos de ABC (Madrid), 
1971: 7–11).4 In September 1973, ABC paved the way for the emergence of 
a genuine Spanish discussion on the Swedish model, publishing a column 
called again ‘El Modelo Sueco’. In these and other similar articles, the Span-
ish conservative media would assign certain values and meanings to the 
Swedish model before the transition to democracy. Thus, they anticipated 
and conditioned the appropriation of this concept by the Spanish left.
The Spanish media presented this model positively, implying that it could 
represent an example for post-Franco Spain. The reason was that Sweden, 
‘under the Swedish crown’, had been living in harmony for decades. This 
was not only due to the stabilizing effect of the monarchy (Gómez-Salvago, 
1975: 23) but also because the political left had managed the economy of the 
country ‘always in a pacific and exemplary dialogue’ with the opposition. 
Swedish democracy5 was considered as the ‘plus ultra’ example among the 
western democracies, the Swedish secret being ‘tolerance’ (ABC, 1973: 26).
The Swedish model could be considered an example for the future of 
Spain, in which the socialists would probably have to play an important 
role, for one more reason. It was a system created by the left that had not led 
to socialism. It was an example precisely because the Swedish social dem-
ocrats did not socialize the means of production and under their system 
private initiative had flourished (La Vanguardia Española, 1976: 21).6
Thus, in the early 1970s, the interest of the Spanish conservatives in the 
Swedish model functioned as a prescription for the socialists in the future 
democratic system. In a context of a banned and radicalized leftist opposi-
tion in Spain, the Swedish model illustrated to these parties what would be 
the acceptable limits of behaviour in a democracy. This, in turn, limited the 
potential attractiveness of the Swedish model for the Spanish leftist opposi-
tion in the early 1970s.
Initial SAP contacts and strategies when PSOE abandoned 
clandestine status
After the SI recognized the renovated PSOE in 1974, the main social 
democrat parties of northern Europe did not increase their contacts with 
the Spanish. They considered the new leaders of PSOE to be too young, 
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inexperienced, radical, and willing to ally with the communists. For Swed-
ish diplomats, it was ‘astonishing’ that the Marxist character of PSOE was 
accentuated during the Suresnes Congress in October 1974.7 At that time, 
the main international partner of PSOE was the PSF, which also experi-
enced a leftwards shift at the beginning of the 1970s. The PSF tried to pro-
mote a trend called southern European socialism in the Iberian Peninsula, 
based on the ideas of building socialism in democracy, the implementation 
of self-management (autogestion) in every field of social life, and the pro-
grammatic union between socialists and communists (Granadino, 2019).
The passive attitude of European social democrats towards PSOE changed 
at the beginning of 1975 when the Portuguese communists strengthened 
their hand in the Carnation Revolution. The logic behind this change was 
that supporting PSOE would help it to become a moderate social demo-
crat party that could regain its former dominant status in the Spanish Left 
(Muñoz, 2012: 184). Thus, PSOE could counterbalance the communist influ-
ence on the Spanish working class. Furthermore, this would prevent PSOE 
from importing the model of the French union of the left.
In the wake of the political developments in Southern Europe, SAP felt 
the urge to strategically downplay the communists both in Spain and in Swe-
den. In the post-May ’68 context, the international economic crisis showed 
the limits of the ability of social democracy to transform society. SAP had to 
face strong criticism from the social democrat left, notably the youth organi-
zation and trade union leaders. Furthermore, the renewed Swedish commu-
nist party (Vänsterpartiet Kommunisterna – VPK) rejected the Soviet model 
and adopted a more attractive Euro-communist line that could threaten the 
hegemony of SAP among the Swedish left. For SAP, taking the lead in the 
solidarity activities with the Spanish opposition was a moral duty as well as 
a way of restraining the potential influence of Euro-communism.
SAP became interested in PSOE as a party that could be helped towards 
a social democratic path. The Swedes considered the strong position of the 
PCE in comparison with PSOE to be a potential problem after Franco’s 
death. The estimation at the SAP-dominated Swedish Ministry of Foreign 
affairs was that
[The] socialist Party, which probably has fairly strong support among 
the Spanish population for historical reasons, suffers from the lack of 
a strong organization. Difficulties in this matter will also continue to 
haunt the party later in the event of a freer post-Francoist era.8
Thus, SAP intensified its relations with the Spanish socialists. Felipe 
González visited a regional SAP Congress in Malmö in March and met Olof 
Palme, a meeting that helped the Swedish Prime Minister ‘to understand the 
Spanish reality much better’.9 Some weeks later, a high-level delegation of 
the Swedish party visited Spain. Officially, this was ‘to strengthen the links 
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between Spanish and Swedish socialists’ although according to the Spanish 
newspapers, the specific reason of the visit was to both provide economic 
support to PSOE and initiate a strategic cooperation supporting the con-
struction of a viable party and union structure, which PSOE lacked (Pueblo, 
1975).
SAP prepared its strategy to gather support for PSOE among its grassroot 
organization, the leading social democratic labour union Landsorganisa-
tionen (LO), and the Swedish people at large. There were solid grounds for 
activating the grassroot levels of SAP. Spain was a well-known tourist desti-
nation, and the dictatorship had been a hot topic and moral question among 
a larger Swedish public since the late 1960s. In Vilgot Sjöman’s famous new 
left generation fiction documentary Jag är nyfiken, gul (I am Curious (Yel-
low)) from 1967, the main character, Lena Nyman, stops people in the street 
asking if Spain should be boycotted as a tourist destination; her father had 
been fighting in the Republican Forces in the Spanish Civil War. Spain was 
one of the more important stages for Palme’s active and high-profile foreign 
policy. And there were also veterans, or relatives of veterans of the Interna-
tional Brigades, who could easily be mobilized to support the Spanish left 
at the prospect of a major political change. It was in SAP’s strategic interest 
to monopolize this heritage, originally firmly rooted in anarcho-syndicalist 
groups (Lundvik, 1980), for the new cooperation with PSOE.
At the same time, the Swedish government had to be careful not to 
violate the Helsinki Declaration of 1975, which stipulated the rule of 
ideological non-intervention between the signatory states. In this light, 
financial support to PSOE became a sensitive issue. In fact, during the 
above-mentioned visit to Spain, SAP’s international secretary Pierre 
Schori ‘strongly denied any rumours in the press of economic aid’.10 Not-
withstanding this statement, clandestine economic support was key at the 
time. According to Swedish diplomatic sources, PSOE received 60,000 
Swedish crowns (an estimated 840,000 pesetas) when González visited 
Sweden in March 1975.11 Moreover, in January, SAP’s treasurer, Nils-
Gösta Damberg, and Bernt Carlsson had planned to meet with represent-
atives of PSOE in Brussels, Paris, and Toulouse to discuss PSOE’s needs 
of financial contributions.12
In April 1975, the vice mayor of Stockholm, John Olof Persson, asked 
Rolf Theorin, organizational secretary and member of the SAP board, to 
act strategically concerning the upcoming 40-year anniversary in July 1976 
of the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War and to monopolize the heritage of 
the Swedish volunteers in the International Brigades for the current strate-
gic causes of SAP. Persson urged Theorin, who was nicknamed the ‘Fellini 
of SAP’, to find old war posters and reprint them as postcards to be sold 
during the anniversary celebrations in Sweden. The idea was clearly to mo-
bilize the memory of the Civil War towards SAP-driven, both ideological 
and financial, support for PSOE.13 As Persson put it in a letter addressed to 
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Theorin, ‘if we don’t take the initiative now, the communists will make the 
cause of Spain their own’.14
In September 1975, PSOE’s international secretary, Pablo Castellano, was 
present at SAP’s Congress, where he had a private talk with Palme.15 After 
that, SAP initiated a campaign ‘For the freedom of Spain’ (För Spaniens 
frihet) in Sweden. The slogan was a conscious re-connection with the sol-
idarity for Spain expressed internationally during the Civil War. Starting 
in October 1975, circular letters were sent to local party and labour union 
organizations, urging them to collect money. In the first days, 400,000 SEK 
was collected, and after that, the party received between 10,000 and 25,000 
SEK on a daily basis, which was channelled clandestinely to PSOE.16 At 
the same time, the SI created the Spanish Solidarity Fund to support de-
mocracy in Spain. The Bureau asked the member parties to provide urgent 
and generous financial and material aid to PSOE (Ortuño, 2005: 39–40). 
On November 20, the day of Franco’s death, the SAP donated 75,000 SEK 
through this fund.17
The Swedish Social Democratic Youth League (SSU) became especially 
active in promoting democratic change in Spain. In a letter to the local clubs, 
dated 3 March 1976, members were urged to support the Spanish democracy 
against fascism economically:
The decisive battle for democracy has to be fought by the Spaniards 
themselves. However, we in Sweden can also help in this battle through 
solidary acts of support. That is the reason why the Spanish social de-
mocracy pleads for support from Sweden.18
The wording here is interesting since the members of the SSU are asked to 
support ‘Spanish social democracy’. There are apparently two different nar-
rative standards: one for the south and one for the north. When Palme spoke 
at the PSOE party congress on 5 December 1976, he called it a ‘congress of 
the democratic and socialist alternative’.19 Before Spanish audiences and in 
communications with PSOE, he tended to use the term democratic social-
ism instead of social democracy for both the Spanish and his own party. 
This shows deliberate re-conceptualization.
The challenge for SAP was both factual and conceptual: how should so-
cial democracy be re-conceptualized for a southern European audience? In 
the dossier, the leftist non-communist groups (basically only PSOE) are de-
scribed under the label ‘democratic socialism’.20 This concept had been used 
by Palme on some occasions and stemmed from the Minister of Finance 
during the 1930s and 1940s, Ernst Wigforss (Berggren, 2010: 422). It now 
came in handy in promoting northern European social democracy, widely 
unpopular among the radicalized Spanish left. This concept would be used 
during the following years to re-brand Swedish social democracy in Spain 
and Mediterranean Europe at large.
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The Spanish left embraces the Swedish model
After the establishment of closer relations and cooperation with SAP and 
other European social democrats in the spring of 1975, PSOE’s leaders un-
derstood that these parties expected them to temper their ideological stance 
(Muñoz, 2012). While the support of SAP and other parties of the SI for 
PSOE fomented political moderation, it simultaneously augmented criti-
cism against PSOE from the rest of the opposition for being a moderate and 
social democrat. This in turn increased the need to radicalize the PSOE’s 
public discourse, which led them to criticize European social democrats for 
being puppets of the capitalist US. However, in this narrative PSOE sepa-
rated the Scandinavians21 from the rest of the social democrats. The reason 
for this was that the Nordics were not marionettes of the United States, 
demonstrated by the fact that they ‘kept an active neutrality’ in the interna-
tional arena (El socialista, 1975: 11).
In this frame, it is our argument that the leaders of PSOE used the concept 
of the Swedish model – considered equivalent to Swedish social  democracy – 
to facilitate the ideological shift of the party from anti-capitalist socialism to 
social democracy between 1976 and 1979. But before that could happen, the 
meaning of this concept had to change in Spain.
This occurred in the second half of 1975. Between August and September, 
the Spanish regime condemned to death and executed several members of 
the opposition. Before the executions, Palme and the Swedish Minister of 
Finance, Gunnar Sträng, took to the streets of Stockholm to demonstrate 
against the sentences, and they raised funds for the Spanish democratic op-
position using the above-mentioned slogan För Spaniens Frihet (Figure 6.1). 
Furthermore, at the annual SAP party congress the day after the executions, 
Palme used harsh language against Franco’s regime, calling its members 
‘satanic murderers’.22
The reaction of the Spanish conservative newspapers to the Swedish lead-
ers’ initiative was furious (ABC (Madrid), 1975a: 79). Palme’s attempts to 
damage the Spanish image and to ‘fund the Spanish opposition with the 
aim of overthrowing the Spanish regime’ (Blanco y Negro (Madrid), 1975: 
29) made him a public enemy of official Spain. The media started a smear 
campaign against him that also modified the image of the Swedish model in 
Spain (ABC (Madrid), 1975b: 21). Palme’s actions coincided with the Swed-
ish debate on the implementation of the Meidner Plan and the introduction 
of economic and industrial democracy in Sweden, which allegedly would 
lead the country to socialism. This allowed the Spanish conservative media 
to connect the deteriorating image of Palme to an emerging hostility to-
wards the Swedish model.
When the social democrats lost control of government in the Swedish 
elections of 1976, ABC, echoing the arguments of Anglo-Saxon critics of 
Sweden,23 only highlighted the dark sides of the Swedish model.
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Suddenly, the Swedes realized that they were dominated by an im-
placable bureaucracy obsessed with the equalitarian ideal. [They] 
have arrived at the hypertrophy of civility; children are educated in 
the excellence of being normal, conformism has become the State re-
ligion, any kind of initiative is discouraged … To summarize, Sweden 
instead of resembling a happy Arcadia, reminds one of the slightly 
inhuman images of an Orwellian universe: a record of criminality and 
suicides, auto- exile of artists and ambitious youngsters; the kingdom 
of boredom.
(Alferez, 1976: 44)
This change of the image and values attached to the Swedish model ren-
dered it interesting to the Spanish left, who also found a friend in Palme, 
now a persona non-grata for official Spain. The bilateral relations estab-
lished between PSOE and SAP were also relevant for the Spanish socialists’ 
change of attitude towards the Swedish model, as we will see below.
At the same time as ABC criticized Palme, the progressive journal for 
Spanish emigrants in Europe, Exprés español, published a graphic report on 
the demonstrations in different European cities against the executions car-
ried out by the Spanish regime. On the front page of the journal was a large 
Figure 6.1  Olof Palme did not hesitate to take the streets to show his solidarity for 
‘Spain’s freedom’. The public is urged to support the solidarity action 
of the Swedish labour movement. © Keystone Press/Alamy Stock Photo
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photograph of Palme holding a cash box. The accompanying text presented 
Palme as ‘… a man who, for sympathy with the Spanish people, repudiates 
Franco’s regime’.24
The Spanish progressives continued to be interested in the Swedish Prime 
Minister in the following months. In May 1976, after the death of Franco, 
the left-leaning journal Cambio16 published an interview with Palme, the 
first that he ever gave a Spanish newspaper or journal. In the introduction, 
he was described as the opposite of the Spanish regime leaders. ‘He drives 
his own car, goes to the supermarket, pays his traffic fines … and, where nec-
essary, he demonstrates in the streets against issues such as … the Spanish 
executions of last September’. This reinforced the positive image of Palme 
and of Sweden for the Spanish progressives. He was presented as the leader 
of an equalitarian country, where the Prime Minister was just like everyone 
else, in dramatic contrast with Spain.
One of the issues that the interview touched upon was Palme’s under-
standing of the Swedish model. He explained:
there is not a Swedish model to be exported. However, it is notable that 
there is international interest in our politics. … In the last decades [this 
interest] has been especially centered on our social policy. That same 
policy that has put us in the top line when it comes to welfare and stand-
ard of living.
Furthermore, Palme subtly directed the attention of the interviewer to a 
new, exemplary aspect of their policy. ‘In the last year, we have noticed a 
new interest abroad in our economic policy’. He went on to say, ‘the OECD 
presents us as a model’ of how to deal successfully with the international 
crisis through the regulation of demand. He finished his reflection on the 
Swedish model with a summary that sounds like a prescription; ‘to summa-
rize, our experience demonstrates the tight relation existing between social 
improvements and economic development. Actually, they condition each 
other mutually’.
This model not only provided the highest living standards in the world 
and equality thanks to the management of the capitalist economy but also 
resonated positively with PSOE’s ideology. Implying that the Swedish model 
was the model of SAP, Palme said:
As a party, we believe in democratic socialism as an alternative to the 
two dominant systems … Neither capitalism nor communism repre-
sents today the dream of freedom of the European peoples … For us, 
democratic socialism is the [ideology] that develops that dream of free-
dom. It is a movement that emerges from the will of freedom and the 
commitment of the people.
(Cambio16, 1976: 42–45)
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At a moment when PSOE was dreaming of freedom and defining its own 
identity, the use of words such as freedom, and democratic socialism instead 
of social democracy, was probably not innocent. As pointed out above, 
Palme may have decided to avoid the term social democracy to sound more 
appealing to the Spanish leftist audience.
While the Spanish perception of the Swedish model was being trans-
formed, Palme visited Spain in December 1976 for PSOE’s 27th Congress, 
the first that the socialists had held in Spain since 1932. At this Congress, 
PSOE approved a clearly anti-capitalist line, committing itself to a social-
ism characterized by the combination of economic planning and autogestión 
(worker self-management) and officially defined itself as Marxist. In terms 
of foreign policy, the party confirmed its opposition to Spain joining NATO. 
Moreover, PSOE’s previous executive committee was re-elected.
PSOE radicalized its ideological line precisely when the party was intro-
duced to Spanish public opinion and when the clarification of the situa-
tion of the Spanish left – the union of the different socialist groups and the 
balance of forces between socialists and communists – was at stake. This 
radicalization unsettled its international partners. The main study of the 
relations between PSOE and SPD argues that the German social democrats 
felt uneasy with the rhetoric employed by PSOE. However, they were satis-
fied with the re-election of the executive committee because it was consid-
ered a guarantee that the party would become more moderate in the future 
(Muñoz, 2012: 354–355).
PSOE’s leaders were under pressure from two fronts. On the one hand, a 
radical rank and file and a tough competition with PCE and other socialist 
parties pushed them towards the left. On the other hand, the Spanish re-
gime, and the persuasion of the European social democrats, pressed them 
to accelerate the process of ideological moderation. Other factors, national 
as well as international, made PSOE’s ideological clarification complicated. 
Nationally, an important part of the Spanish electorate was favourable to 
voting socialist or social democrat. However, in Spain, these trends were 
considered different from each other, and PSOE needed to overcome the 
disorientation of the electorate.25 Internationally, the US government was 
supervising the Spanish transition. They supported the political reform of 
the regime, which implicitly set limits to the left (Lemus, 2011). Thus, PSOE 
needed to be firmly placed on the left but not be excessively radical, while 
attracting voters who identified with socialism and social democracy, seen 
as different concepts in Spain.
At the Congress, Palme delivered a speech in which he reconceptualised 
his understanding of social democracy for the Spanish audience and tried 
to reconcile the two trends of socialism coexisting within the SI – southern 
European socialism and social democracy. According to him, social democ-
racy was ‘… a bit more than some formal liberties. We have considered it as 
a way to fulfil the will of men, to carry out social improvements, to trans-
form society, to impregnate with democracy all the spheres of social life’.26
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After the Congress, members of PSOE asked Palme about his opinion on 
the different tendencies coexisting within the SI. He answered,
regarding the issue of the so-called ‘socialism of the north’ and ‘social-
ism of the south’ that would be represented [on the one hand] by the 
line of Olof Palme and Willy Brandt, by the Nordic parties, and [on the 
other hand] by François Mitterrand and the southern parties, … that 
exact difference does not exist … The fundamental ideas of socialism 
are the same, the methods of social change are also the same…. There 
are distinctive features, it is true, … but there are no essential differ-
ences between the Nordic socialist parties and the French or Spanish 
socialist parties.27
Thus, Palme eased the task of the leaders of PSOE in overcoming the di-
chotomy between socialism and social democracy within the party and in 
Spain. Overall, his definition of social democracy was compatible with dem-
ocratic socialism and autogestión as it was understood by the Spanish party. 
The leaders of PSOE took on Palme’s idea, and in the months before and 
after the democratic elections in Spain (held in June 1977), they attempted 
to minimize the differences between socialism and social democracy, spe-
cifically connecting the latter with Sweden. Swedish social democracy was 
a good example to blur the difference between these ideological tendencies 
without giving up socialism because, according to González, ‘[The Swedish 
social democrats] want to make radical transformations of the social and 
economic structure’.28
The internal debate on the identity of PSOE did not end after the Con-
gress. Although the party declared itself Marxist, the social democratic ten-
dency within its leadership started to claim PSOE’s right to use the social 
democrat label (Múgica, 1977: 3; Turrión, 1977: 3). This provoked internal 
criticism (Andrade, 2012). The leadership of PSOE tried to contain the crit-
ics by blurring the very conceptual difference between socialism and social 
democracy that they had emphasized in the past. This became evident in 
González’s first appearance on Spanish TV in April 1977. He stated that the 
differences between these ideologies were not that great because ‘neither 
socialists nor true social democrats renounce the final aim of socialism: the 
disappearance of social classes’ (El socialista, 1977a: 1). Bernt Carlsson, the 
general secretary of the SI and a member of SAP, intervened in the debate 
as well. In an interview with El socialista, he contributed to blurring the dif-
ference between the terms socialist and social democrat: ‘I am socialist and 
social democrat. You cannot forget that the first person who used the term 
“social democrat” was Karl Marx … The name is not important, [what is 
important is] the programme’. (1977b: 9)
In this context of internal discussion on the identity of the party, an ar-
ticle appeared in PSOE’s official newspaper that analysed Palme’s vision 
of social democracy and the Swedish model. The article was based on a 
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recent Spanish translation of Serge Richard’s book Le rendez-vous suedois. 
According to Palme, the Swedish model was the deepening of democracy 
in its political, economic, and social dimensions. In the article, the Swedish 
model looked very similar to the idea of autogestión that PSOE advocated. 
The Swedish experience was called ‘socialism with a human face’ and sum-
marized as a ‘non-violent way towards socialism through responsible re-
form’. (Rico Lara, 1977: 17)
Five days after the publication of the article, June 15, 1977, democratic 
elections were held in Spain. In the set of arguments that PSOE circulated 
among its members before the elections, the party recognized that it wanted 
to capitalize on the goodwill enjoyed by the European socialists, specifically 
that of the Swedes and Germans.29 Scholars have shown that the European 
social democrats, especially the SPD, supported PSOE during the electoral 
campaign. However, according to the memoirs of Alfonso Guerra, PSOE’s 
then secretary of propaganda, SAP made the greatest contribution. The 
graphic designers who worked for the Swedish party helped create the image 
used by PSOE in the campaign (Guerra, 1984: 104).
The increase in PSOE–SAP bilateral relations after 1977
PSOE’s positive electoral results – it became the leading opposition party 
with 29.3% of the votes – utterly altered its position in the political system. 
After this, other socialist parties started to integrate into the more success-
ful PSOE, which contributed to changing the internal structure and the ide-
ological underpinning of the party (Mateos, 2013). From this moment on, 
PSOE’s ambitions grew, and it sought to appear more attractive to the voters 
of the centre (Juliá, 1990). In this new context, bilateral relations between 
SAP and PSOE increased. The Spaniards were still interested in capitalizing 
on the goodwill attached to the Swedes, but now their focus became learn-
ing how the Swedes were organized, exchanging ideas on foreign policy and 
gaining SAP’s political and financial support for the upcoming municipal 
and trade union elections.
In Sweden, SAP was now an opposition party. However, their interna-
tional engagement increased, especially that of Palme, who was elected 
vice-secretary of the SI in 1976. The Swedes wanted to maintain their sol-
idarity with and to increase their ideological ascendancy over the Spanish 
party, which now existed in a new democratic and legal context. PSOE could 
be an important partner within the SI for SAP’s development of a neutral 
and active foreign policy not only because the Spanish supported this line 
but also because they could be a bridge between Europe, Latin America, 
and the Maghreb.
At the same time, PSOE needed to appear as a responsible opposition 
party in Spain as well as internationally. One way to do this was to con-
nect the party to the image of the Swedish social democrats. Thus, when 
González visited the United States for the first time in November 1977, he 
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had to convince the American leaders of his reliability, especially as PSOE 
was officially a Marxist, anti-capitalist party that opposed Spain’s potential 
NATO membership. According to the American newspaper The Baltimore 
Sun, González tried to do this by showing ‘… that he is like the social demo-
crats of northern Europe with whom the United States feels comfortable …’ 
(La Voz de Galicia, 1977).
When it comes to the increase in bilateral party relations, in November 
1977, representatives of SAP spent a week visiting several Spanish cities. 
They wanted to get to know PSOE and the socialist trade union UGT better. 
At the end of the visits, Gunnar Stenarv, the spokesperson of the Swedish 
delegation, gave El socialista an interview. He said that, besides studying 
different opportunities for future cooperation, both parties wanted to com-
pare their international policies, a field in which they had many ideas in 
common (1978a: 20).
In January 1978, another delegation from SAP visited Galicia, in northern 
Spain, on the invitation of the local federation of PSOE. Around the same 
time, several members of PSOE visited Sweden as guests of SAP, with the aim 
of initiating ‘the exchange of experiences on the internal functioning of each 
party’.30 These visits happened just before the trade union elections in Spain, 
and the Swedes also used these trips to offer economic support to the UGT.31 
On February 28, SAP transferred 100,000 SEK to PSOE’s bank account.32
In November 1978, a delegation of PSOE and UGT visited the city of 
Norrköping in Sweden, where they received training. ‘Each of the Spanish 
representatives [was] informed about how the political and trade unionist 
fields in which they will have to work in Spain function in Sweden’. The 
conclusion of PSOE’s representatives was that although their party and 
SAP were very different, ‘we have to start considering many of their forms 
of organization [for implementation] in our country [Spain]’ (El Socialista, 
1978b: 2). Moreover, both parties agreed on developing cooperation even 
further in the following months.33 Thus, ‘two Swedish experts on municipal 
and electoral issues [would] visit the [Spanish] province [Ciudad Real] at the 
moment of the campaign for the municipal elections … Such contacts will 
be extended to the realm of the trade unions (UGT-LO)’. Furthermore, after 
the Spanish municipal elections, the Swedes planned to invite ‘an important 
number of socialist mayors to visit Sweden in order to acquire municipal 
experience’ (El Socialista, 1978c: 25).
The numerous visits of PSOE’s delegations to Sweden and vice versa sug-
gest that the Spanish socialists learned a great deal about the daily func-
tioning of the Swedish party, the trade unions, and the municipalities in 
which the social democrats governed. These experiences, which included 
exchanges of ideas and political practices, probably influenced the middle 
cadres of PSOE. However, the relevance of these exchanges to the party is 
difficult to measure, among other things because PSOE was also collaborat-
ing with other parties of the SI, such as the PSF and the SPD, in the field of 
cadre formation (Muñoz, 2012; Granadino, 2016).
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At the leadership level, González visited Sweden in September 1978, where 
he attended the Congress of SAP. This was part of a tour that included visits 
to Malta and Yugoslavia. One of his aims was to gain international support 
for PSOE’s policy of neutrality.34 For the Spanish media, González’s trip im-
plied that PSOE wanted to adopt a generic Swedish model. A Spanish jour-
nalist asked González in Stockholm about the applicability of this model 
in Spain and his answer was: ‘Of course. There is a common ideological 
standpoint. Even some practical realizations of Swedish socialism are very 
interesting in terms of application in Spain, such as the cooperative effort … 
and the regularization of the market’. González also provided information 
about SAP’s interest in supporting PSOE. According to him, the Swedes 
had great hopes that PSOE would represent a new model of socialism for 
the south of Europe.35
PSOE’s temporary abandonment of the Swedish model
Despite the intensification of the relations between the two parties and the 
support provided by SAP, the Swedish model – and social democracy in 
general – still encountered resistance in PSOE. In an interview with the 
 political scientist Richard Gunther in July 1978, González was asked if there 
was any society that he regarded as a model. The leader of PSOE answered 
ambiguously:
I don’t like to speak of models. If we are talking about certain charac-
teristics that we would like to have existing in Spain, I could certainly 
refer to Sweden, in which there is both liberty and equality. But social-
ism in Sweden is not the same as socialism in Spain.… Sweden … does 
not serve as a model in my view.36
In May 1978, the recently elected honorary president of PSOE, Enrique 
Tierno Galván, reflected on socialism as an alternative system in West-
ern Europe. He considered there to be two kinds of socialism, socialismo 
agórico, socialismo de plaza (outward socialism), existing in southern Eu-
rope, and socialismo de hogar (domestic socialism/inward socialism), exist-
ing in northern Europe. For him, ‘the messianism of the Nordic countries 
was finished’. Probably due to the existence of welfare in the north, the 
tension between social classes had diminished. Thus, the Nordics ‘… lack 
a collective utopian motor, as it exists in the Mediterranean countries, that 
acts as a catalyst for the revolution’. According to him, models imported 
from the north were not valid for PSOE. The problems in the south of Eu-
rope had to be resolved taking into consideration ‘the peculiar personality, 
the messianism, the enthusiasm, of the Mediterranean people’ (El Social-
ista, 1978d: 14–15).
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, PSOE would not display as much pub-
lic interest in the Swedish model as they had in the previous years. Several 
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factors explain this. In 1979, after the general, trade union, and municipal 
elections, PSOE was the main party of Spain. Thus, from this moment on, 
the main rival of the socialists was not on the left. It was the coalition of 
parties that governed Spain, the UCD. Moreover, the success of the party 
in the municipal elections of 1979 created an enormous demand for quali-
fied middle cadres to occupy governmental responsibilities at the local and 
regional levels. This provoked a massive arrival of new members who were 
ideologically more heterogeneous than the previous members (Tezanos, Co-
tarelo, and de Blas, 1989). Furthermore, the newborn Spanish democracy 
provided funds to the political parties according to their electoral results, 
which – together with bank credits – made international economic support 
less relevant for PSOE (Mateos, 2016). Additionally, the leaders of the party 
consolidated and strengthened their control over the party after the extraor-
dinary Congress of 1979, in which PSOE abandoned Marxism. All these 
factors made it easier for PSOE to moderate its ideological line in order to 
compete for the voters of the centre, which made it unnecessary to look for 
substitute terms or bridges to adopt a moderate ideological stance.
In 1979 and 1980, the Swedish model lost its relevance to PSOE as a rhe-
torical device for adopting a moderate ideological line. Notwithstanding 
this fact, the exchange of ideas and experiences between the Spanish and the 
Swedish had a strong impact for a long time. The concept of the Swedish/
Nordic model was mobilized by PSOE again in the 1980s when the Spanish 
welfare state was being constructed, and some of its elements – health care, 
education, and to some extent social care services – were universalized in 
the 1980s following the Nordic social democrat model (Guillén and Luque, 
2014). On the other hand, in the same decade, PSOE lost interest in the 
Swedish policy of active neutrality as, once in power, the party advocated 
the permanence of Spain in NATO.
Conclusion
During the transition to democracy in Spain, several meanings were at-
tached to the Swedish model, and this concept was used for various politi-
cal purposes by the conservatives as well as by the progressives. For PSOE, 
this model became interesting after the death of Franco in November 1975 
and initiated a process of policy transfer connected to the rupture of the 
political system. The Swedish model and SAP practically merged in the 
discourse of the Spanish party. PSOE used it as a best practice to follow, 
while at the same time disguising its social democratic content through 
rhetorical re-conceptualizations. This typical feature of cultural and pol-
icy transfer, the re-formulation and adaption of content, is clear in the way 
PSOE used the image of the Swedish social democrats in different ways 
depending on its immediate political interests. The original ideas and their 
function in Swedish society were not important; their adaption to Spanish 
conditions was.
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When PSOE had to compete for the hegemony of the left before the elec-
tions, it tried to project a radical but at the same time reliable image, for 
which the party sought to associate itself with the Swedish social democ-
racy. In this context, the Swedish model was understood as a system of po-
litical, social, and economic democracy. Once the political system in Spain 
changed and PSOE became the main party of the left, its interests changed 
and so did the use that the Spanish Socialists made of the Swedish model, 
and image they attached to it. PSOE connected this model to the Swedish 
international policy of neutrality, and at the end of the 1970s, it diminished 
public reference to Sweden, SAP, and the Swedish model. With regard to 
PSOE–SAP relations, the argument here is that the Swedes actively tried to 
help the radicalized PSOE of the early 1970s onto a social democratic path. 
SAP was an active actor in providing PSOE with financial support, ideas, 
experiences, and knowledge. In order to be persuasive, the Swedes had to 
adapt to the Spanish context, and they made an effort to re-conceptualize 
and re-brand as part of effective policy transfer.
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Introduction: aims, approach and argument
In 2015, Norway’s National Museum opened the exhibition ‘Forms of Free-
dom. African Independence and Nordic Models.’ The exhibition, which the 
previous year had been the Nordic countries’ joint contribution to the Vi-
enna architectural biennale, investigated the work of Nordic architects in 
the East African countries Tanzania, Zambia and Kenya during the 1960s 
and 1970s. The exhibition stated that
It is well known that Nordic architects played key roles in establish-
ing modern welfare states in their home countries. Their efforts to help 
modernize and build up the liberated colonies in Africa in the 1960s and 
1970s, on the other hand, have received far less attention.
The liberation of Tanzania, Kenya and Zambia in the 1960s coincided 
with the founding of development aid in the Nordic countries, where 
there was widespread belief that the social democratic model could be 
exported, translated, and used for nation building, modernization, and 
welfare in Africa….
The Nordic social democracies and the new African states estab-
lished solid bonds built on a shared progressive outlook, good inten-
tions, and an almost naïve belief in the potential to replant the Nordic 
model in an entirely different geographic, demographic, and cultural 
context.
(The National Museum – Architecture, 2015)
Much could be said about the national museum’s portrayal of Nordic aid 
and its aims; however, most importantly, the assumption of a conscious 
effort to export the Nordic societal model and way of life to East Africa 
is oversimplified (Engh, 2015). Lately, the portrayal of Nordic aid as con-
sisting of a more or less straightforward export of a social democratic so-
cietal model to other countries has become more prevalent, in academic 
research as well as in popular literature and the media. This portrayal 
could be seen as reflecting one or more by now more or less established 
7 The ‘Nordic model’ in 
international development aid
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‘truths’ or understandings of Nordic aid, closely tied to the dominant Nor-
dic narratives and self- understandings (Andersson, 2009; Andersson and 
Hilson, 2009).
This chapter questions the use of the term ‘Nordic model’ in relation to 
Nordic international engagement and more particularly to Nordic develop-
ment aid, asking how fruitful this concept is for studying Nordic aid pol-
icy or Nordic aid projects. It also contributes to conceptual clarification, 
showing the several ways in which the term ‘Nordic model’ is used within 
development discourse and development research, implying that the term 
may, indeed, have different functions at different times and within different 
contexts. The chapter starts with a brief historical background on Nordic 
development aid efforts, pointing out the similarities and differences in the 
countries’ approaches to development issues, and the basis for the widely 
held belief that there is such a thing as a Nordic model for development aid. 
The main section discusses the different ways in which the concept Nordic 
model is used within development discourse and literature, showing how the 
concept fulfills three distinct functions: as a justification for development 
aid, as a form of aid practice and as an export article in aid. The chapter 
then returns to the initial question: how useful is the concept of the Nordic 
model in discussions of development aid?
The Nordic countries and development aid
In the early post-1945 period, development aid was viewed as a means by 
which a brave, new world of modernity, prosperity and equality could be 
conceived, coordinated and created. Since then, development aid has been 
transformed through gradually evolving approaches and slogans, some of 
which have come full circle. For the Nordic countries, development coopera-
tion has been, and remains, a prioritized part of international politics and an 
arena for particular activism and engagement. As the modernizing mission 
of development aid gradually becomes history, the time is ripe for a histor-
ically informed assessment of the particular Nordic aid to the global south, 
or the Third World, in contemporaneous parlance (Engerman and Unger, 
2009; Engh and Pharo, 2009; Paaskesen, 2011). Although in 1995, a much-
cited article declared the Nordic Model dead as a foreign policy instrument, 
the continued use of the term Nordic model in relation to the Nordic states’ 
foreign engagement indicates that the term is still relevant (Mouritzen, 1995).
Examining the Nordic countries’ aid profiles, a number of overarching 
similarities appear in terms of timing of entry into the field, organizational 
setup and aid policy generally and thematically. Many of these similarities 
also manifest themselves in the countries’ presence in the field, in actual 
development cooperation projects and programs. The Nordic states, and 
especially the Scandinavian ones, have traditionally been considered to be 
particularly generous development aid donors. The Nordics are also seen 
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as pursuing a distinct aid profile, placed within a tradition of humane in-
ternationalism, marked by a feeling of moral obligation to alleviate global 
poverty and combined with a realist conviction that poverty alleviation will 
serve the long-term interests of the Western countries (Stokke, 1989; Olesen 
et al., 2013). The Nordic donors are often understood as vanguards of devel-
opment work for their inclusion of new areas (e.g., the inclusion of African 
countries in aid programs during the 1960s and Latin American countries 
during the 1970s), issues (e.g., human rights, environmental protection and 
good governance) and groups (e.g., the poorest of the poor, women and chil-
dren). They are also believed to have cooperated closely with each other to 
achieve their development aid goals and to have paid close attention to the 
sensibilities, goals and sovereignty of the recipients (Selbervik, 2003; Vik, 
2008). Since the 1950s, a core principle for Danish and Norwegian aid has 
been that aid should be provided on the recipients’ own terms, without any 
political or economic ties or motives – a principle which has remained an 
ideal if not always a reality (Simensen, 2003; Friis Bach et al., 2008).
A main similarity in the Nordic countries’ experiences with aid lies in 
timing and institutional set-up. Although support for international organ-
izations such as the UN is usually seen as a typical Nordic feature, recent 
research has found that this has not been unqualified: the Scandinavians 
reluctantly joined the League of Nations, and even UN membership had 
few enthusiastic supporters in the early days (Götz, 2016). From 1949 to 
1950 onward, all the Scandinavian countries supported the UN’s Expanded 
Program of Technical Assistance (EPTA). Whereas Sweden and Norway 
engaged in bilateral aid beginning in the early 1950s, with projects in South 
Asia and Africa, Denmark preferred to channel all its aid through the UN 
and EPTA until the 1960s (Brunbech, 2008). Sweden and Norway’s early 
bilateral aid programs were in different ways and to different degrees run 
by ad hoc administrations which included voluntary sector representation 
and, in the case of Sweden, also business, export and trade interests. (Nils-
son, 2004; Öhman, 2007). In the 1960s, Nordic aid became institutional-
ized. In 1962, Sweden and Norway both launched new aid administrations: 
the Board for International Aid (NIB, Nämden för internationell bistånd) 
and Norwegian Development Aid (NU, Norsk utviklingshjelp). In 1965, NIB 
was replaced by the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), 
and in 1968, NU was replaced by the Norwegian Agency for Development 
Cooperation (NORAD). Denmark also enacted its first aid legislation in 
1962, which was reviewed in 1971. The Danish Foreign Ministry adminis-
tered all Danish aid through the Danish International Development Agency 
(DANIDA). In 1965, Finland also established an office for development aid 
within its Foreign Ministry, which in 1972 was reorganized into the Finnish 
International Development Assistance (FINNIDA). Iceland was a relative 
latecomer in this respect, with a 1971 Act on bilateral development assis-
tance, and the 1981 act that established the Icelandic International Devel-
opment Agency (ICEIDA). Thus, institutionalization of Nordic aid began 
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in the early 1960s and evolved through a wave of reorganization in the late 
1960s and early 1970s.
A second similarity is found in the political justifications underpinning 
the Nordics’ aid efforts, which appear strikingly parallel and enduring, 
combining elements of realpolitik, self-interest and idealism. Explanations 
for the Nordic states’ commitment to providing development aid include 
these countries’ strong social democratic norms, a desire to spread their 
welfare-state ideals and their own security needs and economic objectives 
(Bergman, 2007). In the case of Norway, the initial interest in development 
aid was mainly a result of changes in the international political environ-
ment. This commitment gained ground in the 1960s and 1970s as newer 
generations of voters and politicians with greater interest in North-South 
matters became dominant, and the consensus has since remained stable (Si-
mensen, 2003). In Denmark, public and political interest in development aid 
was slower to develop. During the 1960s, public attention to development 
matters increased considerably, but this did not translate into political ac-
tion until the latter half of the decade; the years 1965–1967 mark a turn in 
Danish aid policy, with an emphasis on increased transfers (Brunbech and 
Olesen, 2013).
At some more or less critical junctures, development assistance was used 
with a view to gain political advantage with the countries’ domestic audi-
ences, the voters. For example, in the latter half of the 1960s, the Swedish 
Social Democratic Party debated the aid target of 1% of the GDP; the even-
tual inclusion of this target in the party platform was, in part, to attract 
younger generations of voters who often were more radical and internation-
alist (Ekengren and Götz, 2013). Similarly, when Norway in 1952 launched 
the Indo-Norwegian fisheries project, an important rationale was to distract 
or placate the considerable opposition to Norwegian NATO membership 
(Pharo, 1986).
A third main similarity in the Nordic countries’ aid profile is the func-
tion of aid in the countries’ broader foreign policies as a foreign policy tool 
with which to attain status and standing in the international system (Mour-
itzen, 1995; see also de Carvalho and Neumann, 2015). In particular, the 
Scandinavian countries’ self-assumed roles as international leaders in the 
development field seem to have provided them with a spill-over effect re-
garding their general standing in international affairs. The wish to increase 
influence through joining forces was certainly a central motivation when 
the Nordics first launched joint development aid projects in the early 1960s 
(Engh and Pharo, 2009). Over the years, however, each of the Scandinavian 
countries increasingly came to pursue an international profile as either a ‘hu-
manitarian great power’ (Sweden, Denmark) or a ‘peace nation’ (Norway) 
(Leira, 2013, 2015). Sweden’s ‘active foreign policy,’ from 1962 to the late 
1980s, was perhaps the most extreme version of this, distinguished by Olof 
Palme’s tenure as Prime Minister. In this period, Sweden showed increased 
international engagement on a number of issues, such as decolonization, 
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the East-West divide and development and human rights, and it often crit-
icized US foreign policy harshly. Significantly, this tendency to pursue sta-
tus and standing through active international engagement was increasingly 
sought on an individual, national basis rather than a joint Nordic one. As 
the wish to wave one’s own flag increased, joint Nordic efforts lost their 
appeal (Engh and Pharo, 2009: 126–127). Development aid’s function in the 
Nordics’ broader foreign policies as a foreign policy tool to increase their 
soft power or status in the international system became more pronounced 
toward the end of the 1900s and during the early 2000s.
This role or function of development aid engagement is also reflected in 
the countries’ own dominant narratives about themselves and their self- 
understanding as well as in their own official explanations of their large 
interest in development aid: the contemporaneous perception of a lack of 
a recent colonial past and therefore no ulterior motives. In Sweden’s case, 
a particular point was often made in relation to the country’s neutrality 
in the Cold War that Swedish aid would reach out to developing countries 
with which the West struggled to connect. In Swedish political debate ‘…
the picture of a reliable and generous provider of development assistance 
has become an integral part of Swedish identity in international relations’ 
(Ekengren and Götz, 2013: 35). Interestingly, Glover shows how the Swedish 
Institute, responsible for Sweden’s cultural relations with other countries 
and also for the first Swedish aid efforts, has moved from a restrained pro-
motion of Sweden in the late 1940s to an assertive marketing of ‘Brand Swe-
den’ in the early 2000s, using ‘progressiveness’ as its key concept (Glover, 
2009). Norway’s self-perception also seems to have developed during the 
last decades of the 1900s, particularly in connection to Norway’s high 
foreign aid profile and involvement in peace brokering. Indeed, this iden-
tity and self-understanding may have evolved on a regional level as well, 
with aid-giving becoming a ‘Nordic trademark, an essential part of being 
Nordic’ (Brunbech and Olesen, 2013).
The idea of a Nordic model in development aid: explanation, 
experience and export
The term ‘Nordic model’ is used in at least three different ways in the de-
velopment aid literature: to explain the Nordic countries’ commitment to 
development aid, to describe a particular Nordic development aid experi-
ence and to characterize something inspiring or exported through Nordic 
development aid. The Nordic model as explanation refers to a view which 
sees the Nordic domestic societal model as a cause for the particular Nordic 
support of development aid. The Nordic model as experience identifies a par-
ticular Nordic way of providing aid, a uniquely Nordic model of aid giving 
or practice. The Nordic model as export refers to an understanding of Nordic 
aid as more or less consciously working toward mirroring or even recreating 
the Nordic societal model, or selected parts of it, in the recipient countries 
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– either through specific individual aid projects or through prioritized issues 
and areas in aid. This third understanding of the Nordic model may also 
include a certain ideological affinity with the recipients of aid, which has 
marked Nordic aid through the greater parts of the post-war period. Based 
on the donors’ interpretations of the recipients’ views of what a ‘good’ soci-
ety consisted of rather than on actual policy, this ideological affinity could 
be real or, more often, imagined (Simensen, 2003; Paaskesen, 2011).
The use of the concept Nordic model has been greater in social science 
research than in the humanities. This may reflect the scope of inquiry; most 
Nordic histories of development aid have so far been investigations at the 
national level, either of a country’s aid policy over time or of individual aid 
projects, and relatively few studies examine aid at a Nordic or even Scan-
dinavian level (Engh, 2002, 2006, 2009, 2013). Research coming out of the 
social sciences, on the other hand, has to a greater degree been based on 
government white papers and parliamentary debates. This may be a useful 
approach with regard to domestic and international perceptions, but it tells 
us less about what goes on in the field.
The Nordic model as explanation
It is as explanation of the Nordics’ interest in and commitment to develop-
ment aid that the concept Nordic model has made its greatest impact on 
research and literature. A host of authors from a range of academic disci-
plines have sought to justify the Nordic aid commitment with reference to 
the Nordic way of life, Nordic values and norms and Nordic economic and 
societal models. Lumsdaine’s 1993 Moral Vision in International Politics: The 
Foreign Aid Regime 1949–1989 argued that the Nordics’ ‘humane interna-
tionalism’ was the main driver behind the provision of aid, pointing out the 
possible connections between national welfare policy and enthusiasm for aid 
(Lumsdaine, 1993). Over the years, Nordic international engagement has 
inspired several researchers to brand the Nordic aid approach as ‘humane 
internationalism’ (Pratt, 1989; Lancaster, 2006). Noël and Thérien’s linking 
of various countries’ aid policies to Esping-Andersen’s welfare state typology 
became particularly influential; they argued that ‘Welfare principles institu-
tionalized at the domestic level shape the participation of developed coun-
tries in the international aid regime’ (Noël and Thérien, 1995). More recently, 
the international role of the Nordics has been understood as ‘norm entre-
preneurship,’ both generally and, more particularly, in connection to their 
UN commitment (Ingebritsen, 2002; Björkdahl, 2007a). In addition, much 
attention has been given to the central role of Swedish and Nordic values: ‘…
there is a close affinity between the values that shape Sweden’s provisions for 
domestic welfare and its pursuit of redistributive justice at the international 
level’ (Bergman, 2007: 88; see also Kuisma, 2007; Björkdahl, 2007b).
How well do these assumptions stand up when we look beyond official 
policy statements and take aid experience and history into consideration? 
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First, although there undoubtedly seems to be a correlation between a wel-
fare state system in donor countries and a willingness to provide develop-
ment aid, proving a causal relationship between the two remains a challenge. 
Second, looking at the history of development cooperation, it is possible to 
identify a whole range of reasons why the Nordic countries initiated devel-
opment aid efforts, much in the same way that there are a number of reasons 
behind the increased volume of aid, or the involvement in a number of issues 
and geographical areas. For example, the first Norwegian development aid 
project, a fisheries project in Kerala in India, was launched as a ‘positive’ 
foreign policy to counteract the negative publicity surrounding Norway’s 
NATO membership and rearmament efforts. Likewise, Sweden’s active for-
eign policy was intended to serve as a counterweight to the country’s neu-
trality in the Cold War.
Interestingly, the interpretation of the Nordic welfare state or Nordic 
model as an explanation for the Nordic states’ development engagement ap-
pears to have become more common more or less in parallel with a main 
development in Nordic historiography. In the post-war period, research 
on Norden, Scandinavia and above all, Sweden, is marked by a persistent 
Sonderweg argument. This ‘special path’ or unique development argument 
sees welfare-state society and the Nordic or Scandinavian model of soci-
ety as products of shared historical experiences, similar institutions and a 
number of assumed Nordic values (Stråth and Sørensen, 1997; Stråth, 2004). 
Furthermore, this historiographical canon leads to an understanding of the 
development of the welfare state and the Nordic model as teleological, as 
something intrinsic to Nordic political culture and being, rooted in ideas 
of rationality, reformism and modernism. In this perspective, the Nordic 
countries virtually embody modernity (Andersson, 2009). Importantly, as 
Musial has shown, the particular Nordic modernity is also seen as having 
a distinctive moral quality (Musial, 2000). During the 1950s and 1960s, the 
notion of a Nordic Sonderweg ‘took on the proportions of a specific egali-
tarian social democratic community of destiny, in clear distinction to what 
was seen as a capitalistic (…), conservative, and Catholic continental Eu-
rope’ (Stråth and Sørensen, 1997: 20). Indeed, the Sonderweg argument not 
only marks Nordic historiography but has also been adopted by an inter-
national audience, particularly an American one, through which the idea 
of a Nordic, Scandinavian, or Swedish, model has been equated with mo-
dernity and functioned as a utopia. Already during the interwar period, 
after Marquis Childs’ 1936 observation of Sweden as a ‘middle way,’ Sweden 
and Scandinavia were inspiring American academics, politicians and bu-
reaucrats (Childs, 1936). These countries were understood as constituting a 
modern, rational middle way – staking out an independent course between 
communism and capitalism (Marklund, 2009). Visions of Nordic modernity 
and models thus had a reflective function and were negotiated through an 
interdependent, mutually reinforcing process between foreign observations 
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of Norden and domestic self-assertions (Andersson, 2009; Andersson and 
Hilson, 2009).
Whereas Nordic modernity was an inspiration abroad, it also became 
an integral part of Nordic actors’ self-image and understanding. Thus, the 
Sonderweg idea also forged an influential self-image of modernity and moral 
quality, deeply associated with the Nordic model, the welfare state and the 
idea of the Nordics as offering a middle way, an alternative developmental 
trajectory to the dominant directions in international society. Throughout 
the twentieth century, this has been central to the self-image and self- 
understanding of Swedish and Norwegian politics, and importantly, it has 
become a core component of the countries’ development assistance politics. 
Nordic development aid has been based on the assumption that develop-
ment aid is a policy area in which the Nordic countries could and should 
play a particular role, and on the idea that they are in some way ‘different’ 
from other donors. The new initiatives in development assistance emerging 
in the early post-war period, and their inherent quest for modernity, seemed 
a natural arena for Scandinavians and became a prioritized matter.
At times, the Scandinavian countries’ lack of a recent colonial past was 
emphasized as a factor which made them particularly suited to providing 
aid, as this seemingly precluded any ulterior or selfish motivation. This 
perspective is reflected in both contemporary political documents and the 
academic literature. More frequently, the countries’ own social and po-
litical development was seen as so particular as to warrant a special role. 
For example, Danish aid supporters of the 1950s saw the Nordic societal 
model, and especially the welfare state system, as something that should be 
extended internationally, with the help of development aid (Simensen, 2003; 
Friis Bach et al., 2008).
Indeed, the assumption of a ‘special development’ or Sonderweg for the 
Nordic states at home soon seemed replicated in an idea of a ‘special role’ 
for the Nordics abroad. Thus, the understanding of the development of 
the Nordic model as a teleological trajectory, which Andersson describes, 
seemed mirrored in a similar understanding of Nordic aid as the next nat-
ural step on the teleological trajectory – the extension or export of the wel-
fare state system internationally, through aid. Further, this idea of a ‘special 
role’ abroad seems to have established itself at a time when the idea of the 
Nordic Sonderweg was so pervasive that it was taken for granted.
Interestingly, the Sonderweg argument, the focus on Nordic visions of 
modernity and the coconstitutive nature of domestic and international ide-
als are all mirrored in recent research on Scandinavian and Nordic devel-
opment assistance in the social sciences, influenced by social constructivism 
and its emphasis on norms in international politics; it has not yet been much 
discussed among historians of development assistance, however.
In sum, the Nordic societal model appears at best as one of several dif-
ferent reasons behind a country’s interest in providing development aid, 
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and several specific examples show that realpolitik rather than idealism was 
decisive when development aid projects were established, expanded or ter-
minated. In addition, the emphasis on the Nordic model as an explanation 
of aid engagement may privilege altruistic, humanitarian motives for aid 
provision without adequate attention to realpolitik, security concerns and 
economic motives.
The Nordic model as experience
The Nordic model as experience refers to the use of the concept Nordic 
model when describing a particular Nordic way of providing aid, based 
on the assumption there is a particular Nordic model of aid giving or aid 
practice (Olesen et al., 2013). Examining the history of Nordic development 
aid, is it possible to identify a particular Nordic model for development aid 
practice, and if so, what are its main hallmarks? The internationally most 
noted (and often much hailed) similarity among the Nordic countries – their 
compliance with the aid norms and targets of organizations such as the UN 
and the OECD – is obviously accurate (Brunbech and Olesen, 2013; Eken-
gren and Götz, 2013; Pharo, 2013). Other distinctive Nordic features include 
a high percentage of aid being given on ‘soft’ terms, and a relatively progres-
sive approach with regard to various priority areas such as ‘poverty orienta-
tion,’ women, population control and family planning, environment, human 
rights, good governance and democracy, even if the Nordics were not at the 
forefront in the two latter areas.
At the same time, however, there are a number of deviations from the 
assumed larger Nordic aid model, as shown by the historiography on the 
Nordics’ aid practice. Although the Scandinavian countries’ aid admin-
istrations developed in a similar tempo and pattern, Finland and Iceland 
must be termed relative latecomers to aid. This raises the question whether 
a Nordic trajectory within aid really exists. Similarly, although the large 
amounts of aid may appear as a never-ending intra-Nordic competition to 
be the most generous, it is clear that the race to the top has been relatively 
long and, importantly, has not included all the Nordic countries. The influ-
ence of the UN and OECD targets of 1%/0.7% ODA on the Nordic coun-
tries’ policy and practice is difficult to overstate, described as a ‘…standard 
reference, or even fetish, when political parties wanted to display their aid 
goodwill’ (Brunbech and Olesen, 2013: 94). Influence has varied over time, 
however. While Swedish and Norwegian political support for the 1% target 
has largely been overwhelming and constant since the 1960s, aid volumes 
were initially low. During the 1960s, the Nordic countries were among the 
least generous donors within the OECD group and remained so until the 
early 1970s. The countries’ Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
membership from the early- to mid-1960s onward created a certain incen-
tive and pressure to increase aid flows (Pharo, 2013). In 1975, Sweden along 
with the Netherlands reached an aid expenditure of 0.7%of GNP; since then, 
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Swedish aid expenditure has usually exceeded 0.85% and has for a few years 
even surpassed the 1% target (Ekengren and Götz, 2013). Norway passed 
the 0.7% mark in 1976 and the 1% target in 1982. The Norwegian aid flow 
has remained above the 0.8% mark ever since, with the exception of one 
year (2000) (Pharo, 2013). Demark, in contrast, was a relative latecomer, not 
reaching the 0.7% target until 1978 and the 1% mark in 1993 (Brunbech and 
Olesen, 2013). Finland and Iceland are the ‘atypical’ Nordics regarding aid 
volume. Finland reached a peak of 0.8% in 1991, but dropped to 0.3 in 1994, 
and since 2010 has stabilized around 0.5%.1 Iceland was itself a recipient 
of aid until 1976.2 Aid expenditure has risen very slowly, peaking at 0.47 in 
2008 and then dropping sharply again due to the economic crisis.3 Thus, 
while it is possible to distinguish a Scandinavian trajectory, the assumption 
of a Nordic one is questionable.
What about the other distinctive features, such as similar aid approaches? 
From their inception, the Nordic countries’ aid programs have had a rel-
atively large multilateral component, and all the Nordics have been very 
supportive of the UN as a world organization, with Iceland even pointing 
to its UN membership as the main foundation for Iceland’s development 
cooperation.4 Furthermore, the Nordic countries’ aid administrations have 
been quick to adopt new and seemingly progressive issues in development. 
Indeed, Nordic aid has been highly coordinated, with a ‘near total iden-
tity between the Nordic countries’ development policy goals’ (Olesen, 2008: 
337). At the same time, variations exist. Sweden, for example, has seem-
ingly sought an image of ‘greater altruism, less concern about own interests, 
greater use of multilateral channels of distribution, more concern for the 
poorest countries of the world and less concern about the return flow to 
Sweden’s own economy’ (Ekengren and Götz, 2013: 29). In what became po-
litically contested moves, Sweden and Norway, from 1969 and 1972 onward, 
respectively, supported a number of armed liberation movements in Africa, 
such as PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau, MPLA in Angola, Frelimo in Mozam-
bique, SWAPO in Namibia and ZANU and ZAPU in Zimbabwe (Ruud and 
Kjerland, 2003; Simensen, 2003; Ekengren, 2011; Ekengren and Götz, 2013).
On other issues where the Nordics have been understood as progressive, 
such as matters relating to international economy and distribution, and 
the 1974 New International Economic Order (NIEO) initiative, the Nordic 
countries have combined relatively developing country friendly policy state-
ments with a political practice which has not entirely matched their state-
ments. As the developing countries demanded greater access to the world 
economy, Norway was in principle in favor of uniform rules in world trade 
while at the same time maintaining that the Norwegian economy needed 
protection through various exceptions and preferential treatment of its 
major industries (Kvale Svenbalrud, 2012; Pharo, 2013). A parallel can be 
seen in the Nordic support of human rights, democracy and good govern-
ance. Despite their ideals, the Nordics have traditionally displayed extensive 
willingness to accept degrees of dictatorial rule by recipient governments, 
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especially those that maintained a seemingly progressive outlook, at least 
on a rhetorical level.
What drove the quick adaptation of new and progressive approaches 
in development aid of the Nordic countries? Was this a result of such ap-
proaches genuinely enjoying support in the Nordic publics, or were Nordic 
politicians and aid bureaucrats quick to adapt to new agendas in develop-
ment in order to appear ‘best in class’ and to gain standing in international 
society?5 Kvale Svenbalrud indicates that, in discussions at the UN, Nor-
way sometimes showed as much if not more concern for its international 
standing than for addressing the UN matter at hand. For example, in 1976, 
Norway’s UN delegation was simply instructed to ‘go further in meeting 
the demands of the developing countries than what the other industrialized 
countries are willing to’ (Kvale Svenbalrud, 2012: 168).
A variation on the idea of a Nordic model of aid as experience is related to 
the organisation of the aid sector: the term Nordic model6 is also used to de-
scribe the set-up of the aid sector domestically, marked by a great degree of 
involvement by NGOs and academic environments. (Tvedt, 2003; Østerud, 
2006; Olesen, 2008). As shown above, NGOs have been involved in Scandi-
navian development aid from its very beginning in the 1950s; however, since 
the early 1980s, the NGO involvement has grown exponentially (Liland and 
Kjerland, 2003; Ruud and Kjerland, 2003). NGOs are involved in official 
development aid as knowledge providers, aid practitioners and, simultane-
ously, aid recipients. In addition, they function as an aid lobby and constit-
uency, encouraging the sector’s expansion. This has been a tendency in all 
the Nordic countries: powerful aid constituencies were gradually formed, 
ensuring a continued and expanded aid effort. Pharo shows how, in Norway, 
a very ‘strong, vocal and articulate triangle of interests supported develop-
ment aid’, i.e., a cluster of the private sector, the NGOs and a large num-
ber of academics. These groups also had in common that they had become 
increasingly involved in aid practice and were vested in its continuation 
and expansion (Pharo, 2013). A similar effect has been found in Denmark. 
There, a coalition of political parties, NGOs, private businesses and aca-
demics favoring aid expansion was forged as a result of the  percentage-wise 
allocation of aid according to type and interest, which ensured that every-
one got a share of the aid funds (Brunbech and Olesen, 2013).
The Nordic model as export
The Nordic model as export refers to a view of Nordic aid as more or less 
consciously working toward mirroring or even recreating the Nordic soci-
etal model in the recipient countries, either through specific individual aid 
projects or through prioritized areas for aid. The most direct connection 
has been made by Susan Holmberg, who describes Swedish development 
aid policy as explicitly motivated by a wish to export domestic ideals. Holm-
berg describes aid as a continuation of the Folkhem [People’s home] ideology 
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but pursued in the international domain (Holmberg, 1989). This argument 
is echoed in more recent research in political science and history, which 
suggests that the Nordic model has been understood as a ‘superior way of 
organizing social, political and economic life’ (Kuisma, 2007) and provides 
examples of Nordic cooperation in international organizations such as UN-
ESCO where a main aim was to export Nordic values (Haggrén, 2009).
As far as actual Nordic aid cooperation is concerned, its history is quite 
brief. The Nordic Council in 1954 and 1958 discussed the possible potential 
for aid cooperation. None resulted. In 1961, the Council set up a ministe-
rial committee for aid coordination. The respective ministers responsible 
for development aid, Jens Otto Krag (Denmark), Aase Bjerkholt (Norway), 
Ulla Lindstrøm (Sweden) and Heikki Hosia (Finland), participated. Soon 
a Nordic advisory council for development aid was established at the sub- 
ministerial level to consider various possibilities for joint Nordic aid pro-
jects. Several reasons for the establishment of joint Nordic aid cooperation 
may be identified. There was a politically motivated desire for increased 
Nordic cooperation, an interest in pooling resources and knowledge as both 
were fairly scarce, and an interest in gaining experience in the field.
The joint Nordic development aid cooperation may serve to illustrate a 
tendency typical for Nordic aid in the years 1960–1985. An ideological iden-
tification with recipient countries that stood for a societal model which, to 
Nordic eyes, appeared similar to the Nordic one, created lasting develop-
ment cooperation through a number of projects. The East African countries 
Kenya and Tanzania held particular appeal for Nordic social democrats, 
who appreciated their forms of ‘African socialism,’ as expressed through 
Kenya’s 1965 Common Man’s Charter and Tanzania’s 1967 Arusha Decla-
ration. The fact that most of the African countries with which the Nordics 
cooperated had become single party states with varying degrees of dictator-
ship by the mid-1970s seems to have created little concern in the Nordic aid 
administrations, among politicians or the general public. Tanzania became 
a particularly prioritized country, and during the 1970s and the 1980s, the 
Nordic countries supplied between 25% and 40% of that country’s total aid 
flow (Simensen, 2003).
Two joint Nordic aid projects stand out as having possibly been inspired 
by ideas of the Nordic societal model. First is the Nordic Tanganyika Centre 
(the Kibaha Centre), which was established in 1961. Based in Kibaha, Tan-
ganyika, the project center included a number of features such as schools, 
an agricultural center and a health center. A central aim was to create a 
model to inspire, influence and encourage replication. Nordic thinking was 
particularly influential regarding working methods and operations: the ag-
ricultural center produced typically Nordic agricultural products and in-
troduced Nordic teaching on agricultural methods. The school worked to 
adapt Nordic ideas on teaching to African needs for education. The health 
center represented distinctly Nordic approaches, emphasizing preventive 
medicine, family planning and reproductive health. Thus, the project was 
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strongly influenced by the experts’ cultural backgrounds and experiences 
(Røed, 2004; Engh and Pharo, 2009). This aspect mirrored the central role 
of experts in the Nordic states during a time of unprecedented faith in social 
engineering and the potential for scientifically based planning (Broberg and 
Roll-Hansen, 1996; Stråth, 2004). Influential ideas were thus pragmatically 
adapted to both the local recipient society and Nordic ideas of what success-
ful development cooperation would constitute.
An interesting question is whether ideas from the Kibaha Centre may have 
influenced Tanzanian development policy more generally. There certainly 
seems to be a striking correlation between the 1967 Arusha Declaration 
and general values and ideas underpinning Nordic welfare state ideology. 
Kibaha may, indeed, have been one of the channels. The project received 
extensive attention from Tanzania’s president, Julius Nyerere, who followed 
the developments in Kibaha carefully and who also had close connections 
to Scandinavian political elites (Engh and Pharo, 2009). In addition, the 
Nordic experts at Kibaha gained access to Tanzania’s top political circles 
and had considerable influence.
A second project that could be said to represent an attempt to export the 
Nordic through aid is the joint Nordic cooperative project in Tanzania in 
the period 1968–1988. The project worked to establish a free and independ-
ent cooperative movement in Tanzania; the inspiration was the donor coun-
tries’ own traditions and experiences with cooperative movements from the 
end of the nineteenth century which they believed could be modified and ex-
ported to benefit Tanzania’s development. Tanzanian realities soon proved 
dramatically different from the Nordic ones, however, with Julius Nyerere’s 
political visions constituting a major obstacle. Nyerere’s infamous ujamaa 
policy, and particularly its intensification from the mid-1970s onward, en-
tailed forced collectivization of arable land and the moving of the rural pop-
ulation into ujamaa villages. This policy, in the final instance, also brought 
about the dissolution of Tanzania’s cooperative movement. In response to 
developments in Tanzania, Nordic aid administrators decided simply to 
convert the cooperative project into a rural village project; doing so directly 
supported the ujamaa policy (Paaskesen, 2010, 2011). As the 2015 exhibition 
‘Forms of Freedom’ documented, Nordic architects created the plans for 
several of the ujamaa villages (Engh, 2015). During the 1980s, the project 
was reconverted to a cooperative project. However, the period of forced col-
lectivization and removal to ujamaa villages had made cooperative efforts 
obsolete, and the project proved fruitless. The project eventually ended as a 
result of the donor countries’ discontent with the joint Nordic aid work, and 
its inherent bureaucratic difficulties (Paaskesen, 2011).
Conclusions
To return to this chapter’s initial question: is the concept ‘Nordic model’ a 
fruitful one for the study of Nordic aid policies or individual aid projects? 
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Does it provide any additional explanatory power or analytical insight? 
The evidence is somewhat mixed and uncertain, particularly as the concept 
takes on different meanings in different settings. As discussed above, both 
political and popular debate as well as academic literature on Nordic devel-
opment aid employ the concept of Nordic model in three different ways: as 
explanation, as experience and as export. The history of Nordic develop-
ment aid shows that, regarding the Nordic model as explanation, the Nordic 
societal model appears at best as one of several different reasons behind a 
country’s interest for providing development aid. Several specific examples 
show that realpolitik rather than idealism has been decisive. At the same 
time, however, Nordic aid administrators and politicians have repeatedly 
referred to ideational factors in order to explain the Nordic enthusiasm for 
aid, something which a large body of research confirms. As argued above, 
the belief in a Nordic Sonderweg may, indeed, have helped create a simi-
lar interpretation of and self-image regarding Nordic development aid, that 
is, an assumption that aid is a policy area in which the Nordics could and 
should play a particular role, as the countries themselves represent a ‘differ-
ent’ or ‘alternative’ developmental trajectory. Thus, although there are case 
studies showing that realpolitik was decisive in aid decisions, this does not 
mean that idealistic motivations were not also operative.
Regarding the Nordic model as a form of aid experience or aid practice, 
it is clear that the Nordic countries share a number of features and have 
for some time. However, there are also quite considerable variations among 
the Nordics. The similarities seem to be strongest among the Scandinavian 
countries, whereas Finland and Iceland show variations on the general pat-
tern; for instance, both are relative latecomers to aid.
As for the idea of the Nordic model as something that is exported through 
Nordic aid, the picture is somewhat mixed. Whereas replicating the Nor-
dic socioeconomic system in developing countries has not been an overtly 
stated policy, individual Nordic aid projects such as the Kibaha Centre and 
the cooperative project have undoubtedly been inspired by the Nordic soci-
eties and their values, ideas and solutions. Still, the examples from Tanzania 
show that local political conditions, rather than donor ideas, had decisive 
impact on these projects’ development. The results, particularly in the case 
of the cooperative project, differed significantly from the Nordic model of 
society and its solutions.
The Norwegian National Museum in 2015 concluded that the Nordic coun-
tries assumed that ‘the social democratic model could be exported, translated 
and used for nation building, modernization and welfare in Africa’ (The Na-
tional Museum – Architecture, 2015). But the history of Nordic development 
aid shows that the idea of exporting the Nordic model through aid is not 
merely too simplistic, but that it also stands in direct contradiction to a last-
ing principle of Nordic aid – that aid should be given unconditionally and on 
the recipients’ own terms. Whereas this principle has not always been an easy 
one to follow, it has remained a core idea since the beginning of Nordic aid.
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The primary sources provide limited support for the interpretation that 
a conscious, explicit wish to transfer the Nordic model of society to the re-
cipient countries was a driver of development aid. Individual participants in 
a number of development cooperation processes may have felt that the aid 
openly or implicitly contained such a dimension, but there is an absence of 
evidence that this was an explicit Nordic policy. Archival sources on various 
aspects of Norwegian and Nordic aid history rarely reveal expressions of 
any particularly uniform idea about what the Nordic development model 
would amount to. At best, this view of aid was an unspoken, underlying 
assumption. In addition, it may not in fact be possible to trace any uniform 
understanding of the Nordic model through the many arenas and levels that 
constitute the aid cooperation process: the political level, different levels 
within the aid administrations, the interplay between the home and field 
offices of the aid administration and the actual recipients of aid, whether at 
government or user level.
Of the three ways that of conceiving what is meant by the Nordic model, 
it is the Nordic model as export that the historiography on aid offers the 
strongest support for, but only in terms of fairly delimited fields, such as 
health, population, agriculture, education and the cooperative movement. 
In these cases, it is far from obvious whether it was the Nordic model as a 
whole that was an inspiration, or whether it was, rather, specific selected fea-
tures, such as welfare state-inspired schemes, public health care or gender 
equality. Nordic aid has often focused on areas and issues where aid admin-
istrators believed the Nordic countries could make a difference based on 
their own domestic experiences and knowledge, and these are precisely the 
delimited areas mentioned: cooperatives, fisheries, health and population.
The joint Nordic aid effort was of relatively short duration, and may 
partly be considered a consequence of the fact that aid was a recent policy 
field and resources needed to be pooled. As the national aid bureaucracies 
were built up and became more professional, individual countries’ desire 
for own national aid projects and programs grew. This must be linked to 
the fact that aid was frequently designed to serve several purposes and pub-
lics, and that displaying a national rather than a regional, profile gradually 
became more highly prioritized by donors. This was precisely the reason 
that joint Nordic projects ran aground – the individual donors desired to 
display their own flags. Closely related to this was, of course, the ever more 
frequent, recurring need to show taxpayers the purposes for which their 
government’s money was spent, and to promote the international profile of 
small donor states.
On the basis of historical works on development aid so far, it seems that 
a more systematic employment of the approaches of transnational history 
would have helped to see more clearly the fact that Nordic aid takes place 
within a wider framework than the nation-state and the region. Aid, af-
ter all, crosses borders. Thus, it should be no surprise that the phenome-
non of development aid can be understood, and perhaps better grasped if 
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viewed outside the national and regional frameworks, and placed within the 
 partially overlapping ones.
Notes
 1 See the OECD website: https://data.oecd.org/oda/net-oda.htm [accessed March 
4, 2016]
 2 OECD Special Review of Iceland 2013, available at http://www.oecd.org/dac/
dac-global-relations/Iceland%20Special%20Review.pdf [accessed March 4, 2016]
 3 See the OECD website: https://data.oecd.org/oda/net-oda.htm [accessed March 
4, 2016]
 4 Iceland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Icelandic Development Cooperation’: http://
www.mfa.is/foreign-policy/development-cooperation/icelandic-development- 
cooperation/ [accessed March 4, 2016]
 5 For Norway’s status-seeking foreign policy behaviour, see Leira, ‘The formative 
years: Norway as an obsessive status-seeker’ and Benjamin de Carvalho and Jon 
Harald Sande Lie, ‘A Great Power Performance: Norway, Status and the Policy 
of Involvement’, in de Carvalho and Neumann (eds.), Small State Status Seek-
ing. Norway’s Quest for International Standing, pp. 56–73.
 6 Alternatively, «Nordic» can also be substituted by the name of an individual 
country, e.g. the Danish model.
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The 1967 edition of Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary was the 
first to include the term ‘ombudsman’ in its English lexicon, providing 
several lines of Swedish etymology and defining it as ‘a government offi-
cial (as in Sweden or New Zealand) appointed to receive and investigate 
complaints made by individuals against abuses or capricious acts of public 
officials.’ In 1971, Webster’s introduced a new definition as an addendum 
to the first: ‘one that investigates reported complaints (as from students or 
customers), reports findings, and helps to achieve equitable settlements.’1 
Webster’s editorial choices reflected in microcosm a larger transformation 
of the ombudsman office following its arrival in the United States during 
the 1960s. The ombudsman title, if still alien to many Americans, was now 
widespread enough to warrant inclusion in a prominent American-English 
dictionary even as the office itself underwent extensive naturalization, with 
its mushrooming presence within the United States obscuring its Scandi-
navian origins. Connected with this process of naturalization, the meaning 
and responsibilities of the ombudsman changed, moving from a government 
official investigating public abuses to a more open-ended investigative posi-
tion. In less than a decade, the Scandinavian policy had been woven into the 
fabric of American political and social institutions.
The global circulation of the ombudsman office is one of the most suc-
cessful examples of the export of Nordic policy; yet, scholars interested in 
the ombudsman often overlook the office’s placement within the Nordic 
model’s blend of political values and state programs.2 Partially accounting 
for this omission, the ombudsman originated in a political environment 
with goals and concerns very different from those of mid-twentieth-century 
Nordic politics. However, the policy’s subsequent evolution reoriented the 
office to fit with a political culture of consensus-making and compromise, in 
effect carving a niche within the later Nordic ‘view of the state as a benign 
institution capable of acting in the best interests of society’ (Sørensen and 
Stråth, 1997: 19; Hilson, 2008: 33). The ombudsman helped guarantee the 
perpetuation of the cooperative relationship between the citizen and state 
8 ‘A cross between Batman and 
a public ear’
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by providing ‘supervision’ of their interactions as the public sector expanded 
to incorporate a range of social programs and activities (Hurwitz, 1968: 6). 
The ombudsman’s presence in mid-century Norden thus reflects the mod-
el’s emphasis on liberty within security, with the welfare state’s prerogative 
to protect individual freedoms while maintaining expansive social benefits. 
Despite favoring more market-oriented entitlement programs, the United 
States’ social safety net and associated bureaucratic structures likewise ex-
panded rapidly after World War II, eliciting intense discussions about the 
‘intrusion of the state’ and the resulting mitigation of democratic protec-
tions of rights (Quadagno, 1996: 6; Bell, 2010).
While common concerns about the state’s growth and changing responsi-
bilities paved the way for a transfer of the ombudsman office to the United 
States, diverging political structures and cultures nonetheless required a 
‘translation’ of Scandinavian policy into local practices, institutions, and 
discourses. Notably, advocates of instituting regulative procedures through 
an ombudsman would have to place the policy within American normative 
and cognitive assumptions about the role and effectiveness of state institu-
tions (Campbell, 2004: 79–85), while simultaneously navigating preexisting 
political enmities and alliances. Driving the resulting negotiations about 
power relationships between the state the citizen and their translations from 
a Scandinavian context was an epistemic community of legal and politi-
cal scholars who acted as authoritative experts and advocates for the om-
budsman (Haas, 1992: 20; Stone, 2004: 562).3 To broadcast their expertise to 
American audiences, these scholars orchestrated public media campaigns, 
drafted model legislation, and collaborated with political actors to find 
solutions to state problems and, in doing so, define state interests. However, 
differences arose between experts and policymakers regarding the extent 
that Nordic methods of establishing trust between the citizen and the state 
should be preserved or revised.
This chapter explores the spread of the ombudsman as a manifestation 
of mid-century Nordic politics, briefly outlining its reorientation toward a 
Nordic model before investigating how transnational experts and Ameri-
can policymakers variously sought to interpret the office in light of foreign 
challenges and in the process redefine Nordic precedents. Following this 
process of transnational circulation, the ombudsman not only underwent an 
operational transformation in an American political and social context but 
also was unpacked and domesticated in a way that severed many of its ties 
to a Nordic political culture.
The origins of the ombudsman
Accounts of the ombudsman from the 1960s, when the office achieved 
worldwide renown, often bespeak a sense of surprise that the ombudsman 
originated 150 years prior in a Swedish political system with far different 
concerns. Although it formally ended absolutism and established greater 
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legislative control over lawmaking and state finances, the constitution of 
1809 ensured the state remained centralized by granting the mon-
arch wide-ranging powers. In response, the Riksdag established a 
Justitieombudsman as a balance and a parliamentary check against legal 
abuses by administrative authorities acting under the king. Although cho-
sen by parliament, the ombudsman’s formal independence from both the 
government and parliament was intended to ensure the office’s invulnera-
bility to outside influence.
As Swedish democracy’s expansion lessened concerns about the priv-
ileges of royal ministers, the purpose and functions of the ombudsman 
shifted to address, ‘The extension of the activities of the society to new 
fields and the enormous enlargement of the administration’ (Bexelius, 1965: 
42–43). Accordingly, the ombudsman increasingly focused on supervising 
bureaucracy (Rowat, 1985: 3), with the prerogative to investigate and sub-
poena officials and civil servants based on citizen complaints of abuse or 
lawbreaking, and even publically reprimand or prosecute wrongdoers, al-
though the latter function was so rare as to be nonexistent (Bexelius, 1965: 
24–25). From a larger perspective, the new duties fit with the high rates of 
organization within Sweden’s corporatist arrangements. ‘Ombud’ (meaning 
one who represents) came to refer to representatives throughout Swedish 
society: in the Riksdag, political parties, trade unions, and the workplace 
(Rosenthal, 1964: 227). Indeed, as state services expanded, the ombudsman 
became a mediator between the citizen and bureaucracy and a means of 
ensuring trust in a purportedly benevolent system.
With the ombudsman’s placement as guarantor of ‘justice and efficient 
administration of citizens’ affairs, large and small’ (Hurwitz, 1968: 40), 
it logically spread to other countries concerned with establishing trust in 
the government. With the Constitution Act of 1919, Finland drew upon its 
long-preserved legal system, originally developed under Swedish rule. Like 
its Swedish counterpart, the Finnish ombudsman investigated citizen com-
plaints to ensure that decisions by bureaucrats and the judiciary were ‘just,’ 
while notably not aiming to restrict their independence (Gellhorn, 1966a: 
360; Rowat, 1985: 15–27. See also Erikkalä, 2020: 70).
The policy again spread in 1955 when Denmark adopted an ombuds-
man to facilitate conflicts between administrators and citizens, which were 
‘more frequent and often more serious than in former days’ (Pedersen, 1965: 
 76–77). Just like the Norwegian ombudsman, established in 1962, the Dan-
ish ombudsman’s functions reflected its placement within the expanding 
framework of the mid-century Nordic welfare state. While chosen by par-
liament to ensure legality within bureaucracy, these ombudsman offices 
could also investigate ‘arbitrary or unreasonable decisions’ made by ad-
ministrators (Means, 1968: 629), which in Denmark included the power to 
subpoena. The stipulations in both countries against examining the judi-
ciary made it clear that the office was no longer primarily a means of con-
trolling executive or judicial privilege but instead a buffer for citizen rights 
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within an increasingly bureaucratized society. As Swedish ombudsman 
 Alfred Bexelius summed up in 1961, an independent organization aimed at 
investigating wrongdoing in administration ‘must necessarily help to main-
tain the confidence of the general public’ given ‘the new situation created 
by the rapid development of society’ (Bexelius, 1961: 255–256). The Scandi-
navian ombudsman did not limit social services but guaranteed a measure 
of citizen liberty within it.
However, Scandinavia was not alone in facing challenges of expanding 
state responsibilities, and the ombudsman became a frequently studied pol-
icy throughout the 1960s. The result was a policy diffusion wave, as New 
Zealand, Tanzania, India, and the United Kingdom all adopted some form 
of the ombudsman. The Parliamentary Commissioner in the United King-
dom particularly provided a relevant example for the United States, given 
the translation of both intent and form of the policy to fit a non-Nordic 
political culture nervous about ‘maladministration’ or even ‘authoritarian’ 
bureaucracy (Schwartz, 1970: 57, 58; Stacey, 1971: 29).
Translating the ombudsman
This diffusion of the ombudsman innovation did not happen instinctively 
but rather was midwifed into existence by an epistemic community of ex-
perts who translated Scandinavian results for foreign audiences (Haas, 
1992). These translators, acting as authoritative ‘consultants,’ gained le-
gitimacy by prescribing popular, external remedies for local issues, often 
through widely circulated publications (Røvik, 1998: 157). Their efforts to 
de- and then recontextualize the ombudsman, defining aspects requisite for 
success while approving alterations to others, became prized by policymak-
ers over independent investigation of foreign institutions, thereby severing 
the office from Scandinavian political culture (Røvik, 2016). The epistemic 
community consequently possessed wide latitude as ‘brokers,’ interpreting 
the functions and goals of the ombudsman and facilitating its movement 
from one setting to another, and as ‘theorists,’ promoting paradigms that 
emphasized bureaucratic solutions to modern political challenges (Rogers, 
1995: chap. 9; Campbell, 2004: chap. 4). As Tero Erikkilä notes, the dif-
fusion of the ombudsman thus, ‘is hardly a testimony to the power of the 
idea but rather the transnational actors’ ability to shape it to fit their needs’ 
(Erikkilä, 2020, 48). However, these legal and political experts did not them-
selves possess policymaking authority and were dependent on decision- 
makers to implement programs based on their prescribed policy courses 
and mobilize popular support for these programs. This led to a level of con-
flict between the ‘pure’ policy models of the theorists and the ‘diluted’ pro-
grams actually realized in the United States.
Differences between experts and policymakers inspired an inevitable con-
flict between ‘foreignizing’ and ‘domesticating’ the ombudsman. Whereas 
advocates of foreignizing the ombudsman emphasized the program’s success 
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in Scandinavia and therefore supported maintaining as many policy fea-
tures as possible from the original, supporters for domesticating the office 
were more interested in specific domestic issues facing the United States and 
accordingly more willing to make alterations (Røvik, 2016: 293). Further 
complicating this debate about adapting policy features—including goals, 
selection processes, and constraints—was that policies like the ombudsman 
consisted of both practical and normative components, which could be-
come decoupled during the process of translation. These caveats meant that 
multiple outcomes of policy transfer were possible, including emulation, in 
which a foreign exemplar acted as the standard for local policy develop-
ment; hybridization when elements of several policies were synthesized; and 
inspiration or ‘fresh thinking’ (Evans, 2009: 246).
The efforts of expert translators to popularize the ombudsman coincided 
with and, in certain cases, precipitated the popularity of the ombudsman in 
the United States in the 1960s. A search for articles in the JSTOR database 
containing the word ‘ombudsman’ returns only three articles from 1950 to 
1959, but 608 from 1960 to 1970, the high tide of ombudsman acclaim. Even 
with the majority of the articles coming from English-speaking countries 
without an ombudsman and curious about its potential—such as the United 
Kingdom, the United States, and India—references to Scandinavia were 
frequent, sometimes detailed in extensive reports, sometimes with a single 
mention. Sweden, as the originator of the ombudsman, was the most cited 
country, but the other Nordic states (with the exception of Iceland) also 
appeared regularly.4 Moreover, experts often attached a more generalized 
‘Scandinavian’ or ‘Nordic’ moniker to the ombudsman, even when discuss-
ing its results in New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and parts of Canada.
Two principal factors account for the circulation of a ‘Nordic’ ombuds-
man, as opposed to a strictly Swedish office. First, Denmark and Norway 
had recently implemented an ombudsman for reasons similar to other na-
tions considering its adoption, making their experiences highly relevant. 
Second and more importantly, Danish experts had been especially active in 
disseminating information on their new ombudsman internationally.
The trailblazer in the midcentury propagation of the Danish ombudsman 
was Stephan Hurwitz, Denmark’s first ombudsman and, according to the 
Associated Press, ‘the main reason for the worldwide acceptance of that 
position as an institution’ (Associated Press, 1981). Upon assuming office, 
Hurwitz set out on a public information campaign, penning multiple arti-
cles in Danish and English to publicize the functions and purpose of his 
office. In Hurwitz’s articles, the ombudsman acted as a guarantor of the 
‘public trust,’ guiding a highly competent and cooperative Danish adminis-
tration while also protecting civil servants from erroneous charges. Moreo-
ver, Hurwitz stressed the ‘Scandinavian’ ombudsman’s independence from 
partisan divisions, instead describing the office as a ‘personal contact’ for 
all citizens regardless of political leaning (Hurwitz, 1956a: 110, 1956b, 1958, 
1960, 1961: 207).
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Despite such acclaim, a foreign official alone would have found it difficult 
to sell the policy as a solution to other countries. Indeed, Hurwitz’s early 
articles largely refrained from explicit recommendations for the spread of 
the ombudsman, instead broadcasting his own achievements. But Hurwitz 
was not alone in spreading news of the ombudsman in America. Through-
out the 1960s, a transnational community of legal and political scholars 
coalesced around interest in the ombudsman and proved highly active in 
promulgating its record in Scandinavia to justify the office’s establishment 
in the United States. In contrast to Hurwitz’s ‘personal contact,’ American 
expert translators’ ubiquitous references to the ombudsman as a ‘watchdog’ 
or ‘watchman’ recalled American concerns about misuses of administrative 
autonomy, aiding the appeal of the office (e.g., Abraham, 1960; Gellhorn, 
1966a). Nonetheless, even while acknowledging that its original form may 
not be suitable for political structures in the United States, these experts 
advocated emulating the Scandinavian ombudsman policy as closely as pos-
sible. As partisans of ‘foreignizing’ the ombudsman, these scholars modeled 
an office for the purpose of establishing regulated and peaceable contact 
between the state and the citizen without explicitly opposing bureaucracy.
Among the notable translators was Stanley V. Anderson, a legal and in-
ternational relations scholar, whose published articles and books included 
Ombudsmen for American Government? (Anderson, 1964, 1968; Reuss and 
Anderson, 1966; Anderson, 1969). In 1971, Anderson was appointed to 
head the Ombudsman Activities Project at the University of California 
Santa Barbara, which focused on tracking and furthering the spread of the 
American ombudsman (Hill, 1976: 15, fn. 21; Moore, 2010: 164). This put 
Anderson in close contact with Donald Cameron Rowat, a Canadian polit-
ical scientist and another prominent figure for ombudsman advocacy. The 
most prestigious of the American experts was Walter Gellhorn. Gellhorn, 
a long-time legal professor at Columbia University and a vocal liberal pro-
ponent of individual rights (Thomas, 1995), first published on the Scandina-
vian ombudsman in 1962 (Gellhorn, 1962). His greatest contributions were 
two books in 1966: Ombudsman and Others and When Americans Complain. 
Gellhorn’s books received extensive acclaim in both academic journals and 
popular newspapers (Bylin, 1966; Long, 1966; Chazen, 1967; MacFull, 1967; 
Auerbach, 1968) and were widely ‘credited with establishing the Swedish no-
tion of official mediation as a part of the American scene’ (Thomas, 1995).
The models that Anderson, Rowat, and Gellhorn derived from this ‘ex-
port of Scandinavia’ (Rowat, 1964: 230) attempted to replicate ‘Nordic’ rec-
ognition ‘that in the age of the welfare state, traditional controls are not 
good enough’ (Rowat, 1962). Still, all three took pains to show that the 
ombudsman was not designed to restrict bureaucracy, but rather to bolster 
‘lessened confidence in public administration.’ Indeed, Gellhorn pointed to 
experiences in Scandinavia as evidence that the ombudsman was ‘most use-
ful in a society already so well run that it could get along happily without 
having his services at all’ (Gellhorn, 1966b: 192, 422). By setting Scandinavia 
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as the standard for emulation, these assertions advanced a paradigm em-
phasizing greater administrative oversight as the solution for issues related 
to public sector expansion, an extension of the Nordic model’s normative 
assumptions of liberty within security. The purpose of the ombudsman was, 
therefore, to remain the same: securing the effectiveness of the modern state 
although the experts all recognized that certain changes, including multiple 
ombudsman, might be necessary to account for the size of the United States. 
Other aspects, such as the ombudsman’s independence and political neu-
trality, were also to be retained (Rowat, 1964: 232; Gellhorn, 1966c: 225–231; 
Anderson, 1968: 148–149). Just as important, Americans must not see the 
Scandinavian ombudsman as a ‘panacea for the cure of government ills’ 
(Gellhorn, 1966b: 47; Anderson, 1968: 155).
Around the same time that Americans experts were ‘discovering’ the om-
budsman, various newspaper journalists and editors began promoting the 
office as a fit for American politics. In 1960, the Baltimore Sun wistfully 
speculated, ‘Almost everyone can think of a case in which he would have 
been very glad to have one to hand, with all the majesty of Congress behind 
him’ (Baltimore Sun, 1960). Journalists regularly linked the ombudsman 
to a Scandinavian ‘national father-image,’ with the officeholder acting as a 
citizen’s defender against bureaucracy (Boston Globe, 1965) and, for con-
servative commentators, a safeguard against the ‘welfare state’ (Hutchins, 
1966). For many popular writers on both sides of the political spectrum, 
the ombudsman seemed a promising and, much to the chagrin of Gellhorn, 
easy means of protecting the citizen and ensuring government accountabil-
ity. Such enthusiasm carried into the first campaign for a US ombudsman 
in 1963.
The federal ombudsman
On February 10, 1963, Democratic representative Henry S. Reuss proposed 
that the US Congress should examine the feasibility of adopting ‘the Scan-
dinavian office of “ombudsman” to help constituents who turn to Congress-
men for help’ (Associated Press, 1963). Reuss wasted little time acting on his 
own recommendation, proposing a bill on July 16, 1963, for a congressional 
‘Administrative Counsel’ based on the ‘highly successful Ombudsman de-
vice.’ Like the ombudsman, the Administrative Counsel was an investiga-
tory office handling civilian claims alleging improper treatment or denial of 
rightful benefits. The position included a jurisdiction to investigate federal 
‘departments, agencies, or instrumentalities’ although the president, Con-
gress, and the federal judiciary were exempted. Yet Reuss’s Administrative 
Counsel also contained important revisions for an American environment. 
Rather than a truly independent officer, the Speaker of the House and the 
President would appoint the Counsel for two-year terms, fitting with the 
constitutional cycles of the House of Representatives. Furthermore, to al-
lay concerns about weakening ‘congressional-constituent’ relationships, 
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members of Congress would bring the Counsel constituent complaints for 
investigation, rather than having citizens directly contact the Counsel. In its 
focus on easing congressmen’s ‘administrative burden,’ Reuss’s bill resem-
bled a similar, failed proposal in Norway to decrease ‘errands for constitu-
ents,’ which would have made ‘the Ombudsman dependent on the Storting 
to a degree quite incompatible with the basic idea of the office’ (Means, 
1968: 628). Dependency was not a concern for Reuss, who instead described 
the Administrative Counsel as ‘an agent of Congress.’ The Norwegian 
and other Scandinavian ombudsmen, while cited as ‘a successful adjunct 
of democratic government,’ were largely absent from Reuss’s speech to the 
House floor.5
Support failed to materialize and the bill languished in the House Com-
mittee on Administration until the 88th Congress ended in January 1965. 
Unlike its Norwegian counterpart, the bill’s opposition from Republicans 
and Democrats alike centered on their reluctance to surrender former con-
gressional power. This opposition stemmed from an international inconsist-
ency in perceptions of political authority, with the American emphasis on 
elected officials as the most effective agents for handling complaints at odds 
with the Scandinavian deference to experts. Opponents indicated this dis-
crepancy as a sign that Scandinavian policy was inapplicable in a larger na-
tion (Long, 1963; Cleveland, 1964). The resistance to the ombudsman thereby 
couched itself in a rhetoric of national difference, based on the poignant, if 
simplistic, argument that the United States was not Scandinavia.
In an article cowritten with Stanley Anderson, who had taken an advisory 
position in Reuss’s office (Moore, 2010: 164), Reuss responded by promis-
ing that the Counsel would reduce congressional workload, increase effi-
ciency, ensure separation of the state, and stop administrative malpractice. 
Despite including Scandinavian experience as proof that the ombudsman 
safeguarded individual rights, Reuss and Anderson also asserted any for-
eign influence was purely inspirational (Reuss and Anderson, 1966: 47 –50). 
A second Administrative Counsel bill in 1965 drew heavily on Scandina-
vian examples, with no more success than in 1963.6 However, a parallel 
bill proposed by Senator Claiborne Pell received a hearing before the Sub-
committee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, headed by Missouri 
Democrat Edward Long, himself a supporter of the ombudsman campaign. 
Long opened the hearing by remarking that the ombudsman was the third 
Swedish word to enter the American vocabulary after ‘skål’ and ‘smörgås-
bord.’ Indeed, the term ‘ombudsman’ would never effectively be translated 
into English, Reuss’s abortive ‘Administrative Counsel’ notwithstanding. 
The application of the ombudsman as a ‘loan word’ nonetheless necessi-
tated an explanation of how the office should function (Pernau, 2012:  7); 
in Long’s Congressional hearing, its precedents abroad served to explain 
its operations and feasibility to American decision-makers. The choice of 
witnesses reflected the emphasis on a Swedish model: Swedish ambassador 
to the US Hubert de Besche and Sweden’s ombudsman Alfred Bexelius, who 
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had been touring the United States for three weeks to lecture on his office 
(Ombudsman Hearings, 1966).
The contents of the hearing and its results capture the difficulties of 
adapting programs designed for a foreign context. Presenting the duties of 
his office, Bexelius described how the ombudsman ‘strengthens the confi-
dence of the public in the authorities,’ necessary as modern ‘citizens have 
become increasingly dependent on public agencies’ (Ombudsman Hearings, 
1966: 13, 17). Attendees of the hearing pressed Bexelius to forecast the om-
budsman’s role in the United States: its protection against wiretapping, 
elimination of administrative intimidation, and advantages over an elected 
official. Reuss, also in attendance, explained his Administrative Counsel 
plan and asked Bexelius to judge whether ‘such an adaptation of your Scan-
dinavian device would retain many of the advantages of the ombudsman.’ 
Bexelius responded favorably although with some trepidation about the 
lack of direct citizen contact. Despite these positive responses, the hear-
ings ended without suggestions for further action and the bill never made 
it out of committee (Ombudsman Hearings, 1966: 29). However, Long and 
Benny Kass, the subcommittee’s assistant counsel, supported Reuss as the 
congressman proposed a federal ombudsman again in 1967 and 1969, with 
Kass turning to American popular culture to familiarize the office as ‘a 
cross between Batman and a public ear’ (Long, 1966; Kass, 1967: 231).7 As 
part of his efforts in Congress, Reuss—who had finally given in to popular 
vogue and adopted the title ‘Congressional Ombudsman’ (Anderson, 1969: 
15)—invoked the recommendations of Gellhorn and Anderson, while also 
tapping the two experts, along with Rowat, to serve as advisors to a Milwau-
kee ombudsman that Reuss hoped would demonstrate the policy’s feasibil-
ity (New York Times, 1967a).8
Fears of losing contact with constituents, a lack of support among 
 better-educated voters, and concerns about implementing a ‘foreign,’ ‘so-
cialist’ policy combined to doom Reuss’s proposals (Gallup, 1965; Sacco, 
1967). Although bills aimed at creating a federal ombudsman continued un-
til 1973 (Anderson and Stockton, 1990), the most notable a bipartisan effort 
in 1971 that drew upon a model statute written by Gellhorn in Ombudsmen 
for American Government?, a federal ombudsman bill never passed.9 Despite 
committed political advocates, the proposal came too close to upsetting the 
traditional powers of elected officials in the US federal system. The efforts 
of Reuss and his colleagues nonetheless left a mark in Congress, as a pos-
itive reputation combined with successful Scandinavian experiences to es-
tablish the ombudsman as the default method of bureaucratic regulation.
The early history of the Administrative Conference of the United States 
(ACUS) provides evidence to the extent that the ombudsman penetrated the 
American mindset. Begun as a temporary institution by President Dwight 
Eisenhower in 1953 and 1960, the ACUS sought to end ‘the cumbersome 
procedures, unnecessary expense, and the delays’ of federal administra-
tion (United Press, 1960; Kohlmeier, 1963). Notwithstanding similar goals 
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in regulating administrative bodies, the structure and methods of the Ad-
ministrative Conference varied greatly from the ombudsman. Instead of a 
single independent official and his small staff, the rolls of the ACUS were 
expansive and drawn both from within and without federal agencies (Gard-
ner, 1972: 36–39). Moreover, the ACUS did not respond directly to civilian 
complaints but focused on general problems determined by a professional 
core working inside the agencies they intended to regulate.
Even before the approval of a permanent ACUS in 1964, the ombudsman 
idea proved pervasive in ACUS activities. As part of the 1960 iteration of 
the ACUS, Gellhorn had supported a broader, ombudsman-style mandate 
for the conference and produced a report on the Finnish, Swedish, and es-
pecially Danish ombudsman as a means of impressing upon his colleagues 
‘the scope and methods of any permanent organization that may grow out 
of the Administrative Conference.’10 Gellhorn’s reputation as a respected 
legal authority on the ombudsman encouraged President Lyndon Johnson 
to appoint him the first chairman of the ACUS (the only 1 of 15 candidates 
approved by Johnson).11 Although Gellhorn declined the position, he served 
as a board member once the ACUS finally received funding in 1967.
Despite formal funding, Jerre Williams, the eventual chairman, found it 
difficult to differentiate the ACUS’s application of internal regulation from 
the ombudsman’s grievance-based inquiries. At an early appropriation 
meeting, Williams recalled being asked by Congressman Tom Steed, ‘Will 
you investigate individual complaints—Will you be a “homespun man”?’12 
The misnomer indicates the continued foreignness of both the term and the 
concept ‘ombudsman’ to many Americans as well as Williams’s struggle to 
distinguish his organization from the Scandinavian position. Such pressure 
eventually culminated in the ACUS executive council investigating the pos-
sibility of handling individual complaints during its first year of existence.13
Politicians and experts thus continuously worked a Scandinavian policy 
into other forms of bureaucratic control, even as the plan for a congressional 
ombudsman faltered. The Administrative Conference originated with goals 
and structures very different from the ombudsman. However, by 1968, the 
ombudsman was ‘being used to describe any complaint-handling or appeal 
machinery’ (Rowat, 1968: 35), consequently forcing Williams to position 
himself relative to such policy. Although the ACUS never did examine citi-
zen complaints directly, the idea of fulfilling ombudsman functions contin-
ued to intrigue successive conferences into 1990 when the ACUS adopted 
Recommendation 90-2, which encouraged the creation of a federal om-
budsman ‘with major responsibilities involving significant interactions with 
members of the general public’ (Anderson and Stockton, 1990). Fittingly, 
Walter Gellhorn, now in his mid-80s, chaired the meeting.
The state and municipal ombudsman
Campaigns to adopt the ombudsman were more successful within other 
administrative divisions. Taking place at a smaller scale, where notions of 
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a single officer capable of handling complaints were less implausible and 
legislatures were more likely to be controlled by a single party, the state 
and municipal ombudsman offices nonetheless only really became suc-
cessful after the idea had already firmly taken root in the United States. 
Thus, early bills in Connecticut (1963) and California (1965, 1967) failed 
to pass despite support from leading politicians and experts (Nader, 1963; 
Bylin, 1966; Los Angeles Times, 1966). Yet the popularity and tenacity of 
its  expert-advocates of the ombudsman gave the legislation the resiliency 
to survive years of rejection and retooling. By 1967, Walter Gellhorn ob-
served, ‘bills to create American variants of the ombudsman system that 
has been identified with the Scandinavian government [sic] have now been 
introduced in 47 of the 50 state legislatures.’ This widespread consideration 
made Gellhorn hopeful of ‘transplanting ombudsmanship to our country’ 
(Kuhnle, 1981: 125).14 His conflation of the Scandinavian countries into a 
single political- administrative unit displayed the flexibility of foreign mod-
els even for the most acclaimed experts.
1967 also witnessed the first successful bill for a state ombudsman in 
Hawaii, drawing upon the ‘Scandinavian model’ (Wall Street Journal, 1970). 
In 1969, Herman Doi, director of the University of Hawaii’s Legislative Ref-
erence Bureau, was appointed to the office and immediately departed for a 
three-week study tour in Europe.15 Other states followed in Hawaii’s wake 
(Nebraska, 1969; Oregon, 1969; Iowa, 1972; Alaska, 1976) although some-
times with great deviance from the original ombudsman. Oregon Governor 
Tom McCall, for example, bypassed the legislature altogether by unilater-
ally appointing an ombudsman (Rowat, 1985: 88), a far stretch from the in-
dependent check upon executive overreach found in the Nordic countries. 
The variations in form revealed a reorientation toward local situations and 
internal precedents, as Doi became an elder statesman of the ombudsman 
campaign, publishing on the policy and accepting invitations by states to 
explain his part in preventing ‘bureaucracies from overrunning citizens’ 
rights’ (New York Times, 1970).16
Just as important to the spread of the ombudsman was the mature epis-
temic community led by Walter Gellhorn. As a conduit bridging the geo-
graphical and political gap between the United States and Scandinavian 
countries, Gellhorn raised awareness of the office and aided in the more 
practical requirements of its establishment. Legislators took notice, in-
cluding the Senate of Maryland, which based a 1970 bill off a ‘Model Om-
budsman Statute’ prepared by Gellhorn for the ombudsman-themed 1967 
conference of the American Assembly, a public policy institute, which 
recommended, ‘Ombudsman offices be established in American local and 
state governments’ (Tibbles and Hollands, 1970: 356; Gregory and Gid-
dings, 2000: 6).17 Another conference in 1971 reveals the influence wielded 
by North American members of the epistemic community. The meeting of 
the ‘New Jersey Ombudsman Committee’—consisting of academics, labor, 
business, and community-action groups in support of a state ombudsman 
bill—promoted Gellhorn as its notable invitee.18 Bexelius, on the other 
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hand, only received an invitation at Gellhorn’s urging.19 As the strength and 
standing of national translator experts increased, Scandinavia faded as the 
model for ombudsman policy.
Complicating the disassociation of ombudsman policy with Scandina-
via were developments at the municipal level, as attempts to pass an urban 
ombudsman in the wake of minority riots in the urban north changed the 
focus of the office to diffusing racial tensions. Ironically, these efforts also 
came closer to approaching the Scandinavian ombudsman’s emphasis on 
a ‘personal contact’ for building public trust. While the Scandinavian om-
budsmen also had jurisdiction to investigate grievances against police, the 
United States’ urban ombudsmen would give it a distinctly racial focus.
In 1964, liberal editor Marion Sanders was among the first to advocate 
an ombudsman in national print for solving America’s urban discord, the 
same year that tensions between urban minorities and police boiled over 
into six-day riots in New York City. Sanders looked toward Sweden to cor-
rect the ‘kinds of government failures which can precipitate violence and 
police brutality.’ The ombudsman was, therefore, not specific to be a check 
on the police, but a means of solving certain institutional problems. Unlike 
a civilian review board to monitor police activity, Sanders assumed an om-
budsman would be less onerous to conservatives and law enforcement, with 
half a dozen New York lawyers capable of filling Bexelius’s shoes (Sanders, 
1964: 134).
Sanders’s prediction proved astute, as the New York City police force 
proposed an ombudsman in 1966 as an alternative to the civilian review 
board sponsored by New York’s liberal mayor John Lindsay. Backing the 
proposal was William Buckley, Jr., founder of the influential conservative 
journal National Review. Buckley supported a New York City ombudsman 
as a means of protecting ‘the little man’ from the real ‘bureaucratic lab-
yrinths’—the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the educational department, 
and the sanitation department—and a federal ombudsman to roll back 
Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society (Buckley, 1966; New York Times, 1966). 
These proposals subsequently led to endorsements of Buckley as the first 
New York ombudsman (Chamberlain, 1966). Initially, Lindsay opposed 
the policy; however, when the mayor’s allies—the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the American Civil Lib-
erties Union, and several labor unions—all threw in their support for an 
ombudsman, the mayor backtracked. At a press conference in late 1966, 
Lindsay declared that he had appointed a committee of officials to study 
the feasibility of an ombudsman several months prior and was awaiting 
their findings (Fulton, 1966). After Bexelius met with City Council Pres-
ident Frank O’Conner and NAACP President Roy Wilkens, O’Conner 
formally proposed an ombudsman for the city on May 12, 1967, based, in 
part, on Gellhorn’s model bill (New York Times, 1967b).20 However, con-
tinued discussions could not overcome Lindsay’s resistance and the bill 
‘disappeared from sight’ (Buckley, 1968; Rowat, 1985: 89) although new 
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proposals sporadically emerged out of the Democratic controlled City 
Council (New York Times, 1969).
As the ombudsman became embedded as a standard response to racial 
tensions, New York City’s policy discussions for improving municipal re-
sponsiveness to resident complaints were replayed in Los Angeles (1966), 
Oakland (1967), Newark (1968), and Detroit (1968)—cities with large black 
populations where long-simmering resentments erupted into violence dur-
ing the 1960s. Reflecting this growing aspiration to establish trust in munic-
ipal government and law enforcement, the Kerner Report, written following 
a wave of riots in summer 1967, supported improved methods of facilitating 
communication between minority communities and police as part of the 
need for ‘comprehensive grievance-response mechanisms in order to bring 
all public agencies under public scrutiny’ (National Advisory Commission 
on Civil Disorders, 1968: 1, 5, 8).
In a reversal of conservative support for the ombudsman to limit federal 
bureaucracy, Republicans in communities like Berkeley, California offered 
stiff resistance to ‘importing the Scandinavian system,’ which they declared 
was part of a nationwide ‘campaign of the radical Left’ to ‘assault’ law en-
forcement (Berkeley Daily Gazette, 1968; Culbert, 1968). In spite of setbacks 
in many American cities, the urban ombudsman finally broke through in 
March 1967 when the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Ad-
ministration ‘recommended replacing local police review boards with gen-
eral “ombudsman-type” complaint agencies’ (Rowat, 1985, 14). In response 
to a further federal recommendation to allocate money to such agencies the 
following year (Frank, 1972), the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), 
created to administer Lyndon Johnson’s antipoverty and antidiscrimination 
programs, gave approval to ombudsman trials New York City and Buffalo 
(Bennett, 1967). While the New York ombudsman failed to materialize, Buf-
falo’s Citizens Administrative Service was approved for funding and ran for 
a year and a half (Tibbles and Hollands, 1970: 4).21
Like the state ombudsman, these efforts to institute a municipal ombuds-
man relied on American translator experts for knowledge and advice, has-
tening the office away from its Scandinavian roots by limiting reliance on its 
Nordic precedents. Both New York City and Newark-based legislation off 
Gellhorn’s model bill (Gwyn, 1974: 2; Rowat, 1985: 90), while Stanley An-
derson’s Ombudsman Activities Project capitalized on federal funding by 
helping establish ombudsmen in Nebraska, Iowa, and Seattle-King County. 
In 1972, Anderson dispatched political scientist William Gwyn to assist 
Newark in a second attempt to establish an ombudsman. With ready access 
to so many domestic experts, Gwyn focused on gathering information from 
American ombudsmen about the rewards and obstacles of their work,22 
making a study tour of Scandinavia unnecessary. Newark’s second attempt 
at ombudsman legislation advanced further than its first, actually passing 
and receiving OEO funding, although local political rivalries, manifest in 
the city’s inability to agree on an appointee, left this funding idle.
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Conclusion
As ‘ombudsmania’ took hold in the mid-twentieth century United States 
(Anderson, 1968: 155), the office’s reputation for safeguarding democratic 
principles initially thrived from its connections with Scandinavia. Ameri-
can proponents of the ombudsman frequently linked the office with sustain-
ing a strong, service-minded state and projected that such qualities could be 
translated into American institutions.
There remained, however, a stark divide between the expectations and 
desires of Gellhorn and other translator experts and the application of the 
ombudsman by American political figures. As ‘foreignizers,’ Gellhorn, An-
derson, and Rowat generally advocated a process of emulation, retaining 
from Scandinavia the purpose of establishing societal trust in government 
along with features like independent action, while tweaking other aspects 
of the office to fit with American conditions. However, policymakers were 
more interested in ‘domesticating’ the policy to local contexts, modifying as-
pects as they saw fit. The resulting hybrid policies combined elements from 
different ombudsman offices worldwide or, more often, simply appropriated 
the ombudsman’s popularity as inspiration for new programs. In the latter 
case, policymakers combined the image of the ombudsman as a safeguard or 
‘watchdog’ of liberties with a more individualistic definition of liberty than 
in Scandinavia. This led to substantial and uneven changes to the Nordic 
office’s normative objectives in order to restructure it for A merican political 
culture, where skepticism of large government encouraged  decision-makers 
and public commentators alike to treat the office as a check on administra-
tive power and expansion. Unlike in Scandinavia, liberty in security was 
oxymoronic for conservative proponents like Buckley.
Beyond altering its purpose, American policymakers made little effort 
to preserve Scandinavian methods. In some cases, a symbolic resonance 
back to Scandinavia masked substantial practical changes to the office’s 
functions and forms. At the federal level, the Reuss bills imagined the ‘Ad-
ministrative Counsel’ as an outlet for excess work placed on congressmen, 
rather than as a ‘personal contact’ between citizens and administration. The 
reluctance of Reuss’ colleagues to transfer authority from elected officials 
to an appointed expert led proponents to alter its form even further, includ-
ing potentially placing grievance mechanisms within the ACUS. Even more 
pronounced was the transformation of the ombudsman at the municipal 
level, where praise for Nordic precedents presaged the proposal of the om-
budsman as an alternative to a civilian review board. That the urban om-
budsman shared its Scandinavian predecessor’s focus on establishing public 
trust does not disguise its underlying objective of solving racial tensions 
distinctive to the mid-century United States.
By the end of the decade, if Scandinavia was mentioned at all in Ameri-
can ombudsman debate, it was usually limited to noting the policy’s orig-
inal inspiration. Instead, American policymakers now relied on domestic 
precedents and the assistance of translator experts, who, in supporting 
A cross between Batman and a public ear 159
attempts to establish the ombudsman across the United States regardless 
of their faithfulness to the Scandinavian original, furthered the transfor-
mation of the policy. Such substantial changes eventually led more stringent 
foreignizers to bemoan the spread of an American ‘pseudo-ombudsman.’23 
The American ombudsman’s forfeiture of ‘trust’ for ‘control’ as its primary 
aim was evident when journalist Roland Huntford’s The New Totalitarians, 
written for Anglo-American audiences in 1971, condemned the Swedish 
ombudsman as ‘an instrument of the civil service’ in its dominance over 
individual liberties (Huntford, 1971: 131–134). In the international dissem-
ination of the ombudsman, Nordic policy lessons thus circulated more 
effectively as inspiratory images of success than as ready-made program 
models. Ultimately, American suspicions of the state and the desire to erect 
bulwarks against its autonomy proved too pervasive to support a more ex-
tensive transfer of Nordic innovations. Nonetheless, in the following years, 
the presence of the ombudsman remained a sign of the possibility of trans-
ferring Nordic policies to the United States and an argument for continued 
implementation of a ‘Nordic model’ (Egerstrom, 2010). For all its reshaping 
in an American context, the ombudsman never fully lost its connection to 
the Nordic countries and their particular policy systems.
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Introduction
By the late 1960s, a dominant Western imaginary of the Nordic nations 
was a paradise of sexual freedom and liberation (Arnberg and Marklund, 
2016). Pornography was decriminalized in Denmark in 1969 and Sweden 
in 1972 (Kulick and Rydström, 2015), and already in the 1950s, Sweden 
attracted international attention for its introduction of sex education for 
seven- year-old children and production of films with explicit sexual con-
tent (Kulick, 2005). Shocking to some, progressive to others, these legal 
and social developments cemented the reputation of the Nordic region, and 
Sweden in particular, as the home of sexual liberalism. This liberal image 
was further strengthened by the Nordic model of ‘penal exceptionalism’ 
(Pratt, 2008; Ugelvik and Dullum, 2012). Gaining prominence from the 
late 1960s (Nilsson, 2012), the Nordics gained an image for less punitive ap-
proaches to crime, especially through shorter prison terms and a focus on 
offender rehabilitation.
A half-century later, this reputation of the Nordics has been replaced by a 
different and rather less liberal sexual imaginary, an image that also carries 
Swedish origins. Since the 1990s, Sweden has been committed to widening 
the net of criminal justice by broadening which acts are criminalized as 
sexual offences as well as increasing the level of punishment for such crimes 
(Skilbrei and Holmström, 2013). A key example of this shift in the legal and 
social approach to sexuality is the 1999 unilateral criminalization of the 
purchase of sex. This came to be known first as ‘Swedish model’ and later 
as ‘Nordic model’ of prostitution policy. Adopted in several countries (see 
Table 9.1), endorsed by the EU Parliament, and promoted as a progressive 
politics of gender equality, this model emerged as one of the regions’ pri-
mary policy exports.
This chapter asks three questions about the circulation of Nordic pros-
titution regulation. The first is descriptive: How did the model emerge 
and circulate, and which actors were responsible for its circulation? The 
second is analytical: What was the content of the model, and how was it 
understood throughout the world? The third is explanatory: Why was the 
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circulation of the model so successful, both in shaping discourse and policy 
reform? In analysing this circulation, we introduce branding theory to circu-
lation studies. We argue that policy mobility and diffusion can be deeply af-
fected by background nation brands (which shore up or diminish legitimacy) 
and foregrounded actor strategies that seek to brand a policy in a competitive 
ideational environment. In our case, the two branding dimensions were also 
symbiotic. Sweden, in particular, both drew on and sought to strengthen its 
nation brand in promoting the criminalization of the purchase of sex.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, we show the remark-
able spread of prostitution regulation as ‘a’ or ‘the’ Nordic model in the 
period 2012–2017 through a media content analysis. This is followed by a 
presentation of our theoretical framework and examination of the domestic 
emergence of the policy, its characteristics under export, and import. We 
conclude by discussing the causes of the policy’s success.
The emergence of a new Nordic model
In order to understand the potential spread of prostitution regulation as 
Nordic model, we conducted first a global media content analysis. Using the 
media search engine m360, we identified 2,229 news media articles for the 
simple search term ‘Nordic model’ in English between 1 September 2012 and 
1 September 2017. Given that international attention is directed at several 
Nordic models, this approach allowed us to place prostitution policy in a 
relevant discursive universe.
Figure 9.1 shows the distribution and source of those articles across dif-
ferent regions of the world – principally online news, newspaper articles and 
TV media websites. Given the search was in English, the apportionment 
hues unsurprisingly closely to the distribution of English-speaking coun-
tries (especially in North America and Asia) although there is large coverage 
in Western Europe. Even at this level, we can see the presence of prostitution 
regulation in media coverage of the Nordic model. Diffusion is especially 
high in Australia, which reflects how ‘the Nordic model’ of prostitution has 
been a key reference in ongoing debates on prostitution policies there (see 
O’Brien, 2017).
Table 9.1  Adoption of the ‘Nordic model’
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Figure 9.1 Distribution and source of English-speaking articles 2012–2017.
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Figure 9.2 shows the top ten news stories – i.e., where the same news event 
is covered by different media channels. The discussion of the Nordic model 
of prostitution features prominently, with three of the top ten stories. Cov-
erage of France’s adoption of the Nordic model of prostitution policy gen-
erated by far the most attention, with 151 unique articles, while the political 
debate in Western Australia for reform of the prostitution laws being the 
seventh most covered event. The remainder of the top ten stories deals, re-
spectively, with the economic dimensions of the social welfare model, mi-
grants, gender equality, domestic violence and architecture.
Using Nvivo, we generated also a word cloud of the most common words 
in the 2229 articles referring to the ‘Nordic’ and ‘model’. Again, the content 
reveals a strong, if not very strong, focus on prostitution-related themes. 
Of the five most common words (excluding the Nordic model), two relate 
explicitly to the coverage of prostitution (‘sex’ and ‘prostitution’) and one 
partly (women). Drilling down further on the word usage, it is notable that 
some words that might appear to relate to the traditional social welfare 
model, concern prostitution. Thus, 59% of the 1,391 articles that contained 
‘worker’ or ‘work’ refer also to ‘prostitution’, ‘prostitute’, ‘sex’ and/or ‘sex 
worker’ (Figure 9.3).1
To avoid an English bias, we conducted a survey of French- speaking me-
dia. In the period 2012–2017, the phrase Nordic, model featured 284 times in 
this database. We discovered, however, frequent usage of the ‘Scandinavian 
model’, and using this as a search term, we identified a further 596 articles. 
Figure 9.4 provides a word cloud image of the most frequently discovered 
words for both. Again, prostitution features highly in articles on the Nordic 
model as well as the ‘Scandinavian model’, with references to ‘prostitution’, 
‘clients’, ‘prostituées’ and ‘femmes’ (women). As can be seen, ‘prostitution’ 
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‘France’, ‘work’ and ‘politics’. Moreover, as with the English articles, many 
of the references to ‘work’ correspond with articles on prostitution.
The above analysis concerns only mass media. If we analyse other forms 
of text-based circulation, we find slightly divergent results. For example, 
our searches of Twitter at different times reveal that the Nordic model is 
almost exclusively related to prostitution. Although there are tweets ad-
dressing how the Nordic model addresses broader issues of social welfare 
(e.g., many current tweets address how the Nordic model and German 
Rhine model are best placed to navigate the emerging robot economy). If 
we analyse the academic literature, the social welfare model dominates. 
In the period from 2012 to 2017, the number of new academic articles that 
include the terms ‘Nordic model’ and ‘welfare’ is 4,110, while the num-
ber for the Nordic model of prostitution is 496. However, it is somewhat 
remarkable that so many scholarly articles have been published on the 
relatively new theme of prostitution policy in literature enlisting the term 
‘the Nordic model’.
This rise of prostitution regulation as a prominent and, in certain spheres, 
dominant discursive Nordic model reflects what the book editors describe 
in their introduction as the ‘dynamic’ and multivalent nature of the concept. 
While Marklund (2017: 623) is certainly correct to assert historically that the 
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welfare state is ‘Scandinavia’s best brand’, it is less clear that this is always 
so. Alternatively, prostitution regulation can be viewed as the new Nordic 
welfare brand. The Nordic model of prostitution has, at least in name, a 
welfare dimension and, more importantly, draws heavily on the symbolic 
resources of the welfare state and gender equality in securing legitimacy.
In any case, prostitution regulation challenges the idea that one can dis-
tinguish easily between ‘general’ and ‘specific’ Nordic models.2 Arguably, 
as we shall see in this chapter, the traditional welfare model and prostitu-
tion model have a co-constitutive relationship in circulation. The welfare 
model strengthens and shores up the Nordic brand for prostitution policy 
and provides some of its content, while the prostitution model represents a 
new advertisement for the traditional welfare model – presenting new ways 
in which welfarism has tackled apparently social problems, including crim-
inal activity and gender inequality.
Theoretical framework
‘Nordic models’ can be understood as a cultural expression of place that 
provides valuable symbolic resources (Langford and Larsen, 2018). They 
constitute an ‘imaginary’ in which a society, as Castoriadis (1975: 465) puts 
it, ‘creates for each historical period its singular way of living, seeing and 
making its own existence’. Thus, Nordic models (and exceptionalisms) can 
be understood and studied as a construction – a collection of discourses, 
ideas, images and symbols that may (or may not) correspond with ‘reality’ 
and form part of a broader ‘Nordicity’ (Browning, 2007).
In this chapter, we use two specific constructivist frameworks to ana-
lyse the Nordic model of prostitution regulation. The first are standard 
theories of diffusion and circulation, and specifically that of policy mo-
bilities. Diffusion studies vary in their approach – between a focus on the 
‘spread’ of conceptual objects (ideas, rules, institutions and practices); 
their ‘transfer’ with a focus on the actors, processes, local adaption and 
parallel process; and the process of ‘construction’ and ‘mediation’ of 
the objects throughout the entire process (Djelic, 2008: 546–552). While 
we are interested in the spread of the prostitution regulation, we are es-
pecially interested in transfer and dynamic construction. This involves 
close attention to the strategic actions of actors and an understanding 
that diffusion is primarily a ‘historical and conceptual act’ rather than a 
‘linguistic act’ – conceptual change occurs in the very act of translation 
(Palonen, 1998).
In this respect, ‘policy mobilities’ literature in diffusion studies is of 
particular value. The term ‘policy mobilities’ originates in geography but 
has been integrated in critical policy studies (Peck and Theodore, 2010; 
McCann and Ward, 2013). It is intended to move beyond conceiving pol-
icy as something that is rationally communicated, transferred and applied, 
hence allowing it to encompass its more symbolic and disorderly sides (New-
burn et al., 2017). Like much diffusion literature, policy mobilities literature 
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sees the movement of constructs as neither linear nor uniform across time 
and space (McKenzie et al., 2019). It is concerned specifically with the move-
ment of policy, which makes it highly applicable for studying prostitution 
 regulation.
As Newburn et al. (2017) highlight, the concept of policy mobilities carries 
the concept of ‘policy assemblage’ by pointing to the process of ‘temporarily 
bringing something – such as a policy – into coherence’ (McKenzie et al., 
2019: 4). A similar point is made by Peck and Theodore (2010) when they de-
scribe one of the characteristics of policy mobilities is the process of synthe-
sizing policy. Thus, the policy is a social process. In this respect, Jones and 
Newburn (2007: 23) helpfully differentiate among these diverse elements, 
or levels, of policy: (1) ‘ideas, symbols and rhetoric’; (2) ‘the more concrete 
manifestations of policy in terms of policy content and instruments’ and (3) 
‘the more practical applications of policy in terms of its implementation by 
practitioners and professionals’. As we shall argue, the policy package of the 
Nordic model of prostitution regulation travels with these three different 
aspects – but is dominated by the first: ideas, symbols, and rhetoric.
In analysing this circulation, we introduce branding perspectives to cir-
culation studies, drawing on both marketing theory and critical branding 
studies. In our view, branding is relevant to the study of circulation in at 
least two respects. First, a nation’s brand can be used to strengthen or 
weaken the legitimacy of a circulating policy. A ‘brand’ is a name or image 
that identifies and differentiates a product from other products, and a ‘na-
tion brand’ consists of ‘the unique multidimensional blend of elements that 
provide the nation with culturally grounded differentiation and relevance 
for all its target audience’ (Dinnie, 2008: 15). Nation brands exist regardless 
of a state’s or others’ efforts. Aronczyk (2008: 49) observes that nations are 
‘already de facto brands, regularly projecting their assets, attributes and 
liabilities to a public at large’.
During the 1990s, nation branding emerged as an explicit phenom-
enon. As part of the turn to the ‘competition state’, Nordic states joined 
the global movement of ‘nation branding’ and, supported by an extensive 
‘nation branding industry’, competed to promote and manage their image 
and ideas for commercial and political goals (Byrkjeflot et al., 2013; Neu-
mann and de Carvalho, 2014; Angell and Mordhorst, 2015; Strang, 2016). 
Whatever the origins, the main point from an analytical perspective is that 
a country or regional brand, such as ‘the Nordic’, is a background presence 
in circulation and, crucially, is more than a mere shorthand for describ-
ing the origin of an idea, policy or material product. A nation brand pro-
vides also a symbolic resource or liability. Thus, an economic or regulatory 
model might be more or less attractive on the basis that it is ‘American’ or 
‘European’, a football strategy because it is characterized as ‘Brazilian’ or 
‘German’ or furniture design because it is sold as ‘Danish’ or ‘Japanese’ (on 
Denmark, see Chapter 13 by Mads Mordhost). Whether the particular idea 
or object is actually from the nation is less relevant – the use of the nation 
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or region as an adjective brings to bear cognitive, emotional and subliminal 
associations. In practice, they can become ‘sub-brands’ of the nation brand.
Thus, treating brands analytically means using the analytical resources 
embedded in the idea and discipline of (critical) marketing to understand 
contemporary and historical social discourses and realities. Indeed, the 
Nordic region is an ideal place for investigating the idea of branding as an 
analytical category. The Nordics already have a powerful general brand 
(Browning, 2007; Marklund and Petersen, 2013; Marklund, 2017) – the 
Nordics have been described as ‘moral superpowers’ (Dahl, 2006), ‘agents 
of a world common good’ (Bergman, 2007), ‘havens of gender equality’ 
(UN-CEDAW, 2003) or the ‘referent’ for welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 
1990). The labels in the region (Nordic, Scandinavian and five individual 
country names) constitute a form of brand capital and appear to lend sig-
nificant discursive and aesthetic power to almost any imaginable political, 
social or commercial project. Indeed, the model of ‘New Nordic Cuisine’ 
seems to draw heavily on the legitimacy of the Nordic label given its rather 
dubious roots in the Nordic region (on Nordic cuisine, see Chapter 12 by 
Silviya Svejenova et al). As we shall see in the case of the Nordic prostitu-
tion model, it is arguable that the label has been helpful in overcoming its 
elements that are not consistent with standard progressive images of the 
region.
Second, the act of circulating can constitute branding. Browning (2007) 
defines branding analytically as strategic action that seeks to promote a sta-
ble and specific idea with a particular audience in mind. In other words, 
there is some form of strategic commodification that is reductionist in its 
message. The use of commercial frameworks as analytical constructs in dif-
fusion studies is not necessarily new. Many authors refer to the ‘packaging’ 
of concepts for the purposes of circulation (Mitroff and Mohrman, 1987: 
69; Czarniawaska and Jorges, 1996; Rottenburg, 1996: 216; Djelic, 2008: 
546–550). In seeking to understand the fashionability of management 
techniques, Abrahamson (1996: 125) goes further and refers to the cul-
tural industry’s marketing strategies: selecting a limited set of art and 
artists, packaging and launching them and co-opting mass media process – 
a process of supply-driven rather than demand-driven innovation. This 
corresponds to many key elements in branding. In the case of the Nordics, 
Browning (2007) claims that the mobilization of Nordic identity in for-
eign policy during the Cold War was an exercise in branding. Drawing on 
Waever (1992), he argues that the Nordics sought to demonstrate superior-
ity to a divided and militarized continental Europe through a rhetoric and 
foreign policy based on peace, humanitarianism and solidarity.
In the context of circulation theory, we can think of branding as a spe-
cific form of diffusion. In a competitive ideational environment, actors may 
draw on branding tools in order to attain more visibility or support for 
their particular ‘product’. This might include strong differentiation, greater 
simplification, mythologizing or the use of different aesthetics and labels 
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in promotion. A historical example in the case of the Nordics is universal 
suffrage. As Larsen (2021) points out, American suffragists decided to pro-
mote the Norwegian introduction of women’s right to vote in 1913 as the 
first in the world, rather than the earlier and identical reforms in Finland, 
New Zealand and Australia. Norway provided a better ideational product 
since there were fewer doubts over its sovereignty – the other three were still 
disentangling their foreign policies from earlier colonizers despite being in-
dependent states.
In the case of prostitution, it is highly polarized and contested. The princi-
pal competitors are: (1) a Dutch model of full legalization and regulation; (2) 
a traditional model of full criminalization; and (3) a spectrum of approaches 
in-between. In this context, traditional political movements – whether femi-
nism, conservatism, social democracy, human rights – have been often split 
on the best approach. As we shall argue, a strategy that created a distinct 
model in this policy jungle that could draw support from both progressive 
and conservative political forces would be attractive.
The emergence and content of the Nordic model of 
prostitution policy
What has come to be viewed as the Nordic prostitution model first 
emerged in Sweden and was later adopted and adapted by three other 
Nordic states. Throughout most of the twentieth century, prostitution 
in Sweden was considered formally a public health challenge. After the 
deregulation of the municipal prostitution law in 1919, the principal form 
of regulation was the Lex Veneris of 1918, legislation designed to stop the 
spread of venereal disease (Svanström, 2006: 145–146). This was com-
plemented by a latent moral approach, whereby the vagrancy law – with 
the support of various vagrancy commissions – was frequently invoked 
to arrest sex workers and declare their earnings as illegal (Svanström, 
2006: 146). However, opinion began to shift from the late 1950s as, 
and certainly by the 1980s Prostitution was framed as a social problem 
(Holmström and Skilbrei, 2017). This reformulation of the problem of 
prostitution entailed the establishment of targeted social services, but 
also new criminal justice responses were debated. Two white papers and 
a series of law proposals throughout the 1980s and 1990s suggested re-
introducing criminalization of both the seller and the buyer of sex or to 
only criminalize the buyer.
Eventually, on 1 January 1999 as part of a larger law package on ‘women’s 
peace’, legislation criminalizing the purchase of sex entered into force. The 
law’s origins stemmed partly from a further evolution in views of prostitu-
tion. Prostitution was no longer only defined as a social problem that society 
should tackle with social measures, it was also defined as a result of and 
as something that contributed to gender inequality. With this came an un-
derstanding of prostitution as linked to power relations, both in structural 
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and individual terms, and this is key to understanding the movement to-
wards criminalizing ‘the demand side;’ the party deemed most powerful and 
blameworthy (Holmström and Skilbrei, 2017).
The new Swedish law gained significant attention internationally and 
constituted a contrast to how several other European countries at the same 
time decriminalized or regularized prostitution. The Netherlands marched 
decisively in the opposite direction of decriminalization and normalization 
with its 2000 law revision (see, e.g., Outshoorn, 2011). In this respect, the law 
was intended to prevent a similar development in Sweden but provide also a 
reference and beacon for debates elsewhere. Indeed, one of the government's 
explicit goals was to set an example to be followed by other countries (Prop. 
1997/1998: 55), a key feature to which we shall return. 
In addition, three other Nordic states largely followed suit. In 2009, Nor-
way and Iceland criminalized the purchase of sex, reflecting both the tra-
jectories of national discourses and the argument that to ‘follow Sweden’ 
would improve their ability to combat both prostitution and human traf-
ficking.3 In the meantime, in 2006, Finland introduced a partial criminali-
zation of the purchase of sex, only criminalizing instances of buying sex 
from victims of human trafficking or from sex sellers who are ‘the subjects 
of pimps’. The one Nordic country that has not introduced a partial or uni-
versal ban against the purchase of sex is Denmark. Despite proposals to 
introduce comparable legislation in the same period, the debate quietened 
after a criminal law reform committee weighed against its adoption.
With four out of five Nordic countries introducing new legislation that, to 
varying degrees, represented an abolitionist approach towards prostitution, 
defining it as a social ill that should actively be combatted, the ‘Swedish 
model’ was increasingly referred to as the ‘Nordic model’. However, as Mc-
Menzie, Cook and Laing (2019) rightfully argue, Sweden continues to serve 
as the main example of this approach – the invocation of Nordic is as much 
a label as a policy description. As the legislation in the different Nordic 
countries emerged from different debates and was implemented differently, 
the shift in terminology from ‘the Swedish’ to ‘the Nordic’ model is more 
a political or instrumental move than one grounded empirically in actual 
policies.
This ‘Nordic prostitution model’ can be understood as containing three 
constitutive elements: criminalization of sex purchase, decriminalization 
of sex sale, and welfare support. These elements are best understood as 
‘ideas, symbols and rhetoric’ (Jones and Newburn, 2007), rather than con-
crete policies. First, what is often considered core to the Nordic model in 
these and other debates is a simple and particular piece of legislation: The 
Sex Purchase Act, a law criminalizing the purchase of sex. Second, the si-
multaneous decriminalization of the sale of sex is presented (sometimes) as 
part of the model and often framed in the language of human rights and 
gender equality. In 2014, when the European Parliament voted for a resolu-
tion advising EU member states to both decriminalize the sale of sex and 
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criminalize the purchase of sex, ‘the Nordic model’ was defined as a model 
that ‘views prostitution as a violation of human rights and as a form of vio-
lence against women and criminalizes those who buy sex rather than those 
who sell it’ (European Parliament, 2014b). Third, the model is often linked 
to a particular mode of social work, in which the law is meant to be part of 
a broader package of reforms that promote exit from prostitution for sellers. 
These three elements are neatly summed up by Corinne Isler and Marjut 
Jyrkinen (2018: 1):
This model includes the criminalization of buying sex and pimping, the 
decriminalization of selling sex and the offering of exit services to peo-
ple who wish to leave prostitution.
Moreover, over time, an additional communicative element has been added: 
that there is empirical evidence from the Nordic region which demonstrates 
that the model is equipped to abolish prostitution (and address human traf-
ficking and unequal gender relations in the process).
To be sure, the point of this chapter is not to interrogate the actual exist-
ence of any model, and we shall investigate a plurality of representations in 
selected contexts. Mobility and language create space for evolution, while 
the strategic nature of much of its circulation means that both the exporters 
and importers of this Nordic brand will be the co-creators of its content 
and meaning, what in the policy mobilities literature is called ‘mutation’ 
(Peck and Theodore, 2010). Nonetheless, we can identify several paradoxes 
associated with the standard and stylized account of the Nordic model, as 
encapsulated in the summary of the European Parliament decision.
First, decriminalization of the sale of sex was not part of the legislative 
changes in the Nordic region. In Sweden, the sale of sex was decriminalized 
in 1918 and in Norway in 1902 as part of sweeping changes to the criminal 
code. In Iceland, the act of selling sex was decriminalized two years before the 
introduction of the Icelandic Sex Purchase Act, but these legislative changes 
were not directly connected (Skilbrei and Holmström, 2013). The framing of 
the Nordic model as a clearly defined and delimited policy reform package, 
including decriminalization, requires thus a stretch of the historical imagi-
nation. In the context of the region, it was primarily a move to criminalize.
Second, it may appear self-evident that countries such as Sweden and 
Norway would criminalize the purchase of sex based on the fact that pros-
titution was a form of sexualized violence and that it contravened human 
rights. However, this discourse was largely absent from the debate. Sweden 
criminalized the purchase of sex in 1999, well before the human rights dis-
course was integrated into Swedish policymaking. Moreover, the promot-
ers of the Swedish Sex Purchase Act have protested later claims that they 
did so based on an understanding of prostitution as a form of violence (for 
ambiguities on the link between prostitution and violence in debates, see 
Östergren, 2017).
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In Norway, in the political debates leading up to the 2009 criminalization, 
prostitution was typically spoken of as a form of gendered violence, but 
human rights were not a central concern. Rather, the application of human 
rights’ arguments is typical for those who critique the Nordic model, such 
as central organizations in the sex workers’ rights movement and Amnesty 
International.4 Indeed, experimental work by Langford (2016) shows how 
exposure to such human rights arguments among the Norwegian public can 
trigger a significant decrease in support for the Sex Purchase Act in Norway. 
Indeed, there were several strands of debates that impacted the outcome 
of the vote in the Norwegian parliament: while gender equality was one of 
these, an equally strong motivation was the growing fears over trafficking 
and the impact of foreign sex sellers on public space and society (Skilbrei, 
2012).
Third, the availability and quality of welfare services for sex workers has 
varied dramatically across the Nordic countries and over time. Although 
the introduction of the Sex Purchase Act was intended to be followed by an 
increase in investments in services for sex sellers, the Swedish government 
never fulfilled its promise here. As Florin (2012: 276) states: ‘The govern-
ment has done nothing to change this framework and little to guide or fund 
targeted service provision’. Welfare services for sex workers continue to be 
weak in Sweden, in direct contrast to claims made in the European Parlia-
ment. This was not the only aspect of implementation that has been little 
communicated internationally.
Finally, as noted, a key claim for advocates of ‘the Nordic model’ is that 
it has reduced the extent of prostitution and, sometimes, human trafficking. 
This claim was, for example, central in debates about the introduction of a 
ban against the purchase of sex in Northern Ireland (McMenzie et al., 2019) 
and France (Kingston and Thomas, 2019). Although the number of female 
streetwalkers seemed to decline in the period after the introduction of the 
1999 Swedish Sex Purchase Act, later counts and estimates and research on 
online prostitution platforms provide little support for this claim (see the re-
view of the evidence in Holmström and Skilbrei, 2017). Instead, evidence on 
the extent of prostitution is clearly a function of research design. For exam-
ple, when Gunilla Ekberg (2004), human trafficking adviser to the Swedish 
government, concluded in 2004 that the Swedish Sex Purchase Act reduced 
successfully the size of the market, she relied on the number of women 
counted as active in street prostitution in the business hours of municipal- 
run social services in the three largest cities, despite the considerable shift in 
the market at this time to indoor and online prostitution throughout Europe 
(Sanders et al., 2017).
Thus, although there is a great willingness to refer to the regulation of 
sex services in the Nordic region as a ‘model’, its actuality is significantly 
more complex in practice. While it is often represented to contain three core 
elements – criminalization of the purchase of sex, decriminalization of the 
sale of sex and enhanced support for sellers – all these three elements are not 
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present in any of the Nordic countries. Moreover, the claim that the crimi-
nalization of the purchase of sex has resulted in a significant reduction in the 
prostitution market is not well documented (Holmström and Skilbrei, 2017). 
Thus, from a policy mobilities perspective, the Nordic prostitution model is 
perhaps more ‘ideas, symbols and rhetoric’ than a ‘concrete’ policy or ‘practi-
cal’ application. In addition, its construction contains many typical elements 
of branding – a simplification that bears a resemblance to a product but with-
out a level of ‘slippage’ that makes it appears inauthentic. Yet, given that the 
Nordic model is still presented as a fact, also by the European Parliament, 
this provides the background for our exploration below of the powerful cir-
culation of the idea of what this Nordic model is and can achieve.
Exporting the Nordic model
We turn now to the question of how this Nordic model received so much 
attention – in particular, what was the process of ‘transfer’ in Djelic’s (2008) 
framework: How did a model become so heavily referenced in policy de-
bates in countries that otherwise differ radically from the Nordic states in 
their governance, ideology and traditional regulation of prostitution mar-
kets? In this respect, the strategic behaviour of two actors (state and non-
state) is critical.
The success in the circulation of the Nordic model can be attributed first 
to the active engagement of the Swedish government and much later to the 
Norwegian government. The legislation was clearly adopted with the objec-
tive of circulation, policy mobility: It was a model to be used by politicians 
and activists in other countries (Government of Sweden, 2010: 29). Although 
the Sex Purchase Act was intended to have material effects outside of Swe-
den, the aim was not to simply ensure the replication of similar legislation 
elsewhere. Rather, the emphasis was on triggering a cultural shift by pro-
ducing different kinds of conversations about prostitution. For example, in 
the parliamentary debates in 1998 on the legislation, the Swedish Minister 
of Social Affairs, Lars Engqvist stated the following:
Sweden is a pioneer in this area and when we now have taken these steps 
[by criminalising the purchase of sex] we will be able to contribute to 
changing debates also in Europe.
Likewise, the formal proposal for the law was explicit about global inten-
tions. In Prop. 1997/1998:55 (105), the following is stated:
The trade of sexual services has in recent decades developed into an 
international industry. Although the investigation made the estimate 
(in 1994) that prostitution in Sweden is small compared to other Euro-
pean countries, according to various data from, e.g., the prostitution 
services, there are signs that this so-called international sex industry is 
also increasing in Sweden. That Sweden is taking this step is therefore 
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an important sign to other countries which displays our attitude on this 
issue. The law can also be a support for the groups in different countries 
trying to counteract prostitution.
This export ambition was followed up with concrete efforts by the Swedish 
government to ensure the circulation of knowledge about the law and, not 
least, the specific concerns about prostitution it was designed to address. 
Indeed, examining debates on its introduction, possible problems with im-
plementing the law were viewed as less important than the prospect of it 
sending the intended signal at home and abroad (on patterns of implemen-
tation, see Olsson, 2021). Therefore, the export was not necessarily material 
(the legislation) but symbolic (the sentiments and ideology that lay behind 
it). This foregrounding of expressivism had great consequences for how 
later critiques of the lack of implementation and possible negative effects 
for people who sell sex were received – they had little effect on the symbolic 
objectives of the law and could be dismissed without too great difficulty. 
The message to be conveyed by the criminalization of the purchase of sex 
was that it was an act of structural and individual gendered power that men 
generally, and sex buyers specifically, have over women. The law established 
that buying sex is abnormal in any country seeking gender equality (Kulick, 
2005). With this, the Sex Purchase Act was firmly placed as a tool for and 
the expression of gender equality, an understanding that had been forged for 
several decades (Erikson, 2018).
Thus, governmental efforts were made to spread information about the 
Sex Purchase Act and the rationale behind it by organizing events in Swe-
den and abroad. Much of this was funded by the Swedish Ministry of For-
eign Affairs and organized via the Swedish Institute, which has a mandate 
to promote ‘interest and trust in Sweden around the world’.5 It involved a 
clear package if not a full-scale branding strategy. The film Lilya 4-ever,6 di-
rected by Swedish filmmaker Lukas Moodysson, was screened throughout 
the world in cooperation with Swedish embassies and consulates with the 
explicit intention of spreading knowledge on trafficking (Regeringskansliet, 
2003). In addition to showing the film, this project also included seminars 
with representatives from the Swedish government (many of high rank), 
Swedish non- governmental organizations (NGOs), prostitution scholars, 
and women who had exited prostitution; organised often by representatives 
of local NGOs. In 2003, in Eastern and Central Europe alone, the film was 
shown as ‘a part of this campaign’ 125 times (The Swedish Institute, 2004).7 
Together, these actors debated trafficking and prostitution and which poli-
cies should be applied to combat both phenomena. 
The efforts of the Swedish government soon attracted the attention of 
the Economist. In 2004, they noted both a new Swedish phenomenon and a 
pitched global policy battle:
Not content with having won over domestic consumers, the Swedish 
government is self-consciously engaged in a battle for Europe, with the 
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libertarian Dutch on the other side. It even has a roadshow, which be-
gins with a showing the film ‘Lilya 4-ever’, about a trafficked Romanian 
teenager, and proceeds with speeches from ministers, police inspectors 
and reformed prostitutes. Peculiarly for a nation with such firm socialist 
traditions, the government has also teamed up with the White House to 
fund anti-prostitution campaigns in Europe.
(Economist, 2004)
The Sex Purchase Act was a powerful vehicle and attracted attention in very 
diverse contexts, as intended. Asked by a political opponent in the Swedish 
Parliament about whether Sweden was doing enough to promote the Sex 
Purchase Act, the then minister for foreign affairs, Carl Bildt, stated (Swed-
ish Parliament, 2007, our translation) the following:
Sweden’s Sex Purchase Act is seen as a role model for many other 
countries. It has made an impact internationally in terms of its norma-
tive and preventive effects and its potential for promoting attitudinal 
changes. Even though many countries are hesitant about the usefulness 
of sex purchase legislation, others reach out with questions about our 
experiences because they themselves are considering such legislation. … 
We will continue to bring up Sweden’s Sex Purchase Act in all relevant 
international contexts.
This stance demonstrates the continuous expectation of the promotion of 
both the law and its underlying norms. As parliamentarian Carina Hägg 
stated in the said debate (Swedish Parliament, 2007, our translation): ‘Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs Carl Bildt intends to promote the Sex Purchase Act 
within the EU and internationally, not least in the UN’.
However, the Swedish (and later Norwegian) governments were not alone 
in their export efforts. Although the former invested significantly in com-
municating both the law and its benefits for gender equality, it would be 
mistaken to see its rapid diffusion (and partial uptake) as the mere result of 
a successful government campaign. The second central actor was interna-
tional feminist lobby organizations, which quickly took the cue and used the 
case of Sweden to further their argument that prostitution should be abol-
ished. Here, the stylized Swedish model commenced its evolution. While 
many backers of the law in Sweden described prostitution as related to gen-
dered violence, not as a form of violence in and of itself, feminists elsewhere 
applied this definition very forcefully. Although, this depiction was more 
easily assimilated in the later Nordic model as prostitution was portrayed as 
a form of gender violence in the Norwegian debate (Skilbrei, 2012).
The success of international feminist lobby organizations in amplify-
ing circulation, especially in various supranational forums, is interesting 
in its own accord. Although we are unable to yet identify to what extent 
the switch of the label from ‘Swedish’ to ‘Nordic’ was a strategic move by 
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feminist organizations, they were one of the first to deploy the term.8 These 
organizations were well established and highly influential in global policy-
making spaces (Houge et al., 2015) and, for institutions such as the EU, rep-
resent grassroots interests and are a key part of the European democratic 
system (Börzel and Risse, 2007). Organizations working on gender and 
equality issues have been especially good at manoeuvring within this global 
landscape, using regional and global platforms, such as the EU and the UN, 
to strengthen and promote their policy demands (Outshoorn et al., 2012).
Such international civil society actors were active in their efforts to dis-
seminate ‘the Nordic’ way of approaching prostitution, both in its norma-
tive and legislative form, not least by organizing campaigns and developing 
argumentation points and manuals. One example of the last technique is 
that the Australia division of the Coalition Against Trafficking in Women 
(CATW) has made a Nordic model resource page with arguments and info-
graphics that can be used in debates.9 Another is websites such as nordic-
modelnow.org, which describe and promote ‘the Nordic Model’.
The European Women’s Lobby is perhaps the most significant transna-
tional agent among these groups.10 The following is an example from a web 
item on an event in Brussels that forms part of the expanding ‘road show:’
On Monday 8 December [2014], more than 120 persons reached out to 
the welcoming meeting room of the Mission of Norway to the EU, to 
discuss the Nordic model as an inspiration for the realisation of gender 
equality.
This event, co-organised by the European Women’s Lobby (EWL) 
and the Norway Mission, came 3 months after the evaluation of the 
Norwegian law on prostitution, and aimed at feeding into the European 
discussion on women’s rights, at the eve of the 20 years of the Beijing 
Platform for Action, by assessing the impact of the Nordic approach on 
gender equality. It came at a strategic time to also take stock of current 
legislative developments towards the Nordic model in other EU coun-
tries (Ireland, Northern Ireland, Canada) and the growing abolition-
ist movement calling for a Europe free from prostitution, including in 
countries which have normalise [sic] prostitution as ‘work’. (…) What is 
called the ’Nordic model’ when it comes to violence and prostitution, 
is based on key values: equality, protection, considering prostitution as 
harmful to women and society in general, refusing gender stereotypes 
and the trade of the human body and sexuality.
Thus, the export of the Nordic model of prostitution regulation was driven 
heavily by coordinated campaigns from both the originating states and 
interested transnational actors. As shown below, the countries that were 
the most receptive to the model were within the orbit of these campaigns – 
especially European countries and local networks of feminist organi-
zations with strong transnational connections. However, the importing 
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actors – to which we now turn - were more varied, and there are some inter-
esting  country-level exceptions.
Importing the Nordic model
The import of the Swedish – and then the Nordic – model into domestic de-
bates and law is a dizzying example of policy mobility. As mentioned above, 
in 2014, the European Parliament voted for a resolution advising EU mem-
ber states to both decriminalize the sale of sex and criminalize the purchase 
of sex based on the Nordic model. In 2016, France adopted legislation to 
introduce the Nordic model, criminalizing the buying of sexual services and 
providing legal and financial aid to those exploited in the sex industry, gen-
erating significant international attention in the process. The Nordic model 
has also now been adopted in Canada (2014), Northern Ireland (2015), Ire-
land (2017) and Israel (2020), has been discussed in Luxembourg, Italy and 
even the Netherlands, and is at the forefront of various campaigns in other 
countries, often under the slogan ‘Go Nordic’, exemplified with the follow-
ing Scandi knit visual on the Facebook page of the Australian section of the 
CATW (Figure 9.5).
Yet, although it may look like the Nordic model has led to shifts in pol-
icies elsewhere, the frameworks of policy mobilities and branding caution 
against thinking in this way, instead drawing our attention to what kind of 
instrumental and symbolic asset references to ‘the Nordic’ may produce in 
national policy debates on prostitution. In international debates on prosti-
tution policies, the idea of the Nordic model is articulated with great confi-
dence. Political parties and NGOs announce whether they are for or against 
the Nordic model; few questions its existence. Examples include the policy 
Figure 9.5 Facebook homepage for coalition against trafficking in women Australia.
Source: Screenshot from Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/catwaustralia/
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process  leading up to a European Parliament resolution, where the re-
port from the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality, the 
so-called Honeyball report, states that the most effective way of com-
bating the trafficking of women and under-age females for sexual ex-
ploitation and improving gender equality is the model implemented in 
Sweden, Iceland and Norway (the so-called Nordic model)’ (European 
Parliament, 2014a).
Existing research has shown considerable global interest in the model. 
Many scholars conclude that the ‘Swedish’ or ‘Nordic’ model is among the 
international prostitution policies most often discussed and debated (Ward 
and Wylie, 2017; Crowhurst and Skilbrei, 2018; McMenzie et al., 2019). 
Moreover, the dominance of the ‘Nordic’ adjective suggests that this label 
may be more than a geographic and descriptive signifier model. Below we 
offer an analysis of how the Nordic origin of the policy, its Nordic branding, 
has served arguably in legitimating the policy and facilitating its mobility, 
by analysing two cases.
The first is the reception in Israel, which is illustrative of how the idea 
of a Nordic prostitution policy is both strengthened and further developed 
in transfer. The prospect of criminalizing the purchase of sex in Israel had 
been debated for over a decade, and a ministerial committee approved 
a bill on this issue already in 2012. Yet, due to political developments, it 
never went to a vote in Knesset, the Israeli parliament. In 2016, the ques-
tion re-emerged after a new committee was set up to assess such a law 
(Newman, 2016); a bill was approved in 2018, and the law came into force 
in 2020.
In Israeli debates, the Nordic model was a key reference, including dur-
ing the passage of the law. As discussed above, the Nordic Model is often 
presented as building on a framework of gender equality and human rights 
norms and presented as consisting of three elements: a criminalization of 
sex purchase, decriminalization of the sale of sex, and strengthening of wel-
fare services for sex workers. It is further claimed to be an effective tool in 
abolishing prostitution, reducing human trafficking, and tackling unequal 
gender relations. Debates in Knesset built on the assumption that imple-
menting ‘the model’ would decrease both prostitution and human traffick-
ing (Jerusalem Post, 2018).
Yet, despite the discursive wrapping, their material import in Israel is 
somewhat doubtful. While the welfarist aspects were particularly high-
lighted, the new policies were not especially a break with long-standing de-
velopment. The new law was presented in the Jerusalem Post (2018) as ‘not 
only make frequenting of prostitutes a criminal offense, it seeks to help peo-
ple leave sex work and find other careers’. In this respect, the introduction 
of a prohibition of the purchase of sex was followed by a strengthening of 
welfare services to sex sellers (Task Force on Human Trafficking & Prosti-
tution, n.d.). However, while this may seem like an emulation of the Swedish 
approach in 1999, the Israeli policy was more a culmination of long-standing 
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domestic policy developments. Services for people who wanted to exit pros-
titution had been strengthened considerably since 2008 (Shamir, 2018), and 
the 2018 law could be understood as a continuation of that policy, rather 
than a new development.
Most strikingly, the formulation of the Israeli bill pointed to a broader 
approach to purchasers of sex than just a punitive one. Although not yet in 
place, in debates leading up to the law, the punishment was to be replaced 
with participating in an educational program to ‘impart knowledge and in-
crease awareness regarding the damage caused to populations in prostitu-
tion’ (Lee, 2013). This approach has no Nordic roots but is rather similar to 
programs offering sensitivity training instead of punishment for people who 
have purchased sex. (Majic, 2014). The Israeli experience thus represents ar-
guably the power of the Nordic brand in providing legitimacy to a complex 
and distinct policy assemblage that bear little semblance to the prostitution 
policies as they are implemented in, for example, Sweden.
A second case, Northern Ireland, provides an interesting perspective on 
the politics of circulation and how gender equality norms are sometimes lost 
in translation. McMenzie, Cook and Laing (2019) analyse how references to 
Sweden were crucial in the process leading up to the 2015 criminalization 
of the purchase of sex, included in the Human Trafficking and Exploitation 
(Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland). As in 
 Israel, selling sex was already legal, but its purchase was criminalized with 
this new legislation; yet the two cases diverge on the content given to the law 
and illustrate pointedly the politics of circulation.
The successful bid for criminalization of the purchase of sex in Northern 
Ireland was driven by largely conservative groups who built allegiances with 
feminist groups, especially in Scandinavia. Many of the latter were invited 
to Northern Ireland to speak on the Nordic model. In the ensuing debates, 
the Nordic label of progressiveness was mobilized by conservatives to intro-
duce long-desired criminalization. The result was that the reception of the 
Nordic model was rather thin. The punitive aspects of ‘the Nordic model’ 
were highlighted and the welfarist elements were overlooked. Assistance to 
people who sell sex was not strengthened and the gender equality dimen-
sions in practice received muted support.
McMenzie et al. (2019) thus conclude that the case of Northern Ireland 
illustrates well that what the Swedish or the Nordic model is: it is not fixed, 
but rather, it is a resource that can be drawn upon in other contexts and for 
domestic political purposes. Put another way, Nordicity provides a power-
ful brand endorsement of both a model and its domestic interpretation. In 
Israel, the assemblage of ‘the Nordic model’ was represented in a way that 
facilitated more focus on social work than has ever been the case in Sweden. 
Northern Ireland, on the other hand, mainly retained the criminalization 
and level of punishment without exporting the assumed social support ele-
ment or gender equality framework. In both contexts, references to the suc-
cess of ‘the Nordic model’ facilitated the approach.
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Conclusion: explaining mobility
While the Nordic model of prostitution policy represents weakly the diver-
sity and practice that exists across and within the Nordic countries (Skilbrei 
and Holmström, 2013), it has spread globally and had significant traction in 
prostitution policy debates elsewhere. Adopted in law in many jurisdictions 
and promoted by the European Parliament, it has come to be a framework 
for global inspiration or a symbol for opposition by movements mobilizing 
against zero-tolerance visions for prostitution policy. As we find in our me-
dia content analysis between 2012 and 2017, it was the most discussed Nor-
dic model, representing either a new Nordic model or a new iteration of the 
Nordic social welfare model.
In this chapter, we have not only sought to track the transfer of the model 
through analysing key exporters and diverse import contexts but also seek 
to explain how this model gained such prominence and was constructed 
and mediated in the process of circulation. One explanation is clearly the 
sheer volume of advocacy from Nordic governments and NGOs which has 
been relentless and well-resourced – analogous to a marketing or branding 
strategy in its focused and simplistic packaging and communication. The 
role of civil society organizations should not be discounted. Similar to what 
Tryggestad (2014) finds in relation to Norway as a norm entrepreneur in the 
field of gender and peace and security, the importance and legitimacy of 
civil society are often essential for establishing and justifying new positions.
However, that explanation is not enough. Instead, an important and qual-
itative explanation must be the nature of the message and the power of the 
background brand. In the early stages of promotion, the Swedish govern-
ment actively linked a particular way of regulating prostitution with Swed-
ish values, here with a particular focus on gender equality as a central norm 
in Swedish society. Later, governmental organizations and NGOs made ef-
forts to export the Nordic model to the European Union, speaking in the 
EU lingo of harmonization and mainstreaming, arguing that what should 
be mainstreamed was the gender equality havens of the Nordic region. This 
is the case when, for example, the feminist lobby organization Equality Now 
in their factsheet on ‘The Equality Approach to Addressing Sex Traffick-
ing’ simply states: ‘Unsurprisingly, 3 of the top 4 countries [meaning Ice-
land, Norway and Sweden] with the highest level of gender equality have 
adopted this legal approach as a way to combat sex trafficking and sexual 
exploitation’.11
The Nordic model of prostitution can be understood as a strategy to cre-
ate a specific Nordic brand, drawing on the rhetorical and aesthetic power of 
the general Nordic brand. The circulation of this prostitution model seems 
to rest heavily on the legitimacy of the Nordic label, utilizing its linguis-
tic and substantive resources.12 Both gender equality and welfarism feature 
strongly in the Nordic brand. The principle of gender equality is a corner-
stone of what is perceived as a Nordic model of welfare, and it attracts a 
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great deal of interest internationally. Legal strategies are central tools in 
how Nordic governments attempt to establish gender equality.
Efforts to promote criminalization of the purchase of sex draw heavily on 
these elements. As noted above, Equality Now equates the Nordic model with 
gender equality and the high standard of living in the region. Indeed, the switch 
by campaigners from the term ‘Swedish model’ to the ‘Nordic model’ more 
firmly placed the model in the realm of gender equality and social welfarism.13
In the case of prostitution policy circulation, researchers (Crowhurst 
and Skilbrei, 2018) have demonstrated that there is a particularly lively 
transnational exchange and a strong idea that prostitution is an area where 
policies would benefit from being harmonized. As demonstrated above, 
‘the Nordic model’ can be put to use for securing agendas that are already 
present in domestic contexts but can be rebranded and legitimized as an 
uptake of Nordicity. Although the ideological underpinnings serve as an 
argument for policy change, the changes made may not actively reflect, for 
example, the aim of securing gender equality. The ideas inherent in the 
Nordic model are broad and flexible enough to allow it to be repurposed, 
and beyond the normative foundations that undergirded the movement in 
the Nordic countries to use criminal law to redirect attention and blame 
to clients instead of sellers. Thus, it is not the concrete instruments associ-
ated with the model alone (e.g., the criminalization of the purchase of sex) 
that mandates the reference to the model. As McMenzie et al. (2019) note, 
the debates in Northern Ireland mainly referenced the Swedish case, not 
the formulation of policy or experiences from countries that introduced a 
ban against the purchase of sex later, not even neighbouring Ireland. This 
strongly suggests that ‘Swedishness’ served as a symbolic resource in the 
debates.
Moreover, the power of the brand builds on the assumed effectiveness 
and coherence of the general Nordic model. The reception of the Nordic 
model on prostitution is rarely met with a critical analysis of its effective-
ness or an understanding of the substantial differences between Nordic 
countries. Nordic researchers and others argue that the differences within 
and between the Nordic countries are too great for there to exist a Nordic 
model. Moreover, there is a constant debate as to the success of the model – 
with only modest reductions in prostitution and uncertainty over whether 
safety for sex workers has increased or decreased. Therefore, the term Nor-
dic model of prostitution is perhaps best understood as a construction, and 
one intended to lasso certain understandings of prostitution regulation onto 
the Nordic brand.
Notes
 1 Thanks to Charlotte Aslesen for assistance with this calculation.
 2 See discussion in the editor’s introduction.
 3 Interestingly, although debates in, for example, Norway were ripe with refer-
ences to the Swedish version of the law, the prospect of introducing a unilateral 
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criminalization of the purchase of sex was actually debated earlier and more 
forcefully in Norway than in Sweden (Skilbrei and Holmström, 2013), making 
the point that it is important to not confuse correlation with causation in policy 
scholarship.
 4 For an analysis of how and why human rights are controversial issues in debates 
on prostitution, see Anne Gallagher (2001). 
 5 https://si.se/en/about-si/our-mission/
 6 The title of the film when screened in Sweden was Lilja 4-ever.
 7 Among other places, the film was screened in London, Paris, Vienna, St. Pe-
tersburg, Kaliningrad, Warsaw, Moscow, Budapest, Brest, Bucharest, Kiev and 
Sarajevo. 
 8 CATW argues (from 2009 from what we can surmise) that when Norway and Ice-
land introduced unilateral criminalizations of the purchase of sex, the Swedish 
model became the Nordic model (CATWA, 2017). Interestingly enough, CATW 
has in the last couple of years started to refer to it as ‘the Equality Model’ (see 
e.g. https://catwinternational.org/our-work/advocating-for-strong-laws/).
 9 https://www.catwa.org.au/nordic-model-resources/
 10 For examples of interventions, see: http://www.womenlobby.org/International- 
Day-for-the-Elimination-of-Violence-Against-Women
 11 https://www.equalitynow.org/factsheets
 12 A similar process has arguably occurred with New Nordic Cuisine: Byrkjeflot 
et al. (2013).
 13 See http://www.womenlobby.org/Successful-launch-of-EWL-campaign-Together-
for-a-Europe-free-from-prostitution
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Introduction
The Nordic countries are widely known for their gender-equality achieve-
ments. Most famous are their welfare-state policies fostering work– family 
balance through extensive parental leave and public childcare schemes 
(Esping-Andersen, 2009; Walby, 2009; Leira, 2012). However, the Nordic 
countries have also introduced other gender-equality policy innovations 
such as low-threshold monitoring of equality legislation during the 1970s, 
gender mainstreaming of public policies during the 1980s, bans on the pur-
chase of sex during the 1990s, and gender quotas for corporate boards, or 
corporate quotas, during the 2000s (Skjeie et al., 2017). Gender-equality 
policies typically have traveled across the Nordic countries and, in com-
bination with gender-equality progress in education, labor-market partic-
ipation, and political representation, have established what is generally 
called the Nordic gender-equality model (Bergquist et al., 1999; Teigen and 
Skjeie, 2017).
This chapter examines what could be considered to be the most recent 
gender-equality policy innovation: gender quotas for corporate boards. 
Soon after the Norwegian parliament first adopted such regulations in 2003, 
corporate quotas attracted considerable international attention. Norway’s 
making of corporate quotas initiated what has been called an ‘avalanche’ of 
corporate-quota policies in Europe (Machold et al., 2013). Currently, corpo-
rate quotas have been adopted by a number of European countries but only 
one other Nordic country—Iceland.
An important context for the appearance of corporate quotas on Nor-
way’s political agenda is the so-called Scandinavian welfare-state paradox: 
the stark contrast in the Nordic countries between the general gender- 
equality progress and continued gender differences in career achievements. 
It has been argued that this gap is due to (too) generous welfare-state ar-
rangements and their supposed impediments to gender-equality progress 
(Mandel and Semyonov, 2006). Although the contrast between generally 
positive gender-equality achievements and persistent male dominance in 
the corporate world may appear to be a paradox particular to the Nordic 
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countries, male dominance in top positions is a highly visible sign of gender 
inequality in any country. This backdrop likely is an important reason why 
corporate quotas soon became an initiative considered by policy actors in 
many countries. Moreover, it has been claimed that corporate quotas will 
have an impact on women’s careers and hence their representation in execu-
tive management, so-called ripple effects (Teigen, 2015).
The strong debate influenced by Norwegian corporate quotas in a number 
of European countries illustrates the dynamic that bold reforms adopted 
first in one country often soon attracts attention and lead to new policies 
in other countries (Weyland, 2005). Although the Norwegian regulations 
inspired the circulation of corporate quotas to other countries, straightfor-
ward copying of Norwegian regulations has not necessarily resulted. This 
chapter, therefore, presents an analysis of the circulation of corporate quo-
tas in Europe, investigating where they have been adopted, to what extent 
these policies vary, and, finally, how we can understand the wide popularity 
of such a highly controversial measure.
This chapter begins with a broad description of the main features of Nordic 
and Norwegian gender-equality policies and then gives a closer description 
of Norwegian corporate-quota policy. The main section presents an analysis 
of the making of corporate quotas in Norway, followed by a mapping of the 
recent travel of corporate quotas and other softer policies to promote gender 
balance on corporate boards in a number of European countries. The chap-
ter ends with a discussion on how we can understand the circulation of cor-
porate quotas and to what extent the policies that have circulated resemble 
the corporate-quota regulations that first emerged in Norway. Finally, this 
chapter addresses the basic question of why corporate quotas have gained 
such wide attention and circulation in and beyond Europe.
Making and circulation: input from theory
Advancing gender equality through policy adoption is a central building 
block in the Nordic model. However, as argued by Stone (2012), policies 
seldom emerge in a void but often result from ideas traveling across time, 
space, and countries. In the Nordic region, gender-equality policies have 
often been adopted and quickly traveled across countries. To some extent, 
the spread of policies across the Nordic nations has been facilitated by the 
role of the Nordic Council of Ministers through its role as an official body 
for intergovernmental cooperation in the Nordic region. The Nordic coun-
tries thus often pay a high degree of attention to policy reforms introduced 
by their neighbors (Teigen and Skjeie, 2017). At the same time, the interna-
tional academic literature has attended to the Scandinavian welfare-state 
paradox, claiming that there is a trade-off between gender equality in the 
labor market, particularly generous welfare-state arrangements, and gen-
der balance in the workplace (Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Gupta et al., 
2008). This research can be understood as a backdrop that has strengthened 
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political concern and will to invent policies restoring the image of the Nor-
dic countries as pioneers of gender equality.
The diffusion literature has emphasized the importance of regional learn-
ing as a mechanism of diffusion based on the observation that countries 
tend to imitate the policies of their neighbors (Dobbin et al., 2007). In this 
chapter, I map the circulation of corporate quotas and softer policies aimed 
at promoting gender balance in corporate boards and pay particular atten-
tion to how the circulation of corporate quotas fits with the Nordic model. 
Thus, a central question is to what extent a Nordic model is discernible in 
the circulation of corporate quotas.
A related concern is the importance of the origin or ‘source’ of a policy 
because a policy’s capacity to travel is generally assumed to be greater when 
its source is viewed as authoritative (see introductory chapter by Byrkjeflot 
et al.; Røvik, 2016). Norway, as the source that introduced corporate quotas, 
has been central in national and international debates leading to the circu-
lation of corporate quotas. Norway’s role as a leader in gender equality has 
been a central element in debates on whether states and even the European 
Union (EU) should adopt corporate quotas (Lépinard and Rubio-Marin, 
2018). However, being the source also leads to scrutiny for negative policy 
effects. As alleged in Ahern and Dittmar’s (2012) much-debated article, cor-
porate quotas have had negative effects on the economic performance of the 
companies subject to them. Although such studies are part of debates on 
policy adoption, foreignization processes—situations when the translating 
actors find it useful to refer to the source of origin to authorize the policy 
under debate (cf. introductory chapter by Byrkjeflot et al. in this book)—
tend to occur at a more general level, concerned with Norway’s reputation 
as one of the world’s most gender-equal societies.
Another reason possibly important to the circulation of a new policy is 
the cost of introducing it. In the book The Price of Gender Equality, Van der 
Vleuten (2009) analyzed the varied success of women’s activism in imple-
menting gender-equality policies in the EU and EU nation states. All policy 
reforms have potential financial consequences, so new policies may threaten 
the interests, positions, and ideas of some groups more than others (Van 
der Vleuten, 2009). In EU policy, social politics have remained primarily 
a national affair as states have been reluctant to accept supranational pol-
icymaking. However, gender-equality policies constitute a clear exception 
partly because gender equality may be perceived connected to highly val-
uing the principle of equal rights. Still, gender-equality reforms have been 
strongly contested based on their costs and the threats they pose to the in-
terests of privileged groups. Generally, the least-costly reforms enjoy the 
most success in the EU. In this context, corporate quotas are generally a 
low-cost policy, which may have led to their high attention and wide circu-
lation. This policy’s costs and benefits, though, have been a central concern 
in the debate, as mentioned in the widely cited article by Ahern and Dittmar 
(2012). At the same time, other studies have shown no effects or positive on 
company performance (Dale-Olsen et al., 2013).
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The Nordic gender-equality policy context
Nordic gender-equality policies comprise mainly of three pillars: gender- 
equality legislation, family-friendly welfare-state policies, and gender-quota 
policies (Skjeie et al., 2019). In 1978, Norway passed probably the world’s first 
gender-equality act.1 The law was especially innovative in its combination 
of prohibiting gender-based discrimination and laying out positive duties 
and action to promote gender equality. Work–family policies in Norway, 
as in other Nordic countries, are built on the dual-worker/dual-carer fam-
ily model (Ellingsæter and Leira, 2006; Ellingsæter, 2014). Key to promot-
ing gender equality is the right to job-protected, generously compensated 
leave for both parents after child birth and publicly subsidized, high-quality 
childcare (Ellingsæter and Leira, 2006), including a quota for fathers in the 
parental-leave scheme (Brandth and Kvande, 2013). Norway long had un-
met daycare demand, especially for the youngest children, but today, the 
vast majority of children younger than school age attend kindergarten (Ell-
ingsæter et al., 2016).
The Norwegian gender-equality legislation’s explicit provision favoring 
positive action paved the way for the introduction of preferential treatment 
and gender-quota policies (Teigen, 2018). The 1981 Gender Equality Act 
mandated that both genders be represented on public committees, and from 
1988, the law required a balance of at least 40% for each gender on state- 
appointed commissions. The Municipal Act of 1992 applied the same reg-
ulations to municipal commissions. Most political parties also voluntarily 
adopted gender-parity policies. Since the mid-1970s, five major Norwegian 
political parties adopted such measures, but the Conservative, Progress, 
and Green parties have no such regulations. Party quotas entail a zipper 
system, in which candidates of each gender alternate on election lists, and 
each gender is represented by at least 40% of the members of internal party 
bodies.
Gender quotas for corporate boards in Norway
For around 25 years, legal regulations of gender quotas in Norway only ap-
plied to public commissions, boards, and councils. However, this changed in 
2003 when the Norwegian parliament adopted gender quotas for corporate 
boards, including public limited liability companies (PLCs), intermunicipal 
companies, and state-owned companies. Corporate quotas were expanded 
to cooperative companies2 and municipal companies in 2008 and 2009, re-
spectively (Teigen, 2018). The numerous but mostly small- and  medium-size 
limited liability companies (LTDs) are not subject to corporate quotas. Ex-
pansion of the scope of the legislation to include these companies, especially 
the largest ones, has been discussed but not taken up in recent political 
debates.
Regulations of the gender balance on PLCs board are set out in articles 
6–11a of the Norwegian PLCs Act. Similar formulations apply to the other 
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kinds of companies covered by corporate quotas. The gender-representation 
rules are applied separately to employee- and shareholder-elected represent-
atives to ensure independent elections.3 For state-owned and intermunicipal 
companies, regulations adopted in 2003 came into effect in 2004. For PLCs, 
the 2003 regulations were formulated as ‘threat’ legislation: Had PLCs not 
voluntarily met the requirements for gender composition by July 2005, the 
regulations would have gone into effect. Although female representation on 
PLCs increased from 2003 to 2005, the target of 40% of women was not 
reached. Consequently, in December 2005, the government decided to en-
force the gender-balance regulations for the boards of start-up PLCs from 
2006 and for all PLCs from 2008. The 40% target was met when the regula-
tions were fully implemented in 2008. The rather tough sanctions attached 
to the legislation likely contributed to its successful implementation. The 
Companies Act applies identical sanctions for breaches of any of its rules, 
with forced dissolution the final step for companies violating the regulations 
of this Act. The Norwegian Register of Business Enterprises was set to en-
sure compliance with the gender balance regulation of company boards, as 
they are to all aspects of company legislation.
The black line in Figure 10.1 shows the change in the proportion of women 
on PLC boards, covered by corporate quotas, and the grey line illustrates 
the proportion of women on the boards of LTDs, not covered by corpo-
rate quotas. Women’s representation on PLC boards leaped quickly after 
the ‘threat’ legislation (2003–2005) was enforced in 2005 continuing to rise, 












Limited liability companies Public limited companies
Figure 10.1  Proportion of women on the Boards of Public Limited Companies and 
Limited Liability Companies, Norway, 2004–2020.
Source: Statistics Norway
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the grey and the black lines indicate that the quota legislation had no ripple 
effects from PLC boards to LTD boards.
One main reason for the effective implementation of gender quotas for 
corporate boards obviously was the tough sanctions imposed by the regula-
tions. As shown, the Company Act responds to breaches of all its rules with 
identical sanctions, beginning with warnings and coercive fines and moving 
to forced dissolution as the final step. The Norwegian Register of Business 
Enterprises established to ensure compliance with the company legislation 
ensure that companies follow the gender-balance rule or comply with it af-
ter dialogue with the register. Occasionally, the business register has to en-
ter into dialogues with companies about deviances from a gender-balanced 
board composition, which has led to correction of the matter.
A brief note on data
The section on the making of Norway’s corporate-board gender-quota reg-
ulations is based on the author’s earlier studies on the policy’s adoption 
(Teigen, 2015), applying the process tracing method (George and Bennett, 
2005). The analysis drew from all the relevant documents from the political 
process and media debate on the adoption of gender-balance regulations for 
corporate boards. The most important documents were (1) a consultation 
proposal on the revision of the Gender Equality Act from the Ministry of 
Children and Family Affairs in 19994; (2) a white paper from the Ministry of 
Children and Family Affairs, ‘Proposition on Reforms to the Gender Equal-
ity Act (2000–2–01)’5; (3) a consultation proposal on gender representation 
in PLCs, state-limited companies, and state businesses and a proposal to 
change the Companies Act and other acts6; and (4) a white paper from the 
Ministry of Children and Family Affairs, ‘Proposition on Reforms to Com-
pany Legislation on Gender Representation on Company Boards.’7 Teigen 
(2002), Evenrud (2010), Engelstad (2012, 2015), and Sørensen (2011) studied 
the first stages of the political process in depth. Cvijanovic (2009) analyzed 
the media debate on the issue of gender quotas for corporate boards.
Studies on the introduction of policies to change the gender composition 
of corporate boards in several European countries have been a growing field 
in recent years. However, there is no updated, authoritative, comparative 
study on the adoption of corporate-quota policies. The mapping presented 
in this chapter thus was based mainly on several sources: the author’s own 
recent updating on information about the situation in several of the coun-
tries, the author’s own analysis from 2012 (Teigen, 2012); Seierstad et al. 
(2017); Hughes et al. (2017); and Piscopo and Muntean (2018).
The making of corporate board gender quotas in Norway
The corporate-quota regulations were innovative in part because they 
broke the long-established borders of state intervention in the autonomy of 
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economic life. Moreover, they were innovative because the possibility that 
gender representation on corporate boards could be regulated had not 
been given much consideration until it suddenly appeared on the political 
agenda in connection with the revision of the Norwegian Gender Equal-
ity Act in 1999. The first record suggesting the legal possibility of gender 
quotas for corporate boards is found in a letter from the gender-equality 
ombud on preparing revisions of the Gender Equality Act (Teigen, 2015). 
Anne Lise Ryel, the gender-equality ombud, and Ingunn Yssen, the direc-
tor of the Centre for Gender Equality, appear to have played central roles 
in launching the idea of legally regulating the gender composition of cor-
porate boards (Sørensen, 2011). The revision was initiated and prepared by 
a minority-center government coalition consisting of the Liberal, Center, 
and Christian Democratic parties. While reviewing the entire Gender 
Equality Act, the government proposed expanding the scope of the sec-
tion requiring that each gender make up at least 40% of members of pub-
licly appointed boards, councils, and commissions. The proposed revision 
would include all company boards and the requirement that at least 25% of 
members of each gender.8 This proposal, however, was withdrawn and not 
included in the proposed revision of the Gender Equality Act delivered to 
parliament in 2001.9 The proposal met strong opposition, especially from 
industry and employer organizations (Teigen, 2002). The reason given for 
withdrawing the proposed regulations of corporate boards was a need for 
legal clarification.
Gender-balance regulations for corporate boards were presented to par-
liament in 2003 by a conservative-center government coalition10 in ‘Proposi-
tion to Parliament No. 97 (2002–2003).’11 Some important changes had been 
made from the 1999 proposal. First, the 2003 proposal was included in com-
pany legislation, not the Gender Equality Act, as in 1999. Second, whereas 
the 1999 proposition covered all companies regardless of type or size, the 
new proposal limited gender-composition regulations to state-owned com-
panies, intermunicipal companies, and PLCs. Third, the gender- balance 
requirement was increased from the original proposal of at least 25% of 
each of the genders to at least 40% of each gender. The new gender- balance 
rule was passed in parliament with broad political support from all parties 
except the Progress Party.
The gender-balance regulations carried strict sanctions, and the Norwe-
gian Register of Business Enterprises was set to ensure compliance. The 
sanction system requires that a company that does not have a legally com-
pliant board be subject to forced dissolution after several warnings, fines, 
and opportunities for correction. These sanctions follow the normal proce-
dures for contraventions of company legislation but are unusually strong in 
contrast to the weak sanctions system generally applied to regulations in the 
Gender Equality Act (cf. Skjeie et al., 2017).12
The quota regulations immediately went into effect for state-owned and 
intermunicipal companies from January 1, 2004. The gender-balance rule 
for PLCs’ boards, though, was formulated with the rather peculiar ‘threat’ 
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provision that if the companies themselves were able to reach a 40/60% gen-
der balance by July 2005, the legislation would not go into effect. Women’s 
representation increased but did not reach the 40% target by 2005. Conse-
quently, in December 2005, the government finalized its 2003 decision and 
enforced the gender-balance rule for newly established companies starting 
in 2006 and for all PLCs from 2008. The following section lays out the trans-
fer of corporate quotas in Europe.
The persistent travel of corporate quotas
Norway’s adoption of regulations on corporate quotas drew significant in-
ternational attention. Norwegian politicians and experts traveled the world 
to discuss the corporate quotas, and the international press wrote exten-
sively on their advantages and disadvantages (Teigen, 2015). In the years 
following Norway’s adoption of corporate quotas, most, if not all, European 
countries have had heated debates on whether they should adopt such regu-
lations, and quite a few have adopted similar regulations.
Significant variations, though, exist in the corporate-quota policies 
adopted. Table 10.1 shows the countries that have adopted corporate quo-
tas. These countries diverge in their rules for the minimum and maximum 
gender distribution. Some have copied the Norwegian 40/60% principle 















(1) dialogue and 
warning; (2) company 
fine; (3) dissolution of 
the company
Spain 40 2007 2015 All listed companies 
and companies 
with 250 or more 
employees
Consequences for 
state subsidies and 
contracts
Iceland 40 2010 2013 Companies with 50 or 
more employees
No sanctions
France 40 2011 2014 (20%)
2017 (40%)
Companies with 500 
or more employees 
or €50 million in 
revenue
No payment of fees to 
directors










(Spain, Iceland, and France), while others have more modest requirements 
(Belgium, Italy, Germany, Portugal, and Austria). The countries also differ 
in their inclusion criteria. Some regulate gender balance according to which 
companies are included under the regulations, some according to company 
type (public limited and traded companies), some according to revenue 
and number of employees, and some according to all of these factors.
The main differences, though, lie in the sanctions system. The Norwe-
gian Company Act applies identical sanctions for breaches of all rules, from 
warnings and punitive fines to forced dissolution. It is less clear what sanc-
tions systems other countries have adopted and implemented. According to 
Gabalon and Gimenez (2017: 58), Spain applies no sanctions, so its corporate 
quotas are more recommendations. Iceland also does not impose punitive 
sanctions for non-compliance. France and Belgium have stricter sanctions 
systems, nullifying appointments and deducting directors’ fees until gender- 
balance targets are reached. The Italian sanctions system gives warnings 
for non-compliance, followed by economic sanctions on the company and, 
finally, removal of board members if the target is not fulfilled. The German 
regulations hold that appointments are not valid until all the seats intended 
for women board members are filled (Kirsch, 2017: 219). Austria applies an 
‘empty-seat’ sanction, keeping board seats open if not enough women are 
included. Portugal combines the empty-seat and economic sanctions for 
non-compliance with quota requirements.
The Danish and Dutch systems have also been characterized as corporate 
quotas (cf. Piscopo and Muntean, 2018), but the Danish system, in particu-
lar, cannot be said to impose quotas. Danish companies, not legislation, 
set the target thresholds (Table 10.2). The Danish regulations stipulate that 
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Empty-seat sanction
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realistic, ambitious targets and develop policy to meet them. There is no 
sanctions system in place for non-fulfillment of companies’ targets. Com-
panies are free to set targets they find realistic and ambitious, which do not 
appear to meet the standards of a quota policy (Agustín et al., 2018). The 
Dutch system was set to expire in 2016 regardless of the success of the quota 
regulations. Compliance with the quotas was not enforced with sanctions 
(Kruisinga and Senden, 2017).
In addition to the spread of corporate-quota regulations, reform of 
 corporate-governance codes stressing the importance of gender-balanced 
boards has increased sharply. Countries including Finland, Ireland, Luxem-
bourg, Sweden, and the United Kingdom have introduced or strengthened 
policies to improve the gender balance on corporate boards, mainly through 
including ‘comply-or-explain’ recommendations in national corporate so-
cial responsibility codes (Table 10.3). These policies differ from rather vague 
requirements to ‘have at least one female board member’ (Finland) or ‘strive 
for gender balance on board’ (Sweden) (Piscopo and Muntean, 2018).
The EU’s own initiative to establish a gender-balance directive for corpo-
rate boards has also been part of the ongoing circulation of corporate-quota 
policies. The European Commission took an active role in the issue and 
proposed a directive to improve the gender balance among non-executive 
Table 10.2  Gender balance regulation by country, type of requirement, year, company type, 
and sanction
Country Quota % Adoption Implementation Company type Sanction
year year
Denmark Set targets 2012 2013 Companies with at No 
least 156 million sanctions
to 313 million 
DKR and 250 or 
more employees
Netherlands 30 2013 (expired Immediate Balance of at least No 
2016) €17.5 million and 
revenue of at 
sanctions
least €35 million
Table 10.3  Gender balance in corporate governance codes by country, year, and 
type of recommendation
Country Adoption Recommendation
Finland 2010 Have at least one female board member
Luxembourg 2013 Must have representation of both genders
Ireland 2014 Recommends specific targets depending on board size
United Kingdom 2014 Recommends specific targets depending on board size
Sweden 2015 Strive for gender balance on boards
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directors of listed companies. The directive was aimed at securing mem-
bership of at least 40% for the underrepresented gender on the boards of 
through public undertakings by 2018 and all publicly listed companies by 
2020. The EU parliament passed the directive, but it did not get support from 
a majority in the EU Commission (Inderhaug, 2019; Skjeie et al., 2019).13
Discussion and conclusion
The past decade has seen a strong upsurge in the belief that it is possible to 
politically regulate gender balance on corporate boards and thereby further 
promote gender balance and gender equality in the business sector. The ori-
gin of corporate-quota regulations was Norway, from where corporate- quota 
policies, as well as softer versions, have circulated to a number of countries 
in Europe. Policy diffusion studies have been criticized for paying too little 
attention to what policies diffuse (Røvik, 2016). Indeed, the corporate-quota 
regulations that have circulated, differ importantly from one another. In this 
chapter, we have seen that corporate-quota policies have varied in their min-
imum and maximum standard for gender balance, the company types (reg-
istration and size) regulated, and the sanctions imposed for non-compliance.
This final section addresses three questions concerning the circulation of 
corporate quotas. First, the relevance of a regional learning or neighboring 
effect (cf. Dobbin et al., 2007) as a mechanism enabling policy diffusion 
through the circulation of corporate quotas. Second, Norway’s importance 
as a source of the wider spread of corporate quotas. Third, a general un-
derstanding of the circulation of such an inherently controversial measure, 
particularly in light of the ‘cost’ of introducing it.
Policies to advance gender equality typically have circulated across the 
Nordic countries and contributed to what has been called a Nordic gender- 
equality model (Teigen and Skjeie, 2017). However, in the Nordic region, the 
similarities and circulation of gender-equality policies are easier to identify 
within policies on work–family balance than policies on gender balance in 
political and economic decision-making (Teigen and Skjeie, 2017). Neither 
Sweden nor Finland has adopted gender quotas for corporate boards, but 
Norway and Iceland have adopted quite similar corporate-quota schemes. 
The Danish scheme is categorized as corporate quotas by some (Piscopo 
and Muntean, 2017) but seen by others as merely symbolic arrangements 
with little effects on the gender balance of corporate boards (Agustín et al., 
2018). Sweden began a political process parallel to the Norwegian one but 
has paused that process (Bohman et al., 2012; Heidenreich, 2012; Freiden-
vall, 2018). In Sweden, the possibility that corporate quotas could be in-
troduced has, to some extent, functioned as a lasting threat in the debate 
and stimulated taking other actions, which have worked quite successfully. 
In fact, the rapid growth in women’s representation on company boards in 
Sweden (Freidenvall, 2018: 392), which made gender-quota measures ap-
pear to be unnecessarily tough and controversial. In Finland, the question 
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of adopting or enlarging the scope of legislation from the boards of state-
owned companies to publicly listed companies remain. In both Finland and 
Sweden, strengthening gender recommendations in corporate-governance 
codes has been the preferred way to promote gender balance on corporate 
boards. Generally, the spread of corporate quotas has only moderately, if at 
all, been facilitated by a neighboring effect, as we cannot identify a Nordic 
model of corporate-quota policies. A central dynamic identified in the lit-
erature on policy diffusion emphasizing the importance of the geographic 
proximity of neighbor states (cf. Dobbin et al., 2007; Stone, 2012) thus seems 
to have little relevance to the circulation of corporate quotas.
Another question concerns whether Norway, as the first adopter and the 
source, may have fueled this international attention. It is believed that cor-
porate quotas may have appeared to be an especially good idea precisely 
due to Norway’s reputation as a leader in advancing gender equality. In a 
typical dynamic in the early phase of policy diffusion, a policy is introduced 
by a ‘pioneer’ state and then adopted by ‘laggard’ states (cf. Stone, 2012). 
Norway’s successful gender-equality advancements have signaled that poli-
cies originating there are what is needed to lead gender equality in the right 
direction. Norway’s ‘fast-track’ implementation of the requirement for at 
least 40% women’s representation on corporate boards has contributed to 
the perception that such regulations can lead to success.
Spain, the second country to adopt corporate quotas, actively used the 
case of Norway in the reasoning for introducing corporate quotas (see Me-
nendez and Gonzalez, 2012). Corporate quotas were part of a larger pack-
age of welfare-state reforms initiated with the change of government in 
2004 when the Socialist Party came into power with Jose Luis Rodrigues 
Zapatero as Prime Minister (Menendez and Gonzalez, 2012). In this reform 
process, the Nordic/Scandinavian social-democratic welfare-state regime 
constituted a model for inspiration and an argument for gender equality. 
The Zapatero government’s later ill faith in the reforms and gender- equality 
policies, however, contributed to delegitimizing the introduced policies 
(Gabalon and Gimenez, 2017).
Norway also played the role of a leading example in the case of Iceland. Its 
less-developed gender-equality policies compared to other Nordic countries 
played an important role in the restructuring of Icelandic politics and econ-
omy after the country was heavily hit by the financial crisis in 2009 (Teigen 
and Skjeie, 2017). Arguments for the importance of introducing corporate 
quotas referred to the financial collapse and the need to include more women 
in economic decision-making in order to counteract future economic prob-
lems (Styrkarsdottir et al., 2010). In the wake of Iceland’s economic collapse, 
it was argued that the financial crisis was partly due to male dominance (the 
old-boys’ network) and nepotism in economic and political decision-making 
(Styrkarsdottir et al., 2010). Such criticism seems to have paved the way for 
copying elements of other Nordic nations’ gender- equality policies, the par-
ticularly adoption of a corporate-board-quota law.
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Although the adoption of corporate quotas in Iceland appears to have 
been a response to the crisis, Spain did so before the financial crisis. Indeed, 
in the case of Spain, the delegitimization of the welfare-state reforms and 
corporate quotas may have been driven by the same financial crisis, which 
made it more difficult to argue for such reforms in a time of crisis. That said, 
the further circulation of corporate quotas in the aftermath of the finan-
cial crisis probably indicates that the economic crisis overall contributed 
to shedding a critical light on the main actors of corporate power, thereby 
paving the way for corporate quotas.
The final and main question in this chapter concerns why a homegrown, 
inherently controversial policy such as the corporate-quota policy has been 
widely and rapidly diffused to a number of countries. Norway’s role as a 
pioneer in gender equality probably has been important, as argued. Policy-
makers’ decisions are often based on limited information, and there is a gen-
eral lack of certainty about which policies work and which do not. Taking 
inspiration from policies that seem to work for other countries, especially 
those recognized as successful in the matter at hand, therefore, appears at-
tractive to many (cf. Dobbin et al., 2007). In addition, the view of corporate 
quotas as quite spectacular and innovative in breaking the borders of non- 
interference in businesses’ property rights and autonomy probably contrib-
uted to the international attention to corporate quotas. News of the policy 
spread through many significant newspapers and international news- and 
business magazines and was disseminated by organizations such as the Eu-
ropean Women’s Lobby and key actors, such as Vivian Reding, vice presi-
dent of the European Commission (2000–2014).
Finally, corporate quotas are largely costless as they simply require com-
panies to recruit board members of both genders while promising a quick fix 
to the persistent male dominance of the corporate world. Significant fascina-
tion with corporate quotas may derive from such pecuniary circumstances. 
Policies without consequences for public budgets generally appear attractive 
to politicians. Admittedly, a counter-discourse, in part, claims that having 
more women (read: less competent and experienced board members) nega-
tively affects firm performance (c.f. Ahern and Dittmar, 2012). This argu-
ment, however, has been met by fierce resistance, arguing that having more 
women better utilizes the talent pool and is good for business. Corporate 
quotas thus offer a sharp contrast to other Nordic gender-equality policies, 
such as parental-leave schemes and state-subsidized childcare, which have 
heavy fiscal consequences—at least initially and in a narrow fiscal sense.
Notes
 1 The Act Relating to Gender Equality, Ministry of Children and Equality, 
April 20, 2007, available at https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/the-act- 
relating-to-gender-equality-the-/id454568/ [accessed December 4, 2020]
 2 Applying to cooperative companies comprising more than 1,000 members.
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 3 The following rules were formulated: (1) When there are two or three board 
members, both genders should be represented. (2) When there are four or five 
board members, both genders should be represented by at least two members. (3) 
When there are six to eight board members, both genders should be represented 
by at least three members. (4) When there are nine or more board members, each 
gender should make up at least 40% of the members. (5) Rules (1)–(4) also apply 
to the election of deputy members (Authors translation).
 4 Consultation Proposal from the Ministry of Children and Family Affairs, 1999. 
(Høring: Forslag til endringer i likestillingsloven, Barne og familiedepartemen-
tet, 1999). 
 5 Proposition to Parliament 77 (2000–2001), Ministry of Children and Family 
Affairs. (Ot. prp. 77 (2000–2001)), available at http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/
dep/bld/dok/regpubl/otprp/20002001/otprp-nr-77-2000-2001-.html?id=123306 
[accessed December 4, 2020]
 6 Consultation Proposal from the Ministry of Children and Family Affairs, 2001. 
(Høring: Kjønnsrepresentasjon i styret i allmennaksjeselskaper, statsaksjesel-
skaper og statsforetak, m.v.–forslag til endringer i allmennaksjeloven og i en-




 7 Proposition to Parliament 97 (2002–2003), Ministry of Children and Family 
Affairs. (Ot. prp. 97 (2002–2003)), available at http://www.regjeringen.no/en/
dep/bld/dok/regpubl/otprp/20022003/otprp-nr-97-2002-2003-.html?id=127203 
[accessed December 4, 2020]
 8 Consultation Proposal from the Ministry of Children and Family Affairs, 1999 
(Høring: Forslag til endringer i likestillingsloven, Barne og familiedepartemen-
tet, 1999).
 9 Proposition to Parliament 77 (2000–2001), Ministry of Children and Family 
Affairs. (Ot. prp. 77 (2000–2001), available at https://www.regjeringen.no/no/ 
dokumenter/otprp-nr-77-2000-2001-/id123306/ [accessed December 4, 2020]
 10 The conservative-center government coalition comprised of the Conservative, 
Liberal and Christian Democratic parties.
 11 Proposition to parliament 97 (2002–2003), Ministry of Trade and Industry. (Ot. 
prp. nr 97 (2002–2003)), available at https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/
otprp-nr-97-2002-2003-/id127203/ [accessed December 4, 2020]
 12 In the consultation, the main argument from employer and industry organiza-
tions, in addition to assertions why gender-balance regulations should not be 
adopted, was that the sanction system was too strict. The government responded 
that there was no reason to apply other sanctions for this rule. See page 51 in 
Proposition to Parliament 97 (2002–2003).
 13 ht t p: //e c .eu ropa.eu / ju st i c e /gender- e qu a l i t y/f i l e s /gender_ba lanc e _ 
decision_making/131011_women_men_leadership_en.pdf [accessed December 
4, 2020]
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Introduction
Historical and social science literature has a long tradition of interest in the 
Nordic model and its permutations and developments (Logue, 1999; Einhorn 
and Logue, 2003; Scott, 2009). Necessarily, there has been a political dimen-
sion to this interest, both in Norden and outside it. The primary aim of this 
chapter is to consider interest in the Nordic countries among British policy-
makers in the field of healthcare from 1997 to 2010. British political interest 
in the Nordic model has historically been highest among social democrats 
and socialists; however, there is evidence that Nordic ideas appeal beyond 
their traditional centres, with novel (at least in British terms) ideas about the 
Scandinavian social systems taking hold from the late-1990s onwards.
This chapter will make two straightforward and related claims. First, that 
ideas about the Nordic model circulated in British political circles in the 
period 1997–2010, and second, that this Nordic model was a departure from 
the ‘traditional’ social democratic conception of Norden (Ryner, 2002, 2007; 
Andersson, 2009b, 2010). Instead, in this era, the Nordic model was more 
often associated with New Public Management policies. To substantiate this 
claim, I will use a policy diffusion model and data drawn from political 
speeches, think-tank pamphlets and the business and popular presses. It, 
therefore, fits into a growing qualitative literature on international policy 
diffusion (Starke, 2013).
Policy and institutional context
New Public Management and policy diffusion
This section will discuss the contemporary literature in the fields of New 
Public Management and policy diffusion and discuss how these concepts 
can be used to frame the transfer of policies between the Nordic countries 
and the United Kingdom.
An increasingly large literature has developed on policy diffusion in polit-
ical and social science. The Nordic countries, especially Sweden, have long 
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served as international policy models in a variety of contexts (Musial, 2000; 
Hilson and Newby, 2015). Marklund (2009) notes that by the 1930s Sweden 
had increasingly come to be seen as a ‘social laboratory’, and though inter-
est in the Nordic countries in the United Kingdom as well as the rest of the 
Anglophone world has waxed and waned over time, there are commonali-
ties in the characteristics assigned to the Nordic social systems.
In the 1950s and 1960s, interest in the Nordic countries was centred on 
their perceived conformity to social democratic principles. Sweden has a 
significant place in Anthony Crosland’s ([1956] 1980) The Future of Socialism 
and a refutation of Sweden’s utopian socialist status is the central argument 
of Perry Anderson’s (1961a, 1961b) responses in New Left Review, the first of 
which is acerbically titled ‘Mr Crosland’s Dreamland’ (Hale, 2009). Roland 
Huntford’s (1971) The New Totalitarians added a conservative counterview 
to the idea of utopian Sweden (Hale, 2006). Despite their ethical disagree-
ments, these authors were broadly in agreement about the social democratic 
character of Swedish society, and this rather unproblematised view has 
tended to extend to the other four Nordic countries, whether or not it is 
strictly historically accurate (Kettunen, 2012). What can be said is that the 
‘Nordic model’ has circulated in British political discourse for a very signif-
icant period of time, usually in circles associated with the Labour Party and 
typically associated with arguments about gradualism (Aimer, 1985).
The 2000s, therefore, present a novel image of the Nordic model, which 
instead of association with solidaristic wage policies, collective bargaining 
and social welfare are associated with New Public Management (NPM). 
NPM policies have several key characteristics:
1  The introduction or extension of markets into public goods and spheres 
of social value (Self, 1993)
2  ‘Structural devolution’ (Christensen and Lægreid, 2007: 102), entailing 
the creation of new agencies and regulatory bodies, often outside direct 
democratic control
3  The possible privatisation of public service provision and/or funding 
(Krachler and Greer, 2015)
NPM policies have circulated in Western Europe since the 1970s and have 
been associated with wider reform trends under the gloss of ‘globalisation’ 
and ‘neoliberalism’ in the past 50 years (Ryner, 2002; Einhorn and Logue 
2003; Brown, 2015).
Christensen, Lie and Lægreid (2007) note that marketising reform is of-
ten accompanied by the creation of myths and symbols. Political science 
scholars interested in the diffusion of policy across national borders also 
stress the importance of legitimacy to the adoption of a policy. Maggetti 
and Gilardi (2016: 87), for example, note that ‘a policy model can be adopted 
because it is highly valued by peers, provides legitimacy to adopters or is 
widely accepted as an appropriate response to a given problem’. The use of 
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Nordic examples to accompany NPM reform under New Labour is a useful 
empirical example of the efficacy of symbols and their role in providing po-
litical legitimacy in the creation of public policy.
Moreover, it is clear that part of the reason for the adoption of a Nordic 
model by Labour reflects the requirement for ‘ideological similarity’ when 
selecting an appropriate policy model (Grossback et al., 2004: 522). Since 
the 1990s and throughout the period considered here, this ‘ideological sim-
ilarity’ was clearly felt in both directions, since ‘New Public Management 
reforms were implemented in most western countries, and Swedish health 
care politicians tended to look to Great Britain for inspiration when imple-
menting them at home’ (Blomgren and Sahlin, 2007: 163). In a sense, there-
fore, though British politicians were allegedly looking abroad at the Nordic 
countries to supply ideas about health reforms, politicians elsewhere were 
looking to Britain as a site of policy learning.
It is worth noting that very often in policy diffusion ‘the weight of new 
information depends on prior beliefs’ (Gilardi, 2010: 652). As will be demon-
strated below, there was a common belief in the United Kingdom that there 
were ideological commonalities between reform trajectories in both regions 
and prior beliefs about the Nordic model, dating as far back as the 1960s, 
were clearly important to the willingness of UK politicians to look to the 
Nordic region for legitimacy. Though it exceeds the scope of this chapter, 
this process of mutual circulation is clearly worthy of further study.
A similar diffusion process was being undertaken by British critics of 
the National Health Service (NHS). Generally associated with the Con-
servative Party, these critics were often in agreement with elements of the 
marketisation aspects of the NPM reform trajectory but wished to see the 
United Kingdom’s health system shift to an insurance-funded, rather than 
a taxation-funded model. The Nordic model was, therefore, not suitable for 
these purposes, and instead, these policymakers looked to the Social Health 
Insurance (SHI) systems of Central Europe for policy learning. As will be 
shown below, the strategies of critics of general taxation funded healthcare, 
though similar to those pursued by Labour, were different in important 
ways, even if they relied on similar legitimacy claims.
NHS reform from the late 1980s conforms to the general move away from 
corporatist steering mechanisms towards lobbying – a trend which is also 
evident in the Nordic countries (Rommetvedt, 2017). In its place, a system 
emerged based on looser affiliation between actors. Though this term is of-
ten used negatively, at least in Britain, here it will be used descriptively, 
in the sense in which Rommetvedt deploys it, to explain the replacement 
of institutionalised two-way relationships between government and non- 
governmental actors with more informal one-way relationships, in which 
governments are lobbied to advance single issue causes. For present pur-
poses, the implications of the move away from corporatist management of 
the NHS can be considered quite narrowly, since the primary goal is to ex-
plain the behaviour of actors in the policy creation process.
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One of the most significant innovations of the Thatcher-era was the role 
of think tanks as sources of public policy (Jackson, 2012). This was sub-
stantially retained under New Labour with the growth of social democratic 
counterparts to the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), Centre for Policy 
Studies (CPS) and Adam Smith Institute (ASI) which had been active un-
der the Thatcher and Major governments. Think tanks which influenced 
Labour policy included the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), Pol-
icy Network as well as centrist liberal organisations such as Civitas and the 
Social Market Foundation (SMF).
Think tanks provided Labour with new ideas and organised international 
connections. Policy Network, for example, has been chaired by Peter Man-
delson, a key architect of the transformation to New Labour. Among its 
high-profile Nordic contributors is Helle Thorning-Schmidt, former Prime 
Minister of Denmark. Pär Nuder, a former Swedish Social Democratic 
Finance Minister, has contributed several publications to the IPPR (Nuder, 
2002, 2012). There were also connections during this era between members 
of the Swedish Moderate Party and the free-market IEA. Johan Wennström, 
formerly of Timbro, a Stockholm-based free-market think tank, and later 
an adviser to the second Reinfeldt government, was a fellow at the IEA in 
2005 (Wennström, 2005).
This institutional inheritance was a double-edged sword for Labour. 
Although think tanks conformed to the post-ideological, pragmatic focus 
of the Third Way project (Ball and Exley, 2010), in common with other el-
ements of NPM, they were also less amenable to steering than traditional 
policy creation and implementation partners such as trade unions and 
professional associations (Christensen and Lægreid, 2002). New Labour’s 
desire to maintain broad-based support, including among traditionally 
hostile groups like free-market think tanks and conservative newspapers, 
empowered these groups to mount challenges to Labour’s articulations 
of the NHS and to provide alternative policy models. For this reason, 
although less influential than they had been under the previous Conserv-
ative governments, free-market articulations of healthcare policy, espe-
cially regarding SHI, remained influential and problematic for Labour 
politicians.
Healthcare policy in Norden, Germany and the United Kingdom
This chapter will cover a diverse range of national and regional policies. It 
is, therefore, worth sketching out the basic contours of the United King-
dom, Nordic and ‘Bismarckian’ healthcare systems while emphasising that 
the purpose of this paper is not to comment on the empirical merits of any 
of these systems, but, rather, to explore how they were presented by British 
political actors as cases for reform. It is, therefore, principally a study of the 
ways in which Nordic policy ideas were translated into the context of the 
United Kingdom.
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The Nordic healthcare regimes have undergone significant change in the 
past 20–30 years. As noted above, each of them has been affected by reform 
processes, which were to greater or lesser degrees influenced by NPM, but 
in different ways in different periods. The Nordic countries are sometimes, 
though less often in the last two decades, classified as members of a ‘reluc-
tant reformer’ group, of which some continental states are also considered 
a part (Christensen and Lægreid, 2002; Christensen et al., 2007; Bjurstrøm 
and Christensen, 2017). This has been reflected in healthcare with the five 
Nordic countries moving from different starting points at different speeds 
and in somewhat different directions. What unites them is their continued 
use of a general taxation funded-model (Lyttkens et al., 2016).
From a British perspective, the Nordic countries share underlying princi-
ples with the NHS but operate in a far more decentralised fashion and with 
a significantly greater emphasis on democratic participation (Magnussen 
and Martinussen, 2013). This decentralisation makes a comprehensive de-
scription of the Nordic healthcare systems difficult (Lyttkens et al., 2016), 
though it is nonetheless reasonable to speak of a Nordic model of healthcare 
(Martinussen and Magnussen, 2009; Magnussen and Martinussen, 2013; 
Lyttkens et al., 2016), and certainly the perception in the United Kingdom in 
the 2000s was that such a thing existed and was a meaningful source of pol-
icy learning. I will therefore sketch out the aspects of the Nordic healthcare 
systems which were most important from the perspective of British health 
policymakers.
As noted, the Nordic healthcare systems are particularly characterised 
by decentralisation and democratisation, partly as a result of their less co-
ordinated development by comparison with the NHS. Moreover, the Nor-
dic systems have tended to operate political, administrative and economic 
decentralisation (Byrkjeflot and Neby, 2008), with a much greater capacity 
for local raising of funds through taxation compared to Britain’s centrally 
funded system as well as stronger local democratic oversight through local 
councils (Magnussen and Martinussen, 2013). They nonetheless underwent 
significant changes during the period under consideration (Christensen and 
Lægreid, 2002; Bjurstrøm and Christensen, 2017; Christensen et al., 2007).
For present purposes, three changes are of importance: processes of cen-
tralisation and decentralisation; purchasing and provision responsibilities 
and gatekeeping. Recent reform trajectories have tended to entail phases of 
de- and re-centralisation. The 2000s coincided with a period of centralisa-
tion, in which traditional county and municipal systems of provision were 
consolidated into larger regions in Denmark and Norway, with Sweden 
keeping its decentralised structure but allowing greater local experimenta-
tion than previously (Byrkjeflot and Neby, 2008).
Because of the tendency to decentralisation, there is significant variety 
in the extent to which markets and private provision were extended in Nor-
dic healthcare both within and between nation states. Denmark has been 
the most reluctant to split purchasing and provision, with only very limited 
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moves in this direction; Norway provided some secondary care through 
purchasing mechanisms in the 2000s, and Sweden’s decentralised model 
meant that some counties had significant extension of market mechanisms 
and private provision, while others had virtually none (Magnussen and 
Martinussen, 2013). A further difference is in accessibility. In Denmark and 
Norway, General Practitioners (GPs) function as gatekeepers to the wider 
system, whereas in Finland any doctor can refer and in Sweden patients are 
able to self-refer (Olsen et al., 2016). Gatekeeping is also an accepted part of 
the structure of UK healthcare (Greenfield et al., 2016).
Despite these variations, for the purposes of this chapter, the Nordic systems 
will be considered part of a ‘Beveridgian’ type along with the NHS, while the 
Central European systems will be considered Bismarckian. The paradigmatic 
Bismarckian system, as the name suggests, is Germany. This is the system 
that was primarily used as a source of policy learning by those interested in 
SHI systems in UK politics. In common with most other Western European 
healthcare systems, the German healthcare system is based on mandatory 
health insurance with contributions raised from insurance fund members, 
employers and the state. In other respects, the Bismarckian and Beveridgian 
systems have converged significantly since the turn of the twenty-first century 
partly since both systems confronted similar challenges: expanding demand 
for care; aging populations; rising health complaints associated with poor 
lifestyles, etc. (Palier and Martin, 2008; Hinrichs, 2010; Palier, 2010).
The priority for Beveridgian systems in the 2000s was to rectify poor 
accessibility to specialist care through reforms to the GP gatekeeping sys-
tem. Historically, this was a strength of the Bismarckian systems due to the 
relative ease of accessing a GP and a referral to a specialist. Conversely, 
cost containment became a priority for Bismarckian systems, which con-
solidated state authority over some aspects of the social insurance systems 
to ease budgetary pressures. Beveridgian systems, due to their tax-funded 
models (whether local, regional or central), have tended to perform better 
against cost-containment measures than insurance-based systems.
Historically, the NHS was thought of as a command-and-control struc-
ture although arguably this overstates the ability of the Ministry of Health 
to steer healthcare and understates the abilities of groups, especially the 
British Medical Council, to resist or subvert central steering mechanisms 
(Greener and Powell, 2008). UK healthcare reform has taken more than one 
direction since the beginning of the Thatcher era in 1979. The 1983 Griffiths 
Report suggested a direction for the NHS which was highly professionalised 
with doctors and healthcare professionals controlling the administrative as-
pects of the health service, much like the system which evolved in Scotland 
in the 2000s (Greer, 2004). This path was abandoned in 1987 with the intro-
duction of the ‘internal market’ which was the first move towards NPM in 
British healthcare and introduced a purchaser-provider split, characterised 
by contracting between independent, but state-funded health authorities, 
GP fundholding groups and NHS hospital trusts (Greener, 2009).
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The architecture of this system was complex with significant unevenness 
between the size and autonomy of different purchasers. Indeed, built into 
the system were significant pressures on larger health authorities to remain 
with current providers because of the risk that sudden withdrawal would 
cause them to go bust. These pressures did not affect smaller GP fundhold-
ing groups. Moreover, as there had been no increase in care supply and no 
differential pricing of services was permitted, there was always a route back 
into public ownership for bankrupt purchasers and providers, rendering the 
competitive elements of the internal market theoretical (Greener and Pow-
ell, 2008).
New Labour instituted a series of strategic health authorities which 
purchased care from Primary Care Trusts. These covered quite signifi-
cant geographical areas, for example, the north-west of England, and are 
reminiscent of the basic division of Norwegian health provision into five 
regional health authorities. Even though during the New Labour era the 
British healthcare system most closely resembled that of Norway, this was 
not mirrored by a focus on the Norwegian healthcare system among poli-
cymakers. Rather, the Labour government viewed Sweden and Denmark 
as models, with free-market liberals focused on the Bismarckian systems, 
especially Germany.
1997–2010: from ‘fragmentation’ back to the market
1999–2000 the new NHS and the NHS plan
One of the core planks of Labour’s electoral platform in 1997 was a pledge 
to increase investment in the NHS and reduce waiting times for access to 
treatment. This was presaged by a two-pronged analysis of its inheritance 
from the Thatcher and Major Governments. First, that the preceding period 
had seen serious underfunding of the NHS, and second, that Conservative 
attempts to implement NPM structures had created fragmentation within 
the system and worsened, rather than improved outcomes.
This critique of the Conservative-era was set out in The New NHS (De-
partment of Health, 1997), a white paper focused on the ‘fragmentation’ 
which the internal market had allegedly introduced. This was contrasted 
with Labour’s plan to introduce a program of ‘integrated care’. Nonetheless, 
Labour retained the purchaser-provider split characteristic of the internal 
market, though in 1997 it was not envisaged that this would operate com-
petitively or with private providers. Moreover, there was a strong emphasis 
on decentralisation, regionalism and collaboration, with the white paper re-
peatedly emphasising cooperation and partnership (Department of Health, 
1997: secs. 3.16–3.21, 1.22, 1.3).
Alan Milburn replaced Frank Dobson as Health Secretary in 1999 and 
continued in the role until 2003. His stewardship of the NHS set the direc-
tion for Labour’s health policy until it left office in 2010, beginning with 
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The NHS Plan (2000). Mirroring some elements of The New NHS, The NHS 
Plan was also critical of the internal market and was highly critical of the 
perceived ‘lottery in provision’ it had created. A general taxation-funded 
model was articulated as the best way to control this tendency for ‘frag-
mentation’ in markets. To support this, The NHS Plan (2000: 36) argued 
that tax-financed systems (e.g., British and Nordic) were the least socially 
regressive of the various options due to their interpersonal redistributive 
capacity. SHI systems (e.g., German and Dutch) were considered slightly 
more regressive, and private insurance systems (e.g., the US and Swiss), the 
most regressive. The NHS, and by implication the Nordic systems, was de-
fended in terms of their progressive and equal character in contrast to the 
SHI systems used in continental Europe. Milburn (2000) deployed similar 
ideas in speeches.
However, criticism of the internal market in The NHS Plan is significantly 
more circumspect than in The New NHS. Although the former ostensibly 
offered a muscular critique of the Thatcher and Major records in health-
care, it is critical not of quasi-markets per se, instead arguing that the inter-
nal market was a ‘false market’. The NHS Plan demonstrated a move back 
towards the logic of ‘choice’, although not competition, and it reflected am-
biguity in New Labour’s thinking about the relationship between ‘equality’ 
and ‘choice’ as political goals (see, e.g., Tony Blair’s (1997) letter to Isaiah 
Berlin).
Around 2000, then, there was a notable shift in the approach to NPM 
structures in the UK government. In the period from 1997 to 1999, the re-
form trajectory moved away from markets in the health service and towards 
coordination and collaboration. From 2000, that emphasis reversed. This 
was also a period when ideas about the nature of healthcare reform which 
would later become strongly associated with the Nordic countries began to 
develop. Labour argued that its reforms would create a ‘leaner and more 
focused centre’ (Department of Health, 2000: 56); although not explicitly 
mentioned, this clearly echoed trends for the adoption of ‘lean management’ 
techniques in Swedish healthcare (The Economist, 2002).
2000–2003 return to the market
Models of Danish and Swedish healthcare appeared in government white 
papers for the first time in Delivering the NHS Plan (Department of Health, 
2002). The white paper noted the charge that ‘a tax funded national sys-
tem of health care can never deliver choice for patients’. It continued: ‘[I]
n Sweden and Denmark patients have access to information on waiting 
for treatment have the choice of an alternative provider’ (Department of 
Health, 2002: 22). Despite fairly major structural differences between Swed-
ish and Danish healthcare models, the innovation here was threefold. First, 
the patient was situated as a consumer within a system of potential choices 
and providers; second, this movement was presented as possible within a 
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tax-funded healthcare system and third, Nordic healthcare models were de-
ployed to legitimate the preceding claims.
The appearance of Nordic policy models in government white papers 
coincided with growing interest in the popular press as well as increased 
pressure to introduce ‘choice’ measures in the NHS. An article in The Times 
argued that the Danish and Swedish models of healthcare placed ‘an enor-
mous weight on empowering doctors and individual patients’ despite their 
taxation funded systems (Hawkes, 2002). The Guardian and Independent 
also ran pieces praising aspects of the Nordic healthcare systems, especially 
the introduction of market (dis)incentives for providers to reduce common 
issues like ‘bed blocking’ (Charter, 2002a; Dean, 2002; Laurance, 2002).
The Conservative opposition also deployed Nordic examples, with Liam 
Fox, the Shadow Health Secretary, criticising Labour’s reforms for ‘borrow-
ing the language of … Sweden … but not the substance’ by not introducing 
a deeper purchaser-provider split in the NHS (Charter, 2002b). Free-market 
policymakers were arguing simultaneously for the intensification of mar-
ket reforms along Swedish lines, including allowing NHS bodies to borrow 
commercially, as well as taking Germany’s SHI system as a source of inspi-
ration (Charter, 2002b; Ivens, 2002).
Free-market policy think tanks, especially the CPS, and the business 
press, particularly The Economist, focused on the expansion of market 
mechanisms, noting that Sweden had several for-profit providers operating 
hospitals and expounding measures which displayed striking similarities to 
those which had been introduced in Sweden (Blackwell, 2001; Blackwell and 
Kruger, 2002). Alongside this, there was significant discussion of the en-
trance of private providers into the NHS.
This discussion of private provision was often couched in terms of a 
‘Swedish model of healthcare’ or the ‘Stockholm model’ of private care 
(Gillan, 2001; Waples, 2001; Wright and Crisp, 2002; The Economist, 2002). 
The Stockholm Model referred to a model of healthcare in which primary 
care was privatised though still publicly funded. This entailed the privatisa-
tion of several hospitals in Stockholm county and a system of ‘payment by 
results’, in which hospitals received money for the procedures performed. 
Articles were particularly focused on St. Göran’s Hospital in Stockholm, 
and it was claimed that the use of private provision had decreased waiting 
times and improved the quality of care (The Economist, 2002). Notably, the 
Swedish ideological dividing line mirrored the British one, with the Moder-
ates controlling Stockholm council and introducing privatisation measures 
which the Social Democratic-led national government opposed.
By 2003, the coordinates of New Labour’s direction in healthcare policy 
and the political discourses around which it aimed to defend these were al-
ready relatively well established. Swedish and Danish healthcare had been 
widely cited in the press as models of taxation-funded care which could 
also satisfy concerns about patient choice. From the perspective of the La-
bour government, the use of Nordic models allowed it to argue in favour of 
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patient choice and legitimate the potential for choice measures in a taxation 
funded system with reference to concrete healthcare systems in Sweden and 
Denmark.
Given that the major policy creation phase was effectively over by 2002, 
the difficulty from 2003 onwards was the need to defend the use of mar-
kets and the entrance of private company from two directions simultane-
ously. On the one hand, liberal critics argued that policy had not gone far 
enough towards introducing markets and private provision in healthcare. 
On the other hand, left-wing Labour MPs, members and trade unions ar-
gued against the introduction of markets and private providers of any sort. 
In the early 2000s, a discourse was already emerging which argued that New 
Labour’s health reforms were not Swedish enough, with calls for the en-
trance of private firms and/or the abolition of taxation funded healthcare 
altogether. The dilemma facing Labour politicians is well encapsulated by 
this extract from Milburn’s (2003) Speech on Localism:
The Right – in the media and in politics – believe the game’s up for 
services that are collectively funded and provided. In today’s consumer 
world they argue that the only way to get services that are responsive to 
individual needs is through the market mechanism of patients paying 
for their treatment.
It is easy to dismiss the Right’s policies as the last twitch of the 
Thatcherite corpse. But if we fail to match high and sustained invest-
ment with real and radical reform it will be the Centre-Left’s argument 
that public services can both be modern and fair, consumer-orientated, 
and collectively provided that will face extinction.
Milburn was proved prescient in that from 2003 onwards policy interven-
tions from free-market policymakers adopted positions on healthcare reform 
which increasingly emphasised the marketisation and privatisation aspects 
of NPM. Indeed, government policy came under repeated attack from 
free-market groups hoping to undermine the principle of taxation-funded 
care. A series of papers published by CPS and two articles in The Daily Tel-
egraph, a conservative newspaper, were considered sufficiently threatening 
as to warrant a response from John Reid, who took over the health brief in 
2003 (Blackwell, 2001; Blackwell and Kruger, 2002; Brogan, 2003; Daley, 
2003; Reid, 2003a).
2004–2010 defending the benefits of New Public Management
By 2004, the ideological portion of the reforming phase in New Labour’s 
healthcare policy was effectively over, though this era saw the implemen-
tation of new systems as well as the controversial extension of privatisation 
and marketisation. In this period, private health care providers began to 
undertake some elective procedures in the NHS. Of note was the entrance 
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of the Swedish for-profit healthcare provider Capio which began offering 
healthcare services as part of joint bids with British providers (as did com-
parable North American firms) (The Economist, 2004).
The entrance of private providers was often linked back to ideas about 
the Stockholm model but dovetailed with discussions that would become 
increasingly entrenched that imagined the role of the state as a funder and 
regulator rather than a provider of services. This was justified using argu-
ments about the progressive nature of patient choice, whether this was real-
ised in the public or private sector. John Reid, for example, argued that such 
measures empowered patients noting that: ‘empowering patients is directly 
linked to the issues of inequity. Only if we empower all patients can we real-
istically aim for the goal of equity’ (Reid, 2003b). The definition of equality 
used here is, therefore, strikingly similar to that deployed by New Public 
Management theorists since Reid argues that choice – ‘underpinned by the 
resources, the information and power’ – is the route to equality.
The presentation of Labour’s healthcare measures as progressive and as-
sociated with Nordic models which began under Alan Milburn was most 
explicitly continued by Patricia Hewitt as Health Secretary (2005–2007). 
Hewitt made use of a Swedish Social Democratic slogan of the time ‘proud, 
but not satisfied’ (Hewitt, 2006). It is ironic that in Sweden this slogan was 
received as a sign of the Social Democrats’ lack of ideas and a compelling 
future vision, which arguably contributed to their loss in the 2006 Swedish 
General Election (Andersson, 2009a). It is also interesting to note that while 
Hewitt was committed to competition and marketisation and associated 
this with Nordic healthcare models, the elements of reform which she most 
strongly associated with the Nordic countries were not competitive or mar-
ketising in nature.
By the mid-2000s, Labour wanted to imitate three chief aspects of the 
Nordic healthcare models: first, the use of GPs as gatekeepers to the wider 
system to reduce pressure on hospitals; second, the creation of ‘activation’ 
systems which would deal with chronic health conditions allowing people 
to re-enter the labour market and third, the expansion of community orien-
tated care which reduced the length of hospital stays (Hewitt, 2005, 2007). 
While these are basically consistent with the goals of Nordic health policy in 
the mid-2000s, they do not necessarily entail any accompanying extension 
of markets or private provision.
Nordic localism and health insurance
From 2004 to 2010, there was a significant change in the focus of policy 
learning among UK policymakers. This era saw a growing interest in lo-
calism and decentralisation in Swedish and Danish healthcare. Though 
decentralisation was not necessarily associated primarily with marketisa-
tion reforms by UK policy thinkers, they were still often a key part of these 
discourses. Jenkins (2004), for example, viewed Nordic health systems as 
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examples of localised systems with greater democratic oversight than the 
more centralised NHS.
Unlike more free-market-oriented authors, Jenkins was not primar-
ily interested in localisation as a vehicle for NPM reforms, though he ac-
knowledged the potential for this and the title of his report – Big Bang 
Localism – is a tribute to Margaret Thatcher’s deregulation of the City of 
London. Rather, Jenkins saw the Nordic countries as models in which pol-
itics and public policy were democratically accountable with institutions at 
the local level which entrenched democratic forms of governance. The Nor-
dic countries, he argued, had ‘shown that even the smallest communities 
can run a successful and equitable welfare state’ (Jenkins, 2004: 106). This 
he contrasted negatively with the centralising and managerial tendencies of 
British politics.
The rolling back of the central state did though tend to entail plans for the 
extension of the marketisation elements of New Public Management and fis-
cal retrenchment as a result of the 2008 financial crisis. This partly reflected 
a growing sense of purpose in the Conservative Party under the leadership 
of David Cameron. Increasingly, therefore, think-tank and media policy 
diffusion strategies were targeted at the Conservative Party leadership as 
well as towards New Labour.
Furness and Gough (2009) echo New Labour’s discourse of a progressive 
Nordic model, contrasted with SHI systems which encounter redistributive 
limits. Their report, From Feast to Famine, saw Norway and Sweden as 
models in this respect. They were particularly impressed by decentralised 
healthcare funding models, arguing that local diversity, funded by locally 
raised taxes, was a potential model for solving perceived issues in the NHS. 
The report also argued that any adoption of a more localist, Nordic-style 
healthcare reform would entail the retreat of the state from mass service 
provision and its replacement with a range of private (including non-profit) 
provision. This would entail a total split between purchaser and provider 
and would, for this reason, mimic the structure of SHI in almost every re-
spect save revenue raising.
The report does though draw a contrast with New Labour’s discourse on 
the Nordic healthcare systems when it notes that:
Evidence from Finland, Norway and Denmark shows that local con-
trol over health sector decision-making has led to increased dispari-
ties in services provided, and it has been those individuals from lower 
 socio-economic groups who have been adversely affected.
(Furness and Gough, 2009: 140)
New Labour had typically argued that the Nordic systems were successful 
in reconciling individual freedom with equality. Furness and Gough, per-
haps more realistically, argue that policymakers are confronted by a polit-
ical choice.
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Bidgood’s (2013) Healthcare Systems: Sweden and Localism made similar 
arguments to those found in From Feast to Famine. Bidgood was more con-
cerned to argue for the compatibility of localism and markets in the Swed-
ish system. Although pessimistic about the required culture shift in British 
politics required for the creation of greater localism, he was positive about 
the potential for the introduction of further New Public Management ideas 
by this means. Indeed, demonstrating the tendency for policy actors to be 
mutually influencing, many of the ideas cited in Bidgood’s report, especially 
those about Capio and lean management, are from articles in The Economist 
and The Guardian cited above.
By 2013, then, the Nordic systems were no longer seen primarily as a 
means to defend general taxation-funded healthcare but as a model for a 
mixture of localism, competition and choice in a system in which private, 
not-for-profit and public providers competed for public funding. The pres-
entation of Swedish policies as providing space for not-for-profit providers 
was characteristic of UK policy discussion in this era. It was also a feature 
of discussion of Swedish Free Schools (Conservatives.com, 2010), though 
in both cases this was a case of selective policy learning since not-for-profit 
health and education providers were notably weaker than public or private 
providers in Sweden (as they are in the United Kingdom) (Andersson, 2006; 
Wiborg, 2015).
Alongside this was a more empowered and active contingent arguing in 
favour of Bismarckian insurance-funded healthcare in the United Kingdom. 
A range of policy reports had put forward arguments in favour of health 
insurance throughout the New Labour era, but by the late 2000s also had 
the opportunity to put this to a rejuvenated Conservative Party. Gubb and 
Meller-Herbert’s (2009) Markets in Healthcare restated the case for health 
insurance using the kind of market logics previously put forward by Black-
well (2001, 2004) and Blackwell and Kruger (2002). These thinkers typically 
drew on Hayekian ideas about the accountability of markets and sometimes 
also had positive things to say about the ability of the Nordic systems as well 
as continental healthcare to imitate markets:
Possibly the most restrictive use of markets is in the NHS in England 
where the government largely controls the funding, provision, resource 
allocation and regulation of health care. The market, instead is ‘mim-
icked’ through a split between organisations that purchase care and 
those that provide it …. Interestingly, Nordic countries such as Sweden 
and Denmark have followed a similar path, although the major differ-
ence here is that funds are largely raised through local taxes and health 
care is the responsibility of local authorities.
(Gubb and Meller-Herbert, 2009: 47)
Very similar arguments in favour of movement towards a Bismarckian 
healthcare model appeared in Kristian Niemetz’s (2014) Health Check 
222 Tom Hoctor
released through the IEA. This working paper set out a series of practical 
steps which would alter the current infrastructure of the NHS to make it 
more closely resemble a SHI system. This included provisions for hospitals 
to fail, payment by results and other ideas common to free-market argu-
ments about healthcare, removing the functional difference between public 
and private providers.
Within these discourses, the NHS was contrasted negatively with Euro-
pean systems on a number of counts. Its corporate structure with an arti-
ficial quasi-market did not possess the democratic mandate of the Nordic 
countries; did not allow choice of purchaser, as in Germany, the Netherlands 
and Switzerland and did not link customer and insurer directly through fi-
nancial transfer as in the French system.
These pieces reflect the balance of discourse in British health policy in the 
2000s. All influential positions argued in favour of marketisation whether 
through the introduction of NPM, including greater localism or through the 
introduction of (social) insurance. In both cases, ‘choice’ for the consumer 
was privileged over attempts to provide standardised outcomes, which later 
discourse, in contrast to New Labour politicians, even began to argue was 
impossible, whether on theoretical grounds (the nature of the market) or 
empirical ones (fiscal retrenchment).
Conclusion
Although New Labour’s policy record was criticised after the 2008 global 
financial crisis, there is no questioning the party’s political savvy. Devel-
opments and trends in healthcare policy in the period following the estab-
lishment of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition show that Labour 
was correct to be concerned about the potential for an organised group to 
emerge in health policymaking favouring a move towards a SHI system and/
or far more extensive marketisation and privatisation of UK healthcare.
On the other hand, Labour’s adoption of a Nordic model, heavily asso-
ciated with New Public Management ideas, allowed free-market liberals 
associated with the Conservative Party to pick up where Labour had left 
off and had the additional consequence of establishing the Nordic model, 
which in British policy discourses was presented as highly marketising, as 
the leftmost option in political terms. This opened space for the articulation 
of more strident SHI options usually based on the German system, as well 
as localist discourses principally focusing on Sweden which argued for a 
further intensification of New Public Management in the health service.
Nonetheless, the reform trajectory in the United Kingdom closely ap-
proximates these two categories with an immediate shift away from compe-
tition and markets and an emphasis on collaboration and partnership upon 
Labour’s assumption of office. This was gradually replaced by a turn back 
towards ideas more traditionally associated with NPM from 1999 onwards 
which would intensify in 2002 and 2003.
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From the early 2000s onwards, British Labour politicians had adopted 
what could best be described as a defensive discourse which propagated 
particular ideas about a Nordic model in healthcare and its use of NPM 
principles. Their purpose was to persuade those in favour of greater mar-
ketisation and choice that this could be achieved within the framework of 
a general taxation-funded healthcare system. For this reason, the Nordic 
countries were the only available choice (other than the United Kingdom 
itself) for making these arguments.
The ‘Nordic’ components of New Labour’s health programme taken to-
gether are an odd mixture of New Public Management, localising ideas and 
proposed changes to the process of GP referrals as well as elements that 
simply reflect system convergence in European health systems. Labour poli-
ticians themselves though were concerned to link their policies to precedent 
set by the taxation-funded Nordic countries as a defence against criticism 
from free-market liberals on the one hand and Labour’s left on the other 
hand.
The (co-)creation and circulation of Nordic models in British healthcare 
in the late 1990s and 2000s represent something of a paradox. New Labour’s 
utterances about the Nordic countries were relatively accurate and often 
based on specific policies, even where these policies were not necessarily 
consistent with Labour’s agenda. For example, in the mid-2000s, Nordic 
policies demonstrated a collaborative turn where UK policymakers fa-
voured competition. Labour did though tend to downplay those aspects of 
Nordic policies which did not fit their preconceived agenda while emphasis-
ing facets such as privatisation, marketisation, decentralisation, which were 
consistent with the policies they hoped to enact in Britain. In this process 
of translation, then, Nordic policies tended to be seen primarily in terms 
of their consistency with propositions about localism and marketisation. 
There was nonetheless a clear political preference for Nordic or Scandina-
vian models in British healthcare discourse, even where Nordic policies and 
ideas were presented as highly marketising.
It is, therefore, relevant to question to what extent these policies were 
actually Nordic or European, and, despite the widespread and sometimes 
haphazard use of models taken from Scandinavia, what they added to 
British public policy debate. It is tempting to argue that the use of these 
models offered legitimacy to policy proposals, but as the so-called ‘Norway 
model of Brexit’ demonstrates, models can mystify as readily as they clarify. 
Moreover, there is very little evidence to suggest that Nordic or European 
actors, with the exception of some private healthcare firms such as Capio, 
were engaged in propagating these discourses in the United Kingdom. 
What emerges from the analysis is a policy learning process in the United 
Kingdom which is reliant on exemplars imported from elsewhere, but simul-
taneously closed, insular and concerned primarily with internal political 
debates rather than the substance of policies which are increasingly central 
to the policymaking process.
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The UK policy learning process observed here, therefore, reflects a very 
British form of diffusion. Since 2010, the Conservatives have made virtually 
no use of foreign healthcare models, but, if anything, the process of deriving 
legitimacy from ‘policy learning’ has intensified. Perhaps the most obvious 
Nordic example of this is the adoption of Free Schools, based on a Swedish 
marketising reform from the early 1990s (Rönnberg, 2015). This has also 
been observable in debates about the United Kingdom’s relationship with 
the European Union with a whole host of possible models suggested, includ-
ing Norway, Canada, Australia and various others.
This chapter has contributed to the literature examining policy diffusion 
and the circulation of Nordic models. The study of policy diffusion in the 
United Kingdom and the use of policy models is, in many respects, an ur-
gent one since international policy models have been so central to a highly 
politically and economically controversial Brexit process. Moreover, from 
a Nordic perspective, it is notable that the Nordic model, in various guises, 
has now been taken up very widely as a policy model on the British Right 
and is increasingly less associated with the Labour Party, which would, his-
torically at least, have seemed a more natural site of mutual policy diffusion.
This interest in Norden among Conservative politicians is a potential fu-
ture avenue for research on the making and circulation of Nordic models. 
This chapter has adopted a qualitative approach to the question of policy 
diffusion, allowing for a more detailed assessment of the articulations of 
Nordic policy than a quantitative approach would have, but at the same 
time limiting the scope of material that could be covered. Future research 
on these questions, especially those taking up issues such as the ‘Norway 
model of Brexit’, may well wish to adopt quantitative or content analysis 
approaches to these questions to deal with the vast amount of literature 
which was produced on the subject, especially in the popular press, but also 
in think tanks, political speeches and by legal experts.
References
Aimer, P. (1985), ‘The Strategy of Gradualism and the Swedish Wage-Earner Funds’, 
West European Politics, 8(3), 43–55.
Anderson, P. (1961a), ‘Mr Crosland’s Dreamland’, New Left Review, 1(7), 4–12.
Anderson, P. (1961b), ‘Sweden: Study in Social Democracy’, New Left Review, 1(9), 
34–45.
Andersson, J. (2009a), När Framtiden Redan Hänt: Socialdemokratin och folk-
hemsnostalgin (Stockholm: Ordfront).
Andersson, J. (2009b), ‘Nordic Nostalgia and Nordic Light: The Swedish Model as 
Utopia 1930–2007’, Scandinavian Journal of History, 34(3), 229–245.
Andersson, J. (2010), The Library and the Workshop: Social Democracy in the Knowl-
edge Age (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press).
Andersson, M. (2006), Liberalisation, Privatisation and Regulation in the Swedish 
Healthcare Sector/Hospitals (Göteborg: Department of Work Science, Göteborg 
University), 1–33.
Beveridge or Bismarck? 225
Ball, S. and S. Exley (2010), ‘Making Policy with “Good Ideas”: Policy Networks and 
the “Intellectuals” of New Labour’, Journal of Education Policy, 25(2), 151–169.
Bidgood, E. (2013), Healthcare Systems: Sweden & Localism – An Example for the 
UK? (London: Civitas).
Bjurstrøm, K. H. and T. Christensen (2017), ‘Government Institutions and State 
Reforms’, in O. Knutsen (ed.), The Nordic Models in Political Science: Challenged, 
but Still Viable? (Bergen: Fagbokforlaget), 149–170.
Blackwell, N. (2001), Towards Smaller Government (London: Centre for Policy 
Studies).
Blackwell, N. (2004), Better Schools and Hospitals (London: Centre for Policy 
Studies).
Blackwell, N. and D. Kruger (2002), Better Healthcare for All (London: Centre for 
Policy Studies).
Blair, T. (1997), ‘A Letter from Tony Blair’, available at: http://berlin.wolf.ox.ac.uk/
letterstoberlin.html.
Blomgren, M. and K. Sahlin (2007), ‘Quests for Transparency: Signs of a New In-
stitutional Era in the Health Care Field’, in T. Christensen and P. Lægreid (eds.), 
Transcending New Public Management: The Transformation of Public Sector Re-
forms (Aldershot: Ashgate), 155–177.
Brogan, B. (2003), ‘Voters Would Buy Health Insurance If Tax Is Cut’, The Daily 
Telegraph, July 14.
Brown, W. (2015), Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution (Brooklyn, 
NY: Zone Books).
Byrkjeflot, H. and S. Neby (2008), ‘The End of the Decentralised Model of Health-
care Governance? Comparing Developments in the Scandinavian Hospital Sec-
tors’, Journal of Health Organization and Management, 22(4), 331–349.
Charter, D. (2002a), ‘Milburn Acts to Ease Bed Blocking’, The Times, March 14.
Charter, D. (2002b), ‘Tories Inspired by German Health Service’, The Times, 
July 10.
Christensen, T. and P. Lægreid (2002), ‘New Public Management – Undermining 
Political Control’, in T. Christensen and P. Lægreid (eds.), Transcending New Pub-
lic Management: The Transformation of Public Sector Reforms (Aldershot: Ash-
gate), 93–120.
Christensen, T. and P. Lægreid (2007), ‘Introduction – Theoretical Approach and 
Research Questions’, in T. Christensen and P. Lægreid (eds.), Transcending New 
Public Management: The Transformation of Public Sector Reforms (Aldershot: 
Ashgate), 1–17.
Christensen, T., A. Lie and P. Lægreid (2007), ‘Still Fragmented Government or 
Reassertion of the Centre’, in T. Christensen and P. Lægreid (eds.), Transceding 
New Public Management: The Transformation of Public Sector Reforms (Alder-
shot: Ashgate), 18–41.
Conservatives.com (2010), The Conservative Manifesto. DOI: 10.1016/j.
ijnurstu.2005.07.001.
Crosland, C. A. R. (1980), The Future of Socialism (London: Jonathan Cape).
Daley, J. (2003), ‘The New Britain Wants More Choice’, The Daily Telegraph, 
July 16.
Dean, M. (2002), ‘Society: Any Chance of NHS Choice’, The Guardian, April 24.
Department of Health (1997), The New NHS (London: Department of Health).
Department of Health (2000), The NHS Plan (London: Department of Health).
226 Tom Hoctor
Department of Health (2002), ‘Delivering the NHS Plan: Next Steps on Investment 
Next Steps on Reform’, Department of Health, April.
Einhorn, E. S. and J. Logue (2003), Modern Welfare States: Scandinavian Politics 
and Policy in the Global Age (London: Praeger).
Furness, D. and B. Gough (2009), From Feast to Famine – Reforming the NHS for an 
Age of Austerity (London: Social Market Foundation).
Gilardi, F. (2010) ‘Who Learns from What in Policy Diffusion Processes?’, Ameri-
can Journal of Political Science, 54(3), 650–666.
Gillan, A. (2001) ‘Election 2001: Public Backing for Sweden’s Private Success’, The 
Guardian, May 29.
Greener, I. (2009), ‘Towards a History of Choice in UK Health Policy’, Sociology of 
Health and Illness, 31(3), 309–324.
Greener, I. and M. Powell (2008), ‘The Changing Governance of the NHS: Reform 
in a Post-Keynesian Health Service’, Human Relations, 61(5), 617–636.
Greenfield, G., K. Foley and A. Majeed (2016), ‘Rethinking Primary Care’s Gate-
keeper Role’, British Medical Journal, 354, 1–6.
Greer, S. (2004), Territorial Politics and Health Policy (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press).
Grossback, L. J., S. Nicholson-Crotty and D. A. M. Peterson (2004), ‘Ideology and 
Learning in Policy Diffusion’, American Political Research, 32(5), 521–545.
Gubb, J. and O. Meller-Herbert (2009), Markets in Health Care: The Theory Behind 
the Policy (London: Civitas).
Hale, F. (2006), ‘Brave New World in Sweden? Roland Huntford’s “The New Totali-
tarians”’, Scandinavian Studies, 78(2), 167–190.
Hale, F. (2009), ‘British Observers of the Swedish Welfare State, 1932–1970’, Scandi-
navian Studies, 81(4), 501–528.
Hawkes, N. (2002), ‘Theory and Practice’, The Times, April 19.
Hewitt, P. (2005), ‘UK Presidency of the EU Summit: Tackling Health Inequalities’, avail-
able at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/http://www. 
dh.gov.uk/en/MediaCentre/Speeches/Speecheslist/DH_4125537 [accessed April 
22, 2021]
Hewitt, P. (2006), ‘Creating a Patient-Led NHS: The Next Steps Forward’, 
available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/http://www. 
dh.gov.uk/en/MediaCentre/Speeches/Speecheslist/DH_4126499 [accessed 
April 22, 2021]
Hewitt, P. (2007), ‘Investment and Reform: Transforming Health and Healthcare’, 
available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/http://www. 
dh.gov.uk/en/MediaCentre/Speeches/Speecheslist/DH_4124484 [accessed April 
22, 2021]
Hilson, M. and A. Newby (2015), ‘The Nordic Welfare Model in Norway and Scot-
land’, in J. Bryden, L. Riddoch and O. Brox (eds.), Northern Neighbours: Scotland 
and Norway since 1800 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press), 211–229.
Hinrichs, K. (2010), ‘A Social Insurance State Withers Away. Welfare State Reforms 
in Germany – Or: Attempts to Turn Around in a Cul-de-Sac’, in B. Palier (ed.), A 
Long Goodbye to Bismarck? The Politics of Welfare Reform in Continental Europe 
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press), 45–72.
Huntford, R. (1971), The New Totalitarians (London: Allen Lane).
Ivens, M. (2002), ‘Cross Dressing Could Suit the Tories’, The Sunday Times, 
May 26.
Beveridge or Bismarck? 227
Jackson, B. (2012), ‘The Think-Tank Archipelago: Thatcherism and Neo- liberalism’, 
in B. Jackson and R. Saunders (eds.), Making Thatcher’s Britain (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), 43–61.
Jenkins, S. (2004), Big Bang Localism: A Rescue Plan for British Democracy 
( London: Policy Exchange).
Kettunen, P. (2012), ‘Reinterpreting the Historicity of the Nordic Model’, Nordic 
Journal of Working Life Studies, 2(4), 21–43.
Krachler, N. and I. Greer (2015), ‘When Does Marketisation Lead to Privatisation? 
Profit-Making in English Health Services after the 2012 Health and Social Care 
Act’, Social Science and Medicine, 124, 215–223.
Laurance, J. (2002), ‘Bed Blocking the Scandinavian Solution’, The Independent, 
April 19.
Logue, J. (1999), ‘The Swedish Model: Visions of Sweden in American Politics and 
Political Science’, Swedish-American Historical Quarterly, 50(3), 162–172.
Lyttkens, C. H. et al. (2016), ‘The Core of the Nordic Health Care System Is Not 
Empty’, Nordic Journal of Health Economics, 4(1), 7–27.
Maggetti, M. and F. Gilardi (2016), ‘Problems (and Solutions) in the Measurement 
of Policy Diffusion Mechanisms’, Journal of Public Policy, 36(1), 87–107.
Magnussen, J. and P. E. Martinussen (2013), ‘From Centralization to Decentraliza-
tion, and Back: Norwegian Health Care in a Nordic Perspective’, in J. Costa-Font 
and S. L. Greer (eds.), Federalism and Decentralization in European Health and 
Social Care (London: Palgrave Macmillan), 101–123.
Marklund, C. (2009), ‘The Social Laboratory, the Middle Way and the Swedish 
Model : Three Frames for the Image of Sweden’, Scandinavian Journal of History, 
34(3), 264–285.
Martinussen, P. E. and J. Magnussen (2009), ‘Health Care Reform: The Nordic Ex-
perience’, in J. Magnussen, K. Vrangbæk and R. B. Saltman (eds.), Nordic Health 
Care Systems (Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill), 21–52.
Milburn, A. (2000), ‘The Contribution of a Modern NHS’, available at http:// 
webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/ 
MediaCentre/Speeches/Speecheslist/DH_4000761 [accessed April 22, 2021]
Milburn, A. (2003), ‘Speech on Localism’, https://www.ukpol.co.uk/alan-milburn- 
2003-speech-on-localism/
Musial, K. (2000), Roots of the Scandinavian Model: Images of Progress in the Era of 
Modernisation (Baden-Baden: Nomos Vergesellschaft).
Niemetz, K. (2014), Health Check: The NHS and Market Reforms (London: The 
Institute of Economic Affairs).
Nuder, P. (2002), ‘Challenge of Renewal’, in Progressive Politics 1.1, (London: Policy 
Network), 40–45.
Nuder, P. (2012), Saving the Swedish Model (London: Institute for Public Policy 
Research).
Olsen, K. R. et al. (2016), ‘General Practice in the Nordic countries’, Nordic Journal 
of Health Economics, 4(1), 56–67.
Palier, B. (2010), ‘Understanding the “Bismarckian” Welfare Reform Trajectory’, in 
B. Palier (ed.), A Long Goodbye to Bismarck? (Amsterdam: Amsterdam Univer-
sity Press), 18–44.
Palier, B. and C. Martin (2008), ‘From “a Frozen Landscape” to Structural 
Reforms: The Sequential Transformation of Bismarckian Welfare Systems’, in 
Reforming the Bismarckian Welfare Systems (Oxford: Blackwell).
228 Tom Hoctor
Reid, J. (2003a), ‘Choice Speech to the New Health Network’, available at http://
collection.europarchive.org/tna/20040722012352/http://dh.gov.uk/en/News/
Speeches/Speecheslist/DH_4071487 [accessed April 22, 2021]
Reid, J. (2003b), ‘Equity, Choice, Capacity and Culture’, available at http:// 
collection.europarchive.org/tna/20040722012352/http://dh.gov.uk/en/News/
Speeches/Speecheslist/DH_4066541 [accessed April 22, 2021]
Rommetvedt, H. (2017), ‘Scandinavian Corporatism in Decline’, in O. Knutsen 
(ed.), The Nordic Models in Political Science: Challenged, but Still Viable? (Bergen: 
Fagbokforlaget), 171–192.
Rönnberg, L. (2015), ‘Marketization on Export: Representations of the Swedish 
Free School Model in English Media’, European Educational Research Journal, 
14(6), 549–565.
Ryner, J. M. (2002), Capitalist Restructuring, Globalisation and the Third Way: Les-
sons from the Swedish Model (London: Routledge).
Ryner, J. M. (2007), ‘The Nordic Model : Does It Exist? Can It Survive?’, New Polit-
ical Economy, 12(1), 61–70.
Scott, A. (2009). ‘Looking to Sweden in Order to Reconstruct Australia’, Scandina-
vian Journal of History, 34(3), 330–352.
Self, P. (1993), Government by the Market? The Politics of Public Choice (London: 
Macmillan).
Starke, P. (2013), ‘Qualitative Methods for the Study of Policy Diffusion: Challenges 
and Available Solutions’, Policy Studies Journal, 41(4), 561–583.
The Economist (2002), ‘Stockholm Syndrome’, The Economist, February 28.
The Economist (2004), ‘Public Money, Private Care’, The Economist.
Waples, J. (2001), ‘Swede Leads Race for Community Hospitals’, The Sunday Times, 
April 22.
Wennström, J. (2005), The Awful Truth About Sweden (London: Institute of Eco-
nomic Affairs).
Wiborg, S. (2015), ‘Privatizing Education: Free School Policy in Sweden and Eng-
land’, Comparative Education Review, 59(3), 473–497.
Wright, O. and S. Crisp (2002), ‘The Chosen Companies’, The Times, December 20.
Introduction
This chapter puts forward three approaches – localizing, transposing, and 
theorizing for universal application – through which New Nordic Cui-
sine (NNC), an innovation consisting of a novel culinary concept, a set 
of guiding principles, and related practices, has developed into a Nordic 
food model that has had an impact on Nordic food culture, international 
culinary renewal and development, and food policy. First, we highlight 
the novel ideas and critical milestones in the evolution of NNC that have 
paved the way to its renown. Second, we provide a brief overview of our 
theoretical approach, zooming in on core ideas in the organizational lit-
erature on translation, and the data that informs our analytical approach. 
Next, we present and illustrate the three approaches, as well as some con-
nections between them. By way of conclusion, we discuss how an ecology 
of translation, formed by the energy and skill of translators and the power 
of traveling objects, such as the Nordic cuisine manifesto and movement, 
contribute to a Nordic food model in an ongoing development and with a 
wider impact.
The evolution of New Nordic Cuisine
At the outset of the twenty-first century, the Nordic countries (Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden) were enjoying strong recognition 
of their welfare systems, interior design, crime novels, and films, but lit-
tle if any recognition of their food. Terms such as Nordic Food or Nordic 
Cuisine were non-existent and a Nordic model of food was hardly conceiv-
able, whether culturally, socially, or politically. The national cuisines were 
primarily associated with specific local preparations, such as marinated 
herring, smoked salmon, or meatballs, and were considered old-fashioned, 
uniform, greasy, and heavy, ‘created as they are for a hard-working rather 
poor population that for long periods of the year also had to cope with se-
vere cold’ (Tingstrøm, 2004; own translation). Danish culinary culture, for 
example, was described as ‘uninspired, unenthused, and unhealthy’ (Meyer, 
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2017). The development and launch of a new regional culinary concept and 
movement –NNC – inspired a range of culinary, entrepreneurial, policy-
making, and research initiatives that communicated and further developed 
these nascent ideas into practices (Byrkjeflot et al., 2013).
The restaurant Noma (named after nordisk mad, translation from the 
Danish for ‘Nordic food’), founded by gastro-entrepreneur Claus Meyer and 
chef René Redzepi in 2003, was established with the ambition to ‘rebuild’ 
the Nordic cuisine, as Meyer (2006) explained in a chronicle in the Danish 
national daily newspaper Politiken:
We formulated in Noma’s first menu what we wanted: “With Noma, we 
want to offer a personal, Nordic gourmet cuisine, where typical cooking 
methods, Nordic ingredients and our common food cultural heritage 
are exposed to an innovative gastronomic way of thinking. In its ex-
treme consequence, we see it as our challenge to contribute to a recon-
struction of the Nordic cuisine, so that it embraces the North Atlantic, 
and with its taste and regional uniqueness lights up the world.”
(Meyer, 2006; own translation)
In the same chronicle, Meyer explained that the ambition was to draw ‘on 
both traditional and non-traditional Nordic ingredients…. The wild ingre-
dients from ancient ecosystems should have the most prominent place in 
our kitchen,’ keeping certain purity and simplicity, and avoiding ‘high-tech 
exaggeration.’
These ideas took further shape as NNC formally anchored its mean-
ing in a manifesto. Meyer and Jan Krag Jacobsen, the latter a journalist 
and vice president of the Danish Academy of Gastronomy at the time, 
whom Meyer referred to as his ‘wingman,’ developed the draft of the Nor-
dic Kitchen Manifesto (which would later be also referred to as the NNC 
Manifesto and the New Nordic Food Manifesto). A group of renowned 
chefs from the Nordic countries refined, elaborated, and signed the 
manifesto at the NNC Symposium in Copenhagen in 2004. The manifesto, 
which was partly inspired by the Dogme 95 movement and the manifesto 
in Danish film, proclaimed a new culinary movement that aimed ‘[t]o ex-
press the purity, freshness, simplicity, and ethics associated with the re-
gion,’2 affirming its Nordic connotations, and placed the responsibility 
for unraveling and revealing these values with chefs. The term Nordic in 
the label of the newly born regional cuisine helped avoid references to the 
national cuisines it brought together, drawing instead on positive associa-
tions with the general Nordic model (Byrkjeflot et al., 2013). The ambition, 
according to Claus Meyer, was to place the Nordic region on ‘the gastro-
nomic world map. It belongs there together with Spain, Italy, and France’ 
(Meyer, 2006).
NNC experienced a fast-paced diffusion and recognition, influenced by 
different factors and actors (Byrkjeflot et al., 2013; Sundbo et al., 2013), 
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including – as noted above – a largely supportive and benevolent media 
(Leer, 2016). In culinary circles worldwide, the restaurant Noma became 
an exemplar of the movement and the new cuisine, receiving recognition 
as The World’s Best Restaurant in 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2014.3 Another 
strong influence was Redzepi, Noma’s coowner and head chef and the rec-
ognized leader of ‘a culinary revolution that focused on time and place 
and celebrated the produce and cooking techniques of the Nordic region’ 
(Porter, 2015: 44). In 2016, in the wake of Noma’s success, Michelin’s Nor-
dic Guide awarded Denmark’s first three-star designation to the Gera-
nium restaurant and 30 stars to 20 other restaurants in Copenhagen (Ooi 
and Strandgaard Pedersen, 2017). Within a short period of time, and in 
the absence of formalized leadership, organization, and identity, which 
may have allowed for a more coordinated interaction by different players, 
the Nordic culinary movement was ‘spreading at lightning speed at all 
levels,’ ‘like a benign virus’ (Wolff, 2011), and was ‘suddenly everywhere’ 
(Signer, 2017).
Restaurants, cookbooks, new products, and culinary festivals in the 
region proliferated. While Copenhagen was the movement’s epicenter 
and ‘culinary trend-setter’ (Allagui, 2010), Oslo, Stockholm, Helsinki, 
and Reykjavik also became important gastronomic destinations (Ooi and 
Strandgaard Pedersen, 2017), with some of the most celebrated restaurants 
located outside the capital cities, in remote locations. Importantly, not 
only did foodies start coming to Norden, but also the cuisine itself trave-
led, getting in closer contact with other culinary approaches, techniques, 
and ingredients. For example, Noma and its head chef Redzepi ‘popped 
up’ in London in relation to the Olympics (Forbes, 2012), Tulum in Mex-
ico (Rao, 2016), Tokyo (Abend, 2015a; Warwick, 2015), and Sydney (Freed 
and Ruehl, 2015), while Claus Meyer opened a Nordic restaurant in New 
York’s Grand Central Terminal (Mullen, 2014). NNC was also showcased 
at events, ranging from those offered by Nordic diplomacy to cultural 
events, such as Nordic Kitchen Party (2012) at the Cannes Film Festival 
(Rosser, 2015).
Beyond praise and recognition, however, NNC has been criticized for 
serving ‘polemic on a plate’ (Booth, 2015), being elitist, nationalistic, and 
ethnically excluding (Gravdal, 2008; Holm, 2011; Leer, 2016), as well as 
failing to include female chefs at its inception (Leer, 2019). Some have con-
cluded that NNC ‘is no more’ and ‘has run its course as a global food 
movement’ (Booth, 2015). Its initiator, Meyer, affirmed that change has 
already happened and NNC is ‘the new normal’; ‘[we] should just move 
on, talk less about the New Nordic Cuisine…. Not cling to it as a sort of 
successful brand to preserve for 200–300 years, having to find budgets’ 
(Meyer, 2015). It has been suggested that Copenhagen-based chefs that 
have been associated with NNC ‘are loosening their ties to the New Nor-
dic pigeonhole’ (Trimble, 2017) and ‘applying that culinary knowledge and 
expertise to ethnic food’ (Porter, 2015: 42). Noma’s head chef, Redzepi, 
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was quoted as objecting to claims that the New Nordic label had become 
more a marketing means than a meaningful signifier, stating: ‘I don’t have 
a problem with “Nordic,” … [i]t’s the only way to give a sense of place. 
But the “new” in front of “Nordic” should be erased, buried. I am so sick 
of that term’ (Abend, 2015b). Redzepi closed the original Noma in 2017, 
relaunching Noma 2.0 with a new concept in 2018, ‘on the premise of being 
in and of nature, physically and conceptually with a menu based around 
what he says are the three distinct Nordic seasons’ (Porter, 2018: 55), 
thereby still emphasizing core Nordic principles like seasonality, nature, 
and simplicity.
Thus, chefs who had originated and promoted NNC have abandoned 
the label and sought to distinguish their own cuisine as something unique, 
which is characteristic of innovators when they are categorized together 
by audiences (Slavich et al., 2020). In the meantime, rather than vanishing, 
NNC ideas have transformed into a Nordic food model with wider impact. 
This translation from innovation to impact is important for the making and 
circulation of Nordic models, yet insufficiently understood. This chapter 
sheds light on three approaches to this translation. Below we outline our 
theoretical and empirical approach.
Theoretical framing and data
An important research stream in organization studies has focused on the 
circulation of ideas and models about management and organizing, seeking 
to explain the emergence of novelty in these processes. It has taken two main 
directions of analysis – diffusion and translation – each with their historical 
development and variants (Wæraas and Nielsen, 2016; Djelic, 2008), yet also 
with certain overlaps and connections. The primarily North American lit-
erature has investigated the diffusion of forms, concepts, and practices (e.g., 
Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; Fligstein, 1985, 1991; Baron et al., 1986; Meyer, 
2002). Later studies have examined how what diffuses may change along the 
way (e.g., Ansari et al., 2010; Drori et al., 2014).
In particular, European institutional literature (e.g., Djelic, 1998; Mazza 
et al., 2005; Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson, 2006) and Scandinavian Institu-
tionalism have focused on translation processes (Czarniawska and Joerges, 
1996) that are ‘stubbornly material’ and has argued that ‘to set something 
in a new place is to construct it anew’ (Czarniawska and Sevón, 2005: 8). As 
noted by Czarniawska and Joerges (1996: 47), ‘the concept of translation is 
useful to the extent that it captures the coupling between arising contingen-
cies and attempted control, created by actors in search for meaning.’ This 
stream of research has argued that ideas spread successfully when they are 
linked to eminent societal norms and values, as well as to authoritative legit-
imizers (Røvik, 2002). The energy needed for ideas to travel comes from us-
ers or creators as ‘willing political agents’ (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996), 
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as well as skillful and/or interested theorists (Strang and Meyer, 1993) who 
shape and reshape these ideas as they flow (Behrends et al., 2014; Røvik, 
2016). These various users in the circulation of ideas ‘energize an idea any 
time they translate it for their own or somebody else’s use’ (Czarniawska and 
Joerges, 1996: 23). Further, they strategically reframe and locally ground 
them, especially when they collide with prevailing practices in the receiving 
context, as was shown with US diversity management adoption into Den-
mark (Boxenbaum, 2006).
Scholars have also captured the application of managerial practices 
across dissimilar fields through transposition (Boxenbaum and Battilana, 
2005; Mazza et al., 2005). As Boxenbaum and Battilana (2005: 358) found, to 
‘become an innovation, a transposed managerial practice needs to be trans-
lated into a truly new form.’ In other instances, they are universalized and 
claimed as ‘panaceas’ (Mazza et al., 2015; Örtenblad, 2015); that is, ‘tools 
that work successfully in all kinds of organizations’ (Røvik, 2002: 126). At 
times, they also involve ‘politics of meaning’ (Slavich et al., 2020); that is, 
negotiating meanings in the public domain. Despite significant research on 
translation, further investigation is needed on its dynamics, capturing dif-
ferent approaches to purposefully translating an innovation into a model 
with wider impact. Theoretically, we seek to enrich the organizational liter-
ature on translation, which has predominantly focused on the travel of man-
agement concepts and models, such as Total Quality Management (TQM), 
Balanced Scorecard, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), or diversity 
management (Røvik, 2002; Alvarez et al., 2005; Boxenbaum, 2006), with a 
focus on cultural concepts and models.
The circulation of concepts and models associated with cultural prac-
tices, such as food, has been a topic of interest for scholars in history and 
the humanities, yet originally focused mostly on the spread of culture 
from hegemonic nation states, such as the United States to the periph-
ery (Stephan, 2005). Later interest has been directed toward studying cul-
tural exchanges, in some cases employing rather loosely the concept of 
circulation (Gänger, 2017; Poole, 2020). Cultural spheres, such as food, are 
generally quite ambiguous in terms of practices, as they tend to be charac-
terized by authenticity that is materially and emotionally anchored in the 
originating context. In order to understand such processes, we zoom in on 
ecologies of actors that circulate and disseminate ideas (e.g., Djelic, 2017; 
Westney and Piekkari, 2020) and not just those who edit them at adoption 
(Wedlin and Sahlin, 2017) and also the roles that different types of actors 
play in translating ideas (Spyridonidis et al., 2016). Doing so enables us 
to get further insights into processes of translation as proactively sought 
(Røvik, 2016).
In this chapter, we put forward some theoretical insights on translation 
by drawing on the case of NNC and its subsequent translations into a Nor-
dic food model. NNC is a particularly informative case, as its ideas and 
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practices have traveled widely since its creation in the context of a globally 
recognized general Nordic model of welfare state and society. Our under-
standing draws on a wide variety of sources, such as semi-structured in-
terviews with gastro-experts (chefs, gastro-entrepreneurs, and restaurant 
owners) and influential figures (political advisors, food program directors, 
and food scientists) associated with NNC. We gathered data between 2010 
and 2020. The first round of data collection was concerned with acquiring 
an understanding of the emergence and meaning of the NNC phenomenon 
and the role of Noma as an exemplar restaurant and a model for the ideas 
behind NNC, whereas the second round was directed toward understanding 
the model’s circulation. A comprehensive Infomedia and Retriever search in 
Danish and Norwegian was supplemented by a search in English in Factiva 
to gain a deeper understanding of media depictions of the historical back-
ground, current situation, and circulation of NNC within and beyond the 
international culinary field. Sources in Spanish were gathered and analyzed 
to unravel the depiction of NNC’s role in developing Bolivian cuisine (more 
on this below). Within the limited scope of this book chapter, we selectively 
highlight aspects of the collected and analyzed data to illustrate our argu-
ment on approaches to translation of NNC into a Nordic food model aimed 
at a wider impact. The rest of the collected data has been used as a back-
ground, shaping our overall longitudinal understanding of the trajectory of 
NNC.
Next, we delve into and define three approaches to translating NNC into 
a Nordic food model.
Approaches to translating New Nordic Cuisine for wider impact
Our study unraveled three distinctive approaches to translating NNC from 
an innovation to a model with wider impact, which we have labeled local-
izing, transposing, and theorizing for universal application. The first ap-
proach, localizing, is about elaborating and expanding the NNC ideas within 
the originating (Nordic) context through initiatives creating an impact on 
Nordic food culture. The second approach, transposing, involves adapting 
aspects of NNC and Nordic food culture to new contexts with distinctive 
and different challenges, with impact on culinary renewal and international 
development in the receiving context. The third approach is theorizing for 
universal application; that is, developing a template of universally applica-
ble ideas and practices, drawing on NNC, Nordic food culture, as well as 
transpositions to other contexts, with impact on food policy. We briefly in-
troduce and illustrate these three approaches below and suggest how they 
may contribute in different ways to the making of a Nordic food model. 
Table 12.1 provides a comparison of the three approaches to translation in 
terms of their focus and translation agents, objectified ideas that travel as 
well as their influence on and potential drawbacks for the development of a 
Nordic food model.
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Localizing
Localization has been defined as ‘the process by which practices and con-
cepts are modified according to the specific conditions of the locale’ (Drori 
et al., 2014: 17). In the context we study, it is about expanding the local 
(Nordic) meaning of NNC by translating it into Nordic food, Nordic diet, 
and Nordic food culture. In that, the high-end culinary innovation is 
Table 12.1  Approaches to translating New Nordic Cuisine (NNC) into a Nordic food model
Approach Localizing Transposing Theorizing for Universal 
Characteristics Application
Definition Expand Nordic Adapt selected aspects Create a template for 
(example) specificity, of NNC and Nordic application of Nordic 
translating the food culture into a culinary and food 
culinary innovation new context (e.g., practices in global 
to Nordic food Bolivian culinary food policy (e.g., 
culture (e.g., Nordic movement and Nordic Council of 
Council of Ministers’ manifesto) Ministers’ Solutions 
Programs I, II) Menu)
Translation Development of a Culinary and food Universal food policy 
focus Nordic food culture culture renewal in solutions for any 
non-Nordic contexts context
Translation Chefs, bureaucrats, Entrepreneurs, chefs, Bureaucrats, 
agents entrepreneurs, journalists policymakers, 
researchers, communication 
journalists experts
Objectified New Nordic Cuisine Manifesto of the Solutions menu: A 
ideas that manifesto and Bolivian Culinary Nordic Guide to 
travel movement Movement (MIGA) Sustainable Food 
Story of innovative Story of innovative Policy
and award-winning and award-winning Multiple stories 
restaurant Noma restaurant and connected to food 
socially oriented policy, from NNC 
food school Gusto and Bolivian cuisine 
to food waste, etc.
Influence Sustain and elaborate Extend NNC and Extend NNC and 
on the Nordic distinctiveness Nordic food into Nordic culinary 
development as NNC develops a Nordic model for renewal model to 
of a Nordic into Nordic food and culinary and social Nordic food policy 
food model Nordic food culture renewal model
Potential Lost scaling of impact Critique of post- Critique of lost Nordic 
drawbacks due to refraining from colonialism, identity of the model 
‘Nordic food’ label; domination. Potential as it is turned into a 
keeping distance to loss of receiving universal template
big food industry context’s authenticity
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translated into a wider food movement through energy provided by advisors 
and policymakers (Nordic Council of Ministers), entrepreneurs (initiators 
of various food projects), and researchers (for example, Nordic food lab, 
Nordic food diet). Viewing NNC as location-specific (that is, anchored in 
and having meaning in the Nordic region, as well as in the respective nation 
states), this approach to translation seeks to elaborate the distinctiveness of 
Nordic food from high-end to mass market. The ambition to ‘democratize’ 
the new culinary developments was there from the outset, as the following 
quote by the gastro-preneur Claus Meyer reveals:
Such initiatives – regardless of the complex and strategic motives behind 
them – strengthen the diversity of providers and products and generate 
a wave of enthusiasm at all levels in the category. It causes consumers to 
seek insight and ultimately leads to the goods that come out of the effort 
becoming democratically accessible rather than small culinary works of 
art, reserved for a narrow gastronomic elite.
(Meyer, 2006)
In 2005, a year after the New Nordic Kitchen manifesto was signed, it be-
came the foundation of the Nordic Council of Ministers’ Århus declaration 
and was elaborated into New Nordic Food Programme I (2007–2009) and 
Programme II (2010–2014). These programs provided direction and DKK 
18.5 million in funding for initiatives in the period 2007–2014 in the con-
text of Norden. Further, the concluding activities of the second program 
included a series of workshops with the theme #NORDICFOOD2024, en-
visioning a new horizon for Nordic food, which no longer used ‘new’ in the 
label and defined a ten-year horizon with possible future directions.
Following the 2006–2014 initiatives in its Programmes I and II, in 2016 the 
Nordic Council of Ministers presented a more focused programme, which 
sought to ‘democratise good food’ (New Focus Areas for New Nordic Food, 
2016). It prioritized three areas: food in the public sector, a Nordic food 
award, and food and tourism and anticipated that ‘there will be efforts to 
highlight New Nordic Food as a policy tool in other areas’ (ibid., 2016). In 
referring to public sector food, there is a clear ambition to develop a ‘model’:
The project ‘Nordic food in the public sector’ examines how a Nordic 
model for public sector meals can be developed and integrated across 
borders and across sectors. This year the project is being run by the 
Copenhagen House of Food and the Swedish National Food Agency in 
partnership with organisations and stakeholders in public sector food 
from across the Nordic Region.
(ibid., 2016)
Other initiatives sought to expand the set of meanings associated with 
Nordic food through research. One of them was the Nordic Food Lab, a 
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non-profit, open-source organization established in 2008 on the initiative of 
Meyer and Redzepi to ‘combine scientific and humanistic approaches with 
culinary techniques from around the world to explore the edible potential of 
the Nordic region’ (Nordic Food Lab, 2020: 5). The lab counted on support 
from independent foundations, private businesses, and government sources. 
In 2014, it became part of Department of Food Science at University of 
Copenhagen (KU) and was closed down as a self-governing lab although its 
activities continued as part of the KU’s Future Consumer Lab. A 2010 blog 
post by the Nordic Food Lab informs about a collaboration with ‘Nordgen, 
the amazing bank of genetic material, to evaluate the gastronomic potential 
of bygone varieties of Scandinavian produce’ (Nordic Food Lab, 2020: 10). 
Another blog post from 2011 gives a glimpse of another role of the lab that 
of disseminating the NNC ideas: ‘The Nordic Food Lab was honored to be 
invited to an EU Parliament session on innovation… to introduce the con-
cepts of the NNC, and hopefully disseminate the inspiration we find in the 
Scandinavian culinary momentum’ (ibid.: 11). A later article by two of the 
lab’s members affirms: ‘[we] are committed to Nordic cooking not primarily 
because of its value as a cultural export, but because of its value as an ex-
ploration of our own identity… in an increasingly globalized world culture’ 
(ibid.: 266). This reveals the interest in influencing not only Nordic food but 
also food culture and identity in the region.
These initiatives have broadened the impact of NNC by developing novel 
ideas and understandings related to Nordic food and Nordic food culture:
The focus in recent years on New Nordic Food has brought about 
meaningful and significant changes in food culture in a number of the 
Nordic countries. The trend also underlines some of our basic values: 
sustainability, creativity, quality and purity.
(Nordic Council of Ministers, 2014)
Overall, localizing allows sustaining and elaborating the Nordic distinctive-
ness in relation to food, paving the way for ideas of Nordic food and Nordic 
food culture. However, it could be argued that some potential for scaling up 
impact has been lost, as the main actors involved in these translations have 
refrained from involving big industry interests in order to create and enforce 
a ‘Nordic food’ label and standard for mass markets.
Transposing
Transposition is about applying a practice from one field into another, 
which involves adaptation and possibilities for further innovation (Boxen-
baum and Battilana, 2005). However, as Meyer (2014: 81) affirmed, ‘mean-
ingful items cannot be transported “wholesale” from one cultural context 
to another … they have to pass through a powerful filter of local cultural 
and structural constraints to also gain legitimacy in their new local context,’ 
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resonating with it. An example of the transposing approach is Claus Meyer 
and the NGO IBIS’ export and adaptation of ideas and practices from the 
Nordic culinary field; that is, rich welfare states seeking to develop Nordic 
food culture and identity, to a highly dissimilar context of Bolivia, one of 
the poorest countries in the world, seeking to create a sense of pride through 
cuisine and recognition as a culinary destination. These efforts were not 
intended to expand NNC to Bolivia, but rather to enable the development 
of own, locally embedded cuisine there, resonating with the local needs of a 
socially conscious culinary model.
In August 2010, Meyer established the Melting Pot Foundation as a ‘not-
for-profit with the mission of spreading social uplift through the culinary 
arts and traditions.’4 When we interviewed Claus Meyer in the winter of 
2010, he explained that he had been exploring whether the model could 
travel if one replaced the word ‘Nordic’ with any other (regional, national, 
etc.) location. While different sites were considered with both transferability 
potential and social purpose in mind, Bolivia was chosen because, among 
other possible reasons (for example, it had been a priority country for Dan-
ish development aid since 1994, with an Embassy opened in La Paz in 1995) 
on the grounds of its biodiversity:
If you have access to a large diversity of products, unknown to foodies, 
then you have a strong chance of coming up with something that could 
have global interest. Bolivia may have the most interesting and unex-
plored biodiversity in the world.
(Meyer, in Stocker, 2013)
In that it constituted an opportunity for wider impact: If we succeed, this 
will mean more to the Bolivian nation than Noma and new Nordic cuisine has 
meant to anyone (Meyer, in Stocker, 2013).
The Bolivian project was initiated in collaboration with La Paz local 
authorities and Oxfam IBIS (Smedegaard Jensen, 2011) and support from 
Danida, Denmark’s development cooperation, which is an area of activ-
ity under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (Udenrigsministeriet 
DANIDA, 2013). This project involved the creation of the gourmet Restau-
rant Gustu (inaugurated on April 4, 2013), Cafeterias and Schools Manq’a, 
and Gustu Training Center. The Gustu School sought to train young under- 
privileged Bolivians in the areas of kitchen and bakery.5
The First Bolivian Gastronomic Meeting took place on October 12, 2012, 
through a Symposium entitled ‘Tejiendo el Movimiento Gastronómico 
Boliviano’ (Weaving the Bolivian Gastronomic Movement) and involved 
discussions of MIGA, the Manifiesto del Movimiento Gastronómico Boli-
viano (its manifesto). Both Meyer and Jan Krag Jacobsen participated with 
presentations and Gustu provided the food for the event. Further local res-
onance was sought in collaboration with core local actors, such as ‘chefs, 
academics, farmers, and community leaders to collaborate on a new cuisine 
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to celebrate the country’s possibilities’ (Meyer, 2017). The team of trans-
lators also included the Danish chef Kamilla Seidler, who had experience 
with NNC and exposure to New Spanish Cuisine through an apprentice-
ship at the restaurant of leading Basque chef Andoni Aduriz. Aduriz and 
another Venezuelan-Italian chef Michelangelo Cestari, a close collaborator 
of Seidler from their time with Aduriz, were tasked with creating a leading 
Gustu restaurant and a culinary school for underprivileged youth.
Gustu was expected to become the new cuisine’s leading exemplar, similar 
to the role played by Noma, whereas the culinary school was an addition to 
the NNC model, an innovation that fitted the context, to fulfill the social 
purpose of the project and ensure culinary talent for the new Bolivian cui-
sine. As Seidler explained in Price (2016),
Bolivia right now is like a very young version of the New Nordic move-
ment. Young people who studied abroad are coming back and open-
ing restaurants. We’re seeing a very fast-growing middle class, which is 
where the restaurant boom becomes a reality.
(Price, 2016)
Seidler recollected that the purpose of the Bolivian initiative was ‘to start a 
pride about their food culture and their food to raise tourism and thus the 
economy in the country’ (Hartmann Eskesen, 2017). Gustu earned recogni-
tion as best restaurant and Seidler as Best Female Chef in Latin America 
(Price, 2016), but perhaps more importantly, for her efforts to connect with 
the local context, she was given the unofficial name The Dane of the Andes.
As Cestari noted (León, 2014; authors’ translation), ‘The restaurant is the 
tip of the iceberg of a series of projects that seek to generate a whole model 
of commitment with society.’ In a 2017 article entitled Food for All Man-
ifesto, Meyer elaborated on the importance of ‘incorporating community 
control in our organisational structures, with the eventual outcome being 
complete community control of the project.’ He further clarified that,
In La Paz [Bolivia], though, we remain on site as an available resource 
and – since we reserve certain rights as a funding agent and founding 
father – we are in the final stages of successfully transferring the Gustu 
restaurant to Bolivian leadership.
The translation approach in Bolivia extends NNC and Nordic food into a 
Nordic model for culinary renewal, which also has an impact on interna-
tional development. A potential limitation of such an approach to transla-
tion could be criticism of post-colonialism or domination as well as potential 
loss of the receiving context’s authenticity. However, as also related above, 
the entrepreneurs involved in the translation have sought to secure local 
sensitivity as well as ways of transferring the leadership of these culinary 
initiatives back to local hands.
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Theorizing for universal application
Theorizing is about ‘generalizing a translation so that it can diffuse within 
the organizational field’ (Boxenbaum and Battilana, 2005: 356). It is a ‘dis-
cursive process by which concrete forms or practices are turned into types’ 
(Meyer, 2014: 80). Theorizing may also be necessary in order to make tran-
sition from formulation to social movement to institutional imperative 
(Strang and Meyer, 1993). Theorizing could involve creating ‘panaceas’ with 
general appeal, independent of context (Røvik, 2002; Mazza and Strand-
gaard Pedersen, 2015; Örtenblad, 2015) through a quasi-object, such as a la-
bel or a manual (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996). An example of theorizing 
is The Nordic Council of Ministers’ (NCM) ambition to ‘package’ NNC’s 
and Nordic food’s principles and practices to enable their wider adoption, 
across contexts and in relation to different global challenges. In this case, 
what is ‘exported’ is a set of policy ideas as a Nordic Model of Sustainable 
Food Innovation, which seeks to involve a wider range of players across a 
variety of contexts through a ‘Solutions Menu’ (Halloran et al., 2018). As 
explained by Mads Frederik Fischer-Møller, Senior adviser, Nordic Coun-
cil of Ministers (interview, 2017): ‘[T]hat’s also about packaging this, being 
better to tell this story, being better to show this as part of a food policy tool 
case that others can take inspiration from … as Nordic model on sustaina-
ble food innovation.’
The Nordic Council of Ministers has systematically supported the devel-
opment of NNC (Byrkjeflot et al., 2013) and further pursued the circulation 
of Nordic food ideas, opening up new contexts of application through its 
programs, providing resources for these extensions, and legitimizing these 
efforts at the level of regional policymaking. It has also embarked on pack-
aging of ideas and related policies, given the growing international interest 
in replicating the ‘model.’ The following quote depicts this approach:
[P]eople are looking at the Nordic region, … combining their view of the 
Nordic region as sustainable, then they see the Nordic food revolution, 
then they think “there must be some policies behind it”… What they 
see is a blueprint of a policy, but actually is there one policy behind, is 
there ten policies behind? What’s actually behind this? … We can then 
give an outline on all the policies that have enabled the Nordic region 
to go from a developing country culinary-wise to a developed country 
culinary-wise. And that’s a project we are undertaking these years and 
then finishing in 2019.
(Interview with Mads Frederik Fischer-Møller, August 2017)
As the NCM’s senior advisor acknowledged:
“Nordic” as a label is not necessarily that interesting within the Nordic 
region but it’s very, very interesting outside of the Nordic region, so 
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that’s why we are focusing on networks between the actors that have 
internalized the principles… outside we say, “the Nordics!” and we are 
financing a food festival in New York called the “Nordics”.
(Interview with Mads Frederik Fischer-Møller, August 2017)
The Nordic Council of Ministers employs a number of mechanisms in pur-
suing more visibility for the Nordic food ideas, some of which involve re-
sourceful use of connections and opportunities.
… it was very, very fashionable in policy to think about “what are then 
the next businesses? Where are the next business opportunities?” and 
try to see “what can be the next?” and then … we decided, “okay, food 
and creative industries”. Sometimes … it’s also a matter of funding. If 
there is somebody doing a program on creative industries and we could 
say food and creative industries and then fund part of our project with 
that. We’ve believed in food and creative industries, but we also liked to 
double our funding so that’s one way of doing it. Then food and public 
diplomacy … was a core idea by Claus Meyer and he has been critical 
of the way food business operators, but also governments, were using, 
or not using, food to communicate the values of the Nordic region. So 
it was just an idea exactly on this, we need to be better to use food as a 
means of communicating our values when we are representing the Nor-
dic region internationally or just when the Danish minister is having a 
meeting, the topics of the meeting should be communicated through 
“what’s on the plate”.
(Interview with Mads Frederik Fischer-Møller, August 2017)
Overall, theorizing for universal application involves a high level of abstrac-
tion to ensure sufficient generality of the principles advanced (Strang and 
Meyer, 1993). This higher level of abstraction may lead to removal of certain 
Nordic specificities to enable a wider appeal.
Developing Nordic cuisine and food into a template for wider impact, 
independent of the context in which it is applied, could raise concerns about 
loss of authenticity. For example, Evans and Astrup Pedersen (2015) from 
the Nordic Food Lab have cautioned that ‘any cuisine which gains an audi-
ence outside of its birthplace’ is destined to become ‘essentialized, tokenized 
even, emptied of its historical context, rendered internally consistent and 
packaged neatly for foreign consumption,’ which comes with ‘precocious 
exporting.’ Yet, while such concerns are valid and need to be accounted 
for in processes of translation, they refer to the cuisine itself rather than 
to an overall food model that ‘packages’ a wider set of ideas and practices, 
particularly those involving food policies, that, despite being conceived in 
Norden and with Nordic values, can have wider appeal. Hence, while the-
orizing for universal application is the approach that can potentially have 
the widest impact due to its abstraction, it needs the other two translation 
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approaches – localizing and transposing – to support the authenticity and 
social consciousness of the Nordic food model. Below, we briefly discuss this 
connectedness between approaches.
Developing a Nordic food model across translation approaches
Each of the three approaches discussed in the previous section, along with 
NNC itself and the overall Nordic model, contributes in different ways, 
by providing different value, to the shaping of a Nordic food model (see 
 Figure 12.1). NNC, with its creativity and innovation, and its ongoing inter-
est for external, non-Nordic audiences, provides visibility for a Nordic food 
model. The localization gives it a wider local grounding and is a source of 
(Nordic-based) authenticity. The transposition shows how Nordic culinary 
ideas can travel to and have an impact in a context that is distinctively dif-
ferent from the originating one, yet resonates with NNC’s core ideas of a 
locality- based culinary renewal. It adds versatility to the Nordic food ideas 
and to the model in which these ideas are encapsulated. The theorization 
reveals how localized and transposed ideas can become of relevance to pol-
icymaking and have a potential global impact if abstracted and packaged 
together by skillful translators, thereby contributing universality to the 
model. In addition, Figure 12.1 suggests that the overall Nordic model is 
also relevant for the shaping of a Nordic food model, providing it with legit-
imacy, as well as with some of its foundational values.
Neither NNC nor the overall Nordic model or any of these three ap-
proaches alone are sufficient for transforming an elite cuisine into a food 
model with wider impact. Rather, the making of such a model needs these 
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Figure 12.1 Developing a Nordic food model across translation approaches.
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and possibly other approaches to connect and operate in a distributed way 
across contexts and audiences through an ecology of translation ‘of contin-
uously interacting translators, translations, and idea variants’ (Wedlin and 
Sahlin 2017; Nielsen et al., 2021: 5). These translations make it possible to 
bring together the different innovations and make them visible as a Nordic 
food model, thereby extending the impact of the original culinary, food, 
and food policy ideas. In addition, each of these approaches tends to bring 
further innovation through their local translation, as revealed in the case of 
transposition (Boxenbaum and Battilana, 2005).
In particular, the ecology of translation (Wedlin and Sahlin, 2017; Nielsen 
et al., 2021) that supports the traveling of these ideas involves three key el-
ements. The first is committed translators, such as gastronomic entrepre-
neurs like Claus Meyer, or bureaucrat entrepreneurs, such as those from the 
Nordic Council of Ministers, whose energy and creativity sustain and con-
tinuously generate new instances of Nordic culinary, food, and policy trans-
lations. In that way, they ensure an ongoing stream of translation attempts 
that keep the ideas in motion and thus keeps them current, associated with 
continuously relevant concerns. The second is powerful artifacts – key objec-
tified ideas – such as the Nordic cuisine manifesto and Nordic food move-
ment that are used to give meaning and legitimate the translations. They 
continuously appear in the background in all three approaches and are con-
tinuously invoked across translation attempts: as an ideology to guide food 
practices locally, as a tool to emulate in the renewal of the Bolivian cuisine, 
and even as element of support in food policy. Further, highly visible exem-
plars, such as Noma and Gusto, provide concrete practices to emulate and 
powerful stories that travel but also to make the impact of Nordic food ideas 
highly visible, especially as such exemplars attract strong international me-
dia attention. Last, while the objectified idea of a Nordic food movement is 
diffuse and not easily visible, it gives energy to translation by pointing out 
that it is a movement and not a model.
The third is the supportive media that ensures attention to the different 
aspects of the model, connects them, and gives sense to the diverse and 
disperse ideas. As the communication manager of the New Nordic Food 
Program II, Lindfors (2015: 14) acknowledged in the program’s final report: 
‘New Nordic Food has created a strong network of Nordic and international 
food journalists and bloggers. This is supported by communication cooper-
ation with Nordic Council of Ministers, national food actors, and the me-
dia.’ Overall, ‘[w]hat the New Nordic movement is trying to export is not a 
single cuisine, but an all-encompassing philosophy of food’ (Morris, 2020).
Concluding remarks
At the outset of this chapter, we asked how a new culinary innovation be-
came a Nordic food model in the process of its translation, ‘reshaping the 
food world’ (Morris, 2020). What we outlined and illustrated in response to 
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this question were three distinctive approaches to how NNC was translated 
and, in that, contributed to the shaping of a Nordic food model with wider 
impact in relation to food culture, culinary renewal, international develop-
ment, and food policy. These approaches are by no means exhaustive of the 
complex diffusion and translation dynamics of NNC. Other approaches to 
translation may be unraveled – and are worthy of further exploration – for 
example, in contexts translating NNC from a regional-level culinary con-
cept to national food models (such as Danish, Finnish, Icelandic, Norwe-
gian, and Swedish) that also involve agriculture and the food industry.
Further, an account of the translation of NNC and its evolution into 
a global culinary trend (e.g., Moskin, 2011; Petruzelli and Savino, 2014; 
Khaire, 2017) and a food model cannot be complete without accounting 
for the role played by an increasingly visible and popular general Nordic 
Model. Although this Nordic Model is still mainly associated with labor 
and welfare, in the period that NNC developed (2004–2018), it continued 
expanding its meaning in a range of cultural contexts, such as design, lit-
erature, TV, fashion, or lifestyle (illustrated, for example, by a variety of 
exhibitions and media publications referring to ‘Nordic cool’). This was also 
a period when the Nordic Council of Ministers established programs for 
regional branding; the Nordic countries developed their own programs of 
nation branding when they were ranked as top achievers in different indexes 
and presented as supermodels in international meetings and media (World 
Economic Forum, 2011; The Economist, 2013). Einar Risvik (2015: 9), the 
chairman of the working group New Nordic Food II, connected the ‘inno-
vation force’ of the food sector and food culture to the future of the overall 
Nordic welfare model:
The complete value chain for food is already the biggest value- creating 
sector in all Nordic countries, and with an increasing turnover, the num-
ber of employees will help to secure a strong contribution to the welfare 
of the countries. The consequence is that we need to see our food sector 
and our food culture as a major innovation force, worth maintaining in 
order to afford the future of the Nordic welfare model.
Our study suggests that the general Nordic model not only provides a source 
of initial values and meaning to the specific (culinary) innovation, as well 
as legitimacy to it and to the Nordic food model, but also gets enriched and 
reinvigorated by this culinary innovation, as the latter expands and consol-
idates into a Nordic food model in translation.
Of course, one may question whether the popularity of a Nordic food 
model, along with other specific Nordic models, is just a passing fashion or 
has a staying power. It could be argued that as long as the Nordic economies 
are doing well and are seen as examples of a more equal and progressive 
kind of capitalism, the interest in other aspects of the Nordic countries, such 
as their cultural models, will prevail. The positive connotations associated 
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with the term Nordic; the still-active gastro-entrepreneur Claus Meyer and 
the still visible Noma as an exemplar of cutting-edge innovation in Nordic 
culinary practice; and the sustained promotion by the Nordic Council of 
Ministers are all clearly important for sustaining NNC’s trajectory from 
innovation to impact. Rather than a coordinated strategic effort, however, 
it is the distributed and rather loose efforts by these diverse actors involved 
in translating NNC as a flexible concept on their own terms and imprinting 
different meanings on it that have shaped it as a Nordic food model, some-
times driving it in different directions. This chapter is an open invitation for 
further investigation into the role of ecologies of translation in transforming 
innovative ideas into impactful models.
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How are narratives of the Nordic Model constructed, circulated, and with 
what impact? This chapter addresses these questions by examining ‘Scandi-
navian Design’ using Sweden and Denmark with IKEA and Danish Modern 
specifically as representative of this design concept. It follows two circula-
tion processes. The first is the narrative constructions of the model between 
‘the outer non Nordic world’ – mainly the United States – and the Nordic re-
gion. The second process is how they were recirculated in and among these 
two Nordic nations.
I argue that ‘Scandinavian Design’ as a concept did not originate in the 
Nordic states but was ‘invented’ in the United States. It was constructed and 
filled with meaning that to a greater extent addressed target groups 
and ideas in North America rather than the Nordic region itself (Marklund 
and Petersen, 2013). When the concept was imported to the Nordic coun-
tries afterward, it was circulated and transformed through new symbolic 
meanings linked to the individual national Nordic narratives and was then 
returned or re-exported as brands with new meanings. This is thus a process 
of co-production where symbolic values of the nations are linked to design 
products and manufactures and add value to both the nation and producers. 
For example, IKEA is organically linked to the values of Sweden.
Contrary to the narratives of the Nordic model, then, which claim a com-
mon Nordic unity and identity, the national narratives were not created in 
harmony but often in contrast to each other as part of the individual nation- 
building processes going back to the nineteenth century. In Denmark, it is 
linked to ideas like small-scale production, anti-industrialization, process, 
and craft (Mordhorst, 2014). In Sweden, on the other hand, it is linked to 
price, and industrial and large-scale production.
The chapter combines a narrative approach with a branding perspective. 
A brand is created through images and narratives that differentiate one from 
one’s competitors, with the effect of making the product attractive in the 
eyes of the consumer or target groups (American Marketing Organization, 
2015). In the branding literature there is a tendency to conflate the strategic 






marketing efforts of branding and the brand. In praxis most brands do not 
emerge as the result of strategic branding efforts but as unintended side ef-
fects. It is logical to perceive nations as brands, but their brand images have 
not been created through branding campaigns; they are an outcome of cen-
turies of nation-building processes (Mordhorst, 2019). One example is the 
nineteenth-century national romantic construction of the Viking, which to-
day has transformed into an icon that is often used to brand Nordic countries, 
as well as products from the region. In contrast to Hansen (2010), who has 
analyzed the processes as strategic co-branding between Danish design and 
the Danish nation, this chapter claims that the concepts of ‘ Scandinavian-’ 
and ‘Democratic Design’ mainly emerge as unintended effects in the circu-
lation and then become brands that in the long run have positive outcomes 
for companies and the nation. This can be analyzed through the circulation 
of narratives. Narratives fill out the brand with semiotic signs and connota-
tions, but as with the distinction between brands and branding, there can be 
a difference between the sender of the narrative and the performative effects 
the narratives take on when they are received and circulated.
I have chosen chairs as the analytical objects and exhibitions as the cen-
tral contextual framing of the narratives. Chairs are seen as the icons of fur-
niture design and have played a key role in the Scandinavian modern design 
tradition (Dybdahl, 2017: 28; Olesen, 2018: 12). I have more explicitly chosen 
a Danish and a Swedish chair, both of which are framed as ‘iconic’ due to 
their long histories and statuses in exhibitions in Denmark and Sweden to-
day. The chairs are the Danish Wegner ‘Model 503’ or ‘The Round Chair,’ 
later dubbed by the Americans as ‘The Chair’ from 1949 (Dickson, 2017: 80) 
and the Swedish IKEA chair ‘Poem’ from 1976, renamed to the more Swed-
ish sounding ‘Pöeng’ in 1992 (Budds, 2016).
The analytical research fields are exhibitions and museums. These are 
sites where the chairs are transformed from furniture to exhibits and linked 
to broader cultural contexts. Exhibitions are combinations of exhibits, the 
exhibition texts, the design of the exhibition, and the museum housing the 
exhibition. In combination, this creates the ‘material exhibition.’ But exhi-
bitions are also sites where different stakeholders and networks contribute 
to the exhibitions with their own interpretations. You have the senders like 
curators, designers, craftsmen, their industries, museums, and exhibition 
halls. You also have the receivers like visitors, tourists, and consumers, and 
finally, you have the communicators such as design experts and lifestyle 
magazine reviewers. All take part in creating, transforming, and circulat-
ing the narratives with different purposes. Concepts like ‘Nordic,’ ‘Scandi-
navian Design,’ and ‘Democratic Design’ are thus abstractions, which get 
their meaning through ongoing circulations and exchanges between differ-
ent contexts and shareholders.
This chapter follows this process in four different exhibitions. In order to 
track the origin for the idea of Scandinavian Design, I begin with the World’s 
fairs held in the United States from Philadelphia in 1876 to New York in 
1939. After that I turn to the exhibition ‘Design in Scandinavia’ that traveled 
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around North America between 1954 and 1957. I then shift to two contempo-
rary exhibitions in Denmark and Sweden. The first is ‘The Danish Chair – An 
international affair,’ which opened as a permanent exhibition at the ‘Design 
Museum Danmark’ in the fall of 2016. The other is the IKEA museum in Swe-
den, which opened in the summer of 2016. The analytical focus in the reading 
of these exhibitions is to see how the narratives that were created in the United 
States are reconstructed and ‘nationalized’ today in Sweden and Denmark.
The focus is thus on the narrative construction of the concepts and does 
not claim to be a contribution to the design history of Scandinavia but relies 
on others’ research. The Danish historian Per H. Hansen has extensively 
analyzed the Danish furniture industry in Denmark and how it strategi-
cally has been branded and narrated in Denmark as well as in the United 
States (Hansen, 2010; Hansen, 2018). Jeff Werner has done the same from a 
Swedish perspective (Werner, 2008). The Norwegian art historian Ingeborg 
Glambek has analyzed Nordic design from an external perspective but with 
a more national and European perspective (Galmbek, 1997).
Scandinavian Design
The Norwegian art historian Kjetil Fallan has made a distinction between 
Scandinavian Design as an actor’s category, where it describes how actors 
in different cultural and historical contexts ascribe meaning to concepts, 
and Scandinavian design as an analytical category, being a concept that 
describes a specific empirical phenomenon (Fallan, 2012: 2). This chapter 
follows the first understanding, focusing on the concept of Scandinavian 
Design as socially constructed.
From the 1950s onward, Scandinavian Design has been a brand that has 
been profitable for Scandinavian companies in branches like fashion, furni-
ture, architecture, and interior design. In the last decades, it has also been 
used as co-branding new branches like the New Nordic Cuisine, and Nordic 
welfare services. Checking Wikipedia – a source that might be problem-
atic to use in regard to facts, but a good source if you try to trace a public 
 narrative – you can read:
Scandinavian design is a design movement characterized by simplicity, 
minimalism and functionality that emerged in the 1950s in the five Nor-
dic countries of- Finland, Norway, Sweden, Iceland and Denmark…
The ideological background was the emergence of a particular Scandi-
navian form of social democracy in the 1950s…. Many emphasize the 
democratic design ideals that were a central theme of the movement and 
are reflected in the rhetoric surrounding contemporary Scandinavian 
and international design.
(Wikipedia, 2017)
Wikipedia thus places the concept in time and space. It has its origins in the 
Nordic countries and the time is the 1950s, and a ‘from below’ perspective 
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is indicated when Scandinavian Design is characterized as an active social 
movement. This transforms the concept from a geographical and regional 
indicator to semiotic signifier for common values like simplicity, minimal-
ism, and functionality, and the concepts of ‘democracy’ and ‘democratic de-
sign.’ It is these more diffuse and slippery concepts of values which are in the 
center of analysis in particularly how ‘democratic’ emerges as a connotation 
for Scandinavian design and transforms it into a concept of its own by be-
coming ‘Democratic Design.’
North America: the origin of Scandinavian democratic design
Americans were the drivers in establishing Scandinavian Design and as-
sociating it with democracy. It was a process dating back to the late nine-
teenth century and culminated in the 1950s with the exhibition ‘Design in 
Scandinavia.’ Before the WW II, the development was centered on Sweden, 
alongside a broader narrative of the authentic and exotic north. After the 
war, Scandinavian Design became more associated with Denmark and a 
democratic vision building on general concepts and similarity between the 
United States and Scandinavia rather than on difference.
Sweden as the exotic north
From the late nineteenth century, Sweden was more active than any of 
the other Nordic countries in promoting their national art and design in 
the United States. A vehicle for advancing this was the World’s fairs – 
 Philadelphia 1876, Minneapolis 1887, Chicago 1893, St Louis 1904, San 
Francisco 1915, Chicago 1993, and New York 1939 – where Sweden was rep-
resented with national pavilions including special exhibitions of art, design, 
and craft. None of the other Nordic countries had a similar representation.
The Swedish art historian Jeff Werner has thoroughly analyzed the 
art and craft exhibitions at the World’s fairs from a Swedish perspective 
(Werner, 2008). I will focus on how the exhibitions were received and re-
viewed in the US media and how through this Sweden became the incarna-
tion of Scandinavian images and values.
A recurrent theme in the reviews is the making of Sweden as exotic and 
authentic. At the first World’s fairs, this was done through national-r omantic 
narratives portraying Sweden as a historically traditional rural society cele-
brating the peasants and peasant life (Norton, 1877: 87). In later exhibitions, 
this authenticity was supplemented with narratives of the north as having a 
specific climate, light, and race that differentiated the Swedes and the region 
from others. As a reviewer of the World’s fair exhibition in Chicago 1893 
wrote in the Evening Post:
As we move further north among the nations of Europe the art become 
fresher, brighter and perhaps more original. Something of the northern 
winds and lights, blue skies and waters, clear atmospheres comes to us, 
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and we begin to feel that far from the madding crowd of Paris there may 
be a new race with a new art.
To emphasize this unique and exotic character the review concluded: ‘The 
only hope for the northern painting lies in remaining northern painting and 
nothing else. Cosmopolitanism would utterly ruin it’ (Werner, 2008: 105). 
The national concept of Sweden is thus translated into the broader catego-
ries of ‘northern’ (climate) and ‘race’ as a positive and unique brand. Nor-
dicness as a racial category became a trope in subsequent years so much so 
that Nordic connoted the blond race (Lunde, 2012), often with the use of the 
romantic conceptions of the Vikings. In a review from the fair in St Louis, 
1904 you could read:
It is as if the Swedes could not restrain themselves, and had been under 
a sort of necessity of filling the art cup to the very brim until it should 
run over. A sort of violence and fury impel them; common language will 
not suffice; they want to shout and hurrah; they want to cover leagues 
of canvas; they want to invent pigments more brilliant than any ever 
existed. All this is truly northern; truly Scandinavian, and a little bar-
baric; but is it tremendous! Ponderous! Grand!
(Werner, 2008: 113)
Swedes are not just Swedes then; they incarnated the wild Vikings and were 
thus ‘truly’ northern and Scandinavian and able to express those values in 
their art and design. The use of the Viking mythology was useful in bridging 
past and present and the regional global.
The images served as brand driver and as such were excellent in prompt-
ing Swedish art and design. In 1927, the Metropolitan Museum of Art 
in New York (MoMA) held for the first time ever in the United States a 
one-country exhibition of industrial art. At the opening of the exhibition, 
the museum’s president Robert W. de Forest elaborated on how Sweden was 
both a monarchy and a democracy and that this is ‘notable in the character 
of its exhibits, and in their installation. It is democratic in that the objects 
displayed, beautiful as many of them are, are as rule not costly but are ap-
propriate even to humble homes’ (Werner, 2008: 255). The same narrative 
was to be found in the exhibition catalog’s introduction: ‘The quality of this 
decorativeness derives partly from the deeply rooted democratic tradition 
in Northern peasant work of simple masses.’ (Werner, 2008: 256). The intro-
duction was written by the main curator at the museum, Joseph Brick, and 
links Sweden and the rest of the Nordic region to the concept of democracy 
connoted with affordability, humble homes and to the masses. The exhibi-
tion was a success and continued as a traveling exhibition throughout the 
United States and Canada.
Sweden strategically used this successful outcome as part of marketing 
their own fair, The Stockholm Exhibition 1930, where the architecture of 
the pavilions was modern and functionalistic, just as the exhibited Swedish 
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furniture branded Sweden as a modern society and Swedish design as ‘Swed-
ish Modern’ (Glambek, 1997: 80ff). An additional marketing tactic was to 
invite 14 selected American journalists for free to the exhibition and an ex-
cursion around Sweden. This again created positive articles in the Ameri-
can media. One of the invited journalists was Marquis Child who in 1936 
published Sweden: The Middle Way (see also Chapter 4 by Carl Marklund 
and Chapter 5 by Andreas Hellenes), which was perhaps the most influential 
contribution to the positive image of Sweden and Scandinavia, particularly 
his comments on the cooperative movement and housing policies, in the 
United States (Child, 1936).
That these elements for a part of the American public had become linked 
with the concept of Swedish Design became evident when Sweden, as a part 
of the preparation to the World’s fair in New York, 1939, surveyed Ameri-
cans on their perception of Sweden. When asked what they associated with 
‘modern’ and ‘Sweden,’ a majority answered modern furniture, cooperative 
societies, and housing policy. This fitted the theme of the fair, which cele-
brated the 150 years anniversary of America and had the theme ‘Building 
the World of Tomorrow.’ The world of tomorrow was illustrated by the cen-
tral part of the exhibition, the utopian city ‘Democracity’ (Glambek, 1997: 
108). There was in other words an almost perfect fit between the New York 
fair and Sweden as incarnating Nordic and Scandinavian values as modern 
and democratic.
Jeff Werner has shown that the concepts of ‘Middle Way’ and ‘Middle 
Class’ merged with the concept of Swedish Modern during the 1930s, and 
that this was central to the export success for Swedish Modern in that 
decade:
Swedish design could in the interwar time benefit from being rewritten 
to a middle way between reactionary conservatism and radical modern-
ism. The design was at the same time narrated into a discourse on social 
welfare and beautiful everyday goods for all.
(Werner, 2008: 3)
Scandinavian design as democratic hominess
Positive images of Sweden as a model society and utopia were changed by 
WW II, however, particularly due to Swedish politics of neutrality during 
the war that in the United States was seen as acquiescence to Germany. 
This created an opening in the US design market for Danish Design. The 
Danes saw an opportunity to take over the former Swedish position and 
tried to persuade MoMA to host an exhibition on Danish modern furniture 
along the lines of the earlier Swedish Exhibition in 1927. Danish Design 
did get attention in America in the postwar period; there was an interest 
in Wegner and his chair design which, in 1950, was praised in a full page 
review in the magazine Interiors, and it was after this that it got the name 
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‘The Chair’ (Olesen, 2018: 330). Despite this emerging fascination, however, 
MoMA’s answer to the Danes was that it was not interested in an exhibition 
that only focused on Danish design, but perhaps a broader one that had 
Scandinavia as its theme would have greater appeal. The Danes were an-
noyed by the suggestion of a common Scandinavian exhibition. They were 
interested in promoting their own products and found that they could easily 
fill out an exhibition themselves. MoMA, on the other hand, pursued the 
idea of a common Scandinavian exhibition, and its director of Industrial 
Design, Edgar Kaufmann Jr., went on a tour in 1948 to Denmark, Sweden, 
Norway, and Finland to investigate the possibilities for such an exhibition. 
Kaufmann was thrilled by the design, but in the end, he did not find that 
there was enough quality for an exhibition at this time.
In Scandinavia, MoMA’s and Kaufmann’s pressure spiked an idea of a 
cooperation between the Nordic countries. If the Americans had an idea of 
a common Scandinavian design style and tradition, then why not address 
this and start exporting it (Glambek, 1997: 118)? By the end of 1951, a plan 
emerged at a meeting in Copenhagen with participation of the national asso-
ciations of craft, applied art, and design from Denmark, Finland, Norway, 
and Sweden. The idea was to join forces and establish a traveling exhibition 
that would tour through North America. This objective was endorsed by 
other influential people in America such as the editor for the interior design 
magazine House Beautiful, Elizabeth Gorden, who pushed for a Scandina-
vian design exhibition in America (Guldberg, 2011), and during the 1950s, the 
terms Scandinavian Modern/Scandinavian Design subsequently replaced 
the national connotations as the central concept (Werner, 2008: 344).
These Nordic countries had different opinions on the content and framing 
of the exhibition. The Swedish delegation focused on the commercial per-
spective in a common exhibition, while the Danish delegation emphasized 
‘the importance of showing the differences in the design cultures of the Nor-
dic countries’ (Guldberg, 2011: 48). Nevertheless, agreement was achieved 
and ‘Design in Scandinavia’ (Remlov, 1954) opened with over 700 exhibits. 
Subsidized by the Nordic governments, the exhibition traveled from 1954 to 
1957 to 24 cities around the United States and Canada and was visited by 
658.264 people (Guldberg, 2011). The impetus behind the exhibition was to 
boost the export of the individual national design branches under the um-
brella of Scandinavian Design, but this was just a part of the strategy. All 
four countries supplemented it with cultural events, marketing campaigns, 
promotions for national goods, and propaganda for their nations and ways 
of living.
‘Design in Scandinavia’ contributed to filling out the concept of Scan-
dinavian Design as democratic. In the exhibition catalogue, Scandinavian 
Design was narrated as an expression of the core of Scandinavian history, 
values, and identity, while differences resulting for example from the long 
tradition of warfare between the Nordic nations, as well as the image of the 
wild Viking, were toned down (Remlov, 1954: 11–20). American reviews of 
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‘Design in Scandinavia’ were positive. In a narrative perspective, it had a 
plot that stressed a familiarity between America and Scandinavia on the 
level of fundamental values, and at the same time, it made the Scandina-
vian Design goods expressions of those values more ideal and authentic. A 
review in the New York Times found that the high quality of Scandinavian 
Design was rooted in history, and the ‘inspiration for their design is based 
on centuries of high standards of living’ which is what one can see in the 
‘sophistication and high degree of culture that characterize the best of Scan-
dinavia’s craftsmen and architects’ (Hansen, 2018: 263). The lifestyle maga-
zine House Beautiful’s review argued: ‘Why are the home furnishings so well 
designed, and so full of meaning to us? Because they are so well designed 
and so meaningful for the Scandinavians themselves.’ And to stress the link 
and the natural connection of meaningfulness between Scandinavia and the 
United States, the review stressed that this was because ‘we are both deeply 
democratic people. Home is their centre – and people are the centre of their 
homes. Their design is human and warm. Therefore, it is natural, national, 
and universal.’ (Glambek, 1997: 128)
There was also a narrative link to the political climate in the 1950s where 
the discourse on the international scale, framed by the Cold War and anti- 
communism, built on a dichotomy between the good democratic West and 
the totalitarian East. This was not the only way that democracy as a concept 
was filled out, as Hansen sums up the reviews of ‘Design in Scandinavia’:
It is clear that the discussions and reviews in the American journals and 
newspapers for the most parts were based on a contraposition, between 
the rationalized USA and the Scandinavian countries, where the good 
craftsmanship, and focus on quality, function, simplicity and durability 
still were valuable elements.
(Hansen, 2010: 88)
The design had elements that made it easy to create a narrative that bridged 
tradition and uniqueness with a focus on elements like wood being the 
dominant material and craftsmanship with modernity, rationalization, 
and simplicity. In the American narrative on Scandinavian Design, there 
is an implicit critic of American society and of ‘corporate and industrial 
America.’ In contrast to Scandinavia, this corporate America is unable to 
produce democratic, warm, honest, and human design. Further, it could 
be argued that the journals and newspapers that talked so favorably about 
Scandinavian Design mainly attracted upper-middle class academics and 
liberals living in cities on the East- and West Coast. They could thus use 
the narrative of Scandinavian Design as a democratic showcase to signify 
Scandinavia as an alternative democratic society.
If we compare the narrative of Scandinavian Design in the 1950s and the 
Cold War with the narrative of Swedish Modern in the 1930s in the after-
math of the Great Depression, a change has taken place. The class references 
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and focus on the masses and affordability in the latter had been replaced by 
a narrative that focused more on the common history, craftsmanship, and 
aesthetic metaphors. ‘Sweden the Middle way’ had become ‘Scandinavia the 
Third way,’ a less political but still a very positive and idealistic narrative 
(Werner, 2008: 365). Instead of Scandinavian as once linked to the Swedish 
narrative, it had become an independent category. Seen as narrative the new 
Scandinavian story fitted better with the Danish national narrative than 
with the Swedish. This contributes to explain why Danish Modern replaced 
Swedish Modern in the American market.
From a branding perspective ‘Design in Scandinavia’ was a success that 
reached beyond the immediate commercial profits. What was launched as 
marketing and export campaigns for a specific industry ended up as a narra-
tive of modern Scandinavia and Scandinavian values as an ideal model for 
the good life. To what degree this had any background in the reality of the 
Scandinavian countries at that time was not important for either the Scan-
dinavian or the American audience. One reason why the exhibition became 
so successful was that Scandinavians did not need to construct, circulate, 
and market the narrative. It was constructed and narrated by Americans 
themselves and used as a positive magic mirror for national identity pur-
poses. In this way, differences in style, design, and competition among the 
Scandinavian countries were placed in the shadow of the Pan-Scandinavian 
narrative.
Democratic design in Denmark: art, craft, and small scale
In 2016 ‘The Danish Chair – An international affair’ opened as a permanent 
exhibition at the Design Museum Denmark (Olesen, 2018). The exhibition 
underlines the notion of Danish Design being linked to chairs, and indeed, 
Danish chairs have been well represented in the museum. For years, the 
Design Museum had the nickname ‘The Chair Museum.’
Historically this has its background in the fact that the museum played 
an active role in the creation and dissemination of the narrative of modern 
Danish furniture design. The museum has as part of its purpose to pro-
mote and brand the Danish design industry. From 1939 to 1966, the Design 
Museum hosted the annual ‘Exhibitions of hand-made furniture by mem-
bers of the cabinet-makers guild of Copenhagen.’ As Head of Research at 
the museum Lars Dybal expresses it:
Throughout the epoch [1927–69] the Design Museum Denmark was the 
central stage for the taste and status for the cabinet-makers’ annual ex-
hibition… With a glance the audience or the reviewer of the press could 
get an overview of the results of the current trends between the furni-
ture designing architects with their ambitious aesthetic energies and the 
joiner with their high work ethic and professional skills.
(Dybdal, 2017: 61)
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Even though the industry or designers have not been active in the creation 
of the ‘The Danish Chair’ exhibition, the Design Museum still sees itself as 
a part of the design network and has the promotion of Danish Design as a 
part of its purpose (Olesen, 2018).
The introduction to the exhibition is shown in a separate room and as 
with the rest of the exhibition it is minimalistic. The second part of the short 
introduction text starts with:
In 1949, in Design Museum Danmark, the furniture designer, Hans J. 
Wegner presented the chair, which American journalists were to dub 
‘the chair.’ It became the symbol of a giant Danish export adventure and 
a national brand known as Danish Design.
‘The chair’ is placed right next to the text in an unassembled version, which 
allows visitors to see every part of it. Hence, ‘The Chair’ is placed as the 
nexus of the exhibition and thus becomes its icon, and it is also the first chair 
mentioned and described in the book that serves as the exhibition catalog 
(Olesen, 2018: 10–11).
The main exhibition consists of the display of 110 chairs. Each chair has 
an individual display case and is presented more as art works than as furni-
ture or as cultural-historical exhibits. However, text and information about 
the chairs can be found in posters, which can be pulled out off the side of 
the display cases.
A kind of contextualization is presented at the end of both sides of the 
exhibition hall where a video loop can be seen. Most of the time it shows 
cabinetmakers working on the chairs almost as if they are artisans work-
ing on an artwork, making it visible that the chairs are handcrafted. Other 
video clip parts show designers drafting the chairs.
In the main exhibition hall, ‘The Chair’ is placed in the center of the exhi-
bition. When you pull out the poster, nearly half of it is devoted to a picture 
of John F. Kennedy sitting in ‘The Chair.’ The text explains that:
The Chair became a symbol of Western democracy, because it was used 
in the first televised election debate in the United States between John 
F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon in 1960.
The picture of Kennedy sitting in ’The Chair’ has been used extensively 
in the marketing of Danish Design. The semiotic link between the Danish 
chair, Kennedy, and democracy is a powerful cocktail. It was used as part of 
a narrative of a democracy represented by Kennedy and the growing upper- 
middle class in the United States, wherein Nixon represented the undemo-
cratic villain (Figure 13.1).
In Denmark, the link between intellectualism, democracy, and ‘The 
Chair’ is still active. For example, do the Danish Prime Minister receive 
prominent guests in a room furnished with ‘The Chair.’ Consequently, 
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Clinton, Bush, and Obama, among others, have all sat in ‘The Chair’ when 
visiting Denmark.
The Kennedy narrative is itself a development of the larger story of why 
Danish modern furniture is perceived as democratic. This is a national 
Danish narrative that is linked to Danish history, and it was developed be-
fore the international breakthrough of Scandinavian- and Danish Design 
in the 1950s. This narrative is represented in the video loops in the exhi-
bition with the carpenters and designers. As Per H. Hansen has argued, 
it emerged in the interwar years when a network of designers and cabinet-
makers joined together in creating a new design style (Hansen, 2018). They 
had to distinguish themselves from the international design styles like the 
Bauhaus and functionalism on one side, and traditional Danish furniture 
on the other. In other words, Danish Design represented a compromise be-
tween national history, international outlook, and traditional and new de-
sign. With regard to the traditional parts, the designers focused on ‘natural’ 
materials like wood and leather and emphasized the role of craftsmanship 
Figure 13.1 Photo of ‘The Chair.’
Source: Wegner 1949 ‘The Chair’ © Designmuseum Denmark.
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in the production. The new democratic furniture was handmade all the way 
through and used the design to build on values like simplicity, honesty, and 
timelessness. Perhaps as one of the most important elements, they were cre-
ated in a ‘democratic’ process between the cabinetmaker and the designer, 
who were the heroes of the narrative.
This very much resonated with the broader Danish national narrative 
that had been at the center of the Danish nation-building process since 
the last half of the nineteenth century, building on the loss of Norway and 
Schleswig-Holstein. It was one that focused on smallness, historical roots, 
bottom-up processes, and anti-industrialism (Mordhorst, 2014). These were 
the values that filled out the concept of democracy in the Danish narrative 
(Figure 13.2).
As part of the narrative, those values had a negative counterpart that 
served as the villain – industrial production. Specifically, Bauhaus design-
ers used ‘unnatural’ materials like plastic and metal, and unlike the Dan-
ish focus on craftsmanship and production in small workshops, you had 
large-scale production: ‘Wegner’s design offered a new modernist alterna-
tive to cold, rational modernism from Bauhaus. With its craft tradition, 
sensuous qualities and organic and more humanistic expression Danish 
Modern…softened the sharp, objective, cool modernism that Bauhaus 
represented’ (Exhibition text Design Museum Danmark, Bauhaus 100 
year, 2018).
As in most narratives, there are inconsistencies in the Danish Design nar-
rative. One is that the high price did not fit with the idea of equality in an 
Figure 13.2 Photo of ‘exhibition hall.’
Source: ‘The Danish Chair – An international affair’ © Designmuseum Denmark.
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economic sense. Most of the furniture was – and is – expensive and luxuri-
ous. For example, the cheapest version of ‘The Chair’ costs 4.700 USD. That 
makes it rather unlikely for ordinary Danish citizens to furnish their homes 
with ‘Danish Democratic Design.’ The price also distinguishes the Danish 
version of democratic from the Swedish present version of democratic de-
sign, which is exhibited at the IKEA Museum.
Democratic design in Sweden: IKEA
In June 2016, the ‘IKEA Museum’ (IKEA, 2016) opened in Älmhult, Swe-
den, a small village and birthplace of IKEA founder Ingvar Kamprad. 
The museum is situated in the same building which housed the first IKEA 
store that opened in 1958. The exhibition is divided into three themes: ‘Our 
Roots,’ ‘Our Story,’ and ‘Your Stories.’
The design and style are strikingly different from the Design Museum 
in Copenhagen. It displays the ‘IKEA style’ and signals that it addresses 
ordinary people with ordinary materials. These are typical for IKEA: for 
example, many of the display cases and exhibition floors are made of chip-
board and plywood. But as is often the case with IKEA, the exhibitions are 
thought through in all details. Instead of placing the furniture as artworks, 
most of them are, just as in IKEA warehouses, made up as room interiors, 
and by this the lived life in the homes of families becomes the object of the 
IKEA museum.
The first part of the exhibition ‘Our Roots’ takes place on the ground 
floor. The narrative and plot expressed is very explicit. It is Sweden’s devel-
opment from a poor and undeveloped nation to a modern social democratic 
welfare state, with IKEA being a driver in this transformation. The intro-
ductory text with the title ‘Our Roots’ starts with the sentence:
At first poor and undeveloped, then, starting from the 1930s a country 
determined to become a modern egalitarian society. Two very different 
periods that in their own ways shaped the IKEA we know today.
The first part of the period is described as a hard time: ‘living in Sweden was 
a struggle, constantly battling hunger and poverty.’ The values of solidarity, 
entrepreneurship, and austerity are stressed in the texts: ‘they saved and 
scrimped, patched and mended. Nothing went to waste. Everything that 
could be reused got a new life. Only those who were thrifty and inventive 
succeeded.’
These were the values and virtues that helped to transform Sweden 
from a poor agricultural country to a modern industrial society, which is 
the heading of another text: ‘How would Sweden become a better coun-
try to live in? The Social Democratic government of the 1930s had a plan: 
It was time to sweep away “Dirty Sweden” with rationally constructed 
housing, improved hygiene and enlightened citizens. It was time to build 
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“The People’s home.”’ These homes would be furnished with IKEA, thus 
linking the materialization of the Swedish welfare society’s values with 
IKEA through this narrative.
This is a typical Swedish narrative (Rodell, 2014), where the industriali-
zation of Sweden is the driver. The villain is old poor agricultural Sweden 
which kept the Swedish people in poverty. The heroes are a unity of the So-
cial Democrats and ‘genius entrepreneurs’ like Ingvar Kamprad, who used 
his entrepreneurial skills for the Swedish nation. The receiver is the Swedish 
people, and what made it into the everyday life of reality is IKEA and their 
democratically designed furniture.
The concept of democratic design is elaborated in the next part of the 
exhibition ‘Our Story.’ While ‘Our Roots’ was placed on the ground floor, 
‘Our Story’ is placed on the brighter first floor of the old warehouse. On 
the ceiling, there is a moving band with posters of hundreds of the most 
famous pieces of IKEA furniture from different times. Below the photo of 
the furniture, there is a short description in nearly the same format as the 
price tag you would see in the stores, with bold letters for the name and the 
price highlighted. So in contrast to the Danish narrative and exhibition, 
the rolling band reminds visitors that the furniture is not ‘timeless’ but an 
expression of its time; it provides association to an assembly line in an in-
dustrial plant, and the price tag shows that IKEA furniture is cheap because 
it is mass-produced.
The displayed interiors are typical for the different decades of IKEA’s his-
tory. Some are even glued to the ceiling, perhaps as a gimmick. In contrast 
to ‘Our Roots,’ this part of the exhibition uses humor as a part of the exhi-
bition language, reminding the visitor that IKEA is also about fun and play.
One example of this is ‘Our Icons’ consisting of four items. One display 
case looks empty at first glance, but then the spectator can see a small 
exhibit: ‘The Allen key’ that is used to assemble IKEA furniture. So in-
stead of placing one of their iconic pieces of furniture, they place a small 
tool. This is followed by the text: ‘The Allen key is a democratic little 
invention. It doesn’t care if you’re all thumbs or a master carpenter. All 
it asks of you is a little hand power and a few minutes of your time. The 
pay-off is your very own, self-bassembled pieces of IKEA furniture at a 
self- assembled price.’ The Allen key is thus made democratic because it 
makes the consumer a co-producer, which saves money for the consumer. 
This is again in sharp contrast to the Danish narrative, where the produc-
ers were craftspeople who through an artesian process made the furniture 
democratic.
The display case besides the Allen key has the title ‘Hip hip hooray!’ and 
exhibits a small model of the armchair Poäng that, according to the text, was 
designed to last a lifetime and now celebrates its 40th anniversary. Poäng is 
exhibited at different places in the exhibition, where different aspects of its 
success are highlighted. At the poster on the moving band, it is the low price 
of 55 USD – meaning that you can buy 85 Poäng chairs for the same price as 
one ‘The Chair’ (Figure 13.3).
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The link between the IKEA version of democratic design and affordabil-
ity is also a key issue in the largest exhibition text in ‘Our Story’ placed in 
the center of the hall and entitled Democratic Design. The text says: ‘Well 
designed, functional, good quality, sustainably sourced and manufactured, 
and truly affordable. Five elements working together in the same product. 
This is democratic design.’
At this spot, museum guides on a bookable tour relay a short narrative 
about the IKEA version of how democratic design entered into IKEA as a 
core value: ‘Ingvar Kamprad had been at the furniture fair in Milan, and 
seen the Scandinavian furniture. He came back frustrated and said ‘Every-
body can design a beautiful sofa to 50,000 Kroner [5,800 USD], but to make 
a well-designed sofa of good quality to the tenths of that price that is what 
makes it democratic’ (Figure 13.4).
This is the closest you can come to a critique of the Danish version of 
democratic design without mentioning Denmark explicitly, and in this way 
stressing that democratic furniture should be affordable for most people in 
a society in order to be democratic.
Today it is a central element in the IKEA brand that all the furniture 
has Swedish names, but just like the blue- and yellow-colored logo and 
Figure 13.3 Photo of ‘Poäng.’
Source: Poäng © Inter IKEA Systems B.V.
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warehouses, this is a later invention because up until 1984, IKEA’s colors 
were ironically red and white like the colors in the Danish flag (Kristoffer-
son, 2014). Paradoxically this is a part of IKEA’s internationalization and 
globalization that produced the national Swedish narrative around IKEA. 
The more global IKEA has become, the focus on ‘national’ and Swedish has 
become stronger on their brand and brand narrative, and as a part of this 
the focus on democratic design.
From Wegner to IKEA
We thus have two national narratives as to what constitutes ‘Democratic 
Design’ that on key issues contradict each other (Table 13.1):
The question is how can two narratives that in so many parts exclude each 
other be brought together in a united concept as Scandinavian democratic 
Design?
The Danish version of democratic design was, despite its price, an export 
success in the 1950s and 1960s, but in the 1970s, it began to decline. There 
are different explanations for this. First, the Danish modern design had not 
been able to renew itself. It was after all not ‘timeless’ and it fell out of fash-
ion (Hansen, 2010). Other causes included the pop-cultural movement of the 
1960s and 1970s that changed the idea of modernity and furniture design. 
Together with the economic crises in the 1970s, this further put pressure on 
Figure 13.4 Photo of democratic design.
Source: IKEAs visual image of ‘democratic design’ © Inter IKEA Systems B.V.
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high-end furniture, and it became increasingly difficult for the narrative to 
unify the price level with the concepts of democracy and equality.
Into this void, a renewed version of the Swedish/Scandinavian narrative 
from the interwar years on democratic Scandinavian design made a come-
back, now with the Swedish furniture company IKEA as its central player. 
Sweden had regained its positive connotation as representative of a middle 
way, balancing social welfare with capitalism. This fitted the IKEA narra-
tive on democratic design perfectly.
Until the decline of Danish Design in the 1970s, IKEA focused on the 
domestic market. But in this decade, the company also began to internation-
alize, rapidly expanding and becoming an ongoing success. There was still 
a demand for ‘Scandinavian Design,’ and the IKEA narrative and price was 
more in line with the time, had a broader target audience, and perhaps was 
more in touch with the development of the general Scandinavian brand. The 
narrative’s correlation of the Swedish welfare state and Sweden and IKEA 
is one of the best examples in the world of successful co-branding between 
nation and company.
What happens if you make the counterfactual thought experiment and 
ask: could IKEA have been Danish? Denmark was in the 1950s and 1960s 
the frontrunner with regard to Scandinavian design, so why did IKEA not 
emerge in Denmark? If we look at the narratives, they are in contrast to each 
other at most of the key points, not just on the price issue but also on the 
values. The Danish narrative values ‘small’ and ‘handcraft’ while it deval-
ues ‘big’ and ‘industry’ as evil and antidemocratic. This is in contrast to the 
Swedish narrative. In this perception, handcraft and small-scale production 
are elements that belong to the poor and negative past that Sweden was 
able to liberate itself from through the industrial revolution that resulted in 
IKEA and other large corporations like Volvo and Ericsson and made Swe-
den a rich welfare society. With this in mind, it would be unlikely that a com-
pany like IKEA could have emerged in Denmark because it would not have 
the legitimacy to brand itself as representative of Danish and democratic 
Table 13.1  Danish and Swedish versions of democratic design
Design Museum IKEA Museum
Danish democratic design Swedish democratic design
1930–1970 1970 and onwards
Example ‘The Chair’ Poäng
Price: 30,000 DDK Price: 425 DDK
Production Small scale and craft in cooperation IKEA, industrial large-scale 
between designers and joiners production
Keywords why • Craftsmanship • Price
democratic • Quality • Quantity (cheap)
• Honest material • Environmentally responsible
• Eternal design
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values. The national narratives are performative and have become moral 
and cultural institutions. In this function, the narratives legitimize what is 
seen as ‘good,’ ‘national,’ and ‘democratic’ business and what is illegitimate 
and un-national business.
Are there ‘counter cases’ that falsify my argument, like a Danish ‘IKEA’ 
or a Swedish ‘Wegner’? A Danish counterpart to IKEA could be the Dan-
ish furniture company ‘FDB-Møbler’/Coop Furniture. It was established 
in 1942 as a part of the Cooperative Consumer Society in Denmark, with 
the purpose of producing design furniture at an affordable price for the 
(middle class) people (Hansen, 2014). FDB-Møbler became a huge success 
in the postwar decades. Their best-selling chairs were mass produced to 
over 800,000 copies. But despite the demand for their high-end Danish de-
sign, they were not able to transform their national success into an export 
success and from the middle of the 1960s a decline started in the home 
market. Ironically, they closed production down in 1969 – the same year 
as IKEA began their international expansion by opening their first store 
outside of Sweden in Denmark. There are different reasons for the decline 
of FDB, but one of the main ones is that they did not succeed in exporting 
their brand because it was too linked to the national Danish cooperative 
narrative.
Likewise, you could argue that the Swedish furniture architect Bruno 
Mathsson is comparable to Wegner in Denmark. In some aspects, this is 
true. Mathsson became internationally famous and some of his chairs were 
bought by MoMA both as museum exhibits and as a part of the interior de-
sign of the museum. But he differs from the Danish architects in two aspects. 
First, his chairs did not become a commercial export success to the United 
States and second, he was not narrated as part of a national movement 
either in America (Werner, 2008: 350–351), as had happened in Wegner’s 
case, or in Sweden where Mathsson was portrayed as a ‘genius entrepre-
neur’ (Rodell, 2014) in line with the Swedish national narrative (Mathsson, 
2019). The counter cases, therefore, serve as verification of difference in the 
national circulation of design narratives rather than as falsification of the 
influence of the national narratives.
The design case study shows a process where the Nordic and Scandina-
vian stories are constructed outside the region and then circulated in the 
region and returned. While these processes can be said to have produced 
a brand, it would be misleading to see this as the result of branding or 
co-branding. Instead, they are the side effects of complex interactions. It 
also shows that the external construction is dominated by narratives on har-
mony and positive images while the internal Nordic circulation in contrast 
shows competition and strife between the national cultures. This has also 
been the historical pattern, wherein the Nordic states and nations have been 
created in a process where the neighboring countries have been the nega-
tive mirror and villain. This has created a region with similarities but also 
differences. Following this, it is difficult to see how a Nordic model could 
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emerge among the Nordic countries themselves. As a broad brand frame, 
the Nordic and Scandinavia works well because they values and narratives 
that are produced outside the region, that has been picked up in the Nor-
dic countries and re-exported. This has become the Nordic brand model 
used brands like Nordic Lifestyle, New Nordic Cuisine, Nordic Noir, Nor-
dic Greentech, and so on, which then again have contributed to a positive 
reputation of the North.
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The Nordic model is an ambiguous concept. It changes, it flows, and it 
emerges in new fields with new carriers and purposes. This insight is almost 
as old as research on the Nordic model, but in this volume, we have made the 
ambiguity our point of departure and integrated it as part of our approach. 
We sketch out this approach in Chapters 1 (Introduction) and 2. Here we 
stress how the idea of a Nordic model is not only a matter of balancing sim-
ilarities and differences between the Nordic nation states, as is most often 
the case in previous research, but also a matter of studying the influence of 
external factors, and to link the domestic, Nordic, and international levels. 
While the ‘Nordic model’ thus for the most part has been used in the sin-
gular, our empirical studies in this volume have demonstrated it is a rather 
plastic and pluralistic concept.
In order to better understand the processes behind the transformation 
and developments of the Nordic models, we have throughout the book fo-
cused on the empirical circulation, translation, and diffusion of the  models – 
and associated concepts like the Swedish- and Scandinavian models. This 
transnational perspective allows us to grasp how the model has been con-
ceptualized, traveled, and changed over time and place and how it has 
entered into various spheres through different networks and actors with 
different semantics. The chapters in this book analyze different dimensions 
and layers of the model, showing that the routes and ways of how the model 
travel and circulate are non-linear, sometimes even paradoxical, and ran-
dom. However, from a bird’s-eye view, the empirical richness of the indi-
vidual chapters allows us to point out some patterns and trajectories in the 
circulation-routes of the ‘Nordic model.’
Our transnational perspective makes it visible that the Nordic model has, 
over time, become a globalized concept as well as a globalizing concept. It 
has become an integrated part of global discourses and surfaces a variety of 
places and with different directions of circulation. This clearly questioned 
the image of a one-way diffusion of ideas originating exclusively in the Nor-
dic region. The chapters in this book demonstrate that the Nordic model(s) 
do not always emerge in the Nordic region or have the Nordic region as a 
part of the intended target audience.
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Several chapters analyze how Nordic models were strategically con-
structed and used by networks and stakeholders outside the Nordic region. 
In France, the Swedish model was mobilized in the aftermath of the student 
rebellion in 1966, in a way the Swedish social democrats first rejected, as an 
expression of the model (Chapter 5). In a similar way, the idea of ‘Scandi-
navian Design’ (Chapter 13) emerged in postwar North America. A more 
contemporary example is the use of references to the Nordic model in Brit-
ish healthcare policy over the last decades (Chapter 11), as part of a New 
Public Management agenda promoting privatization and marketization, in 
contrast to the historical Nordic traditions and experiences.
However, the routes of travel include more than a spatial and geographi-
cal perspective. The models also move between different spheres and diffuse 
into new fields and sectors. Mjøset (Chapter 3) discusses how the idea of 
a Nordic model traveled between the political and academic spheres and 
changed in this process. Other chapters discuss how the model has diffused 
to the cultural sphere (Chapter 13) and how the Nordic model is strategically 
mobilized as template and brand in the creation of the New Nordic Cuisine 
(Chapter 12).
Within academia, we find a diversity of ways to research the Nordic 
model, from ambitions for synthetic concepts to more social constructivist 
approaches. In politics, the search for the model is more of the normative 
kind – models may be ranked and compared, used as a benchmark or as 
justification for reforms or political programs. This includes also negative 
use, where reference to a model point out policies that are to be avoided (see, 
e.g., Chapter 4). As the models travel between the different spheres, they are 
translated or innovated by new actors and adapted to new purposes. When 
the ombudsman institution was imported into North America in the 1960s, 
it happened in a way rather ignorant of Nordic experiences (see Chapter 8). 
At first, the Nordic origin was regarded as a positive feature. However, as the 
first attempts of adoption failed, US promoters of the ombudsman changed 
to a strategy of domesticating, i.e., getting rid of all references to its origin 
and instead emphasized the cultural fit with American values. We find sim-
ilar ways of domestication and translation taking place in the case of the 
Norwegian model of board quotas (Chapter 10). When this model was lifted 
to the EU-level, its source of origin was largely hidden (Inderhaug, 2018).
In these domestication and translation processes, we see a very diverse set 
of actors involved, such as international organizations, media, ranking and 
rating agencies, and not the least policy entrepreneurs, activist networks, 
and epistemic communities. Arguably, networks tend to become more com-
plex over time with the growing importance of social media, global policy 
exchange, and new arenas for exchange between experts and policymak-
ers. The expanded circulation of policy ideas imported from the Nordics 
reported in Chapter 9 on prostitution regulation or in Chapter 7 on devel-
opment aid reflects the existence of such ecosystems of policy professionals 
and activists.
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In some cases, we find rivalry between the Nordic countries about being 
acknowledged as the source for the ideas that are exported as ‘Nordic.’ In 
most cases, Sweden appears as the dominant point of reference (see Chap-
ters 4–6). In the case of the board quota model (discussed in Chapter 10), it 
travels as a Norwegian model. The prostitution regulation model (discussed 
in Chapter 9), however, has been imported into five countries as a Nordic 
model although it is also only Norway, Sweden, and Iceland among the 
Nordics that have put into effect that model. In this way, we find examples 
where Nordic and national branding ambitions clash as well as examples 
where they go hand in hand and mutually reinforce each other (Chapter 
13). However, from a national branding perspective, branding agents and 
public diplomats wanting to control the spread of the models are confronted 
with an impossible task since it is rather international activist and policy 
networks who may take control and choose the labels and models that serve 
their cause best.
In the field of culture, the Nordic model is framed as an aesthetic cate-
gory, integrating elements such as landscape, light style, and historical nar-
ratives in definition, as often seen in the successful use of it in art, crime 
fiction, TV-series, and lifestyle products. These aesthetics elements are in 
the commercial sector often translated into brand images and utilized, as a 
means for profit, such as when it was used to create and renew Scandinavian 
Design (Chapter 13) or when high-profiled Nordic chefs wrote the manifest 
for the New Nordic Cuisine (Chapter 12). The use of the Nordic model as 
brand is, however, not limited to the commercial sector. Several contribu-
tions in the book exemplify how the Nordic model has been used as a brand 
for exporting political ideas and models. Chapter 4 analyses how diplomats 
use the Swedish and Nordic welfare models as a brand for promoting Swed-
ish interests. Chapter 9 points out how Swedish and Norwegian political 
legislation was transformed into an international brand by feminist NGO 
organizations through the framing of it as the Nordic Model of prostitu-
tion regulation. Again, we see how the models are circulated and translated 
through actor networks representing different interests and purposes.
Held together, the historical case studies in the book indicate changes in 
the use of the Nordic model over time. Models such as the ‘Nordic model of 
Prostitution Regulation’ and the ‘New Nordic Cuisine’ are recent phenom-
ena, while other models have lost in traction. Some models are sticky and 
have long lives, whereas other models are short-lived fitting only a specific 
moment in time. From the interwar period up to the 1980s, ‘welfare,’ ‘Swe-
den,’ ‘progressive,’ and ‘social democratic’ were often seen as the core of the 
model (see especially Chapters 2–6). This seem to have changed somewhat 
over the last few decades where some of the good old virtues have lost trac-
tion, and as pointed out in Chapters 4 and 11, the Nordic model(s) became 
more contested. This paved the way for new understandings of the Nordic 
model (as discussed above), at the same time as the classical images contin-
ued to carry some weight (see Chapter 2 on the duality of the Nordic model).
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When we started this book project five years ago, it was under the impres-
sion that the Nordic models were gaining in attraction. The Nordics were 
dominating international rankings as the happiest, least unequal, most gen-
der friendly countries (Stende, 2017). As argued by Kangas (2000), looking 
behind the Rawlsian ‘veil of ignorance,’ allows us to choose the country in 
which we want to live but without knowing the particular socioeconomic 
circumstances in which we will be living, the Nordic model would, indeed, 
be a rational choice. These impressions were backed by international atten-
tion. In 2013, The Economist declared the Nordic model as ‘the next super-
model,’ and prior to this, the ‘Nordic way’ was on the formal agenda of the 
2011 Davos meeting (World Economic Forum, 2011). At a 2016 state dinner, 
President Obama proclaimed that the world would be in a better place if it 
followed the ‘Nordic way’ (The White House, 2016). Even in the cultural and 
lifestyle spheres, the Nordic model and ‘Nordicness’ were in vogue and high 
demand in areas such as Nordic living and lifestyle (Hygge), Nordic Noir, 
and New Nordic Cuisine.
Even though this was just a few years ago, the world has changed in rather 
remarkable ways. In 2016, the United Kingdom voted to leave the Euro-
pean Union and shortly after Donald Trump was elected president in the 
United States. Populism is flourishing also in Europe, challenging the tra-
ditional way of doing politics. New movements such as Black Live Matters 
and MeToo have emerged on the scene and challenged established social 
and cultural orders. In 2015–2016, Europe experienced a refugee crisis, and 
in 2020–2021, the world is in the middle of the COVID-19 global pandemic. 
These are events that will shatter and shape the world around us in the com-
ing decades – and they will also affect the Nordic model(s) and the interna-
tional circulation of the model(s).
We do not claim to be able to predict the future in any detail. Far from 
that. However, we believe that the historical approach and the empirical case 
studies offered in this book can also serve as a framework for understanding 
more recent developments and changes. What is needed in a period with 
dramatic social and political change is historical sensitivity and an open an-
alytical framework. Understanding the changing normative chartings of the 
‘Nordic model’ – its dualities – for example, allows us to better understand 
the changing use of ‘the Nordic model’ in recent US political debates.
With the election of Donald Trump, the use of the Nordic model in US 
political rhetoric changed. Obama’s positive narrative of countries ‘who 
punch above their weight’ and ‘the Nordic way’ (White House, 2016) 
stands in sharp contrast to Trump’s rhetoric of the Nordic Countries as 
dystopian pictures of violent and dysfunctional socialist states. At a rally 
in 2017, Trump said ‘look at what happened last night in Sweden,’ falsely 
implying that there had been a terror attack due to Swedish asylum poli-
tics (Chang, 2019). Likewise, The Trump White House published a report, 
‘The Opportunity Costs of Socialism’ in 2018 (Council of Economic Ad-
visors, 2018), framing the Nordic countries as cases demonstrating that 
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socialism leads to reduced living standards. In a similar vein, Fox News 
host Trish Regan characterized Denmark as a failed socialist state in line 
with Venezuela. However, this was not the only image of the Nordic model 
circulating in US political discourse. The progressive Democrat Bernie 
Sanders presented the Nordic model as a utopian model for the future of 
the United States during the primaries, where he used it as part of his pro-
gram for ‘democratic socialism.’ As socialist ideas, in various forms, seem 
to gain some popularity especially among younger cohorts in the United 
States and elsewhere, protagonists and antagonists will revisit historical 
experiences such as the Nordic experience, and this might well trigger also 
renewed interest in the historical heritage within the Nordic region. As we 
demonstrate in the book, these dystopian/utopian stereotypes have been a 
recurrent figure in American political discourse since the 1930s (see espe-
cially Chapters 2 and 4). Renewed debate serves as a rich reservoir also for 
contemporary observers and public actors and, like history, often repeats 
itself.
Other kinds of circulation and diffusion of the Nordic model have emerged 
because of Brexit. The Scottish Government, being against Brexit, saw the 
Nordic region as a way for Scotland to dissociate itself from England in a 
post-Brexit time. In a 2017 report titled ‘All points north,’ the Scottish gov-
ernment launched the idea of a ‘New North’ including Scotland in the Nor-
dic region due to the historical and political bonds between Scotland and 
the Nordics. Some have even argued that Scotland should leave the United 
Kingdom and seek to become members of the Nordic Council (Tømmer-
bakke, 2020).
In the Nordic region, the 2015 refugee crises and the 2020–2021 COVID-19 
pandemic brought the regional cohesion into question. Both events have led 
to a reactivation of border control and even closed borders. Historically, 
open borders and the Passport Union between the Nordic countries have 
symbolized the unity of the region. However, as the caravans of refugees 
from Syria came to the national borders, the Nordic nations took very dif-
ferent precautions (Brochmann, 2017). Denmark, bordering to continental 
Europe, reacted with anti-immigrant policies and closing of borders to pre-
vent refugees from entering the country. Internationally, this led to accusa-
tions of inhumane behavior, and Denmark faced the largest negative media 
storm since the 2005 Cartoon crisis (Mordhorst, 2016). Sweden took the al-
most opposite route, as its government perceived the situation as a human-
itarian crisis and consequently saw it as Sweden’s national duty to help the 
asylum-seekers.
Similarly, the COVID-19 pandemic challenged the image of Nordic unity. 
Sharing the same basic goal of securing public health and sheltering the 
population from downturns in the economy, the Nordic countries show di-
vergent responses to the pandemic, both in terms of strictness and the extent 
to which decisions have been delegated to agencies and the regional and lo-
cal level. Here, Sweden is the odd country out, scoring significantly lower on 
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strictness and higher on level of delegation. Sweden has avoided, to a large 
degree, the draconic lockdowns of schools, workplaces, and shops, which 
we find in the other Nordic countries. Also, the effects of the crisis differ in 
significant ways with Sweden’s much higher death rate, which have led the 
other Nordic countries to temporarily closing borders to Sweden in order 
to avoid ‘import infection.’ This, along with disagreements among experts, 
has provoked tensions within the Nordic region and confusion in interna-
tional media over what the ‘Nordic model’ signifies. The dominant image is 
Sweden as a highly problematic model, while the other Nordic countries are 
doing rather well.
As we demonstrate in the book, such internal Nordic divergence is noth-
ing fundamentally new. However, it is hard not to see that the highly diverse 
reactions to such external threats might challenge the basic idea of a Nordic 
model. It has been argued that part of problems for Nordic cooperation and 
coordination lately relates to an overemphasis on the promotion of Nor-
den as a brand rather than the earlier emphasis on dialogue and everyday 
cooperation (Strang, 2016). We find growing tensions around the use of the 
Nordic model as regional identity versus using it as brand. Illustrative in this 
respect is the heated debate around a SAS (Scandinavian Airline System)’s 
TV- commercial ‘What is truly Scandinavian?’ in February 2020, just before 
the Covid-19 crisis took off (SAS, 2020). The message in the controversial 
commercial is that things and traditions we claim to be of Scandinavian or-
igin are rather international phenomena that Scandinavians brought back 
from their journeys across the world and then improved and re-exported as 
‘Scandinavian.’ The commercial initiated a ‘shitstorm’ within the Nordic 
region where many found it disrespectful to Nordic heritage and history. 
‘What is truly Scandinavian?’ thus initiated two processes of circulation: 
One as brand-image for SAS, and another as a part of an internal Scandina-
vian discussion of values and identity.
The changes we have seen in the world order in the last few years have 
thus far not led to a discontinuation or decline in the circulation and dif-
fusion of ‘Nordic models.’ The models have been incorporated in new dis-
courses, in processes where some of the already known layers of meanings 
have been reactivated, and new elements added. The ambiguity of the Nor-
dic model, which makes it impossible to define once and for all, at the same 
time makes it a concept highly suitable for adaptions and survival. The 
pandemic, climate crisis, the quest for a more green economy, digitaliza-
tion and artificial intelligence, increasing inequality (global and national), 
and the challenges of transnational governance are just a few of the ma-
jor societal challenges that will change the world and the Nordic model. 
Clearly, it will not be the same as today, as the model of today, differs in 
significant ways from 30, 50, or 70 years earlier. Consequently, rather than 
asking what is the future of the Nordic model, it might be better to ask what 
is the future Nordic model?
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